in the proportion of 10 to 1 of our total regular | fication of the despatch of troops, the force; and if a concentrated attack were made Secretary of State for the Colonies has upon one of the columns before it had effected received private information to the effect a junction with any of the others, this propore that they are both entirely satisfied not tion might possibly rise to 30 or 40 to 1. personal influence of company officers would only with the character of the reinunder such circumstances be very valuable." forcements, but also with the complete The The General then goes on to state hisness of the arrangements made for the requirements as to special service and troops. other officers, and he concludes by giving a detailed list of the troops required, which is as follows: "Five columns Pietermaritzburg Durban and Fort Williamson.. Middleberg, Derby, and Pongolo Pretoria Lydenburg Total........ Eight battalions and two companies. 40 9 222 3 332 66 2 Troops available. Battalions. Transvaal, 13th and 80th..... 90th 4 Required. Royal Engineers Available. Field Officers 2 Captains Subalterns N.-C. Officers and Men... 2 Lords, had I spoken on this subject a THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My few days ago, I should have expressed my great regret at the outbreak of the Companies. war in Zululand. I should have expressed my regret on account of the expense which the war must involve, and still more the necessity it will impose on the Colonial Office of administering the affairs of Zululand. I regret that the result of the war must be to transfer to our hands an entire territory which it is exceedingly difficult to manage under ordinary circumstances, which it will be still more difficult to govern under the extraordinary circumstances that have occurred, and before we are prepared to receive this new and weighty burden. The condition of Zululand is like a ball of sand-as soon as it is touched it will fall to pieces. I cannot, therefore, but feel that had it been Complete possible to tide over the present difficulcompanies. ties it would have been very judicious on the part of Her Majesty's Government to have done so, as I believe the problem would have solved itself in the course of a very few years. But this unfortunate affair has greatly changed matters. We have now, in addition to our previous difficulties, to deplore a very great reverse and a very heavy loss of life; and, what is worse in its political consequences, a great unsettlement of the Native mind throughout the whole of South Africa, and we might at any moment be the witnesses of all the horrors of a rising of the population of any part of the Colony. There is there an European community of some 18,000 or 20,000, in the face of a Native population of not less than 300,000; and in the Transvaal we have an European population of about 40,000, in the midst of a Native population little short of 1,000,000. These are highly dangerous conditions, and one reverse may endanger the whole of our future policy in South Africa and render it impossible to carry out the changes which are contemplated, and in which all parties are, I believe, agreed. But in the 0 19." Your Lordships will perceive that in this must be merged in one single considera- | their general knowledge of administration-that the war must be pushed to the tion, from temper, and from an intimate utmost, not only for the honour of our acquaintance with the customs and arms, but for the safety of the White habits of the Natives of South Africa, to communities in South Africa. There deal with the class of questions now are, of course, two considerations in- rising in South Africa. If, then, the Govolved in this as in every war. One, of vernment are satisfied that these three course, is its prudence, and the other men, whose opportunities of observation its justice. I think we should do wisely were so good, and whose judgment I to wait for the Papers that are pro- believe to be the best in South Africa, mised by the Government as to the pru- concurred in the wisdom and justice of dence of this war, and I think that in this war, I, as not longer in Office and fairness we ought to be slow to suppose with access to official knowledge, should that there has been any imprudent ac- certainly withhold any disapproval; I tion in this matter. I have therefore should, on the contrary, be inclined to heard with great satisfaction the state- believe that they were right in their judgment of my noble Friend the Under ment under the circumstances. There Secretary of State for the Colonies is one other point to which I wish (Earl Cadogan), that no troops have to refer. When I was in Office a year been withheld that were demanded by ago, I am bound to say that the position the General in command. But as re- of affairs in South Africa as regarded gards the second question-the justice Zululand was precarious in the exof the war-knowing as much as I do treme. It was gradually growing worse of South Africa, I am bound in fair- and worse, and it was evident