more convenient season. That is the impression which would be conveyed to the mind of any ordinary man on reading the paragraphs of the despatch to which I have referred. What are the facts, however, as they appear in the Papers and in the narrative of Lord Northbrook? The Ameer had not sought the interview with Lord Northbrook in vain. On the contrary, Lord Northbrook had himself desired to communicate with the Ameer, in order to explain what had taken place with regard to the boundaries of Seistan and also the character of the negotiations which had taken place between the British and Russian Governments in reference to the Northern boundaries of Afghanistan. Lord Northbrook found, in the course of his conversation with the Envoy of the Ameer, that there was considerable alarm in the mind of the latter, and he gave him certain assurances which had been given by previous Governors General, and telegraphed to the Home Government for authority to give the Ameer further and more precise assurances on the point. The Government replied to him in a telegram which authorized him to give the further assurance that the British Government would pursue a certain policy with regard to Afghanistan. The result was that Lord Northbrook gave those re-assurances which he, with the advice of his Council, was prepared to give, and refused simply those conditions which were asked for by the Envoy, and which neither he nor his Council had the slightest intention of giving, or thought it was possible that any Government would give. That is a short statement of the difference on this part of the despatch. I do not impute to Lord Cranbrook any intention to convey a false impression; I merely wish to show the difficulty of making a statement of this sort thoroughly impartial. The questions which are involved in the accuracy of the remaining portions of Lord Cranbrook's despatch are of a very much graver and more important character; and on the accuracy, or the want of accuracy, of those statements it contains depends the question whether this war and the policy of Her Majesty's Government are justified or not. The hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hall) has stated substantially, and with great ability, the version of the story I need conveyed by this despatch. hardly go over it again; but perhaps the House will permit me to recapitulate the main points of the case put forward by Her Majesty's Government, as I understand them. When Lord Lytton went out to India as Governor General, he found that the Ameer of Afghanistan was unfriendly to us. He found that proofs of his ill-will and unfriendliness had been accumulating for some time; that he had become more and more estranged from us; and that he had been negotiating with the Government of Russia; and, in fact, he found that all the efforts which had been made, and all the sacrifices which had been incurred, by the British Government had been thrown away; and that instead of having on our North-Western Frontier, as we had hoped, the Ameer as an Ally and as an advanced guard of our Indian Empire against invasion, he was, on the contrary, no Ally at all, but a mere instrument in the hands of possible enemies of this country. That I gather is the correct statement of the representation of the Government as to matters existing between this country and Afghanistan. But the story goes on that Lord Lytton went out with instructions from Her Majesty's Government to correct this state of things. He went out to offer the Ameer an alliance under far more favourable terms than had hitherto been offered by any previous Government. But the sole condition required as preliminary to the alliance was one of eventual safety to the Ameer himself, as well as for our own protection. It was that our Agents should be permitted to reside in certain parts of Afghanistan. It is further reported that the Ameer was approached in a most conciliatory manner, and that overtures were made in a manner most calculated to insure a favourable reception. Notwithstanding this the negotiation fell through, and the Ameer declined to accede to the condition. After long consultations with Sir Lewis Pelly nothing further remained for the Government than to adopt an absolute vigilant reserve, not, as I understand it, being on bad terms with the Ameer, but simply on terms of vigilance and watchfulness, in the hope that time would enable him to see the advantage of the proposals which we made to him, and the danger he was incurring by rejecting our alliance and holding himself aloof from us. At this point the Russian Mission was despatched to Cabul, where it met with a very ostentatious reception, and Her Majesty's Government thought it necessary that a Mission from India should also be received by the Ameer; but, notwithstanding the fact, as stated, that representations to this effect were made in the most friendly spirit by the Government of India, permission to send a Mission was most positively refused by the Ameer, and when the Mission attempted to approach it was stopped in a most ostentatious manner by a hostile force. That I understand to be the history of these despatches. I admit at once the perfect accuracy of the position, that if the attitude of the Ameer has been correctly described in these Papers, it went a long way towards establishing the painful necessity for the war which has been undertaken. I say "the painful necessity," because, even if it were established, it is difficult to see what useful