commissioner may act as arbitrator by written consent of the parties. Seaworthiness is an implied condition of the hiring. There may be an examination of the ship on the complaint of the mate and a majority of the crew. The expenses of an unnecessary investigation are a charge upon the wages of those who complain. A scaman may not leave his ship without the consent of the master. For foreign-bound voyages a medicine-chest and antiscorbutics must be carried, also 60 gallons of water, 100 lb of salted meat, and 100 tb of wholesome bread for every person on board, and for every seaman at least one suit of woollen clothing, and fuel for the fire of the seaman's room. An assessment of forty cents per month per seaman is levied on every vessel arriving from a foreign port and on every registered coasting vessel in aid of the fund for the relief of sick and disabled seamen. In the navy a deduction of twenty cents per month from each man's pay is made for the same purpose. The offences and punishments are similar to those in the United Kingdom. There is also the additional offence of wearing a sheath knife on shipboard. As in England, consuls are required to provide for the passage home of destitute seamen (see Revised Statutes, §§ 45544591). A seamen's fund was constituted by the act of the 16th of July 1798, amended by subsequent legislation. Continental European Countries.-The commercial codes contain provisions of a more or less detailed character. For France see $250-272; Italy, §§ 343-380; Netherlands, §§ 394-452; Germany, Wendt, Maritime Legislation (1888). These enactments are in general accordance with British legislation. In Germany the law goes a little further than in the United Kingdom in enacting that copies of the part of the law affecting him must be handed to cach seaman on his engagement at a seamen's office. AUTHORITIES.-The works on merchant shippings, such as those of Abbott, Boyd, Kay, Maclachlan, Maude and Pollock, Temperley, and on admiralty law and practice, such as those of Roscoe and Williams and Bruce. Also E. S. Roscoe Modern Legislation for Seamen and for Safety at Sea (1885). UJ. W.) SEA-POWER. This term is used to indicate two distinct, though cognate, things. The affinity of these two and the History of the term. | exclusively, attached to the term owing to the brilliant way in which it has been elucidated by Captain A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy. The double use of the term is common in German, though in that language both parts of the compound now in use are Teutonic. One instance out of many may be cited from the historian Adolf Holm (Griechische Geschichte, Berlin, 1889). He says (ii. p. 37) that Athens, being in possession of a good naval port, could become eine bedeutende Seemacht," i.e. an important naval power. He also says (ii. p. 91) that Gelon of Syracuse, besides a large army (Heer), had "eine bedeutende Seemacht," meaning a considerable navy. The term, in the first of the two senses, is old in German, as appears from the following, extracted from Zedler's Grosses Universal Lexicon, vol. xxxvi. (Leipzig and Halle, 1743); "Seemachten, Seepotenzen; Latin, summae potestates mari potentes." "Seepotenzen "is probably quite obsolete now. It is interesting as showing that German no more abhors Teuto-Latin or Teuto-Romance compounds than English. We may note, as a proof of the indeterminate meaning of the expression until his own epoch-marking works had appeared, that Mahan himself in his carliest book, Influence of Sea-power on History (1890), used it in both senses. He says (p. 35). "The Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea-power." He alludes (p. 42) to the development of a nation as a sea-power," and (p. 43) to the inferiority of the Confederate States "as a sea-power.' Also (p. 225) he remarks of the war of the Spanish Succession that "before it England was one of the sea-powers, after it she was the sea-power without any second." In all these passages, as appears from the use of the indefinite article, what is meant is a naval power, or a state in possession of a strong navy. The other meaning of the term forms the general subject of Mahan's writings. In his carlier works Mahan writes "sca power as two words; but in a published letter of the 19th February 1897 he joins them with a hyphen, and defends this formation of the term and the sense in which he uses it. We may regard him as the virtual inventor of the term in its more diffused meaning, for-even if it had been employed by earlier given it general currency. He has made it impossible for any one writers in that sense-it is he beyond all question who has to treat of sea-power without frequent reference to his writings and conclusions. ancients. indiscriminate manner in which the term has been applied to each have tended to obscure its real significance. The obscurity has been deepened by the There is something more than mere literary interest in the fact frequency with which the term has been confounded that the term in another language was used more than two with the old phrase, “Sovereignty of the sea," and the still thousand years ago. Before Mahan no historian-not Apprecia