China is currently in the midst of a difficult succession process, which complicates all decision-making in Peking. There is evidence, moreover, of some internal debate in China over foreign policy toward both the United States and the Soviet Union. Some Chinese critics of the opening to the United States probably have argued that because the United States has not yet fulfilled all the pledges made in the Shanghai Communique in 1972, Peking should not agree to any broadening of bilateral U.S.-China relations but instead should stand pat until full normalization can be achieved. There is also recurring evidence that there are some in the Chinese leadership who favor a less hostile and more compromising policy on Peking's part toward the Soviet Union.

There would have been obvious advantages from the U.S. point of view in completing the normalization process at a time when both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai could put their imprimateur on the two-way compromises required. This might have been possible in 1975. Now Chou has died, and no one can be sure whether Mao will still be on the scene in 1977. This inevitably introduces a new element of uncertainty.

Domestic politics have obviously complicated the equation on the U.S. side, too. Since the fall of Vietnam and death of Chiang Kai-shek, some American political leaders have spoken out openly against further compromise_on_the Taiwan issue. This was doubtless a major factor leading President Ford to conclude that the U.S. could not consider further compromise in 1975. Recent polls indicate, moreover, that while a large majority of Americans favor full diplomatic relations with Peking, a sizable majority also opposes severence of formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. They would like, in sum, for us to continue to eat our cake and have it too. The reality of the situation, however, is that genuine consolidation and significant expansion of the U.S. relationship with Peking will only be possible if and when Washington is willing to make major changes in its relations with Taiwan. Because of the uncertainties about China's leadership in the future, it would have been desirable to do this in 1975, but since it was not possible then, it is essential now to plan to do it as soon as possible after the forthcoming presidential elections.

If there were to be a prolonged period without forward movement in the U.S.China relationship, Chinese leaders might well reassess the basic value of the relationship to them. One cannot assume, therefore, that U.S.-China ties can be maintained at their present minimal level indefinitely; without gradual improvement there could be gradual deterioration.

The uncertainties will increase when the Chinese succession actually occurs, since conceivably post-Mao leaders, even if they do not alter the main lines of Chinese policy, may find it more difficult than Mao and Chou have to deal with, and reach compromises on, the most difficult issues in U.S.-China relations. The uncertainties will increase even more if post-Mao leaders begin to move toward reducing Sino-Soviet tensions, before full normalization of U.S.-China relations has occurred.

One reason, therefore, that the United States must take the necessary steps as soon as possible to upgrade and consolidate its relations with Peking is to minimize the dangers of retrogression and deterioration in the existing relationship. An equally compelling reason is that full normalization of relations is a prerequisite to serious efforts to deal with many critical problems that must be high on the agenda of U.S.-China relations in the period immediately aheadproblems such as ensuring peace and increasing stability in Korea and Southeast Asia and moving toward arms control (especially nuclear arms control) in East Asia. In and of itself, the establishment of full diplomatic relations will obviously not guarantee that such problems can be dealt with effectively. It may, in fact, take many years to successfully engage China in serious discussion of them. However, until full diplomatic relations are established, it will be difficult even to begin the required process.

What will be required to achieve full normalization of relations with Peking? The key issue that must be faced is the one that has bedeviled U.S.-China relations for more than two decades, namely the problem of redefining U.S. relations with the Nationalist regime and the island of Taiwan. The United States must accept the fact that to upgrade and consolidate its relationship with Peking, it must be prepared to alter its relationship with Taiwan.

Peking's present basic position, which it is not likely to alter, is that for full normalization of U.S.-China relations to occur, the United States must do three things: sever formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime, withdraw U.S. military forces from Taiwan, and end the existing formal defense treaty with the Nationalists.

In my opinion, the United States should indicate its willingness to take these steps, even though they will obviously represent major compromises, but only under certain clearly understood conditions, which will require significant compromises on Peking's part. What should these conditions be?

First of all, Washington should require from Peking a strong public assertion of its intention to work toward reunification by peaceful means and not by force. The value of this should not be exaggerated, however, Peking will almost certainly refuse, as it has for two decades, to make any binding pledge in this regard, since it regards Taiwan as a domestic issue. The real deterrents to military action will continue to be more basic factors-including the 100 miles of water in Taiwan Strait, the limitation of Peking naval and amphibious capabilities, the effectiveness of Taiwan's defense forces, and-most important of all-the strong political deterrent deriving from the fact that the United States, Japan, and perhaps even the Soviet Union, oppose the idea of a Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan.

More important than any statement Peking makes will be what the United States itself says and does. At the time of normalizing relations with Peking, therefore, Washington must make it clear that it intends to continue important substantive relationships with Taiwan, in new forms and in a new context, despite the severance of formal relations.

