sponsoring agency accords less importance to an issue than desirable. This is, indeed, one of the central reasons for the Impact statement requirement of the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969. Env

ironmental impact statements have gained a reputation as an onerous regulatory requirement. While there is some truth to the complaints about the NEPA process, the benefits to govecoment decision making of impact statements are real and, in my opinion, justify the work of producing

them.

In the radioactive waste arena, the key point is that controversy

is likely to be intense, especially once sites for permanent disposal of identified. The sponsoring agency will not have paid

wastes are

The

attention to everything that potential opponents want analyzed. call for analysis will, to a degree, be a delaying tactic. But it is difficult for the sponsoring agency to draw the line between justified queries and make-work. This is precisely the situation in which judicial review can improve the chances that the program will be successful in the long run. Thus, the limitations on judicial review in ? Section 14 of the Bouguärd=Lujan billa particularly the definition of "final decision or action" in Sec. lýjalillı encourage decision making that is incomplete or incautious, Section 14 should be removed.

A third issue that has been discussed is whether to authorize a legislative veto of Executive Branch plans to site a repository, and, if So, whether the veto should require the disapproval of both houses of

Congress ог only one. Those

advocate either no veto at all, or

seeking to build repositories quickly

a two-nouse veto. I believe a veto

provision is necessary, so that an open, legitimate debate can be held, on a national choice having local impacts perceived to be profoundly important. It is important to consider how the veto mechanism might affect the quality of the decision made.

in a partisan political setting; the

Legislative vetoes are exercised party controlling one or both

decisions of the

houses of Congress typically seeks to check the

President.

When control of Congress is divided, as it is now partisan

competition can be intense.

In

A national waste management policy must weather particular, which

parties control which nouse of Congress and the Presidency should not be a decisive factor in the choices that are made. The configuration of party control is likely to change before any given siting decision can be fully implemented. two-house veto would seem desirable. establish a one-house veto for siting, while H.R. 1993 proposes a one-house veto of the overall mission plan.

For this reason, requiring a

The Bouquard-Lujan bill would

In sum, the institutional design of radioactive waste policy should reflect the uncertainties that must be addressed before a national program that is technically sound and socially acceptable can emerge. Legislation should call for a program plan, of the sort outlined in H.R. 1993. Legislatively defined deadlines should be used sparingly beyond the production of the plan itself. And the bodies empowered to review or veto Administration decisions and plans should be structured so encourage reviews on the merits, rather than on the basis of partisan political considerations alone.

as to

clear guidance on some major elements of institutional design, such as

which kinds of special bodies -

if any

-

should be assigned

authority

the guiding principle should be Ultimately, Congress itself must be

to review plans and sites. Here, experimentation and flexibility.

the guardian of the public interest in this vexing arena of policy. I offer my continued support as you work toward a design: my expectation is that whatever legislation emerges from Congress will need subsequent editing. It is time to offer a draft in earnest.

Due to the press of business currently before the Commission, it
will be unable to appear at next week's hearing on the comprehensive
nuclear waste management issues embodied in H.R. 1993 and in the
Bouquard/Lujan legislative proposal, a draft copy of which has been
received by the Commission.

Instead, the Commission will contribute to your record by providing its comments to the Subcommittee by October 14, 1981.

The Commission shares your concern about moving forward with the nation's nuclear waste management program and appreciates this opportunity to provide comments on these important proposals.

In my letter to you dated October 2, 1981, I indicated that the Commission would provide comments on H. R. 1993 and on the draft Bouquard/Lujan comprehensive nuclear waste management legislative proposal by October 14. Pursuant to that commitment, I am enclosing for the information and use of the Subcommittee comments prepared by the NRC staff on both H.R. 1993 and on the draft Bouquard/Lujan legislative proposal. The Commissioners have not had an opportunity to review fully these comments nor to prepare further views of their own. Accordingly, the Commission or individual Commissioners may wish to supply additional comments at a later time.

Sincerely,

Edward Jay

Carlton Kammerer, Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure:
As stated

CC:

The Honorable Manuel Lujan