current expression, " Command of the sea (vide SEA, COMMAND even one of those who specially devoted themselves to tion of OF). A discussion-etymological, or even archaeological in the narration of naval occurrences-had evinced a sea-power character of the term must be undertaken as an introduction more correct appreciation of the general principles of by the to the explanation of its now generally accepted meaning. naval warfare than Thucydides. He alludes several It is one of those compound words in which a Teutonic and a times to the importance of getting command of the sea. Great Latin (or Romance) element are combined, and which are easily Britain would have been saved some disasters and been less often formed and become widely current when the sea is concerned. in peril had British writers-taken as guides by the public→→ Of such are sea-coast," sea-forces (the "land- and sea-possessed the same grasp of the true principles of defence as forces" used to be a common designation of what we now call Thucydides exhibited. One passage in his history is worth the " Army and Navy "); "sea-service," " sea-serpent" and quoting. Brief as it is, it shows that on the subject of sea-power "sea-officer" (now superseded by "naval officer "). The term he was a predecessor of Mahan. In a speech in favour of proin one form is as old as the 15th century. Edward III., in com-secuting the war, which he puts in the mouth of Pericles, these memoration of the naval victory of Sluys, coined gold "nobles " words occur: οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξουσιν ἄλλην ἀντιλαβεῖν ἀμαχεί, which bore on one side his effigy " crowned, standing in a large ἡμῖν δέ ἐστι γῆ πολλὴ καὶ ἐν νήσοις καὶ κατ' ἤπειρον· μέγα γὰρ τὸ ship, holding in one hand a sword and in the other a shield." Tηs Oaλáσons kpáros. The last part of this extract, though An anonymous poet, who wrote in the reign of Henry VI., often translated " command of the sea," or "dominion of the says of this coin:sea," really has the wider meaning of sea-power, the " power of the sea " of the old English poet above quoted. This wider meaning should be attached to certain passages in Herodotus (iii. 122 in two places; v. 83), which have been generally interpreted 'commanding the sea," or by the mere titular and honorific "having the dominion of the sea." One editor of Herodotus, Ch. F. Baehr, did, however, see exactly what was meant, for, with reference to the allusion to Polycrates, he says, classe maximum valuit. This is perhaps as exact a definition of sea-power as could be given in a sentence, "For four things our noble showeth to me, King, ship and sword, and power of the sea." Even in its present form the term is not of very recent date. Grote (Hist. of Greece, v. 67, published in 1849, but with preface dated 1848) speaks of "the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power." In a lecture published in 1883, but probably delivered earlier, the late Sir J. R. Seeley says that commerce was swept out of the Mediterranean by the besom of the Turkish sea-power" (Expansion of England, p. 89). The term also occurred in the 9th edition of this Encyclopaedia, vol. xviii. p. 574. in the article "PERSIA," where we are told that Themistocles was "the founder of the Attic sea-power." The sense in which the term is used differs in these extracts. In the first it means what we generally call a “naval power that is to say, a state having a considerable navy in contradistinction to a "military power," a state with a considerable army but only a relatively small navy. In this sense there are many old uses of the phrase. In the last two extracts it means all the elements of the naval strength of the state referred to; and this is the meaning that is now generally, and is likely to be " sea It is, however, impossible to give a definition which would be at the same time succinct and satisfactory. To say that power means the sum total of the various elements can only be that go to make up the naval strength of a state would explained be in reality to beg the question. Mahan lays down histori the "principal conditions affecting the sea-power of cally. nations," but he does not attempt to give a concise definition of it. Yet no one who has studied his works will find it difficult to understand what it indicates. Our present task is, within the necessarily restricted limits of an article in an encyclopaedia, to put readers in possession of the means of doing this. The at in this light the great conflicts of former ages are full of useful, indeed necessary, instruction. Persians. In the first and greatest of the contests waged by the nations of the East against Europe-the Persian wars--sea-power was the governing factor. Until Persia had expanded to Wars of the shores of the Levant the European Greeks had the Greeks little to fear from the ambition of the great king. The and conquest of Egypt by Cambyses had shown how formidable that ambition could be when supported by an efficient navy. With the aid of the naval forces of the Phoenician cities the Persian invasion of Greece was rendered comparatively easy. It was the naval contingents from Phoenicia which crushed