decision to the Secretary of the Interior, the decision of the trustee is final, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, with reference to all questions of fact arising in such proceeding, except as the same may be reversed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office or the Secretary of the Interior.

-Miller v. Margerie, 149 Fed. 694.

..79 C. C. A. 382

In a suit to set aside a deed by an Alaska town site trustee for fraud, the fact that the proceeding in which defendant obtained the legal title to the lot in controversy was ex parte, was not of itself sufficient ground to justify a court of equity in entering on an inquiry as to the truth or falsity of the evidence on which the trustee acted in confirming defendant's claim to the property; but it was incumbent on complainants to allege facts showing that, without negligence on their part, they were prevented by fraud or accident from appearing before the trustee and submitting evidence to establish their right to enter the property.

-Miller v. Margerie, 149 Fed. 694....

.....79 C. C. A. 382

In a suit to set aside a deed of an Alaska town site trustee for fraud, it was not sufficient to allege generally that complainants did not have knowledge of the hearing before the trustee or an opportunity to prove that the representations made by defendant to the trustee in obtaining the legal title to the property were false, but the bill must also state the particular facts and circumstances which prevented complainants from having notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to protect their rights. -Miller v. Margerie, 149 Fed. 694... .79 C. C. A. 382

PUBLIC USE.

Taking property for public use, see "Eminent Domain."

PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY.

See "Waters and Water Courses," § 1.

QUESTIONS FOR JURY.

In civil actions, see "Trial," § 1.

QUIETING TITLE.

To mining claim, see "Mines and Minerals," § 1.

1. Right of action and defenses.

A deed executed by a stranger to the title, or which for other reasons is void on its face, to convey title creates no such cloud upon the title as confers jurisdiction on a court of equity of a suit for its cancellation. -Ashburn v. Graves, 149 Fed. 968; Graves v. Crawford, Id. 79 C. C. A. 478

In the absence of any local statute affecting the question, a suit in equity to remove a cloud upon the title to real estate cannot be maintained in a federal court by a complainant out of possession.

-Ashburn v. Graves, 149 Fed. 968; Graves v. Crawford, Id.....

RAILROADS.

79 C. C. A. 478

See "Street Railroads."

As employers, see "Master and Servant."

Carriage of goods and passengers, see "Carriers."

Grant to railroad of right to use street, see "Municipal Corporations," § 1.

i 1. Construction, maintenance, and equipment.

Under the settled law of Illinois, authority given a railroad company by a city to cross a street with its tracks confers no exclusive rights in such street, but the right granted is subordinate to the use of the street for ordinary street purposes, which include the operating of a street railroad thereon; and the railroad company cannot maintain a suit in equity to enjoin the building and operating of a street railroad upon such street. crossing its tracks at grade, on the ground that such crossing will cause inconvenience to it in the operation of its trains, and add to the dangers of the street crossing.

-East St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 149 Fed. 159..... 79 C. C. A. 107

2. Operation.

In an action against a railroad company for killing the superintendent of a milling company by crushing him between certain cars and a wooden spout or chute through which grain was loaded from the mill into the cars, evidence held to require submission to the jury of the question of defendant's negligence in backing the cars onto the switch without notice to decedent.

-Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Connolly, 139 Fed. 398...

RECEIVERS.

Injunction against receiver, see "Injunction," § 2.

RECORDS.

Of judgment, see "Judgment," § 1.

REHEARING.

On appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal and Error," § 6.

RELEASE.

79 C. C. A. 218

See "Payment."

§ 1. Requisites and validity.

The defendant, having a good position with the Standard Oil Company, at Bayonne, N. J., was induced by the plaintiff to undertake the management of a zine mine for him in Missouri, in which the plaintiff was largely interested, being promised a salary of $7,500 and an interest in the mining company, for which he gave plaintiff the note in suit for $15,050, with the stock of the company as collateral. The plaintiff being also interested in a cattle company at Kansas City, and its affairs becoming involved, and a receiver being necessary, the defendant subsequently at his request accepted the position and performed its duties for a number of months, being put under great mental and physical strain in consequence, and also subjected to possible pecuniary liability on his bond, by which he might lose all his property. Wishing to give up the position, he was urged by the plaintiff as a personal favor to continue, which he did. Later on there was a crisis in the affairs of the cattle company, and a large sum of money was necessary to enable the plaintiff, who had guarantied some $2,000,000 of its obligations, to maintain himself, which money the defendant secured by a personal appeal to the plaintiff's brother, who was a man of affluence in New York. Feeling, however, that his position was insecure, the defendant while on this trip obtained another, at a good salary, with a company in Pittsburg; but upon his return, at the earnest solicitation of the

plaintiff and his counsel, was led to give it up and keep on with the cattle company, the plaintiff guarantying and paying the salary which had been promised him from the mining company, but which had been stopped, to which payment, however, the defendant contributed the compensation allowed him by the court as receiver, amounting to $3,800. A few months later the zinc mine was sold at a serious loss; the defendant's interest being made practically worthless. About this time, in a casual interview in a street car, the plaintiff, who had several times before expressed his willingness to give up the defendant's note, saying that he did not wish him to lose anything by the venture, declared to the defendant that he might consider the note discharged; the services which he had rendered to the plaintiff and the sacrifices that he had made to do so being referred to and assigned as the reason. The note, however, was not given up, the plaintiff explaining that it might prejudice him with others, whose notes for similar interests he held and whom he proposed to sue. Held, in a subsequent suit by the plaintiff on the note, that there was sufficient consideration for the promise to release, which was set up, and that a verdict for the defendant should be sustained.

