but with the most formidable weapons of destruction known to modern war, that a first-class navy has been produced, and fortifications erected which have defied the utmost strength of the two great nations of western Europe, that at the same time long lines of railway are constructed, schools start into being, manufactures increase, and agriculture is improved, and it must be allowed by all who are capable of a candid judgment, that we behold on all sides evidences of prosperity rather than of ruin. One important fact should not be forgotten in this connection. It has been the steady policy of the government to foster to the utmost its own industry, and to render the nation independent by a self-sustaining power.

Of the actual strength and resources of such a country it is difficult to judge, and they are generally underrated, and especially by such a commercial people as the English. The North American colonies made but an insignificant figure in the world's tables of wealth and power when each farmer of New England manufactured for himself his clothing from materials raised on his own farm, and when his food was produced in a similar manner; but when England thought to crush them she was met by a power that did not appear in statistical tables, and there was a solid and available wealth in our country that commerce could take no note of, and which was sufficient for successful defense. There is in Russia a vast amount of home manufacture, of home strength and resources, which can not be expressed by figures, and which does not appear in official reports. In such a state of society there is power which does not lie on the surface. The condition of Russia can be more readily understood by an American than by most Europeans, for a similar process in reclaiming wild lands, and filling up a new country, and carrying forward improvements, is going on there as here, though our national character and our free institutions have imparted greater vigor and velocity to 'our movement. The descriptions of the log-houses, the lines of unbroken forests, the log, or

"corduroy" roads, forcibly remind the American reader of home scenes.

It has cost our "transatlantic cousins" some painful experiments before they could be convinced that a vigorous national life, a substantial and most formidable national power, could clothe itself in such rude forms, having only the aspect of poverty and discomfort. It was necessary for them to receive lessons from the broadsides of our "fir-built frigates," and from behind earth walls and cotton-bags, before they could comprehend how a country of forests and cabins, and log-roads, and mud-roads, could possibly be a powerful country; how troops could be mustered, or fed, or clothed, or paid, or transported. Similar mistakes are evidently made in regard to Russia, and they may be corrected in a similar manner.

Again, those who are disposed to amuse themselves with the poverty of the Northern Empire, should not forget that the gold-mines of the Ural are for Russia what California is to the United States-what Australia is to Great Britain, and that the produce of these mines is to a great extent under the control of the government, which has a deposit of treasure of its own, whose amount is known to the chief officers of the realm alone.

A country capable of performing such things, and at the same time preserving a rate of advance beyond that of her neighbors, and which has had her whole military establishment on the war footing since 1848, was not likely to sink suddenly from exhaustion, with only that same army to support, as before, on her own soil. Besides, if Russia was so soon to suffer national collapse, with but a slight addition to her armies, and with her fleets lying in her docks, what should be said of France and England, with their common expenditures vastly increased, maintaining immense fleets in foreign seas which afforded them no supplies, and vast armies, far from home, on a spot where nothing could be obtained for man or beast-armies whose diminished ranks were to be constantly filled up by fresh drains on the popu lation at home.

These statements of the wretched condition of the Russian army, of the sufferings and privations of the troops, of the terrible ravages of disease, of the inability of the government to sustain its establishment on a respectable footing, which have filled English and French books, Quarterlies and newspapers, have been shown to have originated either in utter ignorance of the facts, or in the vain hope of increasing the chances of success by a deliberate system of detraction.

The Turkish Empire, withering under the curse of God, tottering near the goal where the unerring word of prophecy declares that it must fall, was exhibited to wondering Europe and America as a nation freshly set out on a new career of civilization, having in itself a recuperative vital energy, which would place it alongside of western nations, and which might be able soon to cope single-handed with Russia, if a little help were offered it by the Allies, while the Russian forces were represented as flying before the victorious Turks without the courage or skill to meet an enemy anywhere, and the only complaint was that victory was too cheaply won, and then these journalists sat down to a revision of the map of Europe as confidently as to the carving of a turkey for their dinner. The folly of such proceedings was most satisfactorily shown, in a manner which England and France will have cause to remember through long years. It is now evident that the retreat of the Russian forces from the Principalities was decided upon before the failure of the siege of Silistria, and was determined by this event; that the Russian officers foresaw in due season the real plan of the campaign decided upon by the Allies, and their troops were therefore withdrawn, and placed in a position to be within reach of Sebastopol.

The course of the Russian army there was in perfect keeping with the well-known national characteristics. Their enemies were constantly shouting victory and progress, but at the same time they were being exhausted, and fresh supplies of troops, ammunition, guns, and warlike stores of all kinds were constantly demanded from home.

The Muscovite empire exhibited its ancient and proverbial power of resistance, united with a science, skill, and fertility of invention and resources, not displayed in previous wars, and this is shown by the testimony of those before the walls of Sebastopol. The result, if it brings no lesson of wisdom to European writers, should at least teach Americans to be exceedingly cautious in regard to testimony thus furnished against Russia. She shows by her course, that she is expanding by a vigorous life, and the character of this life, and the relations which America may sustain to its future developments, should become for us a matter of earnest consideration. Giving due weight to the most reliable testimony in the case, it seems but a fair conclusion that the statements which exhibit the Russian army as numbering about one million, are open only to such common reductions as would be made in estimating the military strength of any other European Power, and that in determining her relative power a force of a million may be taken as a standard nearly correct.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE NATIONAL SENTIMENT OF RUSSIA AS AFFECTING NATIONAL POLICY AND DESTINY.

One of the most suggestive facts taught by history is, that very often individuals who have reached positions of commanding influence have early felt a consciousness of their powers, and have apprehended the general features of their allotted task; a fact which, perhaps, gave rise to the remark of a distinguished English writer, that, in general, a man's aspirations may be taken as the measure of his capabilities. The remark has doubtless truth for its foundation, though it must be received only with important qualifications. The same thing is true of some nations which have held a sovereign's place among the kingdoms of the world. It appears that in some manner, none, perhaps, can tell how, a national sentiment has arisen pointing to some specific ultimate destiny. Its beginnings and its progress seem removed from all ordinary causes, till a welldefined public opinion pervades all classes-becomes, as it were, the national soul, and shapes the national policy. And, whatever extravagance human pride may attach to such popular convictions, there is often a most remarkable general resemblance between such national anticipations and the results actually reached. When once such a sentiment has been established, and become inwoven with the