to all that ness to say at once that taking into a storm was in preparation. The quesaccount the antecedents of the case, and tion then seemed how long that storm the engagements which have been en- could be properly averted. The conduct tered into, I cannot consider that this of Cetewayo had become insolent and war is unjust. I listened to the state- aggressive. It was the result, no doubt, ment of my noble Friend on the partly of old grievances and misappreother side of the House (Earl Gran-hensions; for there was much genuine ville) with respect to an ultimatum misapprehension and irritation on his alleged to have been sent by Sir Bartle part, and I believe that he had some cause Frere; I hope we shall find in the Papers, of grievance against the Dutch populawhen published, a fuller statement than tion; it was also partly the result of the we have at present. I have also seen in cunning of a barbarian who had, for the daily papers a very severe attack many years, played off the Government made upon a recent Memorandum of Sir of Natal against that of the Transvaal, Bartle Frere. But my own feeling with and who now found that the Government respect to Sir Bartle Frere is that, consi- of the Transvaal, when it passed into dering his past career, it is not too much English hands, no longer afforded him to say that he has always shown tact, the same scope for his craft. It was, foresight, and sense of justice. It was my also, partly the result of that agitation duty, when Secretary of State for the Coloamong the younger and turbulent part of nies, to ask Sir Bartle Frere to undertake his tribe to which every nation, civilized the difficult task of the administration or uncivilized, is more or less subject. I of South Africa; and so far as I was am bound to say that, a year and a-half cognisant of that administration, it was ago, the attitude of Cetewayo was such exercised with a tact, judgment, wisdom, that the Government were more than and moderation worthy of any Governor once compelled to consider the responever sent out by this country to govern a sibilities which fell upon them from the British Colony. There are at this moment possibility of war, and what preparain South Africa no less than three very tions should be made to meet it; and distinguished and experienced Gover- it was only the threatening state of nors-one at the Cape, another at Natal, European affairs that made it undeand a third in the Transvaal-namely, sirable to send out further reinforceSir Bartle Frere, Sir Henry Bulwer, and ments; and it was in consequence of Sir Theophilus Shepstone; and I ven- the very threatening aspect of affairs ture to say that it would be difficult to that I determined, as far as in me lay, find three persons so competent, from that war should not take place on that eleventh hour, after this serious disaster, I would still urge upon the Government the necessity of laying a wire, even at a greater expense, and in a more imperfect manner than would be done under ordinary circumstances, in order that we may no longer be kept for weeks in ignorance of what is passing in the South African Colonies. With regard to rein occasion. It is perfectly true that the terms which had been offered, and which have been alluded to by my noble Friend on the other side of the House, were terms that Cetewayo could not accept without altering the characteristic feature of his whole rule-they changed a bloody, oppressive, arbitrary tyranny into a government with some semblance, at least, of law; but the justifi-forcements, I have long been of opinion cation for this lies in the fact that for that they may most expeditiously and years Zululand had been a standing most economically be sent from India. menace to the Colony of Natal; that it About two years ago there was a very was a tyranny built upon bloodshed serious outbreak in the Malay Peninsula, and cruelty; and, lastly, that Cetewayo, which is a very difficult country. That having deliberately entered into certain outbreak was crushed in the course of a engagements for reforming the adminis- few weeks-and why? Because immetration of his kingdom, and conse- diate telegraphic communication was quently for our better security, either received, and we were able to send could not or would not redeem the pro- troops from India, and one regiment, I mises he had given to us. Speaking think, from China; and so the conflagrabroadly, these seem to me, as far as I now tion was extinguished before it had time can understand the case, the justification to become general. If the Government of the present war. Of course, there should be able to send reinforcements are other questions of policy with which from India, so much the better, even they are connected; but these will be at the last moment-unless this unfordiscussed hereafter. They will involve tunate Afghan War has so crippled the serious questions. I will now only say strength of the Indian Forces that none one word as to the prosecution of the can be spared. Certainly, it must be war. A very important