Mr. WARNER. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. LOSER. You are moving rapidly. Go ahead.

Mr. WARNER. Yes, sir, I am moving rapidly because we have to face the facts. Some people do not want to face the facts. Mr. MATTHEWS. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. WARNER. Has Mr. Loser had a chance to read the 1871 act? Mr. LOSER. Not too carefully.

Mr. WARNER. We are really getting into the guts of it at that point because it is not until 1871

Mr. LOSER. That is the territorial one.

Mr. WARNER. That is territory, which has never been ruled unconstitutional.

Mr. LOSER. These bills are not territorial?

Mr. WARNER. The early ones are not, but the point is that the reason for pointing out what happened was that Madison in the Federalist Papers said, of course, we are going to have a local self-government, and we did, and he signed the bill in 1812. That is the point. The intention of the Founding Fathers was carried through and has always been carried through until 1878. In 1871 you come to the general delegation in the territorial form of government.

If the Congress has not passed anything that is more comprehensive than 1871, it is only because it has not passed the bill we are testifying about. I put into the record a number of Supreme Court cases today to make it perfectly clear-I ask the members of the committee to read those cases-make it perfectly clear that the power of Congress to delegate local self-government powers to the District is exactly the same as the power of the territories. You have two cases in the record. I commend to Mr. Loser the suggestion that he read the record on those cases. There are two or three Supreme Court cases I put in on exactly that point. The Congress has exactly the same power to delegate legislative authority, subject to recall, over the District that it does in the territories.

We might be considering that maybe the Constitution does not mean quite what it used to mean. Certainly, the Founding Fathers meant it to mean what I said it did, and I think to clear that point up we ought to put in the quote from Scott v. Sanford and the State of South Carolina v. The United States in which the Supreme Court has said, as it has done on many occasions in the past, that this Constitution means what the fellows said it meant in 1787.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Warner, let me say this. The previous reporter told me if we make an official part of the record the very interesting information you give us, it is going to make the record very voluminous. What we are going to do is make many of these statements a part of the official files of this committee where the committee will have the advantage of reading them, but I hope you will understand that we cannot put all of the information in the record. It will make it too voluminous.

Mr. WARNER. I suppose that is a budgetary question, sir. I sort of hoped the entire record was, as is usually the case, available to the public when printed. If it is not possible to get enough money to print this record, I am sure that a good many of us will be glad to appear before whatever committees are necessary to urge a supple

mentary appropriation. I think this is a matter of considerable importance. It is one of the most important bills ever to come before this committee. If there is any difficulty in getting enough money to print this entire record

Mr. MATTHEWS. I do not believe it will be necessary. What the gentleman will have to reserve to the chairman, I think, is the privilege accorded to every chairman to submit these matters as a part of the record insofar as is practically possible. I would like the gentleman to know sometimes I have heard witnesses with this much information (indicating several bound volumes) as part of their testimony. As long as I have anything to do with matters of this kind, I do not intend to unnecessarily burden the record. It may be possible to include everything. We will make every effort to do so.

Mr. WARNER. In deference to that, let me change what I was about to say. I was about to ask you to incorporate some matter which has just appeared in the Congressional Record into the record, but let me simply request that a cross-reference be incorporated as a part of the record.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. WARNER. I request the privilege of having these documents available not only to members of the committee but to members of the public. I believe you will find that this puts together a cohesive statement. I would like the record to reflect the fact that the Congressional Record for August 20 of this year at page 15245 contains a useful statement of the constitutional situation put into the record by Congressman Reuss. I was going to ask the committee to incorporate it, but

Mr. MATTHEWs. In that connection, the Congressional Record is a part of the public record. Why do you not just make some kind of statement about the fact that that appeared and anybody who is interested can read it. That will help us.

May I make that suggestion. Try to help us and refer to these things and do not ask that they be made part of the record unless you feel it absolutely necessary.

Mr. WARNER. It is not necessary. I believe my statement now in the record is sufficient. I have the page number, and so on.

(The matter referred to above consisting of the reference to the decision in State of South Carolina v. United States, and Scott v. Sanford, and the Congressional Record material is to be found in the files of the committee.)

Mr. WARNER. Despite lingering doubts which I detect among some members of the committee they have been very courteous to methe problem is purely a political one. That is all it is; that is all it is. There is no constitutional question. You can create one, of course. Sure, I can create a constitutional question out of anything. Let us not use the Constitution as a whipping boy for this one. This is a political problem. That is all it is.

