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CHAP.

XX.

1796.

Caldiero,

defeated.

Nov. 11.

rations of Alvinzi had hitherto been crowned with the most brilliant success. He had regained possession of the whole of the Italian Tyrol, and of all the plain of Italy between that river and the Adige. But the most difficult part still remained, which was to pass the latter stream in the face of the enemy, Returns to and effect a junction with the right wing, under and is there Davidowich, which had achieved such important advantages. He followed the retiring columns of the Republicans, who took a position on the heights of Caldiero, determined to defend the road to Verona to the very uttermost. Napoleon arrived there from the Montebaldo on the evening of the 10th, and resolved to attack Alvinzi on the following day, who had occupied a strong position directly in front, his left resting on the marshes of Arcola, and his right on the heights of CALDIERO and the village of Colognola. Massena was directed to attack the right, which appeared the most accessible, and his advanced guard succeeded in ascending an eminence, surmounted by a mill, which the Austrian general had neglected to occupy; but the Imperialists, returning in force, regained the post, and made the brigade prisoners. The action continued the remainder of the day along the whole line, without decisive success to either party; but the rain, which fell in torrents, and the mud which clogged their wheels, prevented the French artillery from being brought up to meet the fire of the Austrian cannon, which, in position, thundered with terrible effect upon the Republican columns. Wearied and dispirited they drew back at night, yielding, for the first time in the campaign, the victory in a pitched battle to their enemies.' The situation of Napoleon was now, to all appearance, utterly desperate. He had lost 4000 men

1

Nap. iii.

353.

Th.

viii. 457.

XX.

1796.

under Vaubois, 3000 in the recent actions with Al- CHAP. vinzi; his troops, dispirited with these disasters, had lost much of their confidence and courage, and a depressing feeling of the great strength of the enemy had gained every breast. The army, it was true, had still the advantage of a central position at Verona, in the midst of their enemies; but they could resume the offensive in no direction with any appearance of success. In the north they were arrested by the defiles of the Tyrol; in the east by the position of Caldiero, known by recent experience to be impregnable; in the south the blockading force was hardly able to make head against the frequent sorties of the garrison of Mantua. The peril of their situation rapidly gained the minds of the French soldiers, more capable than any other in Europe of judging of the probable course of events, and extremely susceptible of strong impressions; and it required all the art of the general, aided by the eloquence of his lieutenants, to hinder them from sinking under their misfortunes. Napoleon wrote in the most desponding terms to the Directory, but in public he assumed the appearance of confidence; and the wounded in the city, hearing of the peril of the army, began 1 Th. viii. to issue, with their wounds yet unstanched, from Nap. iii. the hospitals.1 *

* The gloomy anticipations of Napoleon at this period are strongly depicted in the following interesting secret despatch to the Directory :"If the events I have to recount are not propitious, you will not ascribe it to the army; its inferiority, and the exhaustion of its brave men, give me every reason to fear for it. Perhaps we are on the eve of losing Italy. None of the promised succours have arrived; they are all arrested at Lyons or Marseilles. The activity of our government at the commencement of the war can alone give you an idea of the energy of the Court of Vienna; hardly a day elapses that they do not receive 5000 men, and for two months I have only received a single battalion. I do my duty; the army does its part; my soul is lacerated, but my conscience is at ease.

1

458, 460.

356, 357.

СНАР.

XX.

1796.

signs.

But the genius of Napoleon did not desert him in this eventful crisis. Without communicating his design to any one, he ordered the whole army to be His new de- under arms at nightfall, on the 14th November, and they began their march in three columns, crossed the Adige, and took the road to Milan. The hour of departure, the route, the universal ignorance in regard to their destination, all inspired the belief that they were about to retreat, and relinquish to their insulting rivals the plains of Italy. Breathless with anxiety, the troops defiled through the gates of Verona; not a word was spoken in the ranks; when suddenly the order was given to turn rapidly to the left, and all the columns, descending the course of the Adige, arrived before daybreak at Ronco. There they found a bridge of boats prepa

I never received a fourth-part of the succours which the Minister of War announces in his despatches.

