ignorant for a moment of the new danger which threatens the country; they announce it to you with confidence, that instead of being dismayed, as our enemies presume, you will collect new strength, and show yourselves more worthy of the cause which you defend, and of the admiration of the universe; they announce it to you, because they know that the unanimous determination of the Spaniards is to be free at whatever cost, and all means however violent, all resources however extraordinary, all funds however privileged, must be called out to repel the enemy. The ship's treasures must be thrown overboard to lighten her in the tempest and save her from ship, wreck. Our country is sinking;strength, riches, life, wisdom, council,-whatever we have is hers; and can we hesitate a moment to lay all at her feet for her salvation and her glory? The victory is ours, if we carry on to the end of our enterprize the sublime enthusiasm with which it began. The colossal mass with which we must resist the enemy, must be composed of the strength of all, and the sacrifices of all; and then what will it import that he pours upon us anew the legions which are now superfluous in Germany, or the swarm of conscripts which he is about to drag from France? We began the contest with 80,000 men less; he began it with 200,000 more. Let him replace them if he can ; let him send or bring them to this region of death, as destructive to the oppressors as, to the oppressed. Adding to the experience of two campaigns the strength of despair and of fury, we will give to their phalanxes of banditti the same fate which their predecessors have experienced; and the earth, fattened with their blood, shall return to us with usury the fruits of which they

have deprived us. Let the monarchs of the north, forgetful of what they are, and of what they are capable, submit to be the slayes of this new Tamerlane; let them purchase at such a price the tranquillity of a moment, till it comes to their turn to be devoured. What is it to us, who are a mighty people, and resolved to perish or to triumph? Did we ask their consent when, twenty months ago, we raised our arms against the tyrant? Did we not enter into the contest alone? Did we not carry it on for a campaign alone? Nothing which is necessary for our defence is wanting. Our connection is daily drawn closer with America, to whose assistance, as timely as it was generous, the mo ther country is so deeply indebted, and on whose zeal and loyalty a great part of our hope is founded. The alliance which we have formed with Great Britain continues and will continue; that nation has lavished for us its blood and its treasures, and is entitled to our gratitude and that of future ages. Let, then, the machinations of intrigue, or the suggestions of fear, prevail with weak governments and misled cabinets; let them, if they will, conclude treaties, illusory on the part of him who grants, and disgraceful on the part of those who accept them; let those great potentates, if they will, relinquish the common cause of civilized nations, and inhumanly abandon their allies. The people, the Spanish people,-will stand alone and erect amid the ruins of the European continent. Here is drawn, never to be sheathed, the sword of hatred against the execrable tyrant; here is raised, never to be beaten down, the standard of independence and of justice! Hasten to it all ye in Europe who will not live under the abominable yoke; ye who will

not enter into a league with iniquity; ye who are indignant at the fatal and cowardly desertion of these deluded princes, come to us! here the valiant shall find opportunities of acquiring true honour; the wise and the vir tuous shall obtain respect; the afflicted shall have an asylum Our cause is the same; the same shall be our reward. Come! and, in despite of all the arts and all the power of this inhuman despot, you shall see that we will render his star dim, and form for ourselves our own destiny."

Two things are remarkable in this paper; the total change, or rather restoration of public feeling, which must have been effected, before a Spanish government would hold up the resistance of the Dutch to Philip as a glorious example to the Spanish people; and the lamentable want of foresight and information in the junta, who could not only rely upon the attachment of the colonies, but even venture to declare, that the hopes of the country rested in great measure upon them. Yet, in summing up the merits and demerits of their administration, if there be found something to condemn and much to regret, there is assured ly much to be applauded. Spain will one day excuse their errors, do justice to their intentions, and remember with gratitude, that of all her governments, this was the first which addressed the Spaniards as a free people; and, though it may be said to have echoed the language of the nation, the first that sanctioned those constitutional principles of liberty which had so long been suppressed. It was to be expected, when such momentous interests were at stake, that their errors would be judged of rather by their consequences than their causes; an unsuccessful administration is always unpopular, and in suspicious times, if

