VI. OBLIGATIONS OF THE MASTER.

647. The master is bound to receive the servant, and to allow him to continue in his service till the termination of the contract. (Bell's Prin. 182.). He is bound to protect him, and treat him with patience and moderation; and if intemperate language cr threats of personal violence be habitually used to him, and, still more, if he be treated with such severity as to destroy his happiness or comfort, a court of law will find him entitled to leave the service, and to sue for wages, and in extreme cases for damages. Even the wanton imposition of unnecessary labour, if carried to a great extent, would be held to be a violation of the contract by the master (Ersk. i. 7. 62); but it is impossible to assign the point at which the master's judgment would no longer be regarded as the measure of what was necessary or reasonable. Every case of this kind must be determined on its own specialties, and no one decision can form a precedent for another.

648. Personal Chastisement.-It was the opinion of Blackstone, and seems to be consistent with our law, that a master may correct an apprentice or very young servant, more especially a male servant, provided it be done with moderation; but if the master or master's wife beats any servant of full age, it is a good cause of departure. (Stephen's Com. ii. 243; 2 Kent, Com. 211; 2 Hutch. 170.)

649. Attempting the Honour of a Female Servant.—A female servant is entitled to leave her master's service if he has attempted her honour. In such a case the master will be liable for wages and board wages for the whole period of the engagement, and not unfrequently in damages also. (M'Lean v. Miller, May 14, 1832; Fraser, 126.)

650. Falsely accusing Servant of Dishonesty.-If the master should fail in proving a charge of dishonesty against the servant, the latter will be entitled to quit the service, and to claim wages

and board wages for a period which will be regulated by the circumstances of the case. (Longmuir v. Thomson, March 16, 1833.) The master's position in regard to such charges, if made at a time when he had a right to speak on the subject, is a privileged one, and the servant will not be allowed to get damages without proving malice. (Fraser, 128.)

651. Food and Lodging.-The master is bound to supply domestic servants with wholesome food and lodging, suitable to their condition. (Bell's Prin. 182.) But even where a particular kind of food has been promised, the master will not be bound to furnish it, or pay the full value, if, from unforeseen circumstances, it has risen to an extravagant price. (Wilkie v. Bethune, Nov. 23, 1848.) [On the neglect of the common law obligation is now imposed the statutory penalty of 38 and 39 Vict. c. 86, sec. 6, viz.: "Where a master, being legally liable to provide for his servant or apprentice necessary food, clothing, medical attendance, or lodging, wilfully and without lawful excuse, refuses or neglects to provide the same, whereby the health of the servant or apprentice is, or is likely to be, seriously or permanently injured," he shall be liable to a penalty of £20 or six months' imprisonment. (Fraser, 128.)]

652. The master may compel a male servant to reside out of his house on paying for his lodging, but not a female servant, because it is implied in her contract that she shall have the protection of her master's house and family. (Bell's Prin. 183; Graham v. Thomson, Feb. 12, 1822.)

653. Medical Attendance.-There has been no decision of the Supreme Court in Scotland as to the liability of the master to furnish medical attendance; and in cases of ordinary sickness, not arising from the service, and over which he had no control, the leaning of lawyers has been to the effect that he would not be liable. In England it may now be considered as established law, that a master is not bound to provide medical advice for his servants, and that it makes no difference whether or not the

servant be living under the master's roof. The liability lies against the parish officer; an arrangement which is conceived to be more for the advantage of servants, from there being many masters not in such a position as to enable them to afford sufficient assistance in cases of serious illness. (Wennall v. Adney, 3 B. and P. 247; Fraser, 127.)

654. Where the illness has arisen from a hurt sustained in the service, and the master has sent his own medical attendant, he may be held to have undertaken the care of the servant in that illness, and be liable for the bill of another medical man, though in general he will not be bound to pay for one whom the servant has selected without his knowledge, and continues to employ without his consent.

