Provided, however, That he shall not be required to attend a meeting of his creditors, or at or for an examination at a place more than one hundred and fifty miles distant from his home or principal place of business, or to examine claims except when presented to him, unless ordered by the court, or a judge thereof, for cause shown, and the bankrupt shall be paid his actual expenses from the estate when examined or required to attend at any place other than the city, town, or village of his residence.

SEC. 8. Death or Insanity of Bankrupts.—a The death or insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, but the same shall be conducted and concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though he had not died or become insane: Provided, That in case of death the widow and children shall be entitled to all

s. c 2 B. R. 95; in re Vetterlein, 5 Ben. 7; s. c. 4 B. R. 599; in re Solis, 4 Ben. 143; S. c. 4 B. R. 68), at any stage of the proceedings, before the first meeting of creditors (In re Franklin Syndicate et al. [D. C.], 101 Fed. Rep. 402), and even after a petition for a discharge (In re Price [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 131; s. c. 91 Fed. Rep. 635; s. c. 92 Fed. Rep. 987). The bankrupt may not refuse to take the oath before the referee (In re Scott [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 161; s. c. 95 Fed. Rep. 815), or to give testimony in actions between the trustee and third parties on the ground that it would incriminate him, he being in this respect protected by this subdivision (Mackel v. Rochester [C. C. A.], 102 Fed. Rep. 314), and he should answer all material questions of the trustee or any creditor, or their attorneys (In re Hayden [D. C.]. 1 N. B. News, 265; s. c. 96 Fed. Rep. 199), for a refusal may be contempt (841; in re Vogel, 5. B. R. 393), as may also an evasive answer, such as "I don't recollect," to facts necessarily within his knowledge (In re Salkey & Gerson, 11 B R. 423, citing and reviewing the English cases. See also in re Mooney, 15 B. R. 456), and an actually and wilfully false answer relative to his property or debts will be perjury (U. S. v. Dickey, 1 Morris, 412), though, perhaps, not so punishable (In re Marx et al. [D. C.], 102 Fed. Rep. 676). The inquiries, however, should be reasonably pertinent, and if they become unreasonably discursive, the expense must be borne by the examining parties (In re Forest [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 258; s. c. 93 Fed. Rep. 190). The inquiry, however, is not limited to facts and transactions occurring within four months prior to the bankruptcy, but may be directed to matters anterior to that time (In re Brundage [D. C.], 100 Fed. Rep. 613). A creditor is not bound by an examination made by others-he, himself, may examine in his own way (In re Vogel, 5 B. R. 393), though it should not unnecessarily oppress or annoy the bankrupt (In re Gilbert, 3 B. R. 152). After the bankrupt has once submitted to an examination, an order for a further examination will not be granted on an ex parte application-the bankrupt is entitled to notice and has a right to be heard (In re Gilbert, 3 B. R. 152; in re Van Tuyle, 2 B. R. 70; in re Robinson & Chamberlain, 2 B. R. 516; in re Frisbie, 13 B. R. 349). The bankrupt cannot refuse to answer a question on the ground that it tends to discredit or degrade him (In re Richards, 4 Ben. 303). but he may do so if it

rights of dower and allowance fixed by the laws of the State of the bankrupt's residence.'

SEC. 9. Protection and Detention of Bankrupts."— a A bankrupt shall be exempt from arrest upon civil process except in the following cases: (1) When issued from a court of bankruptcy for contempt or disobedience of its lawful orders; (2) when issued from a State court having jurisdiction, and served within such State, upon a debt or claim from which his discharge in bankruptcy would not

tends to criminate him (In re Koch, 1 B. R. 549; in re Patterson, 1 B. R. 147; s. c. I Ben. 508; in re Scott [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 161; s. c. 95 Fed. Rep. 815. Contra, in re Bromley, 3 B. R. 686). Whether a wife may testify for or against her husband in a bankruptcy proceeding is still an open question, some courts holding the affirmative (In re Forest, supra), and others the negative (in re Fowler [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 265; s. c. 93 Fed. Rep. 417).

