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of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not, at a fair valuation,3 be sufficient in amount to pay his debts; (16) "judge" shall mean a judge of a court of bankruptcy, not including the referee; (17) "oath" shall include affirmation; (18) "officer" shall include clerk, marshal, receiver, referee, and trustee, and the imposing of a duty upon or the forbidding of an act by any officer shall include his successor and any person authorized by law to perform the duties of such officer; (19) "persons" shall

1 See notes to §3.

2See notes to $3.

3 What a fair valuation may be is a question of fact. It is not a fancy price, nor is it such a price as might be realized on a forced sale, because at such a sale, goods are ordinarily sold at a sacrifice price. It is such a price as persons dealing in the particular line would place on the goods in view of their condition and cost in the open market-such as a good careful business man would inventory the goods at in the ordinary course of business (see in re Martin [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 301). When a question of insolvency arises under this subdivision, all the property which the bankrupt owns is to be reckoned in computing the amount of his assets, except such as may have been transferred or concealed in fraud of his creditors, but not excluding property which is exempt from execution by the laws of the state (in re Baumann [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 946). If, so computing it, the testimony shows assets that cost over $30,000, say, while the liabilities aggregate less than $16,000, insolvency does not exist (in re Rogers' Milling Co. [D. C.], 102 Fed. Rep. 687).

Under the U. S. Revenue Law, the word "debt" was defined as follows: "Standing alone, the word 'debt' is as applicable to a sum of money which has been promised at a future day as to a sum now due and payable. If we wish to distinguish between the two, we say of the former that it is a debt owing, and of the latter that it is a debt due. In other words, debts are of two kinds: solvendum in praesenti and solvendum in futuro. Whether a claim or demand is a debt or not is in no respect determined by a reference to the time of payment. A sum of money which is certainly and in all events payable is a debt, without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. A sum payable upon a contingency, however, is not a debt, or does not become a debt until the contingency has happened" (People v. Arguello, 37 Cal. 525). While this language was used in the construction of a statute foreign to bankruptcy, yet it applies in all its particulars to the bankrupt Act of 1867 for that act declares "that all debts due and payable from the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy, and all debts then existing but not payable until a future day may be proved against the estate of a bankrupt" (§19, Act 1867. See also Rev. Stat. 25067 [Act 1841, 85]). The time of the adjudication was the time the petition was filed (in re Patterson, 1 B. R. 125; Bailey v. Loeb, 11 B. R. 271; 2 Cent. L. J. 42. See also §63 and notes as to debts which may be proved).

"See notes to §14 b.

* * *

include corporations, except where otherwise specified, and officers, partnerships, and women, and when used with reference to the commission of acts which are herein forbidden shall include persons who are participants in the forbidden acts, and the agents, officers, and members of the board of directors or trustees, or other similar controlling bodies of corporations; (20) "petition" shall mean a paper filed in a court of bankruptcy or with a clerk or deputy clerk by a debtor praying for the benefits of this act, or by creditors alleging the commission of an act of bankruptcy by a debtor therein named; (21) "referee" shall mean the referee who has jurisdiction of the case or to whom the case has been referred, or any one acting in his stead; (22) "conceal" shall include secrete, falsify, and mutilate; (23) "secured creditor" shall include a creditor who has security for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature to be assignable under this act, or who owns such a debt for which some indorser, surety, or other persons secondarily liable for the bankrupt has such security upon the bankrupt's assets; (24) "States" shall include the Territories, the Indian Territory, Alaska, and the District of Columbia; (25) "transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode of disposing of or parting with property, or the possession of property, absolutely or conditionally as a payment, pledge, mort gage, gift or security; (26) "trustee" shall include all of the trustees of an estate; (27) "wage-earner" shall mean an individual who works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compensation not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars per year; (28) words importing the masculine gender may be applied to and include corporations, partnerships, and women; (29) words importing the plural number may be applied to and mean only a single person or thing; (30) words importing the singular number may be applied to and mean several persons or things.