the Ionian revolt. The expidition of Mardonius, and still more that of Datis and Artaphernes, had indicated the danger threatening Greece when the master of a great army was likewise the master of a great navy. Their defeat at Marathon was not likely to, and as a matter of fact did not, discourage the Persians from further attempts at aggression. As the advance of Cambyses best, indeed-as Mahan has shown us-the only effective way of attaining this object is to treat the matter historically. Whatever date we may agree to assign to the formation of the term itself, the idea-as we have seen-is as old as history. It is not intended to give a condensed history of sea-power, but rather an analysis of the idea and what it contains, illustrating this analysis with examples from history ancient and modern. It is important to know that it is not something which originated in the middle of the 17th century, and having seriously affected history in the 18th, ceased to have weight till Captain Mahan appeared to comment on it in the last decade of the 19th. With a few masterly touches Mahan, in his brief allusion to the second Punic war, has illustrated its importance in the struggle between Rome and Carthage. What has to be shown is that the principles which he has laid down in that case, and in cases much more modern, are true and have been true always and everywhere. Until this is perceived there much history which cannot be understood, and yet it is essential to the welfare of Great Britain as a maritime power that she should understand it thoroughly.into Egypt had been flanked by a fleet, so also was that of Xerxes Her failure to understand it has more than once brought her, if not to the verge of destruction, at any rate within a short distance of serious disaster. into Greece. By the good fortune sometimes vouchsafed to a people, which, owing to its obstinate opposition to, or neglect of, a wise policy, scarcely deserves it, there appeared at Athens an The high antiquity of decisive naval campaigns is among the influential citizen who understood all that was meant by the term most interesting features of international conflicts. Nothwith-sea-power. Themistocles saw more clearly than any of his Early standing the much greater frequency of land wars, contemporaries that, to enable Athens to play a leading part in manifesta- the course of history has been profoundly changed the Hellenic world, she needed above all things a strong navy. tions of more often by contests on the water. That this has not "He had already in his eye the battle-field of the future." He sea-power. received the notice it deserved is true, and Mahan felt sure that the Persians would come back, and come with such tells us why. "Historians generally," he says, "have been forces that resistance in the open field would be out of the unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither question. One scene of action remained-the sea. Persuaded special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound by him the Athenians increased their navy, so that of the 271 determining influence of maritime strength on great issues has vessels comprising the Greek fleet at Artemisium, 147 had been consequently been overlooked. " Moralizing on that which provided by Athens, which also sent a large reinforcement after might have been is admittedly a sterile process; but it is some- the first action. Though no one has ever surpassed Themistocles times necessary to point, if only by way of illustration, to a in the faculty of correctly estimating the importance of sea-power, possible alternative. As in modern times the fate of India and it was understood by Xerxes as clearly as by him that the issue the fate of North America were determined by sea-power, so also of the war depended upon naval operations. The arrangements at a very remote epoch sea-power decided whether or not Hellenic made under the Persian monarch's direction, and his very colonization was to take root in, and Hellenic culture to dominate, personal movements, show that this was his view. He felt, and central and northern Italy as it dominated southern Italy, where probably expressed the feeling, exactly as-in the war of traces of it are extant to this day. A moment's consideration American Independence-Washington did in the words," Whatwill enable us to see how different the history of the world would ever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the have been had a Hellenized city grown and prospered on the casting vote in the present contest." The decisive event was the Seven Hills. Before the Tarquins were driven out of Rome naval action of Salamis. To have made certain of success, the a Phocaean fleet was encountered (537 B.C.) off Corsica by a Persians should have first obtained a command of the Aegean, combined force of Etruscans and Phoenicians, and was so as complete for all practical purposes as the French and English handled that the Phocaeans abandoned the island and settled had of the sea generally in the war against Russia of 1854-56. on the coast of Lucania (Mommsen, Hist. Rome, English trans. i. The Persian sea-power was not equal to the task. The fleet