the affairs of the state go ill, what is the effect of misconduct, or weakness, or inevitable misfortune, is readily imputed to deliberate treason. Such an opinion prevailed very generally against the junta ; but when their power was at an end, and nothing would have gratified the people more than the detection and punishment of the guilty, not even the shadow of proof could be found against them. They were inexperienced in business, they had been trained up in prejudice, and they partook, as was to be expected, of the defects of the national character; but they partook of its virtues also, and their generous feelings, their high spirit and unshaken fortitude, may command an Englishman's respect, if it be contrasted, not merely with the abject baseness of the continental courts, but with the recorded sentiments of that party in our own state, who have omitted no means of dispi riting and disgusting the Spaniards. We have had abundant cause to be grateful to Providence in these latter times, but never have we had' greater cause than for escaping the imminent danger of having these men for our rulers. Incapable of feeling generously, and therefore inca pable of acting wisely, they would have deserted the last, the truest, the only worthy allies of a free people; they would have betrayed the last, the only hope of Europe and of the world; they would have sacrificed our honour first, and when they had brought home the war to our own doors, which inevitably their mea sures must have done, the lasting infamy which their imbecility and cowardice had entailed upon the country, would have been a worse evil than the dreadful and perilous trial through which she would have had to pass.

THE HE government obtained a few addresses, thanking them for having convoked the cortes, which, it was said, like an elixir of life, would revivify the social body to its very extremities, and congratulating them upon their triumph over internal divisions, and over those who would so hastily and inopportunely have esta blished a regency. But these congratulations were as premature as the triumph was short lived. They thought it necessary for their safety to imprison the Count de Montijo, and D. Francisco Palafox, who was one of their own members, and whose name, as brother to the defender of Zaragoza, would have been deservedly popular throughout Spain, if he had possessed any qualities which could renderit respectable. Romana's declaration against them was not the only symptom that they had lost the confidence of the army, as well as of the nation. Count de Norona, who commanded in Gallicia, being superseded, addressed a proclamation to the Gallicians, telling them," they must now perceive that the country was in danger, and that for his part he had given up all dependance upon the existing government. I have been unceasing in my applications," said he, "not only for money but for arms, and to none of them have I received

Alburquerque's Retreat.

the slightest answer; on the contrary, they seem to have given offence. Under these circumstances, it remains for you to act for yourselves; and what I would recommend is, that you form in your own kingdom a separate junta, to be empowered to act in the name of the inhabitants, who shall be authorized to raise money." A similar disposition prevailed in many of the provinces, and Spain seemed on the point of relapsing into that state from which the formation of the central junta had delivered it.

That body endeavoured to conciliate Romana, and to avail themselves of his military talents, and therefore they requested him to repair to the head-quarters at Carolina, where the wreck of Areizaga's army were collecting, investing him with full powers for whatever measures he thought might best tend to repair the loss, and prevent the apprehended consequences; but Romana was either too much disgusted with the government to serve under them, or saw the consequences too clearly to risk his own reputation by attempting what there was little hope could be effected. The Andalusians appear to have relied upon the passes of the Sierra Morena; this confidence would have been reasonable, had there been any thing like an equality, either in num

bers or discipline, between the armies in the field; but the disproportion in both these things being what it was, the example of Somosierra ought to have undeceived them. Flattering statements were circulated, that no means had been neglected for placing Areizaga's army upon the most respectable footing; that he had been joined by considerable reinforcements, and supplied with every kind of stores. The whole artillery of two divisions of his army had reached La Carolina, cannon and ammunition were passing through Cordova, and the works, it was said, which were judged necessary for strengthening the passes, were carrying on with the utmost activity: in reality the principal pass was only defended by three or four ill-mounted cannon. The junta, notwithstanding these boasted preparations, were prudent enough when they convoked the cortes, to appoint the Isle of Leon for the place of meeting. Upon the remains of the central army they could have little reliance, for in battles like that of Ocana, the best and steadiest part of the army is that which falls. The Duke del Parque's force was not equally broken up, it had lost more in reputation than in actual strength; but its strength was cómparatively trifling, and it was at a distance. The main hope of the government seems to have been upon a corps of 12,000 men, under Alburquerque, whose 'head-quarters were at Don Benito, having 2000 men at Truxillo, and other advanced parties upon the Tagus.

