is indictable as a conspiracy. It was unlawful for persons, for gain, to conspire to procure an appointment in the service of the East India Company, Rex v. Sutton. An agreement between private individuals to support each other in all undertakings, lawful or otherwise, is illegal.

There are many cases in which the act itself would not be cognizable by law, if done by a single person, which become the subject of indictment when effected by several with a joint design. Thus, each person attending a theatre has a right to express his disapprobation of the piece acted, or a performer on the stage; but if several agree to condemn a play, or hiss an actor, they will be guilty of a conspiracy, 2 Camp. 358. Again, a person might singly and without criminal liability refuse to pay rates or taxes, as in many cases is the practice of the Quakers; but if several were to enter into an agreement for that purpose, or to act in concert, they would be guilty of conspiring for an unlawful object. The same applies to a number of persons agreeing not to pay the fine, or serve in the militia if balloted.

The punishment of conspiracy is fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

XI. TRADES UNIONS AND COMBINATIONS.

Related to and often identical with the offence of conspiracy are confederacies among workpeople and their employers; ostensibly formed for the protection of their respective interests against each other, but frequently terminating in their reciprocal annoyance and injury. By 6 G. 4, c. 129, ss. 4, 5, both the common and statute law are repealed, which inflict punishment either on masters or workmen for meeting and entering into agreements for the sole pur pose of settling the rate of wages or the hours of work. But agreements or combinations for other purposes than to regulate wages and the hours of labour may be criminal, subjecting the offenders to imprisonment and hard labour for any period not exceeding three calendar months. By the third section of the statute, the workman is protected in the free disposal of his labour against any combination of his fellow-workmen; he may make such terms and agree to such conditions as he pleases with his employer, without regard to the rules and regulations of any trade union or society, and cannot, with impunity, be compelled to belong to any club or association, nor in any way be coerced by threat, intimidation, molesting, or obstruction. On the other hand, the employer is protected in the liberty to carry on his business or manufacture as he thinks best, and no one can lawfully interfere to dictate to him the kind of workmen he shall employ, nor whether by piece or day work, nor the number of apprentices he shall keep.

Interferences of this kind are expressly prohibited by the statute, and it is likely interference with the freedom of industry of other

descriptions would be cognizable as conspiracy by the common law. No class of persons, neither men nor masters, can legally conspire to the detriment of any individual. Hence it may be doubted whether a combination of workmen not to work with another work man is legal; and the same doubt may be expressed as to the lawfulness of those defensive associations sometimes resorted to by masters, namely, when they agree among themselves not to employ any operative belonging to a trade union.

In conclusion, a point of law affecting the financial departments of trades unions may be mentioned with advantage. It has been decided that if the union is a combination for an unlawful purpose, the unionists are without legal remedy, provided the treasurer or other officer purloin the funds of the society. But it is expected that some legislative remedy for this will be speedily provided.

XII. BRIBERY, EMBRACERY, EXTORTION.

Bribery is when a judge, or other person concerned in the administration of justice, takes an undue reward to influence his behaviour in his office; and though the bribe is refused, the offerer is punishable. By 11 H. 4, it was provided that all judges and officers of the king, convicted of bribery, should forfeit treble the bribe, be punished at the king's will, and be discharged from his service for ever.

To offer money to a king's minister, for the purposes of obtaining a public employment, is held to be a misdemeanor, 4 Burr. 2495. Officers of the revenue taking bribes are punishable by particular statutes; so, also, is the offence of bribery at parliamentary elections, ante, p. 25.

It has been before shown that, by 5 & 6 E. 6, c. 16, the sale of offices in courts of justice is prohibited on pain of forfeiture and disability; and the ecclesiastical courts are within the meaning of the act.

Embracery is an attempt to influence the jury in their verdict, by overawing them, or by promises, entreaties, or entertainments. The punishment of the embraceor, and of the jurors wilfully and corruptly consenting thereto, is, by 6 G. 4, c. 50, s. 61, fine and imprisonment.

Extortion signifies, in a large sense, any oppression under colour of right; but strictly, it is an officer taking, by colour of his office, any money or valuable, where none is due, or not so much as is due, or before it is due. The punishment is, removal from office, fine, or imprisonment.

XIII. DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS, WILLS, AND WRITINGS.

By 24 & 25 V. c. 96, s. 30, if any person steal, or for any fraudulent purpose take away or obliterate, injure, or destroy any

record, writ, panel, process, deposition, affidavit, petition, rule, order, or any original document, whether belonging to any court of justice, or relating to any matter civil or criminal depending in any court, or to any public office or employment, he is liable to penal servitude for three years, or imprisonment not above two years, with or without hard labour or solitude.

By 29th section of 24 & 25 V. c. 96, to steal, or for any fraudulent purpose conceal, cancel, obliterate, or destroy, any will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument relative to real or personal property, is felony, subject to penal servitude for life, or not less than three years, or imprisonment not above two years, with or without hard labour or solitary confinement. Stealing or altering the writings or evidence relative to the title to lands, is penal servitude for three or imprisonment for two years.

The last offence against public justice we shall mention is the negligence of public officers intrusted with ministerial duties, as sheriffs, coroners, and constables; which makes the offender liable to be fined, and, in flagrant cases, will amount to a forfeiture of office, if a beneficial one. Other punishments for similar offences are in many cases provided by statute.