step has been three or four weeks before the troops taken by securing from the Portuguese sent from England can reach their Government a promise to repress the destination, and the loss of time may gun traffic. This is a question I earn- be productive of very serious results. estly pressed for a long time, and II can only join very heartily in the trust that it will ultimately result in the total suppression of that traffic, and thus put an end to the possibility of the Zulus obtaining the supplies of arms and ammunition for which they, in great measure, depend for the carrying on of the war. Another point under the consideration of the Government well deserves their consideration the extension of telegraphic communication between this country and the Cape. The want of this communication has been one of the greatest evils both on this and former occasions. A line of telegraphic wire to the Cape would have been worth to us three or four additional regiments; and we have, by the want of it, been left for weeks in darkness. During my tenure of Office I urged it, in season and out of season, on the Home Government; but the Treasury were unable to spare money for it. The unfortunate part of it is that, when disaster such as this occurs, these matters are acknowledged and rectified; but too late. But even now, at this, the hope which has been expressed on the other side of the House, that the Government will deal with the matter with all possible speed and vigour; for we may depend upon it that half-hearted measures would not only protract the war and involve a great deal more expense and bloodshed, but the contest would probably degenerate into one of those wars between civilized and Native races, which, of all warfares, is most productive of brutality and degradation. THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY said, he cordially shared in the sentiment which had been expressed, that whatever view might be entertained of the very difficult question of policy which was raised by the conditions of affairs in South Africa, there could be no difference of opinion whatever as to the absolute necessity of at once re-establishing our military position in that country and the honour of Her Majesty's arms, and of supporting our troops there with full vigour and energy. Nor was there any difference in universal sympathy felt for our gallant troops who were involved in this disaster. Not having had the advantage of even a cursory perusal of the Blue Books presented that night, he felt great difficulty in approaching the question; but he hoped it might not be thought egotistical in one who had held the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies if he warned those who had to administer South African affairs that there were no affairs which were more complicated or difficult. At the same time, he could not help doubting whether there was a real necessity for this Zulu War. The threatening attitude of the Zulus was nothing new. While he held the Office of Colonial Secretary he was always hearing of the threatening position of the Zulus, and no doubt it was a fact. But by judicious management, especially by the very judicious conduct of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, a collision was avoided. It had been his opinion that though we might come into conflict with the Zulus, it was better that that conflict should be later rather than sooner, since we were always growing stronger and they were growing weaker. Above all, he considered that we should consolidate our power upon our Frontiers before we got into an arduous struggle with a warlike people. But he was bound to admit that the position of affairs had been considerably changed by the annexation of the Transvaal. We took over a dispute with Cetewayo; and it might possibly be found that our position in the Transvaal was such that the quarrel was unavoidable. But nothing had been yet published or was yet known to convince him that by careful management, and not treating border raids-which were really inevitable with savage tribes on our Frontiers-as of too much importance, the Government could not have avoided the war. saw in the manifesto, with some regret, that the ultimatum which was sent to this barbarian Chieftain was one which, in his (the Earl of Kimberley's) opinion, he could not agree to. It was plain to anyone who knew the character and position of the Chief that his acceptance of that ultimatum would mean the total destruction of his power, and the entire change of his relations with his tribe. If he had wished to avoid a collision with us, it was exceedingly doubtful if his position towards his tribe was such that He he could have carried his wish into effect-at all events within 30 days. But all the Papers must be looked at together, and all the difficulties fully considered, and it might turn out that the war was unavoidable. He noticed that there was a disposition at home to be somewhat hard upon the Colonists, and he had seen some remarks upon their unwillingness to take up arms in