claration of war with Russia. By an Order in Council six weeks were given after the declaration of war for Russian merchant vessels to load and depart, and the plaintiff forwarded the goods for shipment in time to be lawfully shipped under this order: it was held that the sale remained good.

If the contract cannot at once be lawfully performed, then it is suspended during hostilities (d) unless the nature or objects of the contract be inconsistent with a suspension, in which case "the effect is to dissolve the contract and to absolve both parties from further performance of it" (e). The outbreak of a war dissolves a partnership previously existing between subjects of the two hostile countries (f).

In Esposito v. Bowden (e), a neutral ship was chartered to proceed to Odessa, and there load a cargo for an English freighter, and before the ship arrived there war had broken out between England and Russia, and continued till after the time when the loading should have taken place: here the contract could not be performed without trading with the enemy, and in such a case it is convenient that it should be dissolved at once, so that the parties need not wait indefinitely for the mere chance of the war coming to an end, or its otherwise becoming possible to perform the contract lawfully.

(d) Ex parte Boussmaker, 13 Ves. 71.

(e) Esposito v. Bowden, 7 E. & B. 763, 783, 27 L. J. Q. B. 17 (in Ex. Ch.) revg. s. c. 4 E. & B. 963, 24 L. J. Q. B. 210. For a later application of the same reason of convenience cp. Geipel v. Smith, L. R. 7 Q. B. 404. A contract to carry goods has been held to be only suspended by a temporary embargo, though it lasted two years: Hadley v. Clarke, 8 T. R. 259. Sed qu. is not this virtually overruled by Esposito v. Bowden?

(J) Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns. (Sup. Ct. N. Y.) 57, in error, 16 ib. 438. In New York Life Insur

ance Co. v. Statham, 3 Otto (93 U.S.) 24, a curious question arose as to the effect of the Civil War on life policies effected by residents in the Southern States with a company in the North. It was held by the majority of the Court that, the premiums having been unpaid during the war, the policies were avoided; but that in the circumstances the assured were entitled to the surrender value of their policies at the date of the first default. But the opinions that the contract was avoided without compensation, and that it revived at the end of the war, also found support.

Bills of exchange between England and hostile country.

Hostilities against friendly nation

cannot be subject of lawful contract.

Questions have arisen on the validity of bills of exchange drawn on England in a hostile country in time of war. Here the substance of the transaction has to be looked at, not merely the nationality of the persons who are ultimately parties to an action on the bill. Where a bill was drawn on England by an English prisoner in a hostile country, this was held a lawful contract, being made between English subjects; and by the necessity of the case an indorsement to an alien enemy was further held good, so that he might well sue on it after the return of peace (g). But a bill drawn by an alien enemy on a domiciled British subject, and indorsed to a British subject residing in the enemy's country, was held to give no right of action even after the end of the war: for this was a direct trading with the enemy on the part of the acceptor (h). It seems proper to observe that these cases must be carefully distinguished from those which relate only to the personal disability of an alien enemy to sue in our Courts during the war (i).

On the other hand, an agreement cannot be enforced in England which has for its object the conduct of hostilities against a power at peace with the English government, at all events by rebellious subjects of that power who are endeavouring to establish their independence, but have not yet been recognized as independent by England. This was laid down in cases arising out of loans contracted in this country on behalf of some of the South American Republics before they had been officially recognized.

"It is contrary to the law of nations, which in all cases of international law is adopted into the municipal code of every civilized country, for persons in England to enter into engagements to raise money to support the subjects of a government in amity with our own in hostilities against

(g) Antoine v. Morshead, 6 Taunt. 237, cp. Daubuz v. Morshead, ib. 332. (h) Willison v. Patteson, 7 Taunt. 439. The circumstances of the indorsement seem immaterial.

(i) Such are McConnell v. Hector, 3 B. & P. 113; Brandon v. Nesbitt, 6 T. R. 23. As to prisoners of war here, Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne, 1 B. & P. 163.

their government, and no right of action can arise out of such a transaction" (k).

The Supreme Court of the United States has held, however, that an assignment of shares in a company originally formed for a purpose of this kind was so remotely connected with the original illegality of the loan as not to be invalid between the parties to it (7).

trade with

risk of

only, not

unlawful.