655. In what case is the Master liable for injuries sustained by a Servant in the discharge of his duty?

656. The master must conduct his business in such a manner as not recklessly to endanger the lives of his servants; and if he act rashly, and injury follow in consequence, he will be liable to damages.

657. In order to entitle the servant to damages, however, it is necessary that positive misconduct be brought home to the master. (Sellen and Wife v. Norman, Carrington and Payne's Reports, vol. iv. p. 80; and Cooper v. Philips, p. 581.)

658. Where a servant was injured by the breaking down of a carriage, in consequence of a defect of which the master was not aware, he was not bound to make reparation, because "he is not responsible for the negligence of his coachmaker or harnessmaker." The master's obligation is discharged when he has provided for the safety of his servant "according to the best of his judgment, information, and belief." (Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. and W.; Fraser, 175.)

659. In strict accordance with this principle, it was subse quently held by the House of Lords, overturning several decisions of the Scotch Courts, that a master is not liable in

damages to a servant for injury caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant, if the latter, when selected by the master, was a suitable person for the employment in which he was engaged. (Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, June 17, 1858; 3 Macqueen, 266; Fraser, 194 et seq.)

660. The principle laid down by Lord Cranworth, and followed by the House, was, that when one workman enters into an engagement in which many other fellow-workmen are employed, he, in general, knows the risk he is exposing himself to; and he knows, moreover, that they are risks of a kind that are more within the immediate control of the servants themselves than of the master. (Brownlie v. M'Aulay, March 9, 1860; M'Intyre, Dec. 24, 1859; Gray, Feb. 8, 1860.)

661. This principle has been greatly extended by recent decisions; and it would seem to be now settled that-circumstance usually occurring in the case of a firm or company carrying on large works-where no fault is directly attributable to the employer, and where he can show that he has chosen a person of knowledge and skill for his subordinate, he is under no responsibility for accidents caused by any of his servants, even though the party in fault be a manager to whom he has entrusted the entire control of his works. (Wilson, 1867, 5 M. 807, and 1868, 6 M. H. L. 84; Sneddon, 1876, 3 R. 868; M'Laughlan, 1882, 20 S. L. R. 271.)

662. In the most recent decision on the subject, the doctrine was carried to its full length and based on its proper principle. It was there decided that a miner working in the employment of contractors for driving a level in a mine belonging to a company, whose manager and underground manager were in charge of the mine, was not, to the effect of rendering the company liable for his death through the underground manager's negligence, a stranger, in respect that, by becoming a member of the organization of the mine, he had taken the risk of injury from the fault of other members without claim for redress except

against the person in fault. (Woodhead, 1877, 4 Rettie, 469.) In this case it was observed by the Lord President, that in such cases the mine-owner is free from responsibility, “not because the injured and injurer are both his own hired and paid servants, but because he is not personally in fault, and has not warranted the injured workmen against the perils of the work." The ground of liability thus appears to be the personal fault of the owner in selecting an incompetent person, from whose incompetency another person engaged in the same common work has suffered injury, and his liability is the same whether the incompetent person were his own servant or that of an independent contractor.

663. [Such was the state of the law as developed by a quarter of a century of judicial decisions both in Scotland and England, since the doctrine was first mooted in Priestly v. Fowler (supra, sec. 658), until the passing of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (43 and 44 Vict. c. 42). This Act, which has given rise to much commentary (vide Fraser, M. and S. 215 et seq.; Sym, "Analysis" of the Act), and whose terms are yet only in course of judicial interpretation, has made an important and extensive alteration in this department of the law, greatly diminishing the master's claims to exemption from liability for injuries caused by one servant to another, on the above ground of "common employment" or "common organization. of labour," and greatly amplifying, in the absence of express contract, the claims of the workman to compensation for injuries. sustained while engaged in his master's employment. Its provisions properly fall under the head of statute law on the subject, and are considered as such (and in their relation to the common law rules above stated), in the sub-chapter on that head (infra, sec. 724).]

664. Liability of Master for Injury by a Servant to a Third Party. The opposite result will follow where the person injured is a stranger. In this case all that is necessary to render the