representative of the bondholders, to buy the road and so secure the debt, the sale being necessary, and the stockholders standing by and permitting it. Sepulture-Right of Widow to Control Husband's Interment.Hackett v. Hackett, 26 Atl. Rep. 42 (R. I.). In this case a bill in equity was brought to compel the respondent to return the body of her late husband to the grave where it was first buried, and from which she had caused it to be removed without the consent of the complainant, the father and next of kin of the deceased. The plaintiff relied upon a number of decisions, where general expressions were used by the courts to the effect that the next of kin had rights exclusive of all other persons in controlling interment. Held, that as a general rule the primary right to control the burial of a husband should be with the widow, in preference to the next of kin, dependent, however, upon the peculiar circumstances of the case or the waiver of such right by consent or otherwise. "It would be a shock to the sensibilities of humanity to say that the reasonable wishes of a wife in regard to the burial of her husband should not be entitled to paramount respect." Trade-marks Rights of Foreigners.-In Richter v. Anchor Remedy Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 455, the plaintiff, a foreigner, having a registered trade in his own country established a branch house in this country and subsequently registered his trade-mark, consisting of a red anchor on a white background, in the United States Patent Office. Prior to this registration but after the establishment of the branch house the defendant began using as a trade-mark in a similar business, an anchor in a combination much different from plaintiff's whole trade-mark. Suit for infringement was brought, and the United States Circuit Court held that the plaintiff had no common-law right to the trade-mark before registering it in the patent office; and following Desmond's Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 126, held that by the registration the plaintiff acquired no exclusive right to the use of an anchor as a trade-mark and that the use of the word and symbol in one combination did not prevent its use in other combinations, "unless it is so similar in appearance that any person using such reasonable care and diligence as the public generally are capable of using and may be expected to exercise would mistake one for the other." BOOK NOTICES. The Law of Collateral Attack on Judicial Proceedings. By Hon. John M. Vanfleet, of the Indiana Circuit Court. Co., 1892. Callaghan & It is indeed strange that so important a branch of the law as collateral attack has never before been the subject of a special treatise. The work which Judge Vanfleet has just completed is therefore of particular interest and value. His treatment of the subject is clear, logical and exhaustive. All the cases have been examined and there is no attempt to reconcile conflicting authorities. The author is particularly free in criticism and has attempted to determine the true rule in all cases of conflict or doubt. The advantage of careful study of the subject in all its features, by so good an authority, insures the soundness of such criticism. A special feature is the arrangement of the work in alphabetical order and as nearly as possible like an encyclopædia. This together with the general index furnishes a quick and ready view of the contents. The care which characterizes the whole work is evidenced by its excellent appearance, the typography and binding being all that could be desired. Patentable Invention. By Edward S. Renwick. Cooperative Publishing Co., Rochester, N. Y., 1893. Lawyer's In this little book the author does not attempt to go at large into details, but simply presents, from the standpoint of the practical mechanic and expert, the main principles which determine the patentability of new inventions. Simplicity and conciseness are the main features of the work, but the citations are sufficiently numerous to point out the way to fuller investigation if the case demands. The book will be useful to the student as well as the practicing lawyer, and should be in every library. Harvard Law Review, April, 1893. Alteration of Negotiable Instruments, Melville M. Bigelow State Corporations, Alfred Russell Land Transfer-A Reply to Criticisms of the Tor- James R. Carret A Defect in the Massachusetts Probate System, Columbia Law Times, April, 1893. Oliver Prescott, Jr. Intention in Law-A Study in Legal Evolution, The Counsellor, March, 1893. Prof. Munroe Smith The Meaning of Some Terms in the Law of Torts, Howard A. Taylor The Extradition and Rendition of Fugitive Crimi- Michigan Law Journal, April, 1893. John D. Lindsay The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, The Liability of Private Corporations, Northwestern Law Review, March, 1893. Bills and Notes, Malice in the Law of Tort, Central Law Journal. Thomas M. Cooley April 7. Suit in Equity to Restrain Action of Munic- Percy Edwards It is an interesting and instructive exercise to follow through a line of successive opinions of the court of last resort, of a State, the gradual unfolding, by repeated applications to new conditions and circumstances, of some particular principle, rule or doctrine of law. To see how step by step, a little added here, a little there, perhaps sometimes a little abated here or there, the principle is developed, expanded, clarified. There are many such lines which may be followed in our Connecticut reports, some of them relating to the construction of important statutes, as the statute of frauds, upon which there are enough decisions in this State to fill an entire volume of our reports. The statute relating to mechanic's liens, the statute of charitable uses, of perpetuities, various sections concerning probate law and procedure, wills and administration; some of them also not based on statute, as concerning hearings in damages, upon default or demurrer overruled; the effect of retention of possession by vendor of personal property, after sale; conditional sales, what findings in reference to negligence may be reviewed, as questions of law, and what may not, as questions of fact, and scores of others, which might be mentioned. It is the purpose of this paper to take up and pursue one of those subjects, and thereby discover, as best we may, how the Supreme Court of Connecticut has answered two questions concerning the extraordinary writ of mandamus, namely; first, under what circumstances and upon what principle may a public officer, entrusted with power, be controlled in respect to the exercise of that power by mandamus? And second, when and upon what principle is the action of the trial court, in granting or refusing a mandamus, subject to revision on appeal? I shall, in reference to each question, considering them in the above order, state, first, the most important, the illustrative cases, and, briefly, the points decided, and shall then endeavor to give the sum or conclusion, to be derived from them all, taken collectively and as a whole. Taking up the first question, then; It was held in Treat v. Middletown, 8 Conn. 243, that mandamus lay to compel selectmen to open a highway laid out. The Court, punctuating each sentence, with reference to authorities, said, "The common law has provided a writ to prevent a failure of justice, where there is no established specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one. A mandamus lies to compel any person, corporation, or inferior court, to do a particular act, which they neglect. And whenever a statute directs something to be done the court will enforce the doing of it, by mandamus. England, this writ may reach a judge on the bench, and direct him to enter up a judgment, as well as a church warden who refuses to admit a sexton. And in our country it may enter the bureau of the Secretary of State" (citing the then recent case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 171)" as well as the more humble office of a town clerk, or that of the trustees of an academy," (citing Strong's case, Kirby, 345, and Fuller v. Plainfield, 6 Conn. 532). In In the Town of Waterbury v. The H., P. & F. R. R. Co., 27 Conn. 146, it was held that a mandamus to compel the defendant corporation to construct a highway in place of one taken by them for the site of their road, could not be maintained, the reason given being, that the subject matter was within the jurisdiction of the commissioners on the railroad, and that "so long as the commissioners were acting within their jurisdiction, and without fraud, their determination could not be reviewed by the Superior Court." In State v. Hd. & N. H. R. R. Co., 29 Conn. 538, it was held that mandamns lay to compel a railroad corporation to carry out the objects of its creation, to conform to its charter, and to run trains over its whole road. A similar case is that of the State v. The N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 37 Conn. 163, where the writ issued to compel the corporation to re-establish a depot, unlawfully discontinued. |