Compagnies des Sucreries v. Iglesias. exchanging the repressive laws under which they formerly lived, for the personal liberty and freedom of speech guaranteed by the government of the United States, they must not fall into the error of construing liberty to mean license, and freedom as abolishing all restraints of law. On the contrary, their members should understand that the United States is pre-eminently a government of law, and that precisely the same law which protects the organization of labor unions and the right of labor to strike for a redress of grievances will be enforced by the government to safeguard and protect property and employers from intimidation, threats, or illegal interference. Should the leaders and promoters of labor unions of agricultural laborers neglect or evade the duty thus imposed upon them and assumed by them as officers and promoters of labor organizations, and fail to instruct their members on the necessity of observing the laws of property as laid down by the courts, the legal responsibility for the results of such disobedience will be visited on them. We cannot, therefore, too urgently impress upon these organizers and leaders of agricultural laborers that their actions and conduct in the matter of promoting and agitating strikes so often leading to disastrous consequences will be subject to severe scrutiny by the citizens of Porto Rico. It is again suggested as sentiments well worthy of being ever present in their minds and deliberations, the remarks already quoted, from President John Mitchell. The same, it is suggested, are equally as applicable to the agricultural laborers of Porto Rico as they are to the coal miners of Pennsylvania. It is deemed proper to also announce, whilst on the subject of the rights of labor organizations to inaugurate strikes, a right which, as stated, is well recognized by the law, that cases have arisen wherein, owing to the abuse of this right, courts of equity have not hesitated to exercise the right to restrain and enjoin a threatened strike. If labor organizations shall delib Compagnies des Sucreries v. Iglesias. erately in advance conspire and combine to plan an attack upon the property of employers, by combining and agreeing to call a general strike for the enforcement of unjust demands at a time or under conditions which must necessarily result in irreparable loss and injury to an employer and his property, courts will, on such complaint being established, interfere to prevent the threatened and irreparable loss. Justice Brewer, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in his celebrated lecture on "The Triumphs of Justice," speaking on the exercise of this power, states "that it is much better, much kinder, and more humane to enjoin the commission of acts which amount to crime than for those in authority to remain quiet until the acts are done, and then punish for crime, often ensnaring the ignorant and those driven to crime by others who have no concern except to show the authority of the nonresident boss." Porto Rico's wealth and resources are necessarily in her fertile soil, and the real basis of her prosperity will therefore be ever dependent upon agriculture. The varied industrial plants, trades, and occupations characterizing the great cities, industrial centers, coal regions, and mechanical occupations so general in the United States have no analogy, even in a small way, in the island of Porto Rico, where nine tenths of all labor is agricultural. The employers of these agricultural laborers are mostly the large sugar refineries, termed "centrals," which, in addition to grinding the sugar cane, are interested in the cultivation of sugar plantations, and in both capacities require labor. Since the American occupation of seven years ago, capital has been attracted to the island, and many new sugar plantations have been developed, and, as a result, the acreage of crops has been very largely increased and wages of labor have also been advanced. It is a hopeful and auspicious sign that the Porto Compagnies des Sucreries v. Iglesias. Rican agricultural laborer is ambitious to improve his condition and that of his family and children, promised through the aid and announced object of labor unions properly conducted. Organizers and members of labor unions may rest assured that the courts of the land organized for administering justice and equity will always be ready and willing to punish the violations of law or equity when committed by an employer, as promptly as they ever will be to assert a strong hand to restrain threatened injuries by the violent and illegal acts of striking employees. Finally, it is to be hoped that the law-abiding spirit exhibited by the leaders and organizers of the labor union in June last, when the temporary injunction was issued in the present case, in promptly obeying the summons of the court, will be repeated in the event of any future labor troubles, and that differences and conflicts necessarily arising will be settled and adjusted in the legal tribunals fixed by law for the proper determination of such questions. In this case, the decree pro confesso having been regularly entered and confirmed in open court, and no showing having been made of a meritorious defense, it is accordingly ordered that a final decree making perpetual the temporary restraining order heretofore granted be prepared and entered herein. Arroyo y Bonilla v. Arrese y Zelaya. RAFAEL ARROYO Y BONILLA v. ESTEBAN ARRESE Y ZELAYA. San Juan, Equity, No. 226. 1. A bill of review to set aside a final decree for error apparent on the face of the record is entitled to be filed as a matter of right, and must be so filed within the time allowed by law for the taking of an appeal from such final decree. Where a petition to file such a bill of review is filed, and the bill of review simply tendered to the court with such petition before the expiration of the period allowed for appeal, but such petition remains pending without action until after the expiration of such period, the petition must be denied. 2. Where defendant makes no answer to a bill in equity, and thus no issue is raised, the matter of the bill may be decreed according to its allegations, without the necessity of oral proof at a formal hearing. 3. In order to authorize the filing of a bill of review, it must contain allegations showing either error of law apparent on the face of the record of the suit in which final decree was rendered, or newly discovered evidence shown not to have been obtainable by due diligence before the entry of the final decree. The allegation of matters clearly within the knowledge of the complaining party before such final entry is not sufficient. : 4. Where a discrepancy is alleged between the record as entered and signed by the court and dockets or other memoranda kept in the clerk's office, and such discrepancy is made the basis of a bill of review, the record proper as signed by the judge is conclusive; and such a question cannot be raised by bill of review. Opinion filed December 18, 1905. F. H. Dexter, Esq., solicitor for complainant. Arroyo y Bonilla v. Arrese y Zelaya. N. B. K. Pettingill, Esq., solicitor for defendant. MCKENNA, Judge, delivered the following opinion: This cause has been argued and submitted on a petition for leave to file a bill of review. The bill of review is marked tendered in the clerk's office on October 21, 1903, and does not appear to have been called up until May of the present year. The bill of review seeks to have set aside a final decree entered in the equity case of Esteban Arrese versus Rafael Arroyo y Bonilla, on November 19, 1901, on the ground that it appears from the clerk's docket and memoranda in the clerk's office that the same was not delivered until November 30, 1901, when there was no session of court, and that the court was at that time without authority to render said decree. By law, two years is allowed from the date of a judgment to file a bill of review. This bill was not filed within such time, and in fact has not yet been filed, although more than four years have clapsed since the entry of said judginent. The petition would have to be denied upon this ground. Aside, however, from the fact of failure to file the bill in time, and in fact failure to file it at all, the court has examined the said bill as tendered, and finds it does not come up to the requirements indispensable to a bill of review. The bill fails to aver error of law or any error apparent on the face of the record. Neither does it contain averments of newly discovered evidence not obtainable by due diligence before final entry of decree. Al the facts alleged were clearly within the knowledge of defendant in said original suit in time to have been raised and passed upon before entry of final decree. The amounts as liquidated in the decree correspond with the mortgage notes. NOTE. As to when a bill of review will lie, see note to Shelton v. Van Kleeck, 27 L. ed. U. S. 269. |