the court, it is not believed that this office would be justified in applying the decision in the Quinn case to the case here under consideration. Many illustrations could be given to show that while the Comptroller General's assumption of extraordinary powers may have its advantages, it also has its great disadvantages. While it may at times save, on other occasions it wastes. Where at times it helps the other departments of the Government to function, at times it disarranges the machinery of the Government. I assume that the Comptroller General would disclaim any intention to exercise his powers as broadly as the statute literally provides. Nevertheless, the inevitable implication of his interpretation of his powers, and the practical result of his unaccountability to the executive branch of the Government, is that, under his asserted power to settle and adjust all claims by and against the Government, the Comptroller General at any time may embarrass the Department of Justice by taking such action as to any claim by or against the Government as he, the Comptroller General, may think wise. Thus there is now presented to this court two concrete instances of existing laws in which a vital prerogative of the President is involved. The one his power to remove a postmaster for the good of the service and without accountability to the Senate. The other his power to bring the office of the Comptroller General into harmonious cooperation with the other departments of the Government. It is these practical illustrations of the asserted power of Congress that give to the instant case its gravity, and this must be my apology for the length of this brief and the care which I have taken to defend the prerogative of the President, not merely by the text of the Constitution but by its historical interpretation. The preservation of the independence of the President and no lesser question is involved—is essential to the perpetuity of our institutions. The Constitution attempted to maintain a just equilibrium between the legislative and the executive departments of the Government, those being the departments in which the menace of inordinate ambition might be more naturally expected. The framers sought to steer between the Scylla of a legislative despotism and the Charybdis of an executive despotism. They did not wish to create either a parliamentary omnipotence or an executive omnipotence. They recognized that if the executive had an absolute power of appointment and removal that the necessary equilibrium between the two departments would be destroyed. Hence the qualification with respect to the greater offices of the State, that the concurrence of the Senate was necessary for a confirmation, and hence, also, the power of Congress to vest the appointment of lesser officials of the State in other officials than the President. Not only did the Constitution thus provide a restraint upon absolute power in the matter of appointment, but there was even a qualified restraint on the power of removal; for while the President could remove in his discretion he could not appoint a successor without the consent of the Senate. Thus they safeguarded the State from the undue power of the Executive. Upon the other hand, they were also indisposed to create a legislative despotism over appointments and removals. They had bitter experience of such a form of undue power in the Congress of the old confederation. They carefully provided that the selection of the servants of the State should be the exclusive function of the executive, and, by necessary implication, that the power of removal was likewise his exclusive prerogative. Thus, with marvelous wisdom, the scales were held in equipoise, and it is of great importance that, in the instant case, this court shall maintain this just and necessary equilibrium. For government, though high, and low, and lower, Shakespeare, Henry V, act 1, scene 2. Solicitor General. ROBERT P. REEDER, Of Counsel. APRIL 13, 1925. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1924 No. 77 FRANK S. MYERS, APPELLANT บ. THE UNITED STATES APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT FILED BY GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER, AMICUS CURIAE GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER, Amicus Curiae 109 INDEX VI. Judicial decisions-- VII. Laches VIII. Summary and conclusion___ Cases referred to: Arant v. Lane-- Field v. People.....-. Nicholas v. United States.. Norris v. United States_ IV. Constitutional provisions respecting the legislature and the execu tive 115 V. The background of history. 119 130 136 137 136 121 132 131 136 136 128-134 135 |