PREFACE

After the promulgation of the Shanghai Communique in 1972 following former President Nixon's first visit to the People's Republic of China, Chinese-American relations slowly improved. Scientific and technological exchanges, political contacts, and bilateral trade increased and in 1973 we established liaison offices, quasi-embassies, in our respective capitals.

In the last 2 years, however, American-Chinese relations have been in a holding pattern, and the prospects for any developments in the next several months appear minimal as the United States moves toward the 1976 Presidential elections.

The Special Subcommittee on Investigations held this series of hearings between November 1975 and February 1976 in order to review United States-Chinese relations and to assess the prospects for normalizing relations in the next few years.

These hearings were held at a significant time, both for United States-China relations and for internal developments in China. President Ford's visit to China, which broke no new ground, and Chou En-lai's death were two benchmarks for our inquiry. Since our last hearing, there have been further and dramatic changes within the Chinese leadership and former Deputy Teng Hsiao-p'ing has come under political and personal attack by several groups and has fallen from the leadership. China's leaders are clearly debating the character of its Government for the post-Mao Tse-tung period.

To add an additional perspective to this inquiry, we asked several of the public witnesses to submit a postscript on the evolving leadership struggle in China and the unexpected second Nixon visit to China. These statements appear in appendix 3 on page 185.

Several conclusions of these hearings should be mentioned: First, it is in the U.S. national interest to try to work toward a normalization of relations with China in the next few years.

Second, the process of normalization of relations with China will necessarily involve a downgrading of our relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan although it is not clear what that deescalation should encompass. Some observers feel that one viable option for the United States would be to adopt the Japanese solution, which involved the breaking of diplomatic ties with Taiwan but the continuation of close and important commercial and economic ties.

Third, the importance of Taiwan as a core problem preventing a normalization of relations should not be underestimated. United States-Chinese relations could deteriorate rapidly if the Taiwan issue is not dealt with. Solving the Taiwan issue remains the key to normalization of relations and to solutions to other outstanding problems, such as the claims-assets question.

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Fourth, the character and the direction of Chinese leadership in the post-Mao period are not yet clear and there will probably be a series of changes, some perhaps abrupt, as plans for succession evolve. For the immediate future, this evolution need not affect our low level ties with China.

Fifth, while the United States and China may have complementary interests in parts of the world, this compatibility should not be overestimated. United States-China ties will undoubtedly develop slowly and any quick and dramatic improvement in our relations is unlikely. Sixth, cultural and scientific exchanges and trade between the United States and China may continue but they will be affected by what happens in our political relations. Beyond a point, their further development will be impaired as long as United States-China political relations remain stationary.

Finally, it is clear that the next administration, which takes office in January 1977, will have to give high priority to the question of United States-China relations, the costs and benefits of normalization of relations, and how best the interests of the peoples of Taiwan can be preserved without interfering in what many regard as an internal Chinese problem and without countering the concept of one China, a concept we agreed to in the Shanghai Communique in 1972.

For Members of Congress who may have to deal with this important foreign policy issue in the coming months and all persons interested in U.S. Asian policy and our ties with China, this series of hearings provides a useful background document. This is true despite the changing political scene in China and Asia and despite the fact that if these hearings were held today, some nuances in what witnesses said might be different.

Recent polls suggest that the American people desire to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China but a majority also want to preserve some ties with Taiwan. It might appear that the United States has little maneuverability in this situation. That could be the case, but we are helped at the present time by the fact that there appears to be a strong sentiment on all sides to seek political rather than military solutions to the problem. Some movement on the political front, then, is the best assurance that military solutions remain remote possibilities.

APRIL 27, 1976.

LEB H. HAMILTON, Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Investigations.