It takes political guts to resolve it. It takes political guts by the citizens of the District to come up here and say that we would like to have our part, our small but important part, in working with the Congress over the next-God knows, I hope a thousand years in making this thing tick.

It takes political guts to decide and we have not decided yetwhether we want to do it or not, whether we have the guts to do it. That can be done only by this referendum in article 14. It takes political guts for you gentlemen to pass it. It is a tough one.

Mr. MCMILLAN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. McMillan.

Mr. MCMILLAN. Where does politics enter into this subject?

Mr. WARNER. Not in the party sense, sir; in the sense of the art of the possible.

Mr. MCMILLAN. I do not think we will lose a vote or gain a vote whether we vote for or against this bill.

Mr. WARNER. I do not mean in the partisan sense of being reelected. I mean in the sense of a political decision, in the sense that politics means how to make things work. I am not talking about it as the effect that it will have the next time any of you gentlemen come up for election.

Mr. MCMILLAN. You mentioned political guts. I do not know what you mean when you make this statement.

Mr. WARNER. It takes sometimes political guts to pass things some people do not want passed. If your constituents have not asked you to vote against this bill

Mr. MCMILLAN. They take my judgment on proposed legislation. Mr. WARNER. If they have not taken a position on this bill, then let us pass it. Gentlemen, thank you for your courtesy.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Thank you very much. I believe Mr. Harmon has a question.

Mr. HARMON. I have never received the first letter or communication from anyone in my district in regard to this, one way or another. Mr. WARNER. I am very glad to hear this. This relieves my mind enormously. Let us report out the bill. I am sure you gentlemen will all get reelected by a heavy majority, and I hope you do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Loser.

Mr. LOSER. I would like to say to Mr. Warner that he has made a very exhaustive and undoubtedly comprehensive statement about his position on home rule, and I am sure he is a very fine lawyer and is enjoying great success in the practice of his profession in the District of Columbia. You certainly should because you have demonstrated to me that you have made a great study on this subject.

Mr. WARNER. The only measure that a lawyer can really use to judge whether he has done a good job or not is the degree of persuasion with which he has accomplished his purpose.

Gentlemen, I ask you again, please report out this bill.

Mr. LOSER. I am wondering if you have heard that passage in Holy Writ when the Apostle Paul appeared before King Agrippa, making his defense, and King Agrippa said I am almost persuaded. You have been most persuasive.

Mr. WARNER. Good. All I ask is that this committee not do what Pontius Pilate did and wash its hands.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. McMillan.

Mr. MCMILLAN. I would like to state, Mr. Warner, as far as this being political, I do not know of anything political about this bill at all. When I was in high school taking civil government, I learned at that time that this was one of the responsibilities of the Congress,

to legislate for the District of Columbia. We are just carrying out our duties here as Members of Congress.

Mr. WARNER. I am sorry you were not here because I think it is pretty well spelled out. I am very sorry you were not here. If I had known you were coming, maybe I would have put that part off until you got here.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I want to compliment you on your statement. It has been a long time since I heard reference made to the theory that all things consist of rights, powers, duties, and privileges. The trouble arises when we try to differentiate among them.

I take judicial knowledge of the fact that the Supreme Court has changed its position on many questions.

Mr. MATTHEWs. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Mr. Warner, we thank you very much. You have been very patient with us and have given us a very fine piece of testimony.

Mr. WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The following citations were filed with the committee by Mr. Warner:)

Excerpt from Murphy v. Ramsey (114 U.S. 15, 5 S. Ct. 747 (1885)) (upholding the power of the Congress to prohibit voting by bigamy in the Territory of Utah):

"The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of the national territories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants. In the exercise of this sovereign dominion they are represented by the government of the United States, to whom all the powers of government over that subject have been delegated, subject only to such restrictions as are expressed in the constitution, or are necessarily implied in its terms, or in the purposes and objects of the power itself; for it may well be admitted in respect to this, as to every power of society over its members, that it is not absolute and unlimited. But in ordaining government for the territories, and the people who inhabit them, all the discretion which belongs to legislative power is vested in congress; and that extends, beyond all controversy, to determining by law, from time to time, the form of the local government in a particular territory, and the qualification of those who shall administer it. It rests with congress to say whether, in a given case, any of the people resident in the territory shall participate in the election of its officers or the making of its law; and it may, therefore, take from them any right of suffrage it may previously have conferred, or at any time modify or abridge it, as it may deem expedient."

