UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS: THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2:07 p.m. in room H-236, the Capitol, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order. This afternoon the Special Subcommittee on Investigations starts a series of hearings on current United States relations with the People's Republic of China and the upcoming visit of President Ford to Peking. Over the last few years Dr. Kissinger has made some eight trips to China in an effort to find a basis for a new relationship after decades of hostility between our two countries. The initial glow caused by the 1972 Shanghai Communique and the establishment of liaison officers by the respective countries in Washington and in Peking, however, has been tarnished somewhat by the lack of any positive developments in the last couple of years. In fact, in 1975, United States trade with China, one barometer of relations, has slowed significantly. It is apparent that the key to further development of relations with China will be a resolution of the Taiwan issue. One purpose of this hearing is to try to explore alternative approaches to breaking the impasse on this particular issue. In today's hearing and in three subsequent sessions we will be exploring with various experts the status of our relations with China today, problems that exist and prospects for the coming months and years. Of particular concern to us today are internal political and economic developments in China that have a bearing on our relations and on the formulation of Chinese foreign policy. We are happy to have with us Dr. Alexander Eckstein of the Department of Economics at the University of Michigan and Dr. Harry Harding of the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. Dr. Eckstein has pioneered most research in this country on China's economy, and he will hopefully be able to evaluate for the subcommittee the importance of trade and the search for Western technology as factors influencing China's behavior in the international environment. Dr. Harding has researched China's military and other domestic groups and has spent some time writing about the succession problem in China. (1) Gentlemen, we are happy to have you here. You both have prepared statements which will be included in the record in full. We hope that you can summarize them for the subcommittee in order to maximize time for questions. Dr. Harding, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF HARRY HARDING, JR., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY Mr. HARDING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great privilege for me to appear before the subcommittee today and also a great pleasure to appear with my friend and colleague, Prof. Alexander Eckstein. I submitted a written statement to the subcommittee which I won't try to read. Instead let me try to summarize some of the most important points and then talk with you about any topic, whether or not it has been covered in my written statement or in my testimony. THE CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE The first point that I try to make in my prepared statement is that foreign policy and particularly relations with the United States have been a controversial political issue in China for the last 7 years. We often tend to assume, because China is a relatively authoritarian system, that its foreign policymaking process is isolated from domestic. political pressures. In fact, foreign policy and Sino-American relations have been a significant issue in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution. And the issue of Chinese-American détente has been more controversial in China than it has been in the United States. SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT The specific terms of debate over foreign policy have varied somewhat since the debate began in the late 1960's. But I think we can summarize the arguments that proponents and the opponents of the rapprochement with the United States have made in China. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine, the deployment of Russian forces on the SinoSoviet frontier and the border clashes beginning in 1969 obviously led the Chinese to be concerned about a possible Russian invasion of China. Sino-American détente, so the proponents of détente argued, would be a quick, effective, and relatively inexpensive way of providing a counterweight to the Soviet threat and a way of bolstering China's deterrent with a minimal expenditure of economic resources. At the same time, the proponents of the Sino-American rapprochement pointed out that the United States seemed willing to talk seriously for the first time about major issues and to consider important changes in its China policy. There was the hope in Peking that détente would lead ultimately to American recognition of China and to a loosening of the American commitment to Taiwan, and thus would hasten the reunification of Taiwan and the rest of China. ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION Finally, of course, the Sino-American rapprochement has been a part of a broader Chinese foreign policy, aimed at gaining access to technology and agricultural imports from the West. The proponents of this foreign policy have argued that expanded economic contact with the West is crucial to the industrial development of China. They have pledged a major effort to substantially modernize the country in all spheres by the end of this century. The opponents of détente have also made arguments which I think it important to understand. To a large part these arguments have been ideological, that it is wrong to compromise with U.S. imperialism. More specifically, however, from time to time the opponents of this policy have argued that it is wrong to rely on the United States for China's security. Instead, they argue China should and could rely upon its own military efforts, including extensive civil defense preparation, a redeployment of forces to the north, and the development of nuclear missiles and other weapons delivery systems. Also since the Shanghai Communique, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, opponents of this policy in Peking have been able to point to relatively slow progress on the Taiwan issue. In general, they make the point that the United States has gotten the better of the deal in Sino-American détente. The opening to China helped the United States get out of Vietnam. It helped the United States to open a liaison office in Peking. What, they ask, have the Chinese gotten in return? Furthermore-and Professor Eckstein will have more to say about this than I-there also has been concern that greater economic contact with the West will not only mean the greater availability of Western technology and