CHAPTER II.

CREATION OF COURTS OF BANKRUPTCY AND THEIR JURISDICTION.

SEC. 2. That the courts of bankruptcy' as hereinbefore defined, viz., the district courts of the United States in the several States, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, the district courts of the several Territories, and the United States courts in the Indian Territory and the District of Alaska, are hereby made courts of bankruptcy, and are hereby invested, within their respective territorial limits as now established, or as they may be hereafter changed, with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings, in 2 in vacation in chambers

'Bankruptcy Courts are statutory in origin. Such courts differ from common law courts in the extent and exercise of their jurisdiction. They have no powers, authority or jurisdiction except as expressly conferred upon them by statute, or such as may be necessary to enable the court, efficiently, to carry the law into effect (Clark v. Binninger, 38 How. Pr. 341; s. c. 3 B. R. 518; in re Norris, 4 B. R. 35; Jobbins v. Montague, 6 B. R. 509; Russell v Cheatham, 16 Miss. 703). Yet, they are not inferior courts in the sense that the face of the record must show jurisdiction to give validity to their acts (Hayes v. Ford, 15 B. R. 569; Buckman v. Cowell, I N. Y. 505; Bank v. Judson, 8 N. Y. 254; Reed v. Vaughan, 10 Mo. 447).

"The Act of 1867 (§1) provided that jurisdiction might be exercised "in their respective districts." In the present act, the language is "within their respective territorial limits." In Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516; s. c 13 B. R. 472, the Supreme Court held that the territorial jurisdiction conferred by the former act was such that the courts of districts other than that in which the bankrupt proceedings were pending, might exercise jurisdiction in matters growing out of or connected with any particular bankrupt proceeding pending in another district so far as the jurisdiction so exercised did not conflict with that of the court in which the proceedings were pending. See also Shearman v. Bingham, 7 B. R. 490; s c. 3 Cliff. 552; Goodall v. Tuttle, 7 B R. 193; Payson v. Dietz, 8 B R. 193. The jurisdiction thus referred to enabled the court which acquired jurisdiction over the bankrupt by the filing of a petition to adjudicate all questions relating to the property of the bankrupt, of whatever character, within its district and all questions excepting the reduction to possession of property without that district. The title to the property, wherever situated, having vested in the legal representative of the bankrupt, the decrees of the court in which the petition was filed would affect the claims of all creditors, whether residing within or without the district, however they might have been brought into the proceeding, or whether they appeared at all (Markson v. Heaney, 1 Dill. 497; s. c. 4 B. R. 510; Paine v. Caldwell, 6 B. R. 558; Piquet v. Swan, 5 Mason, 35; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 327; Herndon v.

and during their respective terms, as they are now or may be hereafter held, to (1) adjudge persons bankrupt who have had their principal place of business, resided, or had their domicile within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six months, or the greater portion thereof, or who do not have their principal place of business, reside, or have their domicile within the United States, but have property within their jurisdictions, or who have been adjudged bankrupts by courts of competent jurisdiction without the United States and have property within their jurisdictions,' (2) allow

Ridgeway, 17 How. 424; in re Hirsch, 2 B. R. 3; s. c. 2 Ben. 493; Jobbins v. Montague, 6 B. R. 509). Under the present act, the property of the bankrupt without the jurisdiction of the district in which the petition is filed, may be reduced to the possession of the Trustee through such courts as the bankrupt might have proceeded before bankrupt proceedings had been commenced (See $23). See also Rule IV as to the right of interested persons to appear personally or by attorney; $69 relating to possession of property; and §70 as to the title of property, together with the notes to these sections.

The powers conferred by this section vest the bankruptcy courts with full jurisdiction of actions at law and suits in equity to collect the estates of bankrupts, and this jurisdiction is not impaired in any respect by the provisions of $23 b (in re Woodbury et al. [D. C.]. 98 Fed. Rep. 833; in re Mayer [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 839; in re Scott et al. [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 404; Wall et al. v. Cox C. C. A.]. 101 Fed. Rep 403. See also $23b and notes thereto).