As to what amounts to a false oath relative to the schedules, see 29 b and notes to same. See also 58 a (1) as to notice of examination to be given creditors.

1 Analogous provisions: Act 1800 & 45; 1867, 12; R S., 5090. The provision is to dower and allowance appeared in no former act.

2 Analogous provisions: Act of 1800, 222, 38, 60; 1867, 26; R. S. 5107. See also Act 1867, 40; R. S. 85024, relative to arrest of bankrupt. One under arrest at the time of becoming a bankrupt is not entitled, because of his petition in bankruptcy, to a release from such arrest (In re Walker, 1 B. R. 318; s. c. 1 Lowell, 222; Minon v VanNorstrand, 4 B. R. 108; s. c. 1 Lowell, 458; in re Casey [D. C.], I N. B. News, 166); and if he be out on bail, the court of bankruptcy will not intervene to prevent his bail surrendering him to the jailor (In re Cheney, 5 Law Rep. 19; Hazleton v. Valentine, 2 B. R. 31; in re Rank, Crabbe 493), though on this, the courts are not agreed (Foxall v. Levi, 1 Cranch C. C. 139; Lingan v. Bayley, 1 Cranch C. C. 112).

The proper practice for procuring the release of a bankrupt improperly arrested is to move for a discharge before the State court which issued the warrant, for it is the duty of that court to release the bankrupt (In re Migel, 2 B. R. 481; in re Wiggers, 2 Biss. 71; in re O'Mara, 4 Biss. 506; in re Simpson, 2 B. R. 47); and the Federal courts will not intervene by habeas corpus until the State court has had an opportunity to hear and decide the Federal question involved (U. S., ex rel Scott v. McAleen [C. C. A.], 1 N. B. News, 265). If the State court fails in its duty, the court of bankruptcy in a proper case will discharge the prisoner on a motion or on habeas corpus (In re Wiggers, supra; in re Williams & McPheeters, 11 B. R. 145; s. c. 6 Biss. 233; in re Simpson, supra; in re Glaser, 2 Ben. 180; s. c. 1 B. R. 336; in re Taylor, 16 B. R. 40. See also Rule XXX as to imprisoned debtors). The discharge of the prisoner may be made by any court of bankruptcy which can acquire jurisdiction of the person detaining the bankrupt, without regard to the district in which he may be confined or where the proceedings in bankruptcy may be pending (In re Seymour, 1 Ben. 348; s. c. 1 B. R. 29 See also Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516; s. c. 13 B. R. 472; Hazleton v. Valentine, 2 B. R. 31; s c. 1 Lowell, 270). An action for escape will not lie against an officer who releases a prisoner in obedience to an order from a court of bankruptcy (Thomas v. Hudson, 13 Mees. & W. 353, 816, 884; Norton v. Walker, 3 Excheq. 480), nor can a State court

I

be a release, and in such case he shall be exempt from such arrest when in attendance upon a court of bankruptcy or engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by this act.2

b The judge may, at any time after the filing of a petition by or against a person, and before the expiration of one month after the qualification of the trustee, upon satisfactory proof by the affidavits of at least two persons that such bankrupt is about to leave the district in which he resides or has his principal place of business to avoid examination, and that his departure will defeat the proceedings in bankruptcy, issue a warrant to the marshal, directing him to bring such bankrupt forthwith before the

punish one for obeying such order (In re Kimball, 1 B. R. 193; in re Hurst, 4 Dallas, 387; Lyell v. Goodwin, 4 McLean, 32), since a disobedience would be contempt.

A bankrupt who withholds money from the trustee, alleged to be lost, will be committed for contempt if the facts are so transparent as to rebut his allegation (In re Purvine [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 326).

