"Extensive efforts during the past year were made by the Services to validate the quality of contractor management systems through application of Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC). To date, over 80 contractors involved in major acquisition programs have received validation. Complementing this effort is the implementation of Contractor Cost Data Reporting (CCDR) including a special overhead monitoring program for selected large procurements. CCDR is a critical part of our efforts to improve the quality of both initial cost estimates and of the estimated costs to. completion of ongoing programs. CCDR is essential for accumulating actual defense contractor direct and indirect costs, and using these actual costs for projecting estimates to complete our current programs and projecting the costs on new programs. "Important revisions in both the format and coverage of the quarterly Selected Acquisition Reports have been made after extensive negotiation with Congressional and GAO users of this information. Though our efforts have not resulted in unanimous agreement on the quality of the final product, we have established a better mechanism for explaining the impact of inflation on program costs. We are, on a continuing basis, examining SAR user suggestions for improvements to the system. Reading List 1. 2. 3. Bauer, T. W. and Yoshpe, H. B. Defense Organization and Baumgartner, John S. The Lonely Warriors, Case of the 4. Brownlout, Cecil. 5. "Inflation Threatens U. S. Defense Posture." Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 7, 1974, pp. 14-15. Cleland, D. I. and King, W. R. Systems Analysis and Project 6. Enke, Stephen. Defense Management. Prentice-Hall, 1967. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 7. 8. Hovey, H. A. The Planning - Programming- Budgeting Approach New York: Praeger, 1968. Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1970. 9. McNamara, R. S. The Essence of Security. New York: 10. 11. 12. 13. Melman, Seymour. The Defense Economy; conversion of Quade, E. S. and Boucher, E. I. Systems Analysis and Policy U. S. Government Printing Office, 1975. U. S. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970. EASTERN EUROPE 11 The survival of nationalism in the individual countries in Eastern Europe has taxed the Kremlin's organizational ingenuity. It has led to "The Brezhnev Doctrine, the concept of limited sovereignty, and even to the use of Warsaw Pact forces to subdue overly enthusiastic reforms in socialist societies. Mr. Leszek Kolakowski, a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, England, and a former Professor of Philosophy at Warsaw University, examined this force in an essay published in The Round Table, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, entitled "Marxist Philosophy and National Reality, January 1974 issue. Certain excerpts of Mr. Kolakowski's essay are reprinted here to provide a deeper analysis of the problem than can be covered in the lecture on Eastern Europe. Those interested in examining Mr. Kolakowski's reasoning further can obtain his forthcoming collection of Essays entitled "The Stranded Left, Library Press (USA) or the Alcove Press (UK). through the "The 'National Question' * * * ་ "There is, perhaps, no more striking example of the doctrinal and political ambiguity of Marxism than the history of the theoretical attempts to deal with the National Question in Marxist terms, and of the practical attempts to solve this question in accordance with the Marxist idea. In the second half of the nineteenth century, it was reasonable and in accordance with the common sense of the time to believe that the division of the world into Nations would rapidly disappear once the economic basis of that division was removed within a world-wide socialist order. National sentiments and doctrines seemed no more than a relic of ancient tribal life or an ideological expression of a protectionist policy specifically connected with a particular stage of the development of the capitalist economy. The inevitable technological unification of the world and the tremendous growth of communications systems would bring about a certain cultural unity of mankind and make the anachronistic character of the old national traditions increasingly obvious. In fact, seen in the perspective of the forthcoming socialist transformation, mankind was on the verge of unity. Such hopes were shared by virtually all nineteenth century socialists, including Marx. They were no utopian fancy but seemed to be based on sound analysis and a reasonable extrapolation of the current trends in human culture. "The failure of these hopes has never been admitted theoretically by those who pretend to Marxist orthodoxy in one form or another. Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged in the political practice of the communist movement and also in its ideological forms; and the 'nationalisation' of communism in its Leninist form is one of the most important factors of twentieth-century political dynamics. Indeed, the impossibility of assimilating this change to Marxist ideological traditions and to its political imperatives still remains the main source of the insoluble contraditions which fetter the non-existent but longed-for 'Communist International.' "Whenever the internationalist ideology of the socialist and communist movement was actually faced with national clashes, internationalism was invariably defeated. The Second International fell apart within the space of a few days at the moment when keeping the internationalist faith no longer meant repeating traditional slogans about workers' solidarity but actively hindering one's own fatherland in its defence effort. (As always, there was nothing but 'defence' on all sides.) Lenin's strategy of 'revolutionary defeatism' at first found an insignificant minority of followers even among the Bolshevik emigres, not to mention the Menshevik faction; and the father of Russian Marxism, George Plekhanov, was among the strongest defenders of the National cause. Among the powerful Reichstag Social- Democrats there was at first not one vote against German war credits; four months later Karl Liebknecht was alone in breaching national solidarity by his dissenting vote. Gustav Herve, one of the most intransigent French spokesmen of the 'war against war' idea, became almost overnight a fanatical patriot. Certainly, arguments were not lacking on either side to justify the sudden arousal of patriotic fervor by the use of socialist and Marxist considerations. How often had Marx unmasked Russian despotism as the mainstay of European reaction? Was the German cause not therefore identical with the general interest of progress when directed against the Tsarist tyranny? On the other hand, were not Prussian Militarism and the power of the Junkers--according to Marx--by far the largest obstacle to social progress? Consequently, why should the cause of the Entente not be considered a kind of holy war of the French republican spirit against Prussian feudalism? These pathetic rationalisations could only serve to demonstrate more vividly the gap between the ideological foundation of Social Democracy and the social reality to which it had to adapt itself. "The Leninist Reinterpretation "But the history and eventual collapse of the Third International revealed, though in a different way, the same inability of the Communist movement to use internationalist ideology as a real political guide-post and, at the same time, the impossibility of shedding this ideology without the loss of momentum. In defending the un-Marxist but extremely efficacious idea of the fight for the 'self-determination of all nations,' Lenin was certainly not guided by any sort of cynical calculation. He stipulated that his party should struggle against all forms of oppression--social, national, and religious--because he wished it to be both the embodiment of all anti-Tsarist sentiments and the leader of all the forces interested (for different reasons) in the overthrow of the ancient autocracy. In a multi-national empire, a party which canvassed for support from the workers of oppressed nationalities was correct, from a purely practical point of view, to promise them the right to national identity and even separation. Stalin, who expounded Leninist ideas in his 1913 treatise on the National Question, stressed very strongly-against Karl Renner and other Austro-Marxist defenders of the principle of 'cultural autonomy'--that the right to self-determination is empty unless it includes the right to complete political separatism: i.e. the right of any nation to build a separate state of its own. However, it should be emphasised that this part of Leninism was formulated entirely in the period when the Bolshevik party was preparing itself for a democratic and 'bourgeois'--not a socialist--revolution, and when almost everyone but Trotsky expected a long time to pass between the collapse of the Ancient Regime in favour of a parliamentary democratic system and the future dictatorship of the proletariat. Once the Leninist movement--after April 1917--started along the path to an immediate transition to socialist dictatorship, the right of separation, though never denied, was necessarily limited by supplementary explanations. Lenin stated that the party--which would fight uncompromisingly against any national oppression-had, of course, to demand the right of self-determination; but, at the same time, it must persuade the formerly-oppressed peoples |