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well as “local" lawmaking, and thus it conforms to the Thompson view on “home rule.”

The reference in 324(a) to the "reserved powers of the Congress as provided in section 324(d)” does not detract from the comprehensiveness of the grant since it is designed to reserve appropriate congressional control. Section 324(d) reads as follows:

The Congress of the United States reserves the right, at any time, to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District of Columbia, by enacting legislation for the District on any subject, whether within or without the scope of legislative power granted to the District Council by this Act, including without limitation legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District of Columbia prior to or after the enactment of this Act' or any provision of this Act.

This section is designed to insure that ultimate control remains in Congress. Such control is necessary to conform to the "exclusive" jurisdiction vested in Congress by the Constitution. This ultimate authority must of necessity be in Congress, and it is submitted that it would exist even in the absence of section 324(d). The authority of Congress to change or even to supersede any legislation by subsequent enactment on the same subject is elementary, and pertains to "home rule" legislation and its by-products as well as to any other enactment. Although thus declaratory of existing power, section 324 (d) seems to be warranted since its explicitness removes all doubt and may serve as a constant reminder to the District assembly that the Congress has the ultimate power over legislation in the District.

In view of the above it is clear that H.R. 1002 as it pertains to the “home rule” aspects of this paper is proper and achieves the maximum of "home rule" for the District. It provides for an elective assembly to enact "general laws" subject to the reserved authority of Congress.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Davis. We thank you for your views on this legislation.

Are there any questions of Mr. Roosevelt? If not, we thank you very much. We will now insert in the record a statement from Mr. H. S. Garber,

a counsel, House District of Columbia Committee to Hon. John Bell Williams.

(The statement referred to follows :)

MEMORANDUM ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. THOMPSON COMPANY (346 U.S. 100

(MARCH 8, 1953)) AS RELATED TO HOME RULE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

To: Hon. John Bell Williams.
From: H. S. Garber, counsel, House District of Columbia Committee.

Advocates of home rule in Senate debates and in House hearings urge that the language of the Supreme Court in its opinion in this case (p. 109) upholds the constitutionality of delegation of full legislative power to a legislative assembly for the District of Columbia.

Criminal proceedings on an information were brought against the Thompson Co. for refusing service to three Negroes in one of its restaurants in violation of the District of Columbia Legislative Assembly acts of June 20, 1872, and June 26, 1873.

The District of Columbia municipal court quashed the information on the ground of implied repeal of the above acts by the organic act of June 11, 1878 (20 Stat. 102), enacted by Congress. On appeal the municipal court of appeals held that the 1872 and 1873 acts were valid on enactment and that the former as applying to restaurants had been repealed but that the latter act was still in effect. The court dismissed the count on the 1872 act and reversed the municipal court on the other counts. (81 A. 2d 249) Cross appeal to the U.S. Court Appeals for the District of lumbia res Ited in a decis th the acts were unenforceable and dismissed the entire information.

Certiorari was granted to the U.S. Supreme Court where an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas reversed the lower court. Two conclusions of law supported its decision. First conclusion (p. 110)

"We conclude that the Congress had the authority under article I, section 8, clause 17, of the Constitution, to delegate its lawmaking authority to the legislative assembly of the municipal corporation which was created by the organic act of 1871, and that the rightful subjects of legislation' within the meaning of section 18 of that act was as broad as the police power of a State so as to include a law prohibiting discriminations against Negroes by the owners and managers of restaurants in the District of Columbia.” Second conclusion (p. 112)

“We conclude, however, that they were saved from repeal by the third exception clause quoted above." Decisions (p. 117)

"We have said that the acts of 1872 and 1873 survived the intervening changes in the government of the District of Columbia and are presently enforcible. We would speak more accurately if we said that the 1873 act survived."

It must be noted that the decision of the Court did not determine anything directly on the question of the constitutionality of home rule. Further, the second conclusion is wholly unrelated to the problem of home rule.

