Mr. BARNETT. I agree with that. It should be our policy to try to develop relations equally with both. I would only add that this is obviously going to involve some difficulties, but I think it is within the realm of possibility, and we should pursue such a policy. CHINA'S OBJECTIVES IN ASIA Mr. HAMILTON. I would like you each to comment briefly on what you think China's foreign policy objectives are in Asia today. Mr. WHITING. I think the Chinese policy objectives in Asia are those of any power, large, or small. First, to advance their security and to minimize the threat posed by any immediate approximate power. Second, to advance their prestige, to enhance their diplomatic and political position in that community. THE CHINESE IN INDOCHINA Mr. HAMILTON. Let's talk in terms of Indochina and Korea specifically. What do you think they are aiming at with regard to those areas? Mr. WHITING. In Indochina, the Chinese are competing with the Soviet Union for influence in Laos and in Hanoi. They see their position in Cambodia as advantageous vis-a-vis Moscow. They have expressed concerns about Soviet acquisition of Camranh Bay as a base, but I know of no independent source to support that concern. I do not think there is a genuine Soviet security threat but this is rather a political competitive position. IN KOREA In Korea, again, I think the Chinese are competing with Moscow for influence as evidenced by their willingness to receive Kim Il-sung last year when the Russians were not willing to receive him and possibly by extending more material support to Kim Il-sung than that which he receives from the Russians. Mr. HAMILTON. Who has the upper hand in North Korea now? MAINTAINING BALANCE Mr. HAMILTON. Do you agree with the statements made by Dr. Whiting, Mr. Barnett? Mr. BARNETT. Yes; I do agree. It would seem to me over the next 10 years-if one could get the Chinese to give you a frank answer as to what their objectives, ideally but in practical terms, would be in Southeast Asia-I think they would indicate they would like to see an area composed of states that are not under the influence of any other power, but are very friendly to China. I do not think it goes beyond that, in the sense that I do not think that they view Southeast Asia as being an area in which China can have a strong dominating role, as a practical objective, in the period ahead. Having said that, I agree with Dr. Whiting that their immediate objective is much more limited than that. Their immediate preoccupa tion is with the danger of the Soviet Union acquiring too much influence in this area, and, therefore, they have taken a very tolerant position vis-a-vis the United States, in terms of its position in the area, here as elsewhere. They are trying to get balance against what they see to be an increase in Soviet influence. KIM IL-SUNG'S ROLE Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think China is a restraining influence on Kim Il-sung, who is often accused of having aggressive tendencies? Mr. BARNETT. If Kim were seriously considering military action, I think the Chinese would restrain him. As I said earlier, however, they have taken a political posture which encourages rigid political positions on Kim's part. Mr. WHITING. There is evidence of constraint with respect to public postures. When Kim Il-sung came to Peking last May, his initial speech had a very threatening reference to it to the role that the North would play in the event there was an uprising in the South. Vice Premier Teng's responding speech had no such references and all subsequent joint statements stressed peaceful communication. Before Kim Il-sung went to Peking, the North Korea media were very heavy on allegations of "Japanese militarism" and "U.S. imperialism," conspiring to start war in the Korea Peninsula. After he visited Peking, those references to Japanese militarism distinctly faded from North Korean propaganda. U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN KOREA Mr. HAMILTON. What would you suggest for American policy with regard to our troop levels in Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines? Mr. BARNETT. That is a large and complicated subject. In a nut shell, my own view is that we should continue our defense commitment to Korea, and that we can work out a phased withdrawal over the time of our ground forces in Korea, paralleling the modernization of South Korea's forces. I am inclined to think that for quite a long time we probably should maintain some air presence in Korea. I think a total disengagement, which would be a desirable long-term objective, should be linked to some progress towards genuine stability on the peninsula, which I think requires, on the one hand, a real North/South process of compromise among the Koreans, and some agreement among all the four powers who have interests there about how to collaborate in working toward stabilizing the situation. THE PHILIPPINES I am inclined to think that we should maintain a naval and air presence in the Philippines, although the size of this is something one can argue about, less for any foreseeable contingencies for military action in Southeast Asia than for the political and psychological effects. It is significant that the available evidence suggests that most Southeast Asian countries would like us to maintain a naval presence in the area; the Chinese also indicate that they favor this. I would say that it is important mainly as a political and psychological factor, as we try to work towards an equilibrium among the four powers that are involved in this area. Many countries, including China, would be disturbed if we totally disengaged and had no military presence in the area. There would be an increased chance of instability which the Soviets might try to exploit militarily. THAILAND In Thailand, I think we should be prepared to withdraw totally, as we seem to be doing. I know there are arguments about the advantages of maintaining some base arrangements for intelligence activities. I guess I do not have a very firm opinion on this. I would be prepared to disengage our presence totally. If the Thais change, and strongly wanted us to make standby base arrangements, or were prepared to have us continue noncombat intelligence operations, I would be open to that. Mr. WHITING. I agree. DR. WHITING CONCURS I think the Thai Government has made its position over the past year. We have responded to it in the proper fashion. I see no threat to the security of Thailand or the area that would follow from the closure of American military bases and their transfer to Thai control. I do not see a power vacuum or anything in which another power would move. As far as the Philippines are concerned, I think the size of our bases there has been a legitimate local grievance and that we will still have a capability for responding either to Philippine needs or to the regional needs. This is quite probable given the negotiations that are going on in Manila, as I understand them, between our two governments. This is not a provocative presence. It is a legitimate, accepted presence. In Korea, I think it is not so much the numbers that are important as the kind of U.S. presence is there to provide credibility to the treaty commitment. Therefore, I can see one-fourth of the present troop presence in a relatively short period of time, looking 2 years down the road, provided this is worked out, both