After the battle of Medellin, the Spanish writers announced to the people without disguise the whole extent of their danger, that they might prepare themselves without dismay for the worst. "What," said Don J. M. Blanco, in that manly spirit of sound philosophy which

characterises his writings,-" What if the French were to enter Andalu sia, and make themselves masters of Andalusia, wherefore should the na tion then think itself conquered? Has the enemy armies enough to keep up the communication from Bayonne to Cadiz, if he be harassed by the people along the road? and if he can establish this immense line, how can he occupy 18,000 square leagues of land, or deprive us of the advantage of two immense coasts, open to our colonies and our allies?" The danger which had then been averted was now near at hand; but the junta, whatever their own individual apprehensions may have been, did not venture to proclaim the whole truth, and call forth in the Andalusians the dreadful strength of despair, which the French had found so destructive at Zarago za. Instead of this, they suffered a treacherous hope to be held out, that if the enemy should enter the kingdoms of the south, the passes would be occupied behind them; the Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque would hasten to the scene of action, and another day like that of Baylen might be expected.

While the junta fixed its attention as well as its hopes upon the Sierra Morena, the French, knowing how easily that barrier would be surmounted, looked on to Cadiz, the possession of which they considered as not less important than that of Madrid. The actual command of the army was vested in Soult, the ablest of their generals, having under him Victor, Mortier, and Sebastiani; and the intruder came in person to take possession of the southern provinces of Spain. Areizaga was perfectly sensible of his own inability to defend the lines, notwithstanding the great advantage which the exceeding strength of the position would have afforded

to a determined people, under a general of any enthusiasm, or any military skill. He made known his hope. lessness to the government, and by sending away great part of his stores for the purpose of securing them, betrayed it also to the army and to the people. The French, to exaggerate their own merits, affirmed that, confiding in the entrenchments which he had thrown up at the entrance of the defile, in the cuts which had been made in the roads, and the mines which he had dug at the brink of the precipices, he considered his position impregnable; but Areizaga had lost his presumption at Ocana, and was prepared for defeat before he was attacked. In fact, the Sierra Morena was not better defended than Somosierra had been; at every point the men gave way, because they knew, by the conduct of their general, that it was not expected they should stand their ground: one division took to flight at Navas de Tolosa, the very spot where one of the most glorious victories in Spanish history had been gained over the Moors. The operations began on the 20th of January, and the head-quarters of the intruder were the next day established at Baylen, of which the French now reminded the Spaniards with bitter exultation.

The junta, who had ventured to hint their apprehensions of this event no otherwise than by convoking the cortes to the Isle of LeJuly 15. on, instead of Seville, announced, five days before the French forced their way into Andalusia, their intention of transferring the seat of government to Cadiz, not daring even then openly to assign what was the obvious cause. The Isle of Leon, they said, was the fittest place for the cortes to hold its sittings,

because there were buildings there applicable to the purpose; from thence their decrees could be communicated to every part of the peninsula, whatever might be the vicissitudes of war; and there they might devote themselves to their noble and arduous functions with a perfect tranquillity, which was hardly attainable amid the distractions of a great city. But this having been determined, the junta found itself in the predicament which had been provided for by a decree of the preceding year, wherein it had been declared, that at whatever place the representatives of the Spanish nation. should be convoked, to that place the government must remove its seat. They gave notice, therefore, that on the first of February they should meet in the Isle of Leon. Accordingly they made immediate preparations for their removal.

The people of Seville could not but perceive that their city was to be abandoned to the enemy; this was obvious. What other designs the members of the junta might have formed, every one guessed, according as he suspected or despised this unfortunate administration. Some said that they were sold to the French, and that the junta were only pretending to fly, that they might deceive other provinces with a show of patriotism, and sell them as they had sold Andalusia; others acquitted them of treason, to fix upon them the charge of peculation: a few of the members, they said, were, for their known virtue and talents, entitled to the love of their countrymen; the rest were a sordid race, who, having appropriated to their own use the free gifts contributed for the use of the army, while they left the soldiers to perish for want of food and clothing, were now about to fly to England or to the 12