the party has a legal remedy. The existence of a legal cause of action is not only a prerequisite to the maintenance of the equitable action, but is also the foundation of the jurisdiction which equity courts possess in respect to the subject-matter.

As the equitable remedy depends, among other things, upon the existence of a legal cause of action, it follows that those facts which will bar the legal action will also afford an answer to the equitable remedy, and that so long as a legal remedy exists an equity court is open to aid in the enforcement of the legal claim.

When the trespass is of such a character that it may be discontinued at the option of the wrong-doer, or, if continued is susceptible of having legal sanction obtained for its continuance, it seems offensive to judicial sense of right that a wrong-doer should be permitted to allege that his intention to repeat and continue his own unlawful conduct should deprive the owner of abutting property of any of the remedies which the law had provided for his protection. If it were otherwise the wrong-doer would be permitted to show the aggravated character of his own conduct as a defence to the action of the legal owner, and thus violate the rule of law, as well as the plainest principles of equity.

The lapse of six years after a trespass has been committed upon real estate, bars not only the legal but also constitutes a practical defence to an equitable action founded upon the necessity of numerous legal actions to obtain redress, because the right to such redress has as to such wrongs expired. But, if the trespasses are continued after that period, new causes of action arise, unbarred by any rule of law or equity, which are cognizable not only at law but also in equity.

It being conceded as to legal causes of action for trespass and nuisance, that the injuries thereby occasioned are continuous and arise from time to time as fresh trespasses are committed, it is difficult to see why the same principle should not apply with at least equal force and propriety to legal actions. Indeed, it is obvious that it should be held

to apply with greater reason to the latter, since otherwise the equity jurisdiction would be practically subverted.

The law applies a period of limitation to actions for the public benefit. They are termed statutes of repose and are founded upon the maxim "Interest rei publicæ ut sit finis litium." They are not intended for the benefit of wrongdoers, and while the law tolerates and protects title acquired by prescription when clearly made out, it does not favor or encourage that mode of acquiring property.

The right to an injunction in a proper case, is just as fixed and certain as the right to any other provisional remedy. The writ can be rightfully demanded to prevent irreparable injury, interminable litigation, and a multiplicity of suits, and its refusal in a proper case, would be error to be corrected by a proper tribunal.

A court of equity will not restrain what has been enjoyed for twenty years past; but if what has been so enjoyed is used in a different way, so as to do mischief, the court may interpose. It has by injunction prevented the letting of a greater volume of water than usual flow upon the wheel of a cotton mill which had been operated for years by a limited supply.

The violation of an injunction prohibiting the obstruction of a right of way to the back door of an inn, by the defendant building a solid, large and expensive structure which completely blocked up the passage way, brought up the question whether the court ought to exercise its discretion by enabling the rich man to buy the poor man's property without his consent. This the court refused to do saying:

"If with notice of the right belonging to the plaintiff, and in defiance of that notice, without any reasonable ground and after action brought, the rich defendant is to be entitled to build up a house of enormous proportions, at an enormous expense, and then say to the court, 'You will injure me a great deal more by pulling it down than you will benefit the poor man by restoring his right,' of course that simply means that the court in every case, at the instance of the rich man, is to compel the poor man to sell him his property at a

valuation. That would be the real result of such a decision."

Whatever a defendant erects after the commencement of the action or after notice given him that his erecting is objected to, is subject to the control of the court which has jurisdiction to order the structure to be pulled down.

The temporary obstruction of a way to a wood and pasture lot can be fully paid for by the damages recoverable according to legal rules, therefore there is no jurisdiction in a court of equity over the invasion of mere private legal rights in land.

A mandatory injunction should be issued interlocutorily with hesitation and caution, and only in an extreme case where the law does not afford an adequate remedy. When there is uncertainty as to future injury and an adequate remedy at law the court should not, by its preventive injunction, stop the completion of an expensive work which will be of great public benefit to restrain nuisance.

It is not every case of a permanent obstruction in the use of an easement that entitles the aggrieved party to a restoration of the former situation. Each case depends on its own circumstances. It is for the court in the exercise of a sound discretion to determine in such instances whether a mandatory injunction shall issue. It will not be issued when it appears that it will be operated inequitably and oppressively, nor when it appears that there has been unreasonable delay by the party seeking it in the enforcement of his rights, nor when the injury complained of is not serious or substantial, and may be readily compensated in damages, while to restore things as they were before the acts complained of, would subject the other party to great inconvenience and loss.

[Specific Performance-Affirmative and Negative Contracts.]

There is no proceeding at law which can compel a party to comply with his promise, after receiving the full consideration upon which it was made, to make and execute evidence of indebtedness, and give security for the payment thereof.

Equity alone can take cognizance of such a case and do justice between the parties.

It is in the discretion of the court to decree a specific performance of a contract, because otherwise a decree might be made which would tend to the ruin of one party.

Before granting a decree for specific performance the court must be satisfied that the plaintiff is entitled to seek his remedy in a court of equity, and on the merits of his case he is entitled to such a decree.

Courts of equity decree the specific performance of contracts, not upon any distinction between realty and personalty, but because damages at law may not in the particular case afford a complete remedy. Thus a court of equity decrees performance of a contract for land, not because of the real nature of the land, but because damages at law, which must be calculated upon the general money value of land, may not be a complete remedy to the purchaser, to whom the land may have a peculiar and special value. So a court of equity will not generally decree a performance of a contract for the sale of stock or goods, not because of their personal nature, but because damages at law, calculated upon the market price of the stock or goods, are as complete a remedy to the purchaser as the delivery of the stock of goods contracted for, inasmuch as, with the damages, he may purchase the same quantity of the like stock or goods.

Notwithstanding the general distinction between personal contracts for goods and contracts for lands, in some cases contracts for personal property are enforceable in equity, but the court will weigh such cases with greater nicety than those which relate to real property.

It is a settled principle in the doctrine of specific performance, that a contract for the sale and delivery of chattels which are essential in specie to the plaintiff, and which the defendant can supply, while no one else can, will be specifically enforced. In such case the plaintiff could not be indemnified by any such amount of damages as he could recover at law.

Where articles of personal property are peculiar and individual in their character, or have an especial value on account of the associations connected with them, as pictures, curiosities, family furniture, heirlooms, specific performance of a contract will be decreed.

The court will not enforce a contract for personal services when such services require the exercise of peculiar skill, intellectual ability, and judgment, because it cannot so mould its order and so supervise the individual executing it that it can determine whether he has honestly obeyed it or not. The profit on a contract, to depend upon future events, cannot be correctly estimated in damage where the calculation must proceed on conjecture. In such a case, to compel a party to accept damages for the non-performance of his contract, is to compel him to sell the actual profit which may arise from it at a conjectural price.

When the remedy at law is not full and complete, and when the effect of the breach cannot be known with any exactness, either because the effect will show itself only after a long time, or for any other reason, courts of equity will enforce contracts in relation to personality.

These principles may be applied in the case of a contract relating to a patent right, the value of which had not been tested by actual use, and cannot be known with any degree of exactness until after the lapse of time; and even then it is doubtful whether it can be ascertained with sufficient accuracy to do substantial justice between the parties by a compensation in damages.

When a contract relates to but a single subject, and it is impossible for the defendant to perform it, except partially, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of such partial performance and to compensation if it is possible to compute what is just, so far as it is unperformed. It has therefore been held that where one had agreed to convey land with release of dower, and was unable to procure a release of dower, the purchaser was entitled to a conveyance without such release, with an abatement from the purchase-money of the value of the wife's interest at the time of the conveyance.