CHAPTER XI. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. Let us briefly consider matters of Equity, which belong to the peculiar jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery; such as the relief which cannot be afforded by Courts of Law, but which Courts of Equity can appropriately give. Explain Equity and the general "Equitable Principles " acted upon in the Court of Chancery.* Equity is said to be "synonymous with natural justice." From the difficulty of framing general rules, many matters of natural justice are left to be disposed of in foro conscientiæ by Equity Jurisprudence; but where it is clear that the courts of law can afford adequate relief without circuity of action or multiplicity of suits and are able to do justice to all parties, equity will not interfere. Equity, then, in its true and genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit of all law. Positive law is construed and rational law is administered by it. Natural justice is the rule by which, where positive law is either silent, defective, or not clearly defined, the decisions of courts of equity are guided. Where the will of the legislature has been clearly pronounced with regard to all the circumstances which belong to a case, as a general rule, equity "can neither take it up where the law leaves it, nor extend the remedy further than the law allows." The general maxims peculiar to equity are: 1. That equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. * See Court of Chancery, p. 206. 2. Equity will administer a due remedy where it cannot be had at law without circuity of action or multiplicity of suits. 3. Equity corrects the imperfections of common law whenever there are relations existing between the parties of which the common law is unable to take cognizance. For instance, in the case of accounts between partners, a court of common law will not entertain an action by a man against his partner. Equity supplies the omission. Similar cases arise between co-executors and corporators. 4. Equity determines according to the spirit of the rule, and not the strictness of the letter. 5. Fraud, accident, and trust are the peculiar objects of a court of equity. 6. Whenever possible, equity takes care that a right shall be actually enjoyed, and will interfere to prevent a violation of that right; it will anticipate the probable event, and restrain, by injunction, a person who merely shows an intention to do an injury, or to break his covenant. The court will also restrain the infringement of a patent of invention, the counterfeiting of a trade-mark, and the piracy of a copyright. 7. Equity will often enforce the specific performance of a contract, whereas courts of common law can only give damages for the breach thereof. 8. It is a maxim that de vigilantibus, et non dormientibus, æquitas subvenit, the meaning of which is, that equity discountenances lâches, or delay; and, independently of any statutes of limitation, refuses to interfere where there has been lâches in prosecuting rights; or where there has been long and unreasonable acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights. 9. In regard to mistakes in matter of law, it is a maxim that "ignorantia legis non excusat;" as where the mistake is one of title, arising from ignorance of a point of law of such constant occurrence as to be understood by the community at large; this is considered, in equity, sufficient to afford such a presumption, so as to disentitle the party to relief. 10. Misrepresentation is a ground of relief, whether the party who made the assertion or intimation knew it to be false, or made it without knowing whether it was true or false. 11. A person cannot avail himself of what has been obtained by the fraud of another, unless he not only is innocent of the fraud, but has given some valuable consideration. 12. If a person conceals facts and circumstances which he is under some legal or equitable obligation to communicate to the other, it amounts to a fraud, for which equity will grant relief; but a purchaser is not bound to communicate his knowledge of the value of the property to the vendor; for it is the business of the vendor to know and sufficiently to estimate the worth of his own property. Mere inadequacy of price or any other inequality in the bargain does not constitute by itself a ground to avoid it. Still in such cases as gross inadequacy, amounting to conclusive evidence of imposition or undue influence, courts of equity will interfere on the ground of fraud. In all cases of any complication or difficulty, whether it be in matters of accident, mistake, fraud, trusts, accounts, mortgages; and in cases of infants, of persons of unsound mind, and of married women, the Court of Chancery has thus, practically speaking, exclusive jurisdiction.* * For cases of trust, see Trustee Acts, 13 & 14 Vict., c. 60; and 15 & 16 Vict., c. 55. For control which the Court of Chancery exercises over Solicitors, see Attorneys and Solicitors Acts, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 73; and 23 Vict., c. 127. For Charitable Trust Acts, 16 & 17 Vict., c. 187; 18 & 19 Vict., c. 124; and 23 & 24 Vict., c. 134. For Lunacy Regulation Act, 16 & 17 Vict., c. 70; and the Amendment Act, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 86; 32 & 33 Vict., c. 110. By the Companies Act (25 & 26 Vict., c. 89), the Court of Chancery entertains in a summary way applications by petition to wind up joint-stock companies, and the collection and distribution of the assets are made under the direction of the court. See also 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131; for Joint-Stock Companies Acts, see 21 & 22 Vict., c. 60; and 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89; for Limited Liability Act, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133; 20 & 21 Vict., c.14. A SUIT IN CHANCERY. The practice and procedure in the Court of Chancery are now regulated and governed by certain rules and orders which were promulgated from time to time by the proper authorities, and are now consolidated by virtue of 15 & 16 Vict., c. 86 (1860), and are called "Consolidated Rules and Regulations of the Court of Chancery." These, with a few subsequent orders, now constitute the law of the Court as to its proceedings. Explain briefly the Proceedings in a Suit in Chancery. The first step in a Suit in Chancery is what is technically called filing a bill. This is done by the party who considers himself aggrieved, stating shortly the facts of the case, asking for the particular relief he thinks himself entitled to, and praying for general necessary relief at the hands of the court. The bill sets forth the circumstances of the case, as fraud, trust, or hardship, and praying relief. If the bill be to stay waste or other injury, or to stay proceedings at law, an injunction is also prayed. The bill must charge all necessary parties to appear in court to answer the statements therein. It must be signed by counsel, printed, and a copy filed. If the defendant, having been duly served with the bill, do not enter an appearance within the prescribed time, the plaintiff may enter an appearance for him, so as to be able to proceed with the suit. To this bill the defendant must enter an appearance, and if interrogatories are filed with it, he must answer them seriatim. Should the defendant be advised that he has good ground of defence by demurrer-which is apparent on the bill itself, either from the matter contained in it or from some defect in its form—the defendant may, instead of answering, demur to it. This, like a demurrer at common law, is argued before the court, and disposed of as the court shall think fit. Instead of a demurrer, the defendant may plead to the jurisdiction of the court. Pleas, however, are not favoured by the court, and are seldom resorted to. An answer, which is the usual defence that is made to a plaintiff's bill, either denies or confesses all the material parts of it; and where it does not deny, it may confess and avoid; that is, justify or qualify the facts; or it may simply admit the case made by the bill, and submit to the judgment of the court. It is given in upon oath. It is the statement of the defendant as to those matters of fact to which the bill refers, and by means of it the plaintiff obtains a discovery, as it is called, of facts which it might be otherwise impossible to prove. After an answer is filed, the plaintiff may amend his bill, either by adding new parties, or new matter, or both; such amendment being usually made in consequence of the admissions in the answer of the defendant; and the defendant, if necessary, is obliged to answer the amended bill. If the answer to the plaintiff's bill, or interrogatories, as the case may be, is considered sufficient; that is, a full answer to the facts of the bill, and there is ground for a final order or decree, the plaintiff proceeds upon the answer without entering into evidence. In such case the cause is set down for hearing upon bill and answer, and the proper order or decree is made by the court. If, however, the plaintiff is advised that he must prove his case, he files what is called a traversing note, which is a declaration of his intention to proceed with his cause, as if the defendant had filed an answer traversing, that is denying, the facts of the case made by the bill.* When the cause is ripe for hearing, it is set down to be heard in its turn before the Master of the Rolls or one of the three Vice-Chancellors to whose court the bill was originally attached. After having heard counsel on both sides, the court proceeds to pronounce the decree, adjusting every point *See 25 & 26 Vict., c. 42. |