It is not a "municipal offence by the law of nations" Neutral for citizens of a neutral country to carry on trade with a bellige blockaded port-that is, the courts of their own country rents is at cannot be expected to treat it as illegal (though of course capture it is done at the risk of seizure, of which seizure, if made, the neutral trader or his government cannot complain): and agreements having such trade for their object-e.g. a joint adventure in blockade-running-are accordingly valid and enforceable in the courts of the neutral state (m). Several decisions on this topic of aiding or trading with enemies have been given in the American Courts in cases arising out of the Civil War. They will be found collected in the last edition of Mr. Story's work (n).

tional

It is admitted as a thing required by the comity of Excep nations that an agreement to contravene the laws of a treatment foreign country would in general be unlawful. But it is of foreign said that revenue laws (in practice the most important laws. cases) are excepted, and that "no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another" (0).

(k) Best, C. J., De Wütz y. Hendricks, 2 Bing. 314. Cp. Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. 194, where the language seems unnecessarily wide.

(1) McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 Howard,

232.

(m) Ex parte Chavasse, 4 D. J. S. 655, see Lord Westbury's judgment; The Helen, L. R. 1 Åd. & Ecc. 1, and American authorities there cited; Kent, Comm. 3. 267.

(n) Texas v. White, 7 Wallace, 700 (where however the chief points are of constitutional law); Hanauer v. Doane, 12 ib. 342; Story on Contracts, § 744. Sprott v. U. S., 20 Wall. 459, goes beyond anything in our books, and the dissent of Field, J. seems well founded.

(0) Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341.

revenue

As a general proposition, however, this is strongly disapproved by most modern writers as contrary to reason and justice (p). It should be noted that our Courts, so far as they have acted upon it, have done so to the prejudice of our own revenue quite as much as to that of foreign states. Thus a complete sale of goods abroad by a foreign vendor is valid, and the price may be recovered in an English Court, though he knew of the buyer's intention to smuggle the goods into England. "The subject of a foreign country is not bound to pay allegiance or respect to the revenue laws of this" (2). But it is admitted that an agreement to be performed in England in violation of English revenue laws would be void-as if, for example, the goods were to be smuggled by the seller and so delivered in England. And a subject, domiciled in the British dominions (though not in England or within the operation of English revenue laws) cannot recover in an English Court the price of goods sold by him to be smuggled into England (r); and even a foreign vendor cannot recover if he has himself actively contributed to the breach of English revenue laws, as by packing the goods in a manner suitable and to his knowledge intended for the purpose of smuggling (s).

The cases upholding contracts of this kind, whether as against our own or as against foreign laws, would probably not be now extended beyond the points specifically decided by them, and perhaps not altogether upheld (t). There is one modern case which looks at first sight like an authority for saying that our Courts pay no regard to foreign shipping

(p) Kent, Comm. 3. 263-266; Wharton, Conflict of Laws, §§ 4845. And see Westlake on Private International Law (1880), pp. 231,

238.

(9) Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 431; Pellecat v. Angell, 2 C. M. & R. 311-3, per Lord Abinger, C. B.

(r) Clugas v. Penaluna, 4 T. R. 466. It seems, but it is not quite

certain, from this case, that mere knowledge of the buyer's intention would disentitle him.

(s) Waymell v. Reed, 5 T. R. 599.

() It must be remembered that the general law as to sale of goods, &c., which the seller knows will be used for an unlawful purpose, was not fully settled at the date of these authorities.

registration laws: but it really goes upon a different principle, and, besides, the law of the United States was not properly brought before the Court (u).

As to instruments which cannot be used in their own Foreign stamp country for want of a stamp, it is now settled that regard will be paid by the Courts of other States to the law which regulates them, and the only question is as to the real effect of that law. If it is a mere rule of local procedure, requiring the stamp to make the instrument admissible in evidence, a foreign Court, not being bound by such rules of procedure, will not reject the instrument as evidence: it is otherwise if the local law "makes a stamp necessary to the validity of the instrument," i.e. a condition precedent to its having any legal effect at all (x).

B. As to matters touching good government and the B. Public administration of justice.

policy as touching internal govern

officers or

It is needless to produce authorities to show that an ment. agreement whose object is to induce any officer of the Corrupt or State, whether judicial or executive, to act partially or influence improper corruptly in his office, must in any civilized country be on public absolutely void. But an agreement which has an apparent legistendency that way, though an intention to use unlawful lature. means be not admitted, or even be nominally disclaimed, will equally be held void. In the case of Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, of which an account has been given a few pages above, it was held that the descent of an estate could not be made to depend on any public event in which the interest of the nation was concerned: or, to put it a little more broadly in one way and a little more definitely in another, that all transactions are void which create con-tingent interests of a nature to put the pressure of

(u) Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Ph. 801, see Lindley on Partnership, 1. 203.

(x) See Wharton, Conflict of Laws, 685-8; Bristow v. Sequeville, 5 Ex. 275.