of p. 153). The enterprise of their navigators had built up for the the great king was numerically stronger than that of the Greek Phoenician cities and their great off-shoot Carthage, a sea-power allies; but it has been proved many times that naval efficiency which enabled them to gain the practical sovereignty of the sea does not depend on numerical superiority alone. The choice to the west of Sardinia and Sicily. The control of these waters sections of the Persian fleet were the contingents of the Ionians was the object of prolonged and memorable struggles, for on it- and Phoenicians. The former were half-hearted or disaffected; as the result showed-depended the empire of the world. From while the latter were, at best, not superior in skill, experience, very remote times the consolidation and expansion, from within and valour to the Greek sailors. At Salamis Greece was saved outwards, of great continental states have had serious conse- not only from the ambition and vengeance of Xerxes, but also quences for mankind when they were accompanied by the and for many centuries from oppression by an Oriental conqueror. acquisition of a coast-line and the absorption of a maritime Per ia did not succeed against the Greeks, not because she had population. We shall find that the process loses none of its no sea-power, but because her sea-power, artificially built up, importance in recent years. "The ancient empires," says the was inferior to that which was a natural element of the vitality historian of Greece, Ernst Curtius," as long as no foreign elements of her foes. Ionia was lost and Greece in the end enslaved, behad intruded into them, had an invincible horror of the water." cause the quarrels of Greeks with Greeks led to the ruin of their When the condition, which Curtius notices in parentheses, arose naval states. the" horror "disappeared. There is something highly significant in the uniformity of the efforts of Assyria, Egypt, Babylon and Persia to get possession of the maritime resources of Phoenicia. Our own immediate posterity will perhaps have to reckon with the results of similar efforts in our own day. It is this which gives a living interest to even the very ancient history of sea-power, and makes the study of it of great practical importance to us now. We shall see, as we go on, how the phenomena connected with it reappear with striking regularity in successive periods. Looked Pelopon nesian war. The Peloponnesian was largely a naval war. The confidence of the Athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its outbreak. The immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in time involved so many states, was the opportunity offered by the conflict between Corinth and Corcyra of increasing the sea-power of Athens. Hitherto the Athenian naval predominance had been virtually confined to the Aegean Sea. The Corcyraean envoy, who pleaded for help at Athens, dwelt upon the advantage to be derived by the terranean matters. The position of the Carthaginians in the western basin of the Mediterranean was very like that of the Portuguese long afterwards in India. The latter kept within reach of the sea; "nor did their rule ever extend a day's march from their ships " (R. S. Whiteway, Rise of the Portuguese Power in India. Westminster, 1889, p. 12). "The Carthaginians in Spain," says Mommsen, " made no effort to acquire the interior from the warlike native nations; they were content with the possession of the mines and of stations for traffic and for shell and other fisheries." Allowance being made for the numbers of the classes engaged in administration, commerce and supervision, it is nearly certain that Carthage could not furnish the crews required by both a great war-navy and a great mercantile marine. No one is surprised on finding that the land-forces of Carthage were composed largely of alien mercenaries. We have several examples from which we can infer a parallel, if not an identical, condition of her maritime resources. How, then, was the great Carthaginian carrying-trade provided for? The experience of more than one country will enable us to answer this question. The ocean trade of those off-shoots or dependencies of the United Kingdom, viz. the United States, Australasia and India, is Athenians from alliance with a naval state occupying an important situation" with respect to the western regions towards which the views of the Athenians had for some time been directed" (Thirlwall, Hist. Greece, iii. 96). It was the "weapon of her sea-power," to adopt Mahan's phrase, that enabled Athens to maintain the great conflict in which she was engaged. Repeated invasions of her territory, the ravages of disease among her people and the rising disaffection of her allies had been more than made up for by her predominance on the water. The scale of the subsequent Syracusan expedition showed how vigorous Athens still was down to the interruption of the war by the peace of Nicias. The great expedition just mentioned overtaxed her strength. Its failure brought about the ruin of the state. It was held by contemporaries, and has been held in our own day, that the Athenian defeat at Syracuse