most safe and proper, though he was sensible it was unfavorable to the little States, which would otherwise have an equal share in making treaties.

Doctor JOHNSON thought there was something of solecism in saying, that the acts of a minister with plenipotentiary powers from one body should depend for ratification on another body. The example of the King of Great Britain was not parallel. Full and complete power was vested in him. If the Parliament should fail to provide the necessary means of execution, the treaty would be violated.

Mr. GORHAM, in answer to Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, said, that negotiations on the spot were not to be desired by us; especially if the whole Legislature is to have any thing to do with treaties. It will be generally influenced by two or three men, who will be corrupted by the ambassadors here. In such a government as ours, it is necessary to guard against the Government itself being seduced.

Mr. RANDOLPH, observing that almost every speaker had made objections to the clause as it stood, moved, in order to a further consideration of the subject, that the motion of Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS should be postponed; and on this question, it was lost, the States being equally divided,

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye-5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-5.

On Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS' motion,—

Pennsylvania, aye-1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no-8; North Carolina, divided.

The several clauses of Article 9, Sect. 1, were then separately postponed, after inserting, "and other public ministers," next after "ambassadors."

Mr. MADISON hinted for consideration whether a distinction might not be made between different sorts of treaties; allowing the President and Senate to make treaties eventual, and of alliance for limited terms, and requiring the concurrence of the whole Legislature in other treaties. 330

The first Section of Article 9, was finally referred, nem. con., to the Committee of five, and the House then

Adjourned.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 24TH.

In Convention,-Governor LIVINGSTON, from the Committee of eleven, to whom were referred the two remaining clauses of the fourth Section, and the fifth and sixth Sections, of the seventh Article, delivered in the following Report:

"Strike out so much of the fourth Section as was referred to the Committee, and insert, 'The migration or importation of such persons as the several States, now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Legislature prior to the year 1800; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such migration or importation, at a rate not exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports.'

"The fifth Section to remain as in the Report. "The sixth Section to be stricken out."

Mr. BUTLER, according to notice, moved that the first clause of Article 7, Sect. 1, as to the discharge of debts, be reconsidered to-morrow. He dwelt on the division of opinion concerning the domestic debts, and the different pretensions of the different classes of holders.

General PINCKNEY seconded him.

Mr. RANDOLPH wished for a reconsideration, in order to better the expression, and to provide for the case of the State debts as is done by Congress.

On the question for reconsidering,—

Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New Hampshire, Maryland, no-2; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, absent.

And tomorrow assigned for the reconsideration. The second and third Sections of Article 9, being taken up,

Mr. RUTLEDGE said, this provision for deciding controversies between the States was necessary under the Confederation, but will be rendered unnecessary by the National Judiciary now to be established; and moved to strike it out.

Doctor JOHNSON seconded the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN concurred. So did Mr. DAYTON. Mr. WILLIAMSON was for postponing instead of striking out, in order to consider whether this might not be a good provision, in cases where the Judiciary were interested, or too closely connected with the parties.

Mr. GORHAM had doubts as to striking out. The Judges might be connected with the States being parties. He was inclined to think the mode pro

posed in the clause would be more satisfactory than to refer such cases to the Judiciary.

On the question for postponing the second and third sections, it passed in the negative,—

New Hampshire, North Carolina, Georgia, aye3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no—7; Pennsylvania, absent.

Mr. WILSON urged the striking out, the Judiciary being a better provision.

On question for striking out the second and third Sections of Article 9,—

New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, aye8; North Carolina, Georgia, no-2; Pennsylvania, absent. 331

Article 10, Sect. 1. "The Executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. His style shall be "The President of the United States of America," and his title shall be "His Excellency." He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time."

On the question for vesting the power in a single person,-it was agreed to, nem. con. So also on the style and title.

Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to insert, "joint," before the word "ballot," as the most convenient mode of electing.

Mr. SHERMAN objected to it, as depriving the States, represented in the Senate, of the negative intended them in that House.

VOL. I.-89 *

Mr. GORHAM said it was wrong to be considering, at every turn, whom the Senate would represent. The public good was the true object to be kept in view. Great delay and confusion would ensue, if the two Houses should vote separately, each having a negative on the choice of the other.

Mr. DAYTON. It might be well for those not to consider how the Senate was constituted, whose interest it was to keep it out of sight. If the amendment should be agreed to, a joint ballot would in fact give the appointment to one House. He could never agree to the clause with such an amendment. There could be no doubt of the two Houses separately concurring in the same person for President. The importance and necessity of the case would en

sure a concurrence.

Mr. CARROLL moved to strike out, "by the Legislature," and insert "by the people." Mr. WILSON seconded him; and on the question,—

Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye-2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-9.

Mr. BREARLY was opposed to inserting the word, "joint." The argument that the small States should not put their hands into the pockets of the large ones did not apply in this case.

Mr. WILSON urged the reasonableness of giving the larger States a larger share of the appointment, and the danger of delay from a disagreement of the two Houses. He remarked also, that the Senate had peculiar powers balancing the advantage given