object we can hope to gain by having undertaken it. I must say, however, that, on the other hand, there is a very different case set up, and it is contended that that case is supported by a greater weight of authority and of evidence than is contained within the pages of the Blue Book which has been issued by Her Majesty's Government. I, however, have no intention on this occasion to attempt to prove any allegation. I have already said that, in my opinion, the time has not come when the House can with advantage be asked seriously to discuss the bearing of these Papers. I do not wish to argue anything; but having stated what I take to be the opinion of the Government, I wish to show briefly what I understand as the nature of the case which may be set up on the other side in support of the view that Her Majesty's Government were not justified in undertaking the war in which we are now engaged with the Ameer of Cabul. Now, Sir, what is that case? It is this-The view to which I allude is based on the fact that before the departure of Lord Northbrook from India the relations of Her Majesty's Indian Government with the Ameer, though not cordial or altogether satisfactory, presented no element of danger; that the Ameer was thoroughly convinced that he had no danger to apprehend from aggressions upon our part, but that he un was very seriously alarmed at possible aggressions on the part of Russia; that he had shown no symptom of rejecting our advice, but had conformed to it in his Frontier relations and in the matter of the Seistan boundary; and that, in fact, the main object of the policy of successive Viceroys from the time of Dost Mahomed had been secured, and there was no occasion to alter it. In fact, he showed that the bad terms were the result of the policy which had been adopted by Lord Canning and his successors-Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo. Lord Lytton when he arrived was determined to remedy this state of things and was prepared to offer an alliance. The requirement of a preliminary Conference was a proceeding which all the best authorities in India condemned as unwise and dangerous. It prepared the way for the proposed Treaty by a pretext as transparently unwise as it was English. Lord Lytton put forward a pretext, in which the Ameer saw only the fulfilment of those schemes for the partition of his country which, although made and discussed here, he was perfectly well acquainted with, and which he at once prepared to resist. He was addressed, before any interview had taken place, in letters which contained threats which were calculated to alarm him, and which did alarm him. These threats were repeated in an interview which was had between the Ameer and our Native Envoy, who conducted the negotiations with considerable skill and ability, and in the course of which the Ameer protested against the conditions sought to be imposed upon him, and appealed to the Treaties which had been concluded with him, and the assurances he had received from various Envoys, as to the position which he was to hold in relation to political matters affecting his country. At the end of this negotiation a violent letter was written by Lord Lytton for transmission to the Ameer, in which his conduct was denounced, and in which Lord Lytton repudiated the obligation contracted by the British Government towards that of Afghanistan; and, in short, cast off the alliance which had been entered into. The Conference was put an end to by the death of the Envoy; but Lord Lytton concluded the business, and did so on the basis of renouncing our obligations to the Ameer, although he was informed that another Envoy was on the road, and instructed to accept our terms. I have now briefly stated the arguments which may be put forward on the opposite side, and I think it puts the I will now point out a singular cir- matter in a very different light. It is, cumstance in connection with all these therefore, for the House to decide as to events. All the accounts given of the the view and the statement of facts Conferences at Peshawur are reported which is most entitled to support and in one single despatch from the Govern- credence. What opinion can the House ment in India to the Government at pronounce, except that the Governor home. These transactions are not, as General and the Government never had is usually the case, related in despatches any serious intention in these negotiasent at short intervals, while the events tions with Shere Ali; because we heard were in progress. During the whole, nothing then about a "scientific Fronor at least a great part, of that time- tier" or "irresponsible frivolity"-the a period of 15 months-there appears words of truth and justice were much to have been but this single despatch. more heard. Was it not, then, reasonWhy was that? Is it a fact, as has able to infer that the account which I been surmised, that if the despatches have just given, and which shows that which passed were published they would the Government was in search of a not point to an unanimous, or nearly scientific Frontier, indicates that the unanimous, opinion between the Viceroy Government did not object to find a preand the Home Government; or is it a text for a quarrel with the Ameer? If fact that the high-handed measures of that is not the explanation, I should Lord Lytton did not receive the cordial like to hear what explanation can be support and concurrence even of his given. If their object was to cultivate own