A State court has no authority to imprison a bankrupt for failure to pay alimony (In re Houston [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 305; s. c. 94 Fed. Rep. 119).

1As to the debts not affected by a discharge in bankruptcy, see 17. The court of bankruptcy, treating the question of the release of the debt on which the arrest was made or one of fact, will carefully examine all legal evidence brought before it on an application to discharge the bankrupt from an arrest (In re Alsberg, 16 B. R. 116; in re Williams & McPheeters, 11 B. R. 145; s. c. 6 Biss. 233; in re Glaser, I B. R. 336; s. c. 2 Ben. 180; in re Kimball, 1 B. R. 193), and if the debt is one not affected by a discharge in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court will not discharge him from the arrest under State process. This, too, even though Rule XXX authorizes his release if the debt or claim is one provable in bankruptcy, that rule being subordinate to the provisions of this section (In re Baker [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 954), though an earlier tendency of the courts had been to rest the decision on an examination of the ex parte showing made before the State court issuing the warrant, leaving the question of fact, the release of the debt, to be determined by the State court if jurisdiction in the State court appeared upon the face of the proceedings (In re Robinson, 2 B. R. 342; s. c. 36 How. Pr. 176; s. c. 6 Blatch. 253; in re Valk, 3 B. R. 278; s. c. 3 Ben. 431; in re Kimball, 2 B. R. 354: s. c. 6 Blatch. 292; s c. 2 Ben. 554). If, however, the proceeding in the State court is based on the fraudulent contraction of the debt on which the bankrupt is arrested, and has proceeded to judgment, the court of bankruptcy will consider itself bound by the finding of facts by the State court (In re Whitehouse, 4 B. R. 63; s. c. 1 Lowell, 429; Shuman v. Štrauss, 52 N. Y. 404; in re Patterson, 1 B. R. 307; s. c. 2 Ben. 155).

The exemption of the bankrupt from arrest on civil process from a State court is not to be restricted to the particular occasions when he is physically in attendance in court, or actually engaged in performing a required duty, but is extended by Rule XII to the whole period of time during which he is under the jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy-until he is discharged or the court from any cause loses jurisdiction of the proceedings (In re Lewensohn [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 73).

court for examination. If upon hearing the evidence of the parties it shall appear to the court or a judge thereof that the allegations are true and that it is necessary, he shall order such marshal to keep such bankrupt in custody not exceeding ten days, but not imprison him; until he shall be examined and released or give bail conditioned for his appearance for examination, from time to time, not exceeding in all ten days, as required by the court, and for his obedience to all lawful orders made in reference thereto.'

SEC. 10. Extradition of Bankrupts.—a Whenever a warrant for the apprehension of a bankrupt shall have been issued, and he shall have been found within the jurisdiction of a court other than the one issuing the warrant, he may be extradited in the same manner in which persons under indictment are now extradited from one district within which a district court has jurisdiction to another.

SEC. II. Suits by and Against Bankrupts.-a A suit which is founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be a release, and which is pending against a person at the time of the filing of a petition against him, shall be stayed until after an adjudication or the dismissal of the petition; if such person is adjudged a bankrupt, such action may be further stayed until the twelve months after the date of said adjudication, or, if

1In its report on this act to the House on Dec. 16, 1897, the Judiciary Committee explained that this paragraph was only intended to apply to bankrupts who were about to leave the district for the sole purpose of avoiding an examination, and said that "if he left for other purposes, such as to better his condition, the provisions of the law will not apply to him." The warrant upon which the bankrupt is arrested need not state that he is to be brought before the court for examination. In addition to the warrant here authorized, the court may issue an order in the nature of a writ of ne exeat under the provisions of 2 [15] (In re Lipkie et al. [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 970). The facts and circumstances on which the affiants reach their conclusion as to the intention of the bankrupt must be set out (In re McKibben, 12 B R. 97; in re Hadley, 12 B. R. 366; ex p. Heyman, 26 L. T. N. S. 339).