Specifically, Washington should indicate, unambiguously, the following:

(1) While the United States is willing to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it will continue to maintain important de facto political and economic ties with the island (as the Japanese have done), will retain significant substantive political ties with the regime there (albeit through missions that are labelled "unofficial"), and will continue to develop and even expand trade and other economic links.

(2) While it is willing to let the existing defense treaty with the Nationalists lapse, the United States will not abandon its concern for the security of the island but will-even without a formal treaty-continue to oppose any solution of the Taiwan problem by force;

(3) While it is prepared to withdraw the last U.S. military forces from Taiwan (which now number less than 3,000), the United States will continue to maintain some sort of American military liaison with the Nationalist regime, and will continue to sell it defensive equipment needed to preserve its basic defense capabilities;

(4) While it will, as promised in the Shanghai Communique, avoid any "challenge" to claims made by either Peking or Taipei that Taiwan is Chinese territory, it will avoid taking any definite stand itself (as have many other nations) regarding Taiwan's present legal status;

(5) While it will be prepared, over the long run, to accept any solution of the Taiwan issue that can be arrived at peacefully by the Chinese themselves including, obviously, the people on Taiwan as well as those on the China mainland), the United States will not prejudge what such a solution should be and will continue to maintain friendly de facto relations with whatever regime exists on Taiwan until some peaceful solution can be reached; and

(6) While it will look favorably upon steps toward some kind of modus vivendi between Peking and Taipei, it will not itself attempt to determine the conditions for, or try to force the pace of, achieving such a modus vivendi. In very broad terms, the United States should also indicate the following:

(1) That its willingness to sever formal diplomatic ties and end its defense treaty with Taiwan is based on the assumption that this will make possible expanded and improved Washington-Peking relations and at least open the door to meaningful U.S.-China discussions of issues crucial to peace and stability in East Asia; and

(2) That because U.S. policy will continue to be based on the premise that no attempt will be made to settle the Taiwan problem by force, if military conflict were to appear imminent, Washington would be compelled to reassess its basic policies toward both China and Taiwan.

The course of action suggested above will obviously involve major U.S. conces sions. It will also, however, require important compromises, tacit and/or explicit, by Peking. There is no guarantee that Peking will agree, although it is to be hoped that it will. If it does not, the U.S.-China relationship will probably continue at its present minimal level, with inevitable risks of retrogression and deterioration.

The government and people on Taiwan will undoubtedly feel that the steps proposed here sacrifice important interests of theirs, even though the more 68-793-76- -10

realistic leaders on the island probably expect something of this sort to occur eventually. In no sense, however, will the United States be "selling out" or "betraying Taiwan". The immediate changes will primarily involve changes in the form rather than in the substance in U.S.-Taiwan relations, and U.S. willingness to continue its opposition to military attack on Taiwan and to sustain important non-official political and economic relationships with the island will help to ensure Taiwan's viability in a de facto sense and to prevent seriously destabilizing consequences. This is the most Taiwan can realistically hope for in the period immediately ahead. In the late 1950s, and early 1960s, a formal "two Chinas" formula might have been feasible (I personally favored it at that time), but today it is not.

None of this will, of course, "solve" the Taiwan problem in any long-term, final sense. There simply is no formula for such a solution now without unacceptable costs or dangers in relation to the stability of the region as a whole. Any final solution will take years, and perhaps even decades, to work out, and it will depend above all on whether or not Peking and Taipei can themselves eventually find a mutually acceptable basis for a modus vivendi. If no such modus vivendi emerges in time, Taiwan may eventually be impelled to move toward formal independence. Such a development would force the United States to reexamine its policies, and there is no doubt that it would pose some extremely difficult choices.

Even in the short run, there is no guarantee that new problems over Taiwan may not arise. But the compromises proposed here nevertheless represent the best hope of defusing and shelving the Taiwan issue in the period immediately ahead, thereby opening the door to further consolidation and strengthening of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, which must continue to be a major objective of U.S. policy, since relations between Washington and Peking clearly will be one of the primary determinants of the prospects for peace and stability in the entire East Asian region in the years ahead. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Barnett. Dr. Whiting, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ALLEN S. WHITING, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Mr. WHITING. Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to appear before your group.

I would like to supplement my prepared remarks, stressing in particular certain aspects of American public opinion in domestic politics, since I am largely in concurrence with Mr. Barnett's presentation and his approach to the international problems which I have addressed in my prepared remarks.

CONTRADICTIONS IN RELATIONS

The contradictions in Sino-American relations confuse the average person. On the positive side, American sports teams in China report that "friendship first, propaganda second" is more than a propaganda slogan as they interact with their Chinese counterparts.

