the evidence before them, and he gave the petitioners the right to bring the cause on again for trial if they saw fit to do so. They took no advantage, however, of this privilege, and the case of Miss Coffin seemed to have passed out of pnblic recollection, when interest in her was again revived by some extraordinary and eccentric acts on her part in relation to Mr. Bellew and another person She was again apprehended, and this time I refused to appear for her, because I did not wish to take upon myself the responsibility, even if that should have been the result of my labors, of turning her loose upon society and against herself. She was sent, I believe, to the insane asylum at Middletown, where she now is.

All that

At the time I first saw her she was certainly curable. she needed was absolute quiet and rest, change of scene, a voyage abroad, specific treatment for the liver and the nerves, and in a very short time, I have no doubt, she would have been restored to perfect health. Her mother, instead of taking proper advice on this subject, permitted her to roam about at will near the scene of excitement and the result was as stated.

It is a matter of profound satisfaction to those interested in the subject of mental alienation that our judges are more and more exhibiting a disposition to master the topic of insanity. Judge Lawrence, who presided on the second trial of the Anderson Will Case developed a knowledge of this interesting question, so profound and varied, that it challenged the attention of all connected with the cause. The spectacle of this superb nisi prius judge, learned, courteous and impartial, holding firmly the scales between the parties to this important controversy, deciding instanter the most complicated questions of law and medical jurisprudence, patient to forbearance, yet stern in justice and the administration of the law, will never pass from the recollection of those who beheld it.

THE " EIGHT-HOUR LAW."

BY JAMES H. HAYDEN,

OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR.

Before entering upon a discussion of the language and construction of Act of August 1, 1892, known as the "Eight-Hour Law," a brief review of the acts of Congress relating to the governmental control of the number of hours service that shall constitute a day's work on the part of persons, employed in certain capacities, by, or on behalf of the United States, may be of service in suggesting its intended scope and effect.1

The first act, in point of time, that of July 16, 1862 (12 Statutes at Large, 576) provides that the hours of labor and wages of employés in the navy yards of the United States shall conform, as nearly as may be consistent with the public interest, with those of private establishments of a similar nature. "These provisions," the court held, in Averill v. The United States (14 Court of Claims 200), "were made in order that the wages of such employés should conform, as nearly as practical, with those paid by individuals in other establishments, and to prevent a disturbance of the prevailing rates in the immediate vicinity." That is to say, the government desired to adopt the rates established and generally accepted, rather than to pursue a course which might lead to dissatisfaction among the employés of individuals.2

R. 200),

The next Act, that of June 25, 1868 (15 Statutes at Large, 77), declares that "eight hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers, workmen and mechanics, now employed, or who shall be employed, by, or on behalf of the United States." It was discussed at length, in the case of Averill v. The United States (supra), the court saying, that: "The eight-hour law resulted from an entirely different object" than the Act of 1862, "and was passed, in deference to a spirit of philanthrophy, which prevails, and which at times is urged with great earnestness by its supporters, that eight hours' labor is enough to be performed in

1 Siemen v. Sellers, 123 U. S. 276.

2 Collins v. The United States, 24 Court of Claims R. 340.

any one day, and that the condition of laboring people would be greatly improved and elevated if their physical work were restricted to that extent," leaving their compensation, however, "to be determined by the inexorable laws of business."

In effect, this act, entitles the laborers and mechanics therein specified, to receive a day's wages for eight hours' labor, in the absence of an agreement on their part, providing that a day's work shall consist of a greater number of hours, and to receive additional pro rata compensation, in the event of their being called upon to work for a longer time in a calendar day. But, although it is in the nature of a direction to officers and agents of the United States, the act does not forbid them to make special agreements with laborers and mechanics, on behalf of the United States, by the terms of which a day's work may consist of more or less than eight hours.4

The courts of States where similar laws have been enacted, have reached the same conclusion. In Connecticut, the Supreme Court of Errors, when called upon to construe the Act of 1867 (General Statutes of Connecticut, 1875, page 194) which provides that eight hours shall be deemed a lawful day's work, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, held that: "The only effect of the statute, where a case falls within it, is to release the laborer from work and entitle him to his compensation for a day's labor, at the end of eight hours.."5

Throughout it seems to have been the policy of the courts to construe laws tending to establish the duration of a day's work, strictly, and to confine their operation to those cases alone which fall directly within their provisions. Thus, in a case where a laborer who had worked more than eight hours daily in the employ of one who was engaged in cutting and finishing granite, under contract with the United States, brought suit against the United States to recover additional compensation, it was held that the Act of 1868 (supra) did not apply, for the reason that there was no privity of contract between him and the United States, and that he was not employed by it, or on its behalf."