imports, but also risks becoming economically dependent upon the West. It also runs the risk that Western technology and other imports will be accompanied by an infusion of Western bourgeois values, which of course the Chinese wish to insulate themselves against. I believe these are the arguments made by the proponents and the opponents of Sino-American détente. It is important to realize also that this debate has been linked to the succession in China and to the competition for power after the death of Mao. Between 1969 and 1971, for example, Lin Piao, the former vice. chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Minister of Defense, appeared to have opposed Sino-American rapprochement in large part because he felt it would weaken his own political position in China. Later in 1973 and 1974 more radical leaders seem to have used the alleged costs of Sino-American détente to try to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the proponents of détente in China. CONTROVERSY AND REASSESSMENT My first point then is that Sino-American relations have been controversial in China. The second point is that this debate has occurred in waves. It has not been constant. One of these waves is occurring right now. China appears today to be in another period of reassessment which is even more critical than those which have gone before. As you know, the Chinese have in various ways been expressing dissatisfaction with Sino-American relations during this past year. It seems to me that this dissatisfaction is genuine. Part of it almost certainly is an attempt to influence what President Ford will bring with him to Peking. But much of it is also genuine concern about the status of Sino-American relations. LESS NEED FOR U.S. COUNTERWEIGHT It also seems to me that the dissatisfaction that is being expressed is deeper than in the past, not concerned simply with the details or timing of Sino-American relations, but with a basic underlying calculation. That is, I think the Chinese are beginning to wonder whether or not the United States is necessary or useful anymore as a counterweight against the Soviet Union. As I argue in my prepared statement in more detail, the Chinese are less fearful now of o Soviet invasion then the they Therefore their need for an American counterweight is less. 1969. It is also amply clear from Secretary Kissinger's visit to China last month that the Chinese question the strength and the determination of the United States to serve as a counterweight against the Soviet Union and that they view our policy of détente toward the Soviet Union as little more than appeasement of Moscow. A WIDER REASSESSMENT Finally, reassessment that is going on today is more widespread than it has been in the past. During the previous periods of reassessment-in 1973-74 for example--it was primarily the leaders who were on the periphery of power in China who seemed to be critical of Sino-American relations. Today the most important leaders, including Mao Tse-tung and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, are questioning and reexamining their relations with the United States. I stress that should Mao himself begin to lose confidence in the policy of détente with the United States, this would be very serious indeed because Mao's support of the policy has been crucial at several points in the past. U.S. POLICY ASSUMPTIONS QUESTIONED Third, I would argue that four assumptions underlying our present China policy are at best only partly valid. MODERATES WILL PREVAIL What are these four assumptions? The first assumption is that the succession to Mao is settled, that moderates will continue to dominate the collective leadership in China, and that they will continue their policy of détente with the United States. I would argue that the succession to Mao is not yet settled. The situation seems to be pretty stable at the moment. But there is still the chance that political changes will occur that will lead to a relatively more radical leadership, that is to say a leadership that will be less conciliatory towards the United States and less desirous of trade with the United States and other Western countries. Moreover, even if the moderates do win the succession struggle, there is still the possibility of change in foreign policy in China. A moderate regime might be one to engage in a limited rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Even a relatively moderate leadership group will eventually lose patience with further delay of the normalization of relations and the solution of the Taiwan issue. PERMANENCE OF SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT The second assumption, which I think is only partly valid, is that Sino-Soviet conflict is a permanent feature of international politics. The implication of this assumption of course is that the Chinese need the United States as a counterweight against the Soviet Union and that they therefore will do nothing to imperil the policy of détente with us. It seems to me that even if Sino-Soviet conflict does continue, it does not preclude a cooling of relations between China and the United States. At several points in the past Chinese leaders have argued for a dual adversary position, that is that the Chinese can and should be hostile to both superpowers. Even if the Sino-Soviet conflict continues, there will still be those in Peking who argue that that is no excuse for capitulation to imperialism. More importantly, however, I do not believe that the Sino-Soviet conflict is necessarily permanent. Following the death of Mao and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who basically seem to be anti-Soviet in their attitude, new leaders will be coming into power who may gradually begin to see the costs of rigid hostility towards the Soviet Union and the advantages of beginning a limited process of détente with their neighbor to the north. Therefore it seems to me that we cannot let the Sino-Soviet conflict be the only underpinning of Sino-American relations, for that underpinning may undergo a change in the coming years. CHINA WILL BE PATIENT The third questionable assumption is that the Chinese will be patient indefinitely on the Taiwan issue and on the question of recognition. Those who hold this assumption argue that we need not be in any hurry to recognize China nor be concerned that so little progress has occurred since 1973. I think it is true that many Chinese leaders do understand that there are both foreign and domestic constraints operating on the U.S. Government in this regard. However many do not. Or at least they claim not to. Moreover even Chinese patience is going to have its limits at some point. More and more Chinese are going to say, "When is normalization going to occur? When are we going to sit down with the |