-Rockefeller v. Wedge, 149 Fed. 130.....

REMAND.

..79 C. C. A. 26

Of cause on appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal and Error," § 8.
Of cause removed from state court, see "Removal of Causes," § 3..

REMITTITUR.

Of cause on appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal and Error," § 8.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

1. Origin, nature, and subject of controversy.

Where suit was brought in a state court against defendant as "the duly qualified and acting postmaster at Dallas, Tex.," and sought relief against certain official acts performed by the defendant under orders of the Postmaster General, it was a suit against an officer of the United States in his official capacity, and removable to the federal courts, under Act Cong. Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, § 2, 25 Stat. 433 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508], authorizing the removal of cases arising under the laws of the United States of which the Circuit Courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by section 1.

-Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 149 Fed. 321.........79 C. C. A. 259

2. Proceedings to procure and effect of removal.

The proper procedure for removing a cause from a state to a federal court as authorized by act Cong. Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, §§ 1, 2, 25 Stat. 433 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508], is for the defendant to file a petition for removal in the state court, together with a bond conditioned that the defendant will enter in the federal Circuit Court on the 1st day of its next session, a transcript of the record from the state court, and will pay costs awarded in case it shall be determined that the suit has been wrongfully removed.

-Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 149 Fed. 321......

$ 3. Remand or dismissal of cause.

.79 C. C. A. 259

The removal by one of two joint defendants of a cause which was not removable because of the absence of a separable controversy does not give the federal court jurisdiction, and the cause should be remanded

at any stage, at the instance of any party or on the court's own motion, whenever such fact appears.

-International & G. N. R. Co. v. Hoyle, 149 Fed. 180. .79 C. C. A. 128 Act Cong. March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 511], provides that when a case is removed from a state court to a Circuit Court of the United States, it shall be remanded whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Circuit Court at any time after removal that the suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of such Circuit Court. Held that, where a cause was properly removable, and was actually removed, it would not be remanded because of an irregularity in the proceedings for removal or because such proceedings were taken under the improper statute.

-Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 149 Fed. 321.........79 C. C. A. 259

§ 4. Proceedings in cause after removal.

Rev. St. § 643 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 521], provides that after removal of a cause from a state to the federal courts, it shall proceed as a cause originally commenced in the federal court. Section 914 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 684] declares that the practice, pleadings, forms and modes of civil procedure other than equity and admiralty causes in the federal and District Courts shall conform as near as may be to the practice in the state courts, and section 913 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 683] requires that the forms and modes of procedure in suits in equity shall be according to the rules and usages which belong to courts of equity and to rules of court made in conformity to law. Held, that where a suit in equity is removed from a state to a federal court, it must thereafter conform to the equity practice and rules in force in such court, regardless of the forms of practice in equitable proceedings in the state court. -Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 149 Fed. 321..

See "Quieting Title."

REMOVAL OF CLOUD.

REPORTS.

False report by bank officer, see "Banks and Banking," § 2.

REQUESTS.

For instructions in civil actions, see "Trial," § 2.

RESCISSION.

Of contract, see "Contracts," § 3.

Of contract for sale of goods, see "Sales," § 2.

Of contract for sale of land, see “Vendor and Purchaser," § 1.

.79 C. C. A. 259

RES JUDICATA.

See "Judgment," § 3.

REVENUE.

See "Customs Duties"; "Taxation."

REVIEW.

See "Appeal and Error"; "Criminal Law," § 6.

Bill in equity, see "Equity," § 3.

REWARDS.

Where defendant, as sheriff of a county, offered a reward "for the arrest of each of the parties convicted" of a certain bank robbery and murder, the reward was not accepted merely by the giving of information concerning the whereabouts of the suspect, but could only be accepted by the party assuming the personal danger and responsibility of either actually arresting the suspect or causing some other person to arrest him.

-McClaughry v. King, 147 Fed. 463....

.79 C. C. A. 91

RISKS.

Assumed by employé, see "Master and Servant," § 1.
Within insurance policy, see "Insurance," § 2.

By or to bankrupt, see "Bankruptcy," § 2.

Compensatory damages for breach of contract of sale, see "Damages," § 1.
In bankruptcy proceedings, see "Bankruptcy," § 4.
Of public lands, see "Public Lands," § 1.

Of realty, see "Vendor and Purchaser."
Tax sales, see "Taxation," § 1.

1. Construction of contract.

Plaintiff contracted to deliver 1,000 bales of cotton, of specified grades and at specified prices, on or before October 15, 1905, to a carrier, according to shipping directions to be furnished by defendants; plaintiff to pay cost and freight to Liverpool. About October 3d the point of delivery was changed; plaintiff agreeing to deliver at its warehouses in Birmingham and Decatur, Ala. On October 4th defendants sent an agent to Birmingham to receive cotton to be tendered there, and he, after accepting 100 bales, refused to examine or accept more, because the cotton tendered was not equal in staple to the contract quality. The agent was requested to go to Decatur and examine cotton to be tendered