With the exception of the Act of March 30, 1866 (First Supplement to R. S. U. S. 582) which directed the public printer "to rigidly enforce the eight-hour law," in the department under

3 Collins v. The United States (supra). 4 United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400.

5 Luske v. Hotchkiss, 39 Connecticut, 219.

6 Driscoll v. The United States, 96 U. S. 421.

his charge, there was no further legislation upon this subject until the enactment of the law now under consideration. Congress, nevertheless, was beset by labor organizations, wishing to procure legislation which would imperatively require the enforcement of the Act of 1868. The President, also was called upon to issue a proclamation commanding the heads of the Executive departments and other officers of the government to adopt the eight-hour standard. But the attorney-general, when the matter was submitted to him by the President, gave it as his opinion that the Act of 1868 was "no more and no less, in legal effect, than if Congress should provide that in all contracts for the purchase of coal, by officers of the United States, two thousand pounds should constitute a ton;" that it did not forbid officers of the United States to pay additional compensation for additional labor; that the President was without authority to regulate the performance of duties imposed by law upon subordinate administrative and executive officers, and that the relief sought could only be obtained through additional legislation." At length the House of Representatives, yielding to the pressure brought to bear upon it, passed the following bill, after a considerable debate; in the Senate it was passed with little or no opposition, and finally it was signed by the President, thus becoming a law on August 1, 1892:

"

"AN ACT RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF THE HOURS OF DAILY SERVICE OF LABORERS AND MECHANICS EMPLOYED UPON THE PUBLIC WORKS OF THE "UNITED States and of THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

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"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the service and employment of all laborers and mechanics who are now or may hereafter be employed by the government of the United States, by the District of Colum"bia, or by any contractor or subcontractor upon any of the public works of the United States or of the said District of Columbia, is hereby limited and "restricted to eight hours in any one calendar day, and it shall be unlawful for any officer of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia or any such contractor or subcontractor whose duty it shall be to employ, direct or control the services of such laborers or mechanics, or require or per"mit any such laborer or mechanic to work more than eight hours in any calendar day, except in cases of extraordinary emergency.

44

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SEC. 2. That any officer or agent of the Government of the United "States or of the District of Columbia, or any contractor or sub-contractor whose duty it shall be to employ, direct or control any laborer or mechanic "employed upon any of the public works of the United States or of the Dis"trict of Columbia who shall intentionally violate any provision of this act, "shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each and every such

719 Opinions of the Attorneys-General, p. 685.

"offense shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not to exceed one thou"sand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both "such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction ..thereof.

"SEC. 3. The provisions of this act shall not be construed so as to in any "manner apply to or affect contractors or sub-contractors, or to limit the hours "of daily service of laborers or mechanics engaged upon the public works of "the United States or of the District of Columbia for which contracts have “been entered into prior to the passage of this act.”

This is in derogation of the common law right of both the employers and employés, therein described, to fix the duration of a day's labor, by contract. It is also on its face a penal statute. Therefore it must be construed strictly, and at the same time, if possible, given the effect obviously intended by Congress.8

There has been some question whether the law applies to all laborers and mechanics employed by the Government of the United States and by the District of Columbia, or only to those so employed upon the public works. The phrase "upon the public works of the United States, or the District of Columbia," following the word "sub-contractor," in the first section of the act, may be taken either as qualifying all the preceding part of the section, or as quallifying only the words "contractors and sub-contractors." The title of the act favors the latter view, and "where doubt exists as to the meaning of a statute, the title may be looked to, for aid in its construction. Yet perhaps the most conclusive evidence of the intention of Congress is to be obtained from the condition of the country and existing legislation. "10

We have seen that the law was enacted at the solicitation of a powerful class of citizens, who desired the adoption and enforcement of the regulation suggested by the "eight-hour law" of 1868, which applied to "all laborers, workmen and mechanics, employed by, or on behalf of the United States." It also appears from the record of the debates in the Senate and House of Representatives 11 that it was understood, by the adherents and opponents of the present act, in both houses, at the time of its passage, that its provisions included all "laborers and mechanics employed by the government of the United States and by the District of Columbia." Strictly, the record of these debates would not be admissable in

88.

8 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; Respublica v. Weidle, 2 Dallas,

9 Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wallace, 380.

10 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Smythe v. Fiske, supra.

11 Congressional Record, pp. 6, 357 et seq., and 7, 638.