was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the force in Sicily properly supplied and reinforced. This explanation of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected. The friends of unsuccessful generals and admirals always offer it, being sure of the support of the political opponents of the administration. After the despatch of the supporting expedition under Demosthenes and Eurymedon no further great reinforce-largely or chiefly conducted by shipping of the "old country." ment, as Nicias admitted, was possible. The weakness of Athens was in the character of the men who swayed the popular assemblies and held high commands. A people which remembered the administration of a Pericles, and yet allowed a Cleon or an Alcibiades to direct its naval and military policy, courted defeat. Nicias, notwithstanding the possession of high qualities, lacked the supreme virtue of a commander-firm resolution. He dared not face the obloquy consequent on withdrawal from an enterprise on which the popular hopes had been fixed; and therefore he allowed a reverse to be converted into an overwhelming disaster. "The complete ruin of Athens had appeared, both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid and so energetic had been her rally, that (a year after Syracuse) she was found again carrying on a terrible struggle (Grote, Hist. Greece, v. p. 354). Nevertheless her sea-power had indeed been ruined at Syracuse. Now she could wage war only "with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system." Even before Arginusae, it was seen that "superiority of nautical skill had passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies" (ibid. p. 503). " So that of Carthage was largely conducted by old Phoenicians. These may have obtained a Carthaginian Register," or the contemporary equivalent; but they could not all have been purely Carthaginian or Liby-Phoenician. This must have been the case even more with the war-navy. British India for a considerable time possessed a real, and indeed highly efficient navy; but. it was officered entirely and manned almost entirely by men from the old country. Moreover, it was small. The wealth of India would have sufficed to furnish a larger material element; but, as the country could not supply the personnel, it would have been absurd to speak of the sea-power of India apart from that of England. As soon as the Romans chose to make the most of their natural resources the maritime predominance of Carthage was doomed. The artificial basis of the latter's sea-power would not enable it to hold out against serious and persistent assaults. Unless this is perceived, it is impossible to understand the story of the Punic Wars. Judged by every visible sign of strength, Carthage, the richer, the more enterprising, ethnically the more predominant among her neighbours, and apparently the more nautical, seemed sure to win in the The great, occasionally interrupted, and prolonged contest great struggle with Rome which, by the conditions of the case, between Rome and Carthage was a sustained effort on the part was to be waged largely on the water. Yet those who had of one to gain and of the other to keep the control of watched the struggles of the Punic city with the Sicilian Greeks, Struggle between the western Mediterranean. So completely had that and especially that with Agathocles, must have seen reason to Rome and control been exercised by Carthage, that she had cherish doubts concerning her naval strength. It was an anticipa Carthage. anticipated the Spanish commercial policy in America. tion of the case of Spain in the age of Philip II. As the great The Romans were precluded by treaties from trading with the Elizabethan seamen discerned the defects of the Spanish naval Carthaginian territories in Hispania, Africa and Sardinia. establishment, so men at Rome discerned those of the Rome, as Mommsen tells us, 'was from the first a maritime city Carthaginian. Dates in connexion with this are of great signifiand, in the period of its vigour, never was so foolish or so untrue cance. A comprehensive measure, with the object of " rescuing to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect its war marine and their marine from its condition of impotence" was taken by the to desire to be a mere continental power." It may be that it Romans in the year 267 B.C. Four quaestores classici—in modern was lust of wealth rather than lust of dominion that first promoted naval English we may perhaps call them port-admirals--were a trial of strength with Carthage. The vision of universal empire nominated, and one was stationed at each of four ports. The could hardly as yet have formed itself in the imagination of a objects of the Roman Senate, so Mommsen tells us, were very single Roman. The area of Phoenician maritime commerce was obvious. They were to recover their independence by sea, vast enough both to excite jealousy and to offer vulnerable to cut off the maritime communications of Tarentum, to close the points to the cupidity of rivals. It is probable that the modern Adriatic against fleets coming from Epirus, and to emancipate estimate of the sea-power of Carthage is much