CHAPTER VIII.

Offences against the Public Peace.

THESE offences are either such as are an actual breach of the peace, or constructively so by tending to make others break it. Both these species of offence are either felonies or misdemeanors. The felonious breaches of the peace are strained up to that degree of criminality by several modern statutes: we shall begin with the less penal offences against the peace.

I. CHALLENGE TO FIGHT.

To challenge to fight, either by word or letter, or be the bearer of such challenge, is an indictable offence, punishable with fine and imprisonment. It is an offence, though the provocation to fight does not succeed; and it is a misdemeanor merely to endeavour to provoke another to send a challenge, 6 East. 464. But mere words which, though they may produce a challenge, do not directly tend to that issue, as calling a man a liar or knare, are not necessarily criminal, though it is probable they would be so if it could be shown they were meant to provoke a challenge.

II. AFFRAY,

From the French effrayer, "to frighten," signifies a fighting between two or more in some public place, for if the fighting be private, it is not an affray, but an assault. No angry or threatening words, however violent, amount to an affray: but if a person arm himself with dangerous or unusual weapons in a way to excite terror in the people, it is an affray. Persons present and assisting at such disorder, as a prize-fight, are guilty of an affray (Arnold on Public Meetings, 14). The punishment of common affray is by fine and imprisonment. Affrays may be suppressed by any private person present; but the constable, who is bound to keep the peace, may break open doors to suppress an affray, or apprehend the affrayers.

III. ROUT, UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY, RIOT.

A rout is a disturbance of the peace by persons meeting together to commit with violence an unlawful act, without actually committing it. If any step be taken to execute the unlawful act proposed, the riotous assembly become rioters. An instance has occurred of parties being indicted for a rout for having gone to the ground where a prize-fight was to take place, and for which all preparations were made, but no blow was struck, Wise on Riots, 28. The defendants pleaded guilty, and the point was not argued.

An unlawful assembly is any meeting of three or more persons under such alarming circumstances, either from large numbers, or mode of assembling, as in the opinion of rational men may endanger the peace, without being actually guilty of any aggressive act, Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91. As to the degree of alarm arising from excessive numbers, or mode of assembling, essential to render a meeting unlawful, these are incidents for a jury to appreciate, duly impressed on the one hand with the importance of the maintenance of the public peace, and on the other with a proper regard for the invaluable right of good citizens publicly to meet and freely discuss any question of general interest or excitement.

A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three persons or more assembling together without lawful authority, and jointly committing, to the terror of the people, some unlawful and violent act. Three persons are necessary to constitute a riot, as two are for an affray or a conspiracy; and, to make the unlawful assembly a riotous one, an outrage must be actually perpetrated. Women, whether married or single, are punishable as rioters, and also infants, if old enough to know that they were doing wrong. If parties meet with the intention of aiding and encouraging a prizefight, which is clearly illegal and a breach of the peace, and if,

while so intending, the fight takes place, all the parties present are liable to be indicted for a riot.

The punishment of the three preceding offences, namely, a rout, unlawful assembly, and riot, is by the common law discretionary fine or imprisonment, or both.

Stat. 24 & 25 V. c. 97, ss. 11, 12, provides for the punishment of malicious injury to property by rioters. (See the next section.)

IV. RIOT ACT.

The unlawful assemblies described in the last section may be of such ordinary character as respects numbers, intentions, and acts, as renders the common law adequate to their punishment; but, from the violence and excessive numbers assembling, they may assume a more formidable form, and fall within the cognizance of a statute expressly made for their repression. This leads us to speak of the Riot Act, passed in the first year of the reign of George I., for the more effectual prevention of tumultuous assemblages of people.

By this act, the 1 G. 1, c. 5, if twelve persons or more are unlawfully assembled, to the disturbance of the peace, and continue together one hour after being commanded by proclamation of one justice of peace, sheriff, or under-sheriff, to disperse, they are guilty of capital felony. Silence must be commanded, and proclamation made with loud voice, in these, or words to the like effect:

"Our sovereign lord [lady] the king [queen] chargeth and commandeth all persons, being assembled, immediately to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations, or to their lawful business, upon the pains contained in the act made in the first year of King George I., for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies. God save the king [queen]."

If the reading of the proclamation be by force opposed or hindered, such hinderers and opposers are felons; and all persons to whom such proclamation may have been made, and knowing such hindrance and not dispersing, are felons. But the death punishment under this statute has been mitigated, by 1 V. c. 91, to transportation for life, or fifteen years, or imprisonment for three years, at the discretion of the court.

It appears from the decision of Mr. Baron Vaughan, and Mr. Justice Alderson, Rex v. Child, 4 C. & P. 442, that if the magistrate in reading the proclamation, omit the words "God save the king," persons remaining together an hour after the reading of it cannot be convicted under the statute.

By 24 & 25 V. c. 97, s. 11, if any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled shall, with force, begin to demolish any church or chapel, or other place for divine worship; or any house, stable, coachhouse, outhouse, warehouse, office, shop, mill, malthouse, hop-oast, barn, or granary; or any building or erection used in