in Tokyo and Seoul as providing no cause for anxiety as to what our intentions are and what would be the consequences. Both Japanese and South Korean attitudes are important in talking about the rate or timing of draw down. MULTILATERAL UNDERSTANDING I do believe that a unilateral American move pegged to a fixed point in time such as 1980, is not wise. I do think we should exhaust all our diplomatic efforts to having a multilateral understanding and the arms that will go into the Korean Peninsula over the future 5 or 10 years. It is very difficult to ask Peking to act in effect, in a way that might compromise the interests of Peking, unless we have already normalized relations and met some of the prior Chinese interests in the area. In a sense it is an anomaly to say the Chinese should agree to do less for Kam Yung while we have not done more on the Taiwan side of the issue. President Ford has said he foresees no need in 1980 for an American logistical support, let alone the larger inputs of air and naval action, provided the North at that time is alone on its own military capability. We know North Korea is acquiring an impressive modernized capability in tandem with the South. We may be setting up these two Koreas for some eventual kind of conflict. AN ACTIVE U.S. ROLE Mr. HAMILTON. So far as I know, nothing is taking place now in the U.S. executive branch toward negotiating the kind of withdrawal patterns that both of you are suggesting. Do you both feel United States diplomacy ought to be active on this point at the present time, or should we be relatively inactive? Mr. BARNETT. I think we certainly ought to be active, in negotiating on Korea and in general. Mr. HAMILTON. Specifically on Korea. Mr BARNETT. I would not myself say the evidence suggests we have not made some efforts to be active. I do not know this, but it is my understanding that we have tried to discuss this with the Chinese, for example, and we have not gotten very far. I think we ought to be active in laying out a process and in defining this process, and the process should be one in which we are prepared to take some unilateral steps but not go very far in unilateral steps without some positive reaction from the other side. RELAXATION IN CONFRONTATION Mr. HAMILTON. Are you under the impression that process is underway? Mr. BARNETT. I think we need to do more. I cannot give you an answer as to what the U.S. Government's internal considerations regarding these problems now are. Mr. WHITING. Promising exchanges that occurred between 1972 and 1973 and there were echo effects in both Cameron and Seoul that looked toward some easing in the confrontation and tensions between the two sides. That ended in 1973 as the political situations of Korea appeared increasingly unstable. There is the question of President Park's viability-it is not just the relationships among the four powers that is going to determine what the Koreans are going to do with or to each other. If the South remains stable, it offers no promise for overthrow or revolution, then I think it is much more likely that arrangements can be arrived at in the major powers because they will not seem on the Communist side to be compromising the position of Pyongyang. Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, thank you very much. You have contributed a great deal to our work and we are most appreciative of your statements as well as your responses to the questions. The subcommittee stands adjourned. [The subcommittee was adjourned at 4:02 p.m., subject to the call of the Chair.] APPENDIX 1 BIOGRAPHIES OF WITNESSES A. DOAK BARNETT A. Doak Barnett was born in Shanghai, China, in 1921, and spent his childhood there. He completed his secondary education in the United States, at White Plains High School, and then attended Yale University, graduating in 1942 (B.A., International Relations, "Philosophical Orations"-Summa Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa). During World War II he served in the Marine Corps in the Pacific, where he received a Personal Commendation for performance in the Okinawa campaign; at the end of his service career he was a Captain. Following V-J Day he spent a brief period of time in China. Returning to Yale after the war, he then took an M.A. in International Relations and received a Certificate of Chinese from the Yale Institute of Far Eastern Languages. (In 1967 he was awarded an Honorary LL.D. by Franklin and Marshall College.) In 1947 Barnett returned to China, as a Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs and Correspondent for the Chicago Daily News Foreign Service, and from then through 1949 he analyzed and wrote about developments in China during the critical period of Communist takeover. He was in Peking when Communist armies entered the city, and for several months thereafter observed their initial period of rule. During the 1950s, Barnett held a variety of governmental, scholarly, and journalistic positions, in the United States and in East Asia. During 1950-51 he was a consultant to the Far East Program Division of the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington, D.C. During 1951-52 he was a Consul and Public Affairs Officer in the American Consulate-General in Hong Kong. Thereafter, until 1955, he was based in Hong Kong, as an Associate of the American Universities Field Staff and again was a correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. Returning to the United States in 1955, he headed the Department of Foreign Area Studies of the State Department's Foreign Service Institute during 1956–57. In late 1957 he was a consultant to the National Planning Association in Washington, D.C. Then, during 1958-59, he was a Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Subsequently, he was a Program Associate of the International Training and Research Program of the Ford Foundation during 1959-61. From 1961 to 1969 Barnett was a Professor of Government at Columbia University, where he headed the University's Contemporary China Studies Program. He also spent 1964-65 in Hong Kong, engaged in research and writing, and 1967-68 as a Visiting Professor of Political Science at MIT. At Columbia he sponsored and advised a large number of graduate students working in the field of Chinese politics and foreign relations. In 1969, he joined the staff of the Brookings Institution in Washington, as a Senior Fellow. At Brookings he has concentrated his research and writing on China and U.S. policy in Asia. In 1972-73 he revisited China, on the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and in 1974 he was invited to the Soviet Union by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In addition to his teaching, writing, and administrative responsibilities, Barnett has also been active in a great many scholarly and professional organizations and associations, and he has served as consultant to numerous governmental agencies, foundations, and other organizations. At various periods he has been Chairman of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Societies; Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations; and Vice Chairman of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (of the National Academy of Sciences and ACLS and SSRC). He has also been a member of the State Department's Panel of Advisors on China, Chairman of the Conference on Communist Studies of the American |