exaggerated. It themselves from Carthaginian supremacy." Four years afterwas great by comparison, and of course overwhelmingly great wards the first Punic War began. It was, and had to be, largely when there were none but insignificant competitors to challenge a naval contest. The Romans waged it with varying fortune, it. Mommsen holds that, in the 4th and 5th centuries after the but in the end triumphed by means of their sea-power. The foundation of Rome," the two main competitors for the dominion victory of Catulus over the Carthaginian fleet off the Aegadian of the Western waters" were Carthage and Syracuse. "Car- Islands decided the war and left to the Romans the possession thage," he says, "had the preponderance, and Syracuse sank of Sicily and the power of possessing themselves of Sardinia and more and more into a second-rate naval power. The maritime Corsica. It would be an interesting and perhaps not barren importance of the Etruscans was wholly gone. Rome itself investigation to inquire to what extent the decline of the mother was not exempt from the same fate; its own waters were likewise states of Phoenicia, consequent on the campaigns of Alexander commanded by foreign fleets." The Romans were for a long the Great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the time too much occupied at home to take much interest in Medi-Carthaginian defences. One thing was certain. Carthage had now met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources power. The attainment of all but universal dominion by Rome was now only a question of time. "The annihilation of the Carthaginian fleet had made the Romans masters of the Expansion of Roman sca" (Schmitz, Hist. Rome, p. 256). A lodgment had dominion already been gained in Illyricum, and countries farther furthered east were before long to be reduced to submission. by sea. A glance at the map will show that to effect this the command of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, like that of the western, must be secured by the Romans. The old historic navies of the Greek and Phoenician states had declined. One considerable naval force there was which, though it could not have prevented, was strong enough to have delayed the Roman progress eastwards. This force belonged to Rhodes, which in the years immediately following the close of the second Punic War reached its highest point as a naval power (C. Torr, Rhodes in Ancient Times, p. 40). Far from trying to obstruct the advance of the Romans the Rhodian fleet helped it. Hannibal, in his exile, saw the necessity of being strong on the sea if the East was to be saved from the grasp of his hereditary foe; but the resources of Antiochus, even with the mighty cooperation of Hannibal, were insufficient. In a later and more often quoted struggle between East and West-that which was decided at Actium-sea-power was again seen to "have the casting vote." When the whole of the Mediterranean coasts became part of a single state the importance of the navy was naturally diminished; but in the struggles within the declining empire it rose again at times. The contest of the Vandal Genseric with Majorian and the African expedition of Belisarius-not to mention others-were largely influenced by the naval opera tions (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, chaps. xxxvi., xli.). Extension medan conquest. A decisive event, the Mahommedan conquest of northern Africa from Egypt westwards, is unintelligible until it is seen how great a part sea-power played in effecting it. westward Purely land expeditions, or expeditions but slightly of Mahom supported from the sea, had ended in failure. The emperor at Constantinople still had at his disposal a fleet capable of keeping open the communications with his African province. It took the Saracens half a century (A.D. 647-698) to win "their way along the coast of Africa as far as the Pillars of Hercules" (Hallam, Mid. Ages, chap. vi.); and, as Gibbon tells us, it was not till the Commander of the Faithful had prepared a great expedition, this time by sea as well as by land, that the Saracenic dominion was definitely established. It has been generally assumed that the Arabian conquerors who, within a few years of his death, spread the faith of Mahomet over vast regions, belonged to an essentially non-maritime race; and little or no stress has been laid on the extent to which they relied on naval support in prosecuting their conquests. In parts of Arabia, however, maritime enterprise was far from non-existent; and when the Mahommedan empire had extended outwards from Mecca and Medina till it embraced the coasts of various seas, the consequences to the neighbouring states were as serious as the rule above mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. "With the conquest of Syria and Egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come into the Saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of a navy for the protection of the maritime ports as well as for meeting the enemy became a matter of vital importance. Great attention was paid to the manning and equipment of the fleet " | (Amir Ali, Syed, Short Hist. Saracens, p. 442). At