Aguirre v. Sobrinos de Ezquiaga.

proceedings in any court of a state, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."

There is hardly a subject regarding the jurisdiction of courts of the United States that has resulted in so much contention as this, as shown by the efforts made by counsel to avoid the force of this act of Congress. It is enough to weary a person to even try to follow the decisions holding against the jurisdiction, save as therein specified. In fact, so far as we have examined the question, it appears to be doubtful if there ever was a case where the true and plain import of this act of Congress was successfully attacked. The efforts that have been made in that be half are often marvels of ingenuity. It may be but a backhanded compliment to counsel for complainant here, but the present incumbent of this bench can state that rarely has he over known such an able argument supported by a few close but distinguishable cases. From beginning to end, with all due respect, in our opinion, it is an effort exhibiting marvelous ingenuity and forceful ability to apply inapplicable decisions, to change settled law as to known facts.

It is fundamental in this country that a United States court will not enjoin or intermeddle with proceedings in a state (and, of course, by analogy, in a territorial or insular) court, where the latter has first, properly and legally, acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties. See note to Central Trust Co. v. Grantham, 27 C. C. A. 575; Riggs v. Johnson County (United States ex rel. Riggs v. Johnson County) 6 Wall. 195, 18 L. ed. 776; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, 38 L. ed. 981, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; Sharon v. Terry, 1 L.R.A. 572, 13 Sawy. 387, 36 Fed. 337; Note to Garner v. Second Nat. Bank, 16 C. C. A. 90; Leathe v. Thomas, 38 C. C. A. 75, 97 Fed. 136. There is apparently not a case in the books varying this rule,

Aguirre v. Sobrinos de Ezquiaga.

and every case cited by the able counsel for complainant here has some condition or fact connected with it that easily distinguishes it and clearly shows that it does not vary this well-known rule.

This complainant has had his day in court. We cannot imagine what could have been litigated between these same parties in the insular court, after respondents had succeeded in their contention that the contract between them was not a partnership, unless it was the determination of the proper balance due on the open account between the parties. It is incomprehensible that a presumably intelligent man, doing business on this island for some ten years as a merchant and coffee planter of considerable pretensions, who was sending in for thousands of dollars worth of goods almost daily to these defendants at San Juan, and presumably receiving from them a bill with every shipment of goods, and probably monthly statements of the account between the parties, showing credits given him for cash sent in and coffee received from day to day, should not have discov ered the fact that they had, during this time, defrauded him to the extent of $30,000. And if, as a matter of fact, he did not discover it, he is guilty of the grossest laches and negligence. In his complaint he does not make out any case of fraud, save by the mere fact of assuming and alleging it. He does not set out the particular items of coffee wherein the market price was different from that credited to him, although he files with his bill of complaint, as an exhibit, an immense account current between himself and the defendants during these years. If this cause of action can be maintained in this court at this time, we are absolutely incapable of seeing how it can be characterized as anything else than retrying here the only matter which could possibly have been in controversy between the same parties in the local court, after complainant was defeated in his efforts to

II. PORTO RICO.-10.

Aguirre v. Sobrinos de Ezquiaga.

show a partnership between the parties; that is, to retry the question of how much balance of account was due from him to the defendants here (plaintiffs there). With all due respect, no sort of sophistry can make anything else out of this proceeding, in our opinion.

An examination of this long account between the parties, filed as an exhibit here, shows that the complainant was indebted to the defendants about a month after the beginning of their dealings in February, 1893, in the sum of about $6,000. And balances were thereafter struck, according to the account, as follows, and each showed in round numbers the balances mentioned due from this complainant to the defendants, that is to say:

And during the interim between all of these periods, large transactions took place between the parties, often involving several hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Counsel for complainant contends that, while he might have a remedy in the local courts, because of the citizenship of the parties he has a perfect right to come into this court. The reply to this is, that it is as fundamental as that one court will not interfere with another, that a United States court will not entertain a bill of review as to matters which were litigated in a state

Aguirre v. Sobrinos de Ezquiaga.

court between the same parties. If this was a court such as they have in other territories, having the jurisdiction of a circuit and district court of the United States, as also chancery and common-law jurisdiction locally, and these matters had been litigated between these parties all in the same court, there might be some chance that a bill of review would be entertained if a proper showing could be made; but we contend that such a showing as is made here would not be sufficient even in that case.

The allegation of the complainant here (defendant in the other court) that he was wholly ignorant of the matters and things upon which the action here is founded, during that trial, is, as stated, almost unbelievable, and if we accept it as true, which we are willing to do, it shows him to be guilty of negligence and laches, as stated, against which not even a court of equity will relieve. He was there in that court to defend against an account on which he was sued, where the court could see and hear the witnesses and could pass upon the credibility to be given to them, and that is the forum where his defense ought to have been made, and it is presumed that he did make it there. If he did not, as is contended, it is his own fault. If he desired to invoke the equity jurisdiction of this court, he could have removed the cause here in the first instance. He chose his forum and he must abide its decision. Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. ed. 195; Beattie v. Wilkinson, 36 Fed. 646.

Sec. 147 of Story on Equity, cited by complainant, does not, in our opinion, sustain him; and wherever that and the succeeding sections of that work cited have any application, it will be found to be in state courts or United States courts where all the subject-matter is litigated, and does not touch the rule that a court receiving its powers from an entirely different source will

Aguirre v. Sobrinos de Ezquiaga.

not interfere with the proceedings in a court of concurrent jurisdiction getting its powers in another way.

The section from Eaton on Equity, cited by complainant, with reference to the good faith that should exist between parties standing in fiduciary relations to each other, is not, in our opinion, applicable here, because, from a careful reading of the contract between the parties, there was little or no relation between them save that of debtor and creditor, and it appears that the local court so found the fact to be.

The case of Davis v. Tileston, 6 How. 114, 12 L. ed. 366, is confidently cited by complainant. We do not think it is applicable at all, for the reason that it was an appeal from a United States court to the Supreme Court of the United States. It did not touch the question of the right of a United States court to enjoin or interfere with the proceedings in a state court. A citation in one of the notes to that case is instructive here:

"Unless complainant has an equitable defense of which he could not avail himself, or was prevented by fraud or accident, and not his own negligence, from availing himself of a legal defense at law, the court will not relieve;" citing Hendricksen v. Hinckley, 17 How. 443, 15 L. ed. 123.

"Merely to show that injustice has been done by the judg ment is not sufficient; it must appear that this resulted, notwithstanding the close attention and diligence of the complainant;" citing Cairo & F. R. Co. v. Titus, 27 N. J. Eq. 102, and many other citations.

The citation of § 507, vol. 2, of Freeman on Judgments, with all due respect, is not applicable, in our opinion, because it simply states the rule which is applicable in a court of equity in a suit for relief against an unconscionable judgment in a court of the same state, deriving its powers from the same source or sovereignty. And it is doubtful whether, even under the rule