66

To-day I shall allow the troops to repose; but to-morrow we shall renew our operations. I despair of preventing the raising the blockade of Mantua; should that disaster arrive, we shall soon be behind the Adda, if not over the Alps. The wounded are few, but they are the élite of the army. Our best officers are struck down; the Army of Italy, reduced to a handful of heroes, is exhausted. The heroes of Lodi, of Millesimo, of Castiglione, of Bassano, are dead, or in hospital; there remains only their reputation, and the pride they have given to the soldiers. Joubert, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Charlot, are wounded; we are abandoned in the extremity of Italy.

"I have lost few soldiers, but those who have fallen are the flower of the army, whom it is impossible to replace. Such as remain have devoted themselves to death. Perhaps the hour of the brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, of Berthier, is about to strike; what then will become of these brave soldiers? This consideration renders me circumspect; I know not how to brave death, when it would so certainly be the ruin of those who have so long been the object of my solicitude.

"In a few days we shall make a last effort; should fortune prove favourable we shall take Mantua, and with it Italy. Had I received the 83d, 3500 strong, I would have answered for every thing; in a few days 40,000 men will perhaps not give me the same security."— Confidential Despatch, 14th Nov., ii., 246-251.

XX.

red, and the whole army was rapidly passed to the CHAP. other side, and found itself in an immense sea of morasses. A general feeling of joy was immediately 1796. diffused over the army: the soldiers now perceived that the contest for Italy was not abandoned, and passing quickly from one extreme to another, prepared with alacrity to follow the footsteps of their leader, without any regard to the fearful odds to 461. which they were exposed.'

'Th. viii.

Nap. iii.

357.

Adige, to

position of

Arcola.

Having perceived, during the former action at Caldiero, that the position was too strong to be carried by an attack in front, Napoleon had resolved to assail it in flank, by the village of Arcola, and for that purpose placed his army in the midst of the morasses, which stretched from thence to the banks of the Po. He thought with reason that, on the He moves narrow causeways which traversed these marshes, down the the superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy learn the would be unavailing; every thing would come to Caldiero by depend on the resolution of the heads of columns; and he hoped that the courage of his soldiers, restored by being thus brought to combat on equal terms with the enemy, and animated by this novel species of warfare, would prevail over the discipline and tenacity of the Germans. The position which he had chosen was singularly well adapted for the purpose in view. Three chaussées branch off from Ronco; one, following the left bank of the Adige, remounts that river to Verona; one in the centre leads straight to Arcola, by a stone bridge over the little stream of the Alpon; the third, on the right, follows the descending course of the Adige to Albando. Three columns were moved forward on these chaussées; that on the left was destined to approach Verona, and observe that town, so as to secure

CHAP.

XX.

1796.

1 Nap. iii. 358, 360.

Th. viii.

15th Nov.

Dreadful

actions there.

it from any sudden attack of the enemy; that in the centre, to attack the flank of their position by the village of Arcola; that on the right, to cut off their retreat.1

At daybreak on the 15th, Massena advanced on 462, 463. the first chaussée as far as a small eminence, which brought him in sight of the steeples of Verona, and removed all anxiety in that quarter. Augereau, with the division in the centre, pushed, without being perceived, as far as the bridge of Arcola; but his advanced guard was there met by three battalions of Croats, who kept up so heavy a fire on the head of the column, that, notwithstanding the greatest exertions on the part of the soldiers, they were driven back. In vain Augereau himself hastened to the spot, and led them back to the charge: the fire at the bridge was so violent, that he was overthrown, and compelled to halt the column. Meanwhile, Alvinzi, whose attention was fixed on Verona, where he imagined the bulk of the enemy's forces to be, was confounded in the morning at hearing a violent fire in the marshes. At first he imagined that it was merely a few light troops, but soon intelligence arrived from all quarters that the enemy were advancing in force on all the dikes, and threatened the flank and rear of his position. He immediately despatched two divisions along the chaussées by which the enemy was approaching; that commanded by Mitrouski advanced to defend the village of Arcola, while that under Provera marched against the division of Massenà. The latter column soon commenced an attack on their antagonists, but they were unable to withstand the impetuous shock of Massena's grenadiers, and were driven back with heavy loss. Mitrouski, at the same time, passed through Arcola, crossed the bridge, and

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