"

1The Act of 1867 provided that persons who "had resided or carried on business for six months next preceding the time of filing such petition, or for the longest period during such six months. Where the place of residence conflicted with that of domicile, questions arose in which it was held that the bankrupt proceedings should be commenced with reference to the place of residence, and not with reference to the domicile (In re Watson, 4 B. R. 613; Styles v. Lay, 9 Ala. 795; in re Kinssman, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 307). Since the present act provides that the proceedings may be commenced with reference to the domicile as well as the residence, these decisions are of importance only in so far as they show the strict interpretations placed on each word in the act.

Where a corporation, organized under the laws of one state in which it did its manufacturing, has an executive office in another state, the latter may be regarded as its domicile, especially when its manufacturing works has been shut down in the former state some months before the filing of the petition (in re Machine & Conveyer Co. [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 135; s. c. 91 Fed. Rep. 630). So, the place of business of a firm is its domicile (in re Blair et al. [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 76). "Domicile" is analogous to "residence;" it means "that residence from which there is no present intention to remove, or to which there is a general intention to return' after one has been absent from it and taken up an abode and engaged in business in other places (In re Williams [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 544). Whenever residence is put in issue, the petitioner has the burden of establishing it as being in the district alleged in the petition (In re Waxelbaum [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 562). The issue may be raised, before adjudication, on a motion to dismiss the

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claims, disallow claims, reconsider allowed or allowed claims, and allow or disallow them against bankrupt estates; (3) appoint receivers or the marshals, upon application of parties in interest, in case the courts shall find it absolutely necessary, for the preservation of estates, to take charge of the property of bankrupts after the filing of the petition and until it is dismissed or the trustee is qualified;3 (4) arraign, try, and punish bankrupts, officers, and other persons, and the agents, officers, members of the board of directors or trustees, or other similar controlling bodies of corporations for violations of this act, in accordance with the laws of procedure of the United States now in force, or such as may be hereafter enacted, regulating trials for the alleged violation of laws of the United States; (5) authorize the business of bankrupts to be conducted for limited periods by receivers, the marshals, or trustees, if necessary in the best interests of the estates; (6) bring in and substitute additional persons

petition for want of jurisdiction (in re Waxelbaum [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 589). See also Forms and 3 for allegation of residence in petitions; also Rule VI as to petitions in different districts, and Rule VII as to priority of petitions when two or more are filed against a common debtor.

1For proof and allowance of claims, see §57; for provable debts, §63, and notes to these sections.

2"Bankrupt estate" undoubtedly has the same meaning as "estate of a bankrupt." This latter expression means such property and rights of property of the bankrupt as the bankrupt act vests in the assignee (In re Hambright, 2 B. R. 498).

See $70 as to what and when the title to property vests in the trustee, together with the notes under that section. See $29 as to punishment for concealing or appropriating property belonging to the bankrupt's estate.

The power here vested in the court to appoint receivers or marshals was inserted in the bill after the report of the Conference Committees of the House and Senate, thereby showing that the intention of Congress was to leave the title of property in the bankrupt until adjudication. See $69, as to possession of property and §70 as to title of property. The bankruptcy court may enjoin a disposal of the property in order to preserve the estate until a trustee can be appointed (Rumsey & Skinner Co. et al. v. Novelty & Machine Co. et al. [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 699).

See §1 (26) for definition of trustee; §23 as to suits by trustees; $44 and 45. relative to their appointment; $50 b as to what constitutes their qualification; $46 as to death or removal; $47 as to duties; $48 as to compensation; and $49 as to inspection of papers and accounts in their possession.

'See §19 relative to the right of trial by jury; §29 as to offenses generally, and $41 as to contempts before Referees.