Finally, the first conclusion may be significant on the question of the power of Congress to delegate lawmaking to a local legislature in the District of Columbia only after examination of the substance of the Court's findings as related to

1. A “municipal” corporation, as contemplated by Congress;

2. The meaning of “rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution";

3. The provisions of section 18 of the act of 1873; 4. The nature of police powers of a State; 5. Court decisions involving the constitutionality of the act of 1873; and

6. The intent of the scope of delegation of legislative power by the Congress as found in the act, committee reports, and debates of the Congress.

COURT DICTUM

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But the proponents of home rule do not find support in the decision or conclusions reached by the Court. They choose to rely on dictum of the Court on page 109, as follows:

“It would seem then that on the analogy of the delegation of powers of selfgovernment and home rule both to municipalities and Territories there is no constitutional barrier to the delegation by Congress to the District of Columbia of full legislative power, subject, of course, to constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking is subservient and subject also to the power of Congress at any time to revise, alter, or revoke the authority granted." (Italics supplied.)

The Court makes no positive statement. Even if the statement were positive. the result is the same. It ventures no further than to say, "It would seem.” This statement adds no single word of support to the proponents of "home rule.” If anything, it leaves the question of home rule in the District of Columbia precisely where it was before the decision was handed down. The real substance of this statement extracted from the Court's observation is : "It would seem *** there is no constitutional barrier to the delegation by Congress to the District of Columbia of full legislative power, subject, of course, to constitutional limitation * * * "

The statement also adds the clause "and subject also to the power of Congress at any time to revise, alter, or revoke the authority granted." This entire statement, put in simple language, is “Congress can delegate legislative authority in the District of Columbia only within the limits stated in the Constitution and may revoke such authority at any time.”

In the paragraphs immediately preceding the dictum relied upon by proponents of home rule, the Court treats the subject of home rule in the States.

The Court quotes from Metropolitan Railway Company v. District of Columbia (132 U.S. 1):

“Crimes committed in the District are not crimes against the District, but against the United States. Therefore, whilst the District may, in a sense, be called a State, it is such in a very qualified "sense."

The Court then observes that the powers exercised by Congress in the District of Columbia are not only national powers but also those of a State (Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141).

The Court then states :

“There is no reason why a State, if it so chooses, may not fashion its basic law so as to grant home rule or self-government to its municipal corporations."

Citing the case of Barnes v. District of Columbia (91 U.S. 540, 544), construing the organic act of 1871 to the effect that:

“A municipal corporation in the exercise of all its duties, including those most strictly local or internal is but a department of the State. The legislature may give it all the powers such a being is capable of receiving, making it a miniature State within a locality."

Whereupon the Court observes that the foregoing is the theory which underlies the constitutional provisions of some States allowing cities to have home rule.

Then follows the summary or clincher statement.

“So it is that decision after decision has held that the delegated power of municipalities is as broad as the police power of the State, except as that power may be restricted by the terms of the grant or by the State constitution." (Italic supplied.]

This is masterful reasoning. It is sound constitutional law. The Court has concluded that a State in delegating home-rule powers to a municipality may grant as broad powers as the State possesses escept as restricted by the terms of the State constitution.

The Court has now developed a clear analogy on which rests its dictum cited by the proponents of home rule. The analogy is that just as a State may grant municipal home rule, except as that power may be restricted by the state constitution, so similarly the Congress may grant home rule in the District of Columbia except as limited by the Constitution.

Mr. Davis. Our next witness is Mr. Fred Schwengel, author of House bill 4640.

We will be glad to have your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRED SCHWENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Chairman, colleagues, and members of the committee, I want to assure you it is a pleasure to have this opportunity to appear before you this morning to give you the benefit of my thinking on this important matter that is before the committee at this time. I might add that I have been thinking on this subject for a long, long time, long before I became a Member of the U.S. Congress. It has always been sort of a mystery to me to note that we have not done a better job in recognizing people who are loyal, and who, I think, are good citizens and deserve and do not have the right to have voice in government.