first the fleet was manned by sailors drawn from the Phoenician towns, where nautical energy was not yet quite extinct; and later the crews were recruited from Syria, Egypt and the coasts of Asia Minor. Ships were built at most of the Syrian and Egyptian ports, and "also at Obolla and Bushire on the Persian Gulf," whilst the mercantile marine and maritime trade were fostered and encouraged. The sea-power thus created was largely artificial. It drooped-as in similar cases-when the special encouragement was withdrawn. "In the days of Arabian energy," says Hallam, "Constantinople was twice, in 668 and 716, attacked by great naval armaments." The same authority believes that the abandonment of such maritime enterprises by the Saracens may be attributed to the removal of the capital from Damascus to Bagdad. The removal indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the Mediterranean Sea, which was now left by the administration far behind. "The Greeks in their turn determined to dispute the command of the sea," with the result that in the middle of the 10th century their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the first successors of Heraclius." Not only was the fall of the empire, by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, but also much that had been lost was regained. "At the close of the roth century the emperors of Constantinople possessed the best and greatest part" of southern Italy, part of Sicily, the whole of what is now called the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, with some parts of Syria and Armenia (Hallam, chap. vi.; Gibbon, chap. li.). Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its own punishment. Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial creation it is nearly sure to disappoint Sea-power those who wield it when it encounters a rival power Se of natural growth. How was it possible for the Crusades. Crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts? How did the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem contrive to exist for more than three-quarters of a century? Why did the Crusades more and more become maritime expeditions? The answer to these questions is to be found in the decline of the Mahommedan naval defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of the West. Venetians, Pisans and Genoese transported crusading forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the Christians and hampered the operations of the infidels. Even the great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration of conditions. This is evident when we look at the efforts of the Christians to regain the lost kingdom. Saladin "forgot that the safety of Phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx from beyond the sea " (Amir Ali, Syed, pp. 359-360). Not only were the Crusaders helped by the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the "arrival of Malik Ankillar [Richard Cœur de Lion] with twenty shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war." Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the importance of the naval states of Italy. That they had been | nople. In 1470 the Turks, "for the first time, equipped a fleet, with which they drove that of the Venetians out of the Grecian seas" (Sismondi, p. 256). The Turkish wars of Venice lasted a long time. In that which ended in 1503 the decline of the Venetian naval power was obvious. "The Mussulmans had made progress in naval discipline, The Venetian fleet could no longer cope with theirs." Henceforward it was as an allied contingent of other navies that that of Venice was regarded as important. Dyer (Hist. Europe, i. p. 85) quotes a striking passage from a letter of Aeneas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius | II., in which the writer affirms that, "if the Venetians are defeated, Christendom will not control the sea any longer; for neither the Catalans nor the Genoese, without the Venetians, are equal to the Turks." The last-named people, indeed, exemplified once more the rule that a military state expanding to the sea and absorbing older maritime populations becomes a serious menace to Sea-power its neighbours. Even in the 15th century Mahommed and proII. had made an attack on Southern Italy, but his gress of sea-power was not equal to the undertaking. Suley- the Turks. man the Magnificent directed the Ottoman forces towards the west. With admirable strategic insight he conquered Rhodes, and thus freed himself from the danger of a hostile force on his flank. "The centenary of the conquest of Constantinople was past, and the Turk had developed a great naval power besides annexing Egypt and Syria" (Seeley, British Policy, i. 143). The Turkish fleets, under such leaders as Khairad-din Barbarossa), Piale and Dragut, seemed to command the Mediterranean, including its western basin; but the repulse at Malta in 1565 was a serious check, and the defeat at Lepanto in 1571 virtually put an end to the prospect of Turkish maritime dominion. The predominance of Portugal in the Indian Ocean in the early part of the 16th century had seriously diminished the Ottoman resources. The wealth derived from the trade