Vallecillo y Mandry v. Bertran.

bers of the bar and citizens of Porto Rico, the general character of which communications is set forth in an extract from a letter of Mr. F. H. Dexter, a member of the bar at San Juan, and the extract is set out. There is nothing in the extract from Mr. Dexter's letter that throws any light whatsoever upon the question at bar.

But in looking over the report of the hearings had before the House committee on insular affairs, on this very subject, in the 56th Congress, it appears (p. 178, report) that the bar of Porto Rico did make a direct and strong effort to broaden the jurisdiction of this court as is here contended for by complainants, because the chairman of the committee states that a clause in the original draft of the bill sent to him from Porto Rico, speaking of the jurisdiction, provided that it should extend to all cases "wherein either a citizen of the United States or a citizen or subject of any foreign government or sovereign is a necessary party upon either side of the controversy." And it appears on same page, from the evidence of Mr. Abbott, a member of the Porto Rico bar, who was there testifying before the House committee, that the original draft of the proposed amendment on this question, made by a committee of the Porto Rico bar, used the language, "extend to and embrace controversies where a citizen of the United States or a citizen or subject of a foreign. state or government is a necessary party, etc." Yet, notwithstanding all this, the amendment was passed in its present form.

But it is plain from the language of the amendment itself, that the jurisdiction given is in addition to what the court before possessed. The act further states that this additional jurisdiction "shall extend to and embrace controversies where the parties or either of them are," etc. Now, this in and of itself is ordinary and plain language, and requires us only to understand

Vallecillo y Mandry v. Bertran.

what is meant by or comprehended in the words "parties" and "either."

The best definition of the word "parties" as used in a suit in equity, that we have been able to find, is contained in Rawle's Revision of Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 2, p. 578, and is as follows: "The person who seeks a remedy in chancery by suit, commonly called the plaintiff, or complainant, and the person against whom the remedy is sought, usually denominated the defendant, or respondent, are the parties to a suit in equity."

As to the word "either," the best definition we can find is in the Century Dictionary, vol. 3, p. 1857, where it is defined as "being one or the other of two, taken indifferently, or as the case requires; referring to two units or particulars of a class."

In the case at bar, "either" refers to "parties," and if the latter word includes collectively all co-complainants and all codefendants it would seem to follow that they all must be of the class required; that is, either citizens of the United States or citizens or subjects of a foreign state or states.

It is useless to quote authorities in support of the well-known proposition that, where a law is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms, no room is left for construction; and that there can be no construction where there is nothing to construe; because construction is reserved for doubtful language.

These statements are made because, in the light of the rule laid down in Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 33 L. ed. 635, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303, the language of the amendment in question is plain and unambiguous. If any other effect than that admitted by the respondents here was to be given to the act, it would have been an easy matter for Congress, instead of the language used, to have employed other and more specific words, such as, "where any of the litigants are citizens of the United States or citizens or subjects of a foreign state or states."

Vallecillo y Mandry v. Bertran.

The amendment in question, restricted as to its exact terms as contended for by respondents, still gives the court large additional jurisdiction over what it before possessed. To construe it as contended for by complainants would be to aid it by intendment, and to depart from sound rules of construction. This the court is not willing to do.

The demurrer is therefore overruled, with costs, the plea sustained, and the bill will be dismissed, unless the complainants modify their bill to conform to this opinion.

JOHN D. H. LUCE, Survivor, ET AL.

บ.

MULLENHOFF & KORBER ET AL.

San Juan, Equity, No. 377.

1. The court has jurisdiction of a case on the ground of diverse citizenship, in which Porto Ricans are parties defendant only.

2. A demurrer to a bill charging fraud and conspiracy will not be sustained when it appears that the proceeding is directed at the parties, and not at judgments and decrees already entered by the insular courts.

3. In cases of fraud, the provisions of local laws cannot be used to defeat or limit the equity powers of the Federal courts.

4. The provisions of the Porto Rican laws prescribing the conditions under which corporations can sue and be sued in Porto Rico have no applications to associations other than corporations.

5. This court, as a court of equity, if it possesses jurisdiction on other grounds, will, in cases within the principles of equity, grant relief, notwithstanding that by the peculiar construction of the local laws the same proceedings could not be maintained in the local courts.

6. Defendants may have a rule for costs.

Order filed August 13, 1906.

Luce v. Mullenhoff & Korber.

Francis H. Dexter, Esq., solicitor for plaintiffs.

Cay. Coll y Cuchi, Esq., and Herminio Diaz, Esq., solicitors for defendants.

Order by RODEY, Judge:

This cause comes before the court at this time upon a demurrer to the bill of complaint, which was recently fully argued before the court, and thereafter ably supported by elaborate written arguments and briefs, by the respective counsel, to which careful attention has been given.

The first point made in the demurrer is: (a) That it appears from the face of the bill of complaint that the court has no jurisdiction because of the citizenship of the parties. This point is not well taken. It appears from the bill itself that Porto Ricans are parties defendant only, and that point has been decided against defendants' contention in the case of Vallecillo y Mandry v. Bertran, ante, 46, in this court. And (b) that the whole bill does not set forth any equity, and that it is an attempt to interfere with a judgment or decree of a local district court, duly entered, and with the operations of the mortgage law and registry of property, etc. The court has examined the bill with some care, and is free to confess that, if its allegations are true, it sets out a most unusual case of fraud and conspiracy against the rights of the complainants, that it would be impossible, in the opinion of the court, to have corrected anywhere save in a court of equity possessing the fullest powers of a chancellor. The court is further of the opinion that it cannot be said, at this stage of this proceeding, whether or not the suit will of necessity interfere in any manner with the judgment or decree of the district court referred to, or that it will operate other than

Luce v. Mullenhoff & Korber.

upon the parties to the alleged fraud, and upon property now in their hands under the alleged fraudulent decrees by which they obtained it.

The further statement in this subhead of the demurrer, that the bill is an attempt to interfere with the mortgage law of Porto Rico, which of necessity was a part of the contract entered into between the defendants at the time of the making of certain mortgages mentioned in the bill, is not well taken, either. The answer to it is that fraud of the grossest kind is alleged, which, as alleged, did not come to the knowledge of the complainants for some considerable time after the consummation of all the proceedings in the local court. Fraud vitiates everything, and no court can correct frauds as well as a court of equity. If the facts of this bill are true-which remains to be proved after answer and issue joined-it is impossible to see how the complainants could have any remedy at law that would be at all adequate.

The second ground of demurrer is that none of the plaintiffs have complied with the requisites prescribed in the corporation laws of Porto Rico to entitle them to sue or be sued in this island. There is nothing in the description of the complainants, as set out in the bill, to show that any of them are corporations, but, on the contrary, it appears they are all firms or individuals, and therefore this point is not well taken. If any of them were corporations of any state of the United States, it is doubtful if any local requirement restricting their right to sue in the courts would be constitutional. They would have the same right to sue as any other citizen of the United States, irrespective of any local law.

Whenever, according to the received principles of equity, a cause for equitable relief is stated, and a case where fraud of the character alleged in this bill appears certainly comes within