within that time such person applies for a discharge, then until the question of such discharge is determined.1

1The language, "filing of a petition against him," has reference to both the voluntary and the involuntary bankrupt (21[1]). It is a suit to press a personal liability and not one to enforce a valid lien to which the stay applies (Mason v. Warthens, 14 B. R. 341), the act not being intended to affect such liens (867d). The stay will reach suits began against the bankrupt after adjudication as well as those pending at the time of the filing of the petition (In re Basch [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 761), though it will not be granted when the debt would not be released by a discharge, as alimony (In re Anderson [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 321), though as to that there is a difference of judicial opinion (In re Challoner [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 82). If, however, the enforcement of the lien will injuriously affect the estate of the bankrupt, the court will undoubtedly restrain the proceedings, especially when it will not injure the lienor. It is of no consequence in what court the proceedings may be pending, for a stay will reach them in a court of appellate as well as in a court of original jurisdiction (In re Metcalf & Duncan, 2 Ben. 78; s. c. 1 B. R. 201; Merritt v. Glidden, 39 Cal. 559; s. c. 5 B. R. 157; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 479). And so long as the purpose is the same, the character of the proceedings (In re Whipple, 13 B. R. 373; in re Migel, 2 B. R. 481; in re Rosenberg, 2 B. R 236; in re Duncan, 14 B. R. 18; in re Schwartz, 15 B. R. 330), or the stage of their advancement (In re Metcalf & Duncan, supra; Zimmer v. Schleehauf, 115 Mass. 52; s. c. 11 B. R. 313) is of no consequence. The application for the stay may be made by either the bankrupt or the trustee, and probably by a creditor injuriously affected by the suit, to the State court (In re Frostman & Hicks, 15 B. R. 41), or to the bankruptcy court (In re Meyers, 1 B. R. 581; in re Reed, 1 B. R. 1; in re Jacoby, 1 B. R. 118; Sampson v. Burton, 4 B. R. 1; s. c. 5 Ben. 325), the latter being preferable (In re Basch [D. C.] 97 Fed. Rep. 761). When the order to stay is made by the bankruptcy court, the injunction is directed to the suitor and not to the State court (In re Meyers, supra), though a better practice would be to direct it to both, since the State court is subject to the supervisory direction of the bankruptcy court. The action of the district court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that there was an abuse of discretion (In re Lesser et al. [C. C. A.], 99 Fed. Rep. 913). When a suit is not stayed, a judgment entered in it is not a nullity (Ewart v. Schwartz, 48 N. Y. Superior, 390; Flannigan v. Pearson, 14 B. R. 37; s. c. 42 Tex. 1), but its collection may be defeated by setting up the discharge in bankruptcy of the debt on which the judgment is founded (McDonald v. Davis, 105 N. Y. 508)

In considering the application for a stay, when the order is discretionary, the court should weigh the effect the stay would have on the rights of third persons and consider the rights the suing creditor might have against persons or bodies that are collaterally liable, or may become co-debtors; if the effect is injurious, the order to stay should not be made (Shellington v. Howland, 53 N. Y. 371; Allen v. Ward, 36 N. Y. Superior, 290; Ansonia Co. v. Chimney Co., 10 B. R. 355; Meyer v. Aurora Ins. Co., 7 B. R. 191; Cooper v. Troy Woolen Co., 11 Abb. Pr. [N. S.], 353; Allen v. Soldier's B. M. & D. Co., 4 B. R. 537; Hoyt v. Freel, 4 B. R. 131; s. c. 8 Abb. Pr. [N. S.], 220; in re Ghiradelli, 4 B. R. 164; s. c. I Saw. 343). A judgment may be rendered in a suit commenced after adjudication in bankruptcy when the claim is in danger of being lost under the statute of limitations. A judgment so rendered will establish the claim and stop the running of the statute (In re McBryde [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 686).