Government? I certainly [think friendly relations with the Ameer, and that explanations on this point ought to to secure in him a friendly Ally instead be received, and that is my sole reason of a sullen enemy, I must say they have for mentioning it at the present junc-mismanaged the negotiations as negoture. Then, a year after these events, tiations never before were mismanaged. it was found that a Russian Envoy had I know what is said on another view arrived at Cabul. Could the Govern- of this question, and I know that it is ment be surprised at that? Lord Lytton, said this is not a matter which merely having repudiated the relations between concerns Great Britain and a small Fronhis Government and that of the Ameer, tier State; that we cannot leave out the was it to be wondered at that the Ameer great question of the advance of Russia should seek the support of, or throw him- in Asia. I can assure the House that self into the arms of, his next most power- I am by no means indifferent to the ful neighbour? I do not deny that Her gravity of the considerations involved Majesty's Government (were, probably, in that question. No Government-no justified in requiring that the Ameer Party-in this country has been indifshould receive an Embassy; but it does ferent to these considerations. There is not seem clear, on the face of the Papers, no despatch which is more remarkable that the refusal to grant a reception than one of the earliest written by the was a positive one, or one couched in Government of Sir John Lawrence-the such terms as to justify Her Majesty's greatest advocate of what is called Government in proceeding by force of "masterly inactivity"-in which the arms against the Ameer. It is stated attention of the Government of 1867 is in the despatches that the Ameer strongly directed to the advance of Russia in complained of the tone of the letters ad- Central Asia. In that despatch the Godressed to himself and to his Ministers; vernment of Sir John Lawrence pointed but in spite of all these things, there out what was the character and what appears to be good reason for believing the inevitable course of that advance, that the Ameer was perfectly willing to and they prophesied with remarkable receive the Mission if only it was under-accuracy the extent to which Russian stood that it came by his permission and was not forced upon him. Notwithstanding that, no delay was granted, and the consequence was the stoppage of the Mission. progress would extend. There is one despatch in this Book which is still more remarkable. It is the answer given by the Government of the day-by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who was Se states that cretary of State for India-and the ex- | her influence. That has been the policy pressions are so remarkable that I shall of former Governments. It has also ask the House to allow me to read them. always been our policy to provide that, They are the only extracts I intend to when Russia approached towards India, read. The extract to which I refer she should find other States well affected to us, anxious to maintain their own independence-States jealous of the danger of Russian advance. That, however, has not been the policy of the present Government; for we find that it holds, not Russia responsible for what it is doing in Asia, but it holds the unfortunate State of Afghanistan responsible for it -a country which will not be rendered jealous by the Russian advance, which will not be actuated by feelings of amity towards us, but which will be forced to fall into the arms of Russia. Before I sit down I have only to refer again to the condition of complete ignorance in which Parliament has been kept; and I think we have something more to complain of than the neglect that information has not been communicated to us. It has been withheld from us. In the Session of 1877 the attention of the Go "Upon this point [the question of the progress of Russia in Central Asia], Her Majesty's Government see no reason for any uneasiness or for any jealousy. The conquests which Russia has made, and apparently is still making in Central Asia, appear to them to be the natural result of the circumstances in which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. Friendly communications have at various times passed between the two Governments on the subject, and should an opportunity offer Her Majesty's Government will avail themselves of it for the purpose of obviating any possible danger of misunderstanding either with respect to the proceedings of Russia, or to those of England. This is all that it appears necessary or desirable to do."-[Afghanistan, No. 1, pp. 25-6.] Argyll to this subject of the North-West "Now, we have not tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul-we have not suggested Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy to Cabul. Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul [An hon. MEMBER: What is the date ?] I said 1867. I have pointed out that the Government was informed of the in-vernment was called by the Duke of evitable progress which would be forced upon Russia, and the extent to which Russia would be forced in a few years to extend her dominions. I am not imputing any blame to the Government of the day; but I say there is no excuse for imputing to the late Government, or to any other Government, that they were indifferent to the movements of Russia. I am perfectly willing to admit the possible danger and the certain inconvenience to our external and internal relations with India, with the power of Russia bordering on the Frontiers of India. I am perfectly willing to admit this; but it does not follow that that danger is disposed of by rushing into hasty or ill-considered measures in the way of extending our Frontiers. Certainly, the effect of an advance on our part will not be to retard, but rather to accelerate the danger which will ensue when our Frontiers are coterminous with those of another European Power. It is not an infallible remedy against an apprehended danger; and we may hasten the danger, if we take the initiative and advance to meet Russia. The policy of all former Governments has been to deal with Russia direct in this question-to hold Russia responsible for what she was doing in Asia-and not the intermediary Štates which are coming within have undergone no material change since last There was a similar attempt to obtain information from the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton). In the debate on the 9th of August, 1877, the noble Lord said"He hoped that the frank exchange of opinion which had undoubtedly passed between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Envoy had removed previous misconception, and would lead to a restoration of those friendly terms which had formerly existed."-- [3 Hansard, ccxxxvi. 707.] I need not refer to the further declarations of Lord Salisbury, nor to a speech made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, giving a warm adherence to what is called the old policy, and saying he would be no party to any change in it. Again, Sir, precautions should be taken by the Government to relieve this House up to the present moment of a serious responsibility. The responsibility is not shared in the slightest degree by Parliament at present. It will be shared in a few days no doubt; but, in my opinion, that does not relieve the House in the slightest degree. On the contrary, it is still more incumbent on this House to examine the policy which has led to this. I do not intend to take up the attention of the House any further. It will, no doubt, be anxious to hear from the Ministers what information the Government has to give, and to hear such explanations which may have some influence on the judgment of the House as to the objects of the war; and I do not think any explanation on that point can avert, or ought to relieve, the responsibility of asserting a judgment which the House ought to form on the previous conduct and policy of the Government which led to the outbreak of the present war. MR. GLADSTONE: I purposely rise, notwithstanding the Chancellor of the Exchequer has risen, for a reason which will be obvious. I do not propose to enter at all, on the present occasion, into what I conceive to be controversial matter. My noble Friend has made the observations that he thinks necessary, and I have no wish to make any addition to those observations. He has given us a distinct intimation that, on a future occasion, a Motion will be made which will open up fully the whole question of the merits of the policy which has led to the present war, and the merits of the war itself. That being I feel under no obligation to touch the matter at present; but, that being so, I take it likewise to be quite clear that nothing shall be said or done in the Address which shall have the effect of committing us to any opinions expressed. I am going to point out what I think an unfortunate error, an error which I do not think anybody in the least degree to blame for, but it is an error which has probably arisen from the haste of preparation; and I know that sentences sometimes assume a form and colour, in fact, which is far from the intention of those who phrased them. It is almost habitual with us not to pay a very close attention to these Addresses when they are read, and I am very far from blaming the noble Lord and the hon. Gentlemen who have so well discharged their duties to-night; yet, at the same time, it is a matter of grave consideration for those whose minds do not happen to be in the same attitude, that we should not be called upon to express an opinion on the hostility of the Ameer's policy, and the manner in which he has repulsed Her Majesty's Mission, leaving Her Majesty no alternative but war. [Cheers.] I do not question that sentiment on the present occasion; but is it the meaning of the hon. Gentleman who so gallantly cheers me that I am to be called upon to vote that? That is the obvious meaning of his cheer, if it has any meaning; but, in truth, I do not believe it has any meaning. I do not think it will be necessary to postpone discussion on the Address for this reason, as doubtless Her Majesty's Government will see fit to make some verbal Amendment, which will have the desired effect. I reserve myself entirely for a future occasion, when we shall be enabled to open up the merits of the question. anxious to make one observation merely in the manner of question. It would be of great advantage to the House if Her Majesty's Government could on one or two points enlarge the information given us on this subject. My noble Friend has referred to points apparently omitted-one a reference to the distress in the country, and the other a reference to the war at the Cape. The point I want information upon is this-It is stated in Her Gracious Majesty's Speech from the Throne that Her Majesty contemplates with confidence the execution of the requisitions of the Treaty of I am |