CHAPTER XXI.

RUSSIA CONTROLLED BY ONE RACE-THIS GIVES HER A TRUE NATIONAL LIFE.

It is evident, that however extensive the territory of a nation may be, however productive its soil, or dense its population, there will still be no solid foundation for great and permanent national power if this population is composed of diverse races, bound together by the force of circumstances only, or forced into contact, not union, by external lashings of any kind. The moment the compressing bond is loosened in such a case, the discordant materials separate, and the whole mass of an imposing dynasty will suddenly crumble into fragments, which are scattered apart, because they are not the production of a common central life. Such has been the fate of most empires that have grown out of a succession of rapid conquests. Success has attended them, until the mass of material added could no longer be assimilated, until the national structure became a mere aggregation, not one living body, and the constituent parts instead of being united by mutual sympathies were hurled asunder by mutual repulsion. It has been fashionable to look upon Russia as occupying this precise position, and to represent the Czar as ruling over a rude mass of heterogeneous and discontented tribes, held

in subjection merely by a cruel and relentless military despotism.

These views gave rise to the expectation, that in in any sudden calamity, or in case of the death of Nicholas, Russia would be separated into warring factions, and the Colossus of the North would vanish like the spectre of the Brocken. France and England pleased themselves, and calmed in part their fears, by picturing the inherent weakness of the Muscovite Empire. The general tone which prevailed may be seen by the following extracts from one of the ablest English Quarterlies, the North British, in November, 1854. The writer refers to a former article, in which was pointed out, as he says, "elements of "weakness in the Muscovite Empire which had never "hitherto been duly estimated." He goes on to say, "We "reminded our readers that the great conquests of Russia "had been effected by diplomacy and not by actual fighting, "and that these conquests were annexed merely-not assimi"lated. All things considered, it is by no means unlikely "that if the present war continues, she may turn out to have "been a gigantic impostor-that when tried by the severi"ties of a real struggle, she will prove weak, to a degree "which will astonish those whom she has so long duped "and dazzled; weak from her unwieldy magnitude-weak "from her barbarous tariffs and restrictive policy-weak "from the inherent inadequacy of her one-eyed despotism"weak from the rottenness of her internal administration— "weak from the suppressed hatreds she has accumulated "round her-weak in everything save her consummate skill "in simulating strength." This was written in February, 1854; in November, 1854, the same Review says: "These "surmises, which at the time they were uttered were con"sidered somewhat wild and rash, have been not only justi"fied but surpassed by the event. The feebleness every"where displayed by Russia, both in attack and defense, "have been matter of ceaseless astonishment. * * * As "soon as it was known that the expedition to the Crimea "was resolved upon, we took for granted that the Crimea

"would be conquered, and that Sebastopol would ultimately "fall into our hands; but assuredly no one anticipated that "after months of notice, our armies would have been suf"fered to land without the faintest attempt at opposition; "that our victory would have been so signal, so decisive, "and so rapid; or that the greatest fortified harbor of Russia-probably the strongest in the world-would be "taken on such easy terms, and in so brief a period. Hence"forth, the prestige of Russian military power is gone; Europe need dread her arms no more. The Czar, hitherto "the great bugbear of Europe and of Asia, has been beaten "on all hands."

In a subsequent portion of the same article, the writer boasts and exults as follows, giving, as will be seen, also, a highly significant side-roar of the British lion at the Americans, who, after such English victories in the Black Sea, will, he thinks, be a "trifle less insolent and overbearing," when they remember that the Baltic fleet can winter in the Gulf of Mexico:

"But if Nicholas had been less rash or less stubborn we should never have been stirred into activity sufficient to afford the world the astounding spectacle it saw in April and May. In a few weeks time we sent forth the two largest and best-manned fleets that ever left our shores, and, beyond all parallel, the best equipped army that ever sailed from England on any expedition-both fleet and army provided with every new invention of science to which experience or judgment had given their sanction. * * The Baltic fleet alone consisted of forty-two ships, twenty-two hundred guns, sixteen thousand horse-power, and twenty

two thousand sailors and marines.

"In 1852 and 1853, there were doubts. whether we had either ships or men sufficient to defend our own shores against a sudden descent. In 1854 we sent to our Ally both land and naval auxiliary forces, which have checkmated, conquered, and despoiled his colossal antagonist. All this, too, was done rapidly, silently, and easily; regi

ments were recruited, and ships were manned, without difficulty; volunteers flocked both to the militia and the navy; the moment there was a prospect of active service men were forthcoming in ample numbers, and neither conscription nor impressment had to be resorted to. This magnificent spectacle will not be lost either on Europe or America, or on ourselves. Already a great change of tone on all hands is observable. Our foes have had a forewarning with what sort of a people they will have to deal; our transatlantic cousins will become a trifle less insolent and overbearing wher they find that the fleet which summers in the Baltic can, without cost or effort, winter in the Gulf of Mexico."

In the summer, then, England proposed to amuse herself with demolishing Russia, and in the winter she would be occupied with checking the insolence of her "transatlantic cousins." This, moreover, agrees with the declaration of Lord Clarendon, with the corresponding semi-official statement of the French government of the far-reaching intentions of the English and French Alliance, viz: that it had reference to the western as well as the eastern hemisphere. The Review thus sums up the results of the first campaign, up to November, 1854:

"Russia, the great bugbear of Europe, and the great foe of free development, shorn of her prestige, baffled, beaten back, blockaded and despoiled-deprived, in a single year, of the conquests of half a century of intrigue and violence, not only thwarted and checked, but humbled and crippled, retreating across the Pruth in place of advancing beyond the Danube; and paying for the massacre of Sinope by the loss of Sebastopol and the Crimea. Such are the results of the first campaign."

Such was the language, not of some vain, flippant trav eler, but of one of the gravest and stateliest Reviews of the British Empire, and when such a Quarterly as the North British will indulge itself in such transparent folly, we are led to believe that the British government really sent

forth its fleets and armies in this same spirit, and with the same opinions of Russia. What a scorching commentary upon such an article subsequent events have given!

These things are not mentioned for the purpose of taunting or reproaching England, but as historical facts whose significance ought to be calmly considered by Americans. They show, first of all, the spirit of England in regard to Russia, and the worthlessness of most opinions and statements which have issued from the British press concerning their northern neighbors, and it should not be forgotten that these views, most derogatory to Russia, which are passing current in our country, have been derived from the representation of England. These facts show, moreover, . the nature of the stake which the United States had in that Eastern war, an interest quite different from what many seem to suppose. They demonstrate a cherished purpose of England and France to interfere, not with Russia alone, but with the too rapid growth even of America.

The English Review pleases itself with a view of the internal weakness of Russia and her eminent danger of being rent asunder by domestic strife. Oliphant, writing in 1853, dilates largely, and with evident satisfaction, upon this same topic, and would have us believe that, the whole power of the Czar is needed to protect his throne against the discontents and threatened uprisings of his own. subjects:

"But the Russian Autocrat is also keenly alive to the critical position of matters at home. Before he decides upon prolonging indefinitely a hazardous contest, he will consider the present aspect of the internal condition of the empire as attentively as its external relations. He can not not forget that an extent of territory comprising one-half of what is now called Russia in Europe, has been annexed within the last sixty years-that, consequently, more than half of the European inhabitants of the empire, having been recently subjugated, are more or less disaffected; that of these, sixteen millions, or about one-fourth of the entire population