The last person to testify before your committee last week was Mrs. Louckheim, a charming lady and a member of the Democratic Central Committee of the District. While I agree with the position she took on the question of home rule, I want to assure the committee I am not in complete agreement with her on all she said. For instance, she, like all those who appeared that day, kept referring to the need for a democratic representation. I think that I know what she meant. What they meant was to give the citizens of the District the right to elect representatives to represent them in local government and some in the Federal Government. So, what they were speaking for was representative government, and according to Webster's Dictionary, and others that I have checked, I find that that means republican government-Thorndike Barnhart's Comprehensive Desk Dictionary says: 1. of a republic; like that of a republic. 3. Favoring a republic. 1. a person who favors a republic.

The definition of republic is: nation or state in which the citizens elect representatives to manage the govern

ment.

So I reiterate what I think we are working for, those of us who are representing this cause—a representative government for the District, or a republican form of government.

Mr. Davis. If the gentleman will pardon an interruption there, I am glad you have given some thought to the fact that we do live in a republic. So many people this day and age seem to have reached the mistaken conclusion that the United States of America is a democracy and not a republic.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. And further, if I may suggest, our forefathers always spoke of this Government as a republican form of government, and since so much has been said about what our forefathers thought and said about so many matters, I think it is good for us to note that too.

Mrs. Louckheim also assured you that the other day that the next administration would be won by the Democratic Party. I understood her to say that while she did not think they would need the vote of the District to do that she did want to have the right to vote in the next election. I take issue with her on the prospects of the next election and point out that maybe the urgency of this legislation is such that unless we get it now we probably will not get it in a Democratic administration for that seems to have been the record.

Mr. BROYHILL. None of the legislation that is before us will provide for a vote for President and Vice President for the people of the District of Columbia.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I understand that that is true.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is not that the problem before the Committee on the Judiciary?

Can the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, who has been one of our most loyal workers trying to help the District of Columbia, tell me why in the world that committee does not give these people a hearing on that bill?

Mr. BROYHILL. I have been asking for a hearing on those two resolutions for the past 3 years. I have been promised hearings repeat

3 edly, but somehow or other the very heavy schedule of the Committee on the Judiciary has prohibited them from getting around to it. That is the only answer that I can give.

Mr. MATTHEWs. Thank you.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. The political status of the District of Columbia is an anomaly in the United States of America. As the principal seat of the government of the greatest and finest system of representative government on earth, the city of Washington ought to be the showcase for both the complete expression and the practical application of our beliefs in a government of, by, and for all the people.

This is not the case. In fact, tragically, just the opposite is true. The government of the District is now, and has been for 80 years or so, what might be called, for lack of a better term, a sort of benevolent and paternalistic one. Whatever its virtues are, the theory and practice of a great republic are not among them. It is, rather, a mockery of those elements of the fine traditions that we have for so long cherished and practiced in this country.

What I have just said is, of course, not new. I claim no originality for these views. They have been stated and restated many times in the past. But they describe a fundamental weakness and a basic contradiction of a way of life in this Nation. I make no apologies for repeating these arguments. They ought to be put forth over and over again until Congress, which is the only organization that can do anything about it, restores self-government and self-respect to the residents of the District of Columbia.

We now have the opportunity, and if we do not take advantage of it we shall, I believe, have betrayed one of the finest traditions we possess—the tradition of self-government by a free people.

The substance of representative government has been expressed and defined and refined in many superb and moving passages in literature of America.

Mr. McMILLAN. I am certain that you realize the District of Columbia is a Federal site. The District of Columbia is really not a city; it is a Federal site. Is that not correct?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. It was certainly selected as the seat of government by the Federal Government.

Mr. McMILLAN. What is the difference between this Federal site and Fort Belvoir and Fort Meade? Do you want to give them a city government ?

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