In this country, United States-China friendship associations arrange group tours, show films, and publish glowing articles on the mutual exchange of experience. Two American presidents have visited Peking with full fanfare, including long interviews with Chairman Mao Tsetung and highly publicized family tours of the Great Wall.

Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and other officials talk about "common strategic interests" that should join the United States and China in concerted efforts against "Soviet hegemony." Yet, on the negative

side, Peking's domestic and foreign propaganda continues to attack U.S. imperialism.

Chinese children study luridly illustrated booklets that celebrate heroic exploits against the so-called American devils in the Korean war. Official editorials commemorate the victory over Japan in World War II, and pay tribute to the Soviet people but make no mention of the American contribution.

Chinese media depict life in the United States in stereotypic terms of racial tension, economic misery, and capitalistic crime. In the United Nations the PRC speeches consistently oppose the United States, whether on specific questions such as Korea or on general issues such as world food and energy problems.

GOVERNMENT INTERACTIONS

This dichotomy is dissillusioning to those who cherish the notion that nations are good or evil and should relate to us as friend or foe. But these contradictions are not unique to Sino-American relations All governments interact in terms of interests which conflict or converge and they react on the basis of power, which dictates control or compromise.

This is as true for United States and Soviet behavior in the Middle East, vis a vis Israel and the Arab States, as it is for the ChineseAmerican relationship.

1972 SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE

In this sense, the February 1972 Shanghai Communique exemplifies what separated and what linked our two countries at that time. Half that communique presents the positions of each side on a wide range of issues where agreement was impossible or difficult to achieve.

The exchange of views are bluntly described as "serious, frank, extensive, honest, candid." The listing of issues yet to be resolved and the identification of the steps toward normalization was joined by the express recognition that "there are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies".

"RELAXATION OF TENSIONS"

The communique's penultimate paragraph does not ascribe friendship as the goal of normalized relations, but more correctly speaks of contributing "to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world."

The communique also reflects the interest which brought the two countries together, such as, a strategic concern over "hegemony,"read the Soviet Union-and a tactical desire to "relax tension"-read Vietnam.

EXPANDING RELATIONS

However, it could not reflect all the potential future problems that faced China and America. The sheer scale of these two societies promises that bilaterally and separately, their impact on the world will grow over the coming years.

Just as Soviet-American relations expanded almost beyond belief from the sterile confrontation of "cold war" to joint exploration of space, while at the same time preserving political competition in

Africa and the Middle East, so too do Sino-American relations have the prospect of jointly addressing global and extra-global problems without abandoning the contest for advancing competitive interests and ideologies.

In short, our China policy cannot be defined and developed on the basis of friendship or enmity. The impact of emotion and attitude in person-to-person contacts and cultural exchanges cannot be realized in interstate relations nor, indeed, given the power of states to wage war, is this truly desirable.

This is particularly true where a wide range of conflicting values. and goals exists, as in Sino-American relations.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS

It is regrettable that President Nixon never addressed the problem in public with the wisdom and candor ascribed to him by an associate who attended his initial briefing of close officials on his return from Peking in February 1972. After describing the Chinese motivation for improved relations as "cold-blooded interest," Nixon

remarked:

The naive assumption, particularly among Americans, that problems evaporate when nations get to know one another, that is nonsense. The idea that either of us is going to be affected by more personal visits is just baloney. It helps to be polite and have communication. I don't believe in hot rhetoric but we are not going to have instant peace. We have set up a process where common ground can be gradually expanded.1

Secretary Kissinger put it more pithily at the same meeting

We judge by different standards. We talk compromise. They talk principle. We exalt stability. They believe in struggle.2

These words contrast with the sweeping public utterances of the time and reveal the firm grip on reality which underlay this historic reversal of U.S. policy. The failure to realize full normalization in the aftermath of the Nixon visit, with its tidal effect on the mass media and public opinion, is unfortunate but not fatal.

PUBLIC REACTION

Much has been gained and little lost in the interim. The initial euphoria which gripped many Americans at the prospect of improved relations with China has evaporated so that less will be expected in the final step. The danger remains, however, that illusions will plague public debate.

For instance, a Gallup poll sponsored in September 1975, by the Republic of China found that while 61 percent favored establishing dipfomatic relations with the PRC, 9 out of 10 in this group believed we should maintain relations with Taiwan.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS VERSUS SECURITY COMMITMENTS

The practical incompatibility of the two positions testifies to the inadequate understanding which prevails concerning our China policy

1 William Safire, "Before the Fall," Doubleday, New York, 1975, pp. 410-416.

2 Ibid., p. 414.