in that ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea had supplied the Mahommedans with the sinews of war, and had enabled them to contend with success against the Christians in Europe. "The main artery had been cut when the Portuguese took up the challenge of the Mahommedan merchants of Calicut, and swept their ships from the occan" (Whiteway, p. 2). The sea-power of Portugal wisely employed had exercised a great, though unperceived influence. Though enfeebled and diminishing, the Turkish navy was still able to act with some effect in the 17th century. Nevertheless, the sea-power of the Turks ceased to count as a factor of importance in the relations between great states. A fertile source of dispute between states is the acquisition of territory beyond sea. As others have done before and since, the maritime republics of Italy quarrelled over this. Seapower seemed, like Saturn, to devour its own children. In 1284, in a great sea-fight off Meloria, the Pisans were defeated by the Genoese with heavy loss, which, as Sismondi states, "ruined the maritime power" of the former. From that time Genoa, transferring her activity to the Levant, became the rival of Venice. The flects of the two cities in 1298 met near Cyprus in an encounter, said to be accidental, that began "a terrible war which for seven years stained the Mediterranean with blood | and consumed immense wealth." In the next century the two republics, "irritated by commercial quarrels "-like the English and Dutch afterwards---were again at war in the Levant. Sometimes one side, sometimes the other was victorious; but the contest was exhausting to both, and especially to Venice. Within a quarter of a century they were at war again. Hostilities lasted till the Genoese met with the crushing defeat of Chioggia. "From this time," says Hallam, "Genoa never commanded the ocean with such navies as before; her commerce gradually went into decay; and the 15th century, the most splendid in the annals of Venice, is till recent times the most ignominious In the meantime the state which had a leading share in winning in those of Genoa." Venice seemed now to have no naval rival, the victory of Lepanto had been growing up in the West. Before and had no fear that any one could forbid the ceremony in which the union of its crown with that of Castile and the Spanish the Doge, standing in the bows of the Bucentaur, cast a ring formation of the Spanish monarchy, Aragon had been sea-power, into the Adriatic with the words, "Desponsamus le, mare, in expanding till it reached the sea. It was united with Catalonia, signum veri perpetuique dominii.” The result of the combats Catalonia in the 12th century, and it conquered &c. at Chioggia, though fatal to it in the long run, did not at once Valencia in the 13th. Its long line of coast opened the way to destroy the naval importance of Genoa. A remarkable char- an extensive and flourishing commerce; and an enterprising acteristic of sea-power is the delusive manner in which it appears navy indemnified the nation for the scantiness of its territory to revive after a great defeat. The Persian navy occasionally at home by the important foreign conquests of Sardinia, Sicily, made a brave show afterwards; but in reality it had received Naples and the Balearic Isles. Among the maritime states of at Salamis a mortal wound. Athens seemed strong enough on the Mediterranean Catalonia had been conspicuous. She wa the sea after the catastrophe of Syracuse; but, as already stated, to the Iberian Peninsula much what Phoenicia had been t her naval power had been given there a check from which it Syria. The Catalan navy had disputed the empire of the Mediter never completely recovered. The navy of Carthage had had ranean with the fleets of Pisa and Genoa. The incorporatior similar experience; and, in later ages, the power of the Turks of Catalonia with Aragon added greatly to the strength of that was broken at Lepanto and that of Spain at Gravelines not- kingdom. The Aragonese kings were wise enough to understand withstanding the deceptive appearances afterwards. Venice was and liberal enough to foster the maritime interests of their new soon confronted on the sea by a new rival. The Turkish naval possessions (Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, Introd. sects. historian, Haji Khalifeh (Maritime wars of the Turks, Mitchell's i., ii.). Their French and Italian neighbours were to feel, before trans. p. 12), tells us that, After the taking of Constantinople, long, the effect of this policy; and, when the Spanish monarchy when they [the Ottomans] spread their conquests over land and had been consolidated, it was felt not only by them, but by sea, it became necessary to build ships and make armaments in others also. The more Spanish dominion was extended in Italy order to subdue the fortresses and castles on the Rumelian and the more were the naval resources at the command of Spain Anatolian shores, and in the islands of the Mediterranean." augmented. Genoa became " Spain's water-gate to Italy.... Mahommed II. established a great naval arsenal at Constanti-Henceforth the Spanish crown found in the Dorias its admirals; |