Excerpt from U.S. v. McMillan, et al. (165 U.S. 504, 17 S. Ct. 395 (1897)) (relating to act of Congress regulating fees in territorial courts). Gray, J. for the Court:

"But it is equally indubitable that Congress, having the entire dominion and sovereignty, National and municipal, Federal and State, over the territories of the United States, so long as they remain in the territorial condition, may itself directly legislate for any territory, or may extend the laws of the United States over it, in any particular that Congress may think fit. As said by Chief Justice Waite, speaking for this Court: 'Congress may not only abrogate laws of the territorial legislatures, but it may itself legislate directly for the local government. It may make a void act of the territorial legislature valid, and a valid act void. In other words, it has full and complete legislative authority over the people of the territories and all the departments of the territorial governments. It may do for the territories what the people, under the Constitution of the United States, may do for the States.'"

Excerpt from Binns v. United States (194 U.S. 486, 24 S. Ct. 816 (1904)). "It must be remembered that Congress, in the government of the territories as well as of the District of Columbia, has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution; that the form of government it shall establish is not prescribed, and may not necessarily be the same in all the territories. We are accustomed to that generally adopted for the territories, of a quasi

State government, with executive, legislative, and judicial officers, and a legislature endowed with the power of local taxation and local expenditures; but Congress is not limited to this form. In the District of Columbia it has adopted a different mode of government, and in Alaska still another. It may legislate directly in respect to the local affairs of a territory, or transfer the power of such legislation to a legislature elected by the citizens of the territory. It has provided in the District of Columbia for a Board of three Commissioners, who are the controlling officers of the District. It may intrust to them a large volume of legislative power, or it may, by direct legislation, create the whole body of statutory law applicable thereto. For Alaska, Congress has established a government of a different form. It has provided no legislative body, but only executive and judicial officers. It has enacted a penal and civil code * * *. "The power of Congress, legislating as a local legislature for the District, to levy taxes for District purposes only, in like manner as the legislature of a State may tax the people of a State for State purposes, was expressly admitted, and has never since been doubted."

Excerpt from Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98 (1954)) (in part, upholding the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945). Douglas, J. for the Court:

"The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a State may exercise over its affairs. See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co. (346 U.S. 100, 108, 73 S. Ct. 1007, 1011, 97 L. Ed. 1480). We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia, see Block v. Hirsh (256 U.S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865), or the States legislating concerning local affairs."

Excerpt from Keyes v. U.S. (119 F. 2d 444 (C.A.D.A., 1941)) (relating to the constitutionality of an act of Congress relating to the District of Columbia Alley Dwelling Authority). Groner, C. J. for the Court:

"(The law relating to the power of the United States to condemn property in one of the States) *** has no relevancy to a proceeding begun by the United States in the District of Columbia, for in that District Congress has plenary legislative power-all the power that a State has within the territory of the State, and more (cf. Neild v. District of Columbia (71 App. D.C. 306, 110 F. 2d 246)), and there can be no doubt that a State legislature may validly provide for low-rent housing projects and authorize the condemnation of land for that purpose."

Excerpt from Cohen v. Virginia (Va. 1821, 6 Wheat. 418, 5 L. Ed. 257).

"The opinion of the Federalist has always been considered as of great authority. It is a complete commentary on our Constitution; and is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth. Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank; and the part two of its authors performed in framing the Constitution put it very much in their power to explain the views with which it was framed. These essays having been published while the Constitution was before the Nation for adoption or rejection, and having been written in answer to objections founded entirely on the extent of its powers, and on its diminution of State sovereignty, are entitled to the more consideration where they frankly avow that the power objected to is given, and defend it.”

Excerpt from Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (158 U.S. 601, 15 S. Ct. R. 912 (1895)) (unconstitutionality of income tax, on ground that certain such taxes are direct taxes). Fuller, C. J. for the Court (15 S. Ct. R., 916).

"What was decided in the Hylton case was, then, that a tax on carriages was an excise, and therefore an indirect tax. The contention of Mr. Madison in the House was only so far disturbed by it that the Court classified it where he himself would have held it constitutional, and he subsequently, as President, approved a similar act (3 Stat. 40). The contention of Mr. Hamilton in the Federalist was not disturbed by it in the least. In our judgment, the construction given to the Constitution by the authors of the Federalist (the five numbers contributed by Chief Justice Jay related to the danger from foreign force and