the conflict. He thought that such remarks were made from an insufficient consideration of the circumstances of the case. The Kaffir War was carried on on the immediate Frontier of the old Cape Colony; and it was perfectly reasonable that, under such circumstances, the Cape Colonists should fight in their own defence. On the other hand, Zululand was at so great a distance from the Cape Colony that they could not be expected to render any considerable assistance to us in dealing with the Zulus. It was beyond their power to do so, and it was not reasonable to expect it. It would take all their energy and courage to defend themselves against the immense Black population upon their own borders; and we ought not to expect them to help us in the Transvaal or in Zululand. For the defence of Natal and the Transvaal, with their scanty White population, they must look to the Imperial Government; and he feared that for many years to come it would be impossible that assistance from home in money and arms could be dispensed with. Whether or not it was desirable to maintain our present relations with South Africa was a question into which he would not now enter. He earnestly hoped that the next intelligence might be of a more re-assuring character, and that it might be found that Her Majesty's Black subjects in Natal had not joined the Zulus in an attack upon the Colonists. His own view was rather in favour of their remaining quiet, for the Black residents in Natal were principally composed of those who had fled from the tyranny of the Zulu King, and they could not be desirous to come again under his power. If an incursion were made into Natal the tribes in Natal might be compelled, whether they would or not, to join the main force; and he thought that under that compulsion they would do so; but he hoped that there would be no spontaneous movement, and that if the borders of Natal could be defended by our troops there would be peace and tranquillity in their rear. CATHEDRAL STATUTES BILL [H.L.] A Bill to amend an Act passed in the sixth year of Queen Anne and intituled "An Act for the avoiding of doubts and questions touching the Statutes of divers Cathedral and Collegiate Churches"-Was presented by The Lord Bishop of CARLISLE; read 1a. (No. 4.) House adjourned at a quarter past Seven HOUSE OF COMMONS, Thursday, 13th February, 1879. MINUTES.]-NEW WRITS ISSUED-For Nor- PUBLIC BILLS-Second Reading-Bankers' Books MAJOR O'BEIRNE asked the Secretary of State for War, If it is contemplated transferring Colonel M'Kerlie to the command of the Royal Hibernian Military School on his resignation of the Chairmanship of the Irish Board of Works? COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, in answer to the Question of the hon. and gallant Member, I have to say that the appointment in connection with the Hibernian Military School has been filled by Colonel Cotton. I do not believe it was contemplated to offer it to Colonel M'Kerlie; and, indeed, I have no ground for supposing it would have been accepted by him had it been so offered. JOINT STOCK BANKS-LEGISLATION. QUESTION. MR. COOPE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Government is prepared to introduce any measure, which, by means of public audit or otherwise, may prevent the evils to which depositors as well as proprietors of Joint Stock Banks are at present exposed through the defective state of existing legislation affecting them? THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, it was difficult to answer a Question put in terms so wide without entering into a lengthened statement beyond the limits of an answer. He might, however, inform his hon. Friend that the Government did not intend to introduce any extensive measure such as he, perhaps, had in his mind when he referred to the public audit of joint-stock banks; but, at the same time, they did contemplate the probability of their having to introduce a measure with regard to banks which he would take an opportunity to explain to the House in order to meet certain diffiMAJOR O'BEIRNE asked the Chief Se-culties which had arisen in the consticretary for Ireland, If Colonel M'Kerlie, tution of such banks. the present Chairman of the Irish Board of Works, is about to resign that appointment, or will be recommended to take that step by the Government? QUESTIONS. BOARD OF WORKS (IRELAND)— COLONEL M'KERLIE. QUESTIONS. SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, that if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would allow him, he would answer the Question. Colonel M'Kerlie had not tendered his resignation, nor had the Government considered it necessary to call upon a valuable public servant to resign. SOUTH AFRICA-THE ZULU WARTHE REINFORCEMENTS.-QUESTIONS. COLONEL MURE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Colonial and Imperial civil and military authorities in South Africa had, previous to the declaration of war, represented to Her Majesty's Government the formidable character of the Zulu Army; and, whether, previous to the declara |