reserved all questions of priorities against the fund in court, Gorell Barnes, J., decided that the damage claim of the Mersey Docks Board must rank first; then that of the tugs, the second salvors; and then that of the Caledonian. In his judgment, it is true, he spoke of a division of maritime liens into liens arising ex delicto, and liens arising ex contractu or quasi ex contractu; and he seems to have said that liens ex delicto take precedence, generally, over liens arising ex contractu. That, however, was not the decision in the case. And the reasoning of the judgment (p. 313) rather shows that it is only a subsequent lien ex delicto which ranks prior to a lien ex contractu. The judgment, there cited, of Dr. Lushington in the Aline1 expressly recognized the prior right of the holder of a bottomry bond given after the collision.

Inverse order of dates, then, is the general rule as between competing claims, which are charged by maritime lien upon the ship. But, apart from contract, that is only true under English law, of claims which are so charged. A claim which gives rise to a maritime lien attaches to the ship and her freight as soon as it arises; and entitles the claimant to follow the ship though in the hands of transferees. Such claims may be divided into five groups:

1. Salvage; pilotage; towage. 2

2. Damage done by the ship.

3. Wages of master and crew, including compensation for dismissal; and expenses of getting home, in the case of foreign seamen.

4. Master's "disbursements or liabilities properly made or incurred by him on account of the ship as master.".

5. Loans secured by bottomry of the ship.

In contrast with these claims we have others which can be enforced by admiralty process in rem, against ship and freight, but have not the res as a security until it has been arrested under the process. These are claims for necessaries supplied to any foreign ship, or to any ship of which

1

2

1 (1839) 1 W. Rob. 111 at p. 118.

Towage is doubtful; compare Westrup v. Great Yarmouth Co. (1889) L. R. 43 Ch. D. 241, with The Constancia (1846) 4 N. of C. 512, and The St. Lawrence (1880) L. R. 5 P. D. 250.

3 M. S. Act 1894, s. 167.

no owner is resident in England or Wales; also claims for breaches of duty, or contract, on the part of the owner, master, or crew, unless an owner or part-owner is domiciled in England or Wales.1 And under the County Court Acts the same jurisdiction is given in all claims (below £300) for towage, or necessaries, or damage to cargo; or arising out of the use or hire of a ship; or in tort in respect of goods carried in a ship.

Such claims are on a different footing from those which are secured at once by lien upon the res; and the arrest under process cannot, it seems, alter their position, so as to bring them into competition with existing liens. The arrest gives the creditor the security of the res so far as that then belongs to the debtor; but not more.4

The position of claims which are charged upon the ship by contract, simply, stand in a position intermediate to the first group, giving rise to maritime liens, and the second group, enforceable in rem. Thus, a mortgage of a ship cannot compete with a maritime lien. The mortgagee is an assignee of the owner's rights of property who has left the owner in possession of the ship, with liberty to adventure her. He cannot override the liens which have in consequence fallen upon her. On the other hand, his claim to the ship is superior to that of one who has only acquired a charge by taking her in execution, whether after judgment or before judgment, by process in rem."

The same is true of one who has acquired a possessory lien on the ship, as a ship-repairer. His lien does not override an earlier maritime lien; except, perhaps, to the extent to which he has added value to the ship. On the other hand, it does override claims enforced in rem after she came into his possession." And also it ranks before claims for wages, to which he is no party, which may accrue after that date; although they may be charged by maritime lien."

1

2
Admiralty Court Acts 1840 and 1861. 1868 and 1869.

3 See however the opinion of Gorell Barnes, J., in the Veritas (1901) P.

at p. 314.

* The Cella (1888) L. R. 13 P. D. 82. The Two Ellens (1872) L. R. 4 P. C. 161, The Aneroid (1877) L. R. 2 P. D. 189.

5 The Pacific (1864) 32 L. J. Ad. 120.

6 The Gustaf (1862) 31 L. J. Ad. 207.

7 The Turgeste (1902) P. 26.

The position of one who has a possessory lien as against prior chargees may, however, depend upon whether they have expressly or impliedly authorized the acts which have given him his lien.

Thus, leaving out cases of possessory liens, creditors of the ship under English law fall into three classes:

(a) Those having maritime liens.

(b) Those having charges on the ship by contract, or assignment.

(c) Those having a remedy in rem, which has been enforced by suit.

Of these (a) rank among themselves in inverse order of date; (b) rank among themselves in direct order of date; and (c) stand on an equal footing with one another, without reference to the order in which the suits have been begun, until an unqualified decree has been obtained. Where such a decree has been given the creditor obtaining it ranks first against the fund available to (c).1

This arrangement no doubt seems complicated, but that lies in the nature of the matter itself. Looked at as a whole it follows intelligible lines of principle; and it is free from some elements of arbitrariness and injustice which we have noted in the French and German systems. The result is to put the damage-claimant in a much better position than he occupies under those systems.

This diversity of laws as to ship's creditors is one of the subjects which have been taken in hand recently by the International Maritime Committee. That Committee is an unofficial association of representatives from the maritime States, working in conjunction with national associations or committees in those States. Its object is unification of maritime laws. It has held several conferences which have been engaged upon Collision and Salvage law. The subject of charges upon ships has been reported upon by the National Associations, and was set down for discussion at the Conference of the Committee held in September, 1902, at Hamburg, but for want of time it could not then be dealt with, and it stands over for the next Conference.

1 The William F. Safford (1860) 29 L. J. Ad. 109.

Uniformity of law on this matter is much to be desired. It is quite unsatisfactory, from the point of view of the lawyer, as well as of those practically concerned as creditors, that the remedy available should vary according to the port in which the ship happens to be, whether as her destination, or as a port of distress. And, but for the rather fundamental difference of views as to the relationship between shipowners and their creditors, which has been indicated above, it ought to be easy for the various maritime States to agree upon rules suitable for general adoption. It remains to be seen whether the differences are too serious.

The method of the International Maritime Committee will be to formulate a draft convention on the subject, and to seek to have this considered by a conference of representatives of the maritime Powers. If such a conference were to approve the draft, or some modification, it would doubtless take the form of a treaty among the agreeing Powers, and would be followed in due course by legislation in the several States to bring the law in each State on to the agreed lines.

This course is being followed in the case of Collision and Salvage law. Drafts of conventions on these subjects were adopted by the Committee at the Hamburg meeting, and have now been brought before the Governments of the other maritime States by the Government of Belgium. Before long, it is hoped, they will be considered by a conference of representatives of those Governments; and upon that, important steps towards uniformity of law on those subjects should result. Each such step is a gain. And if efforts of the kind are persisted in, we may hope that by degrees the discords of our maritime laws may be taken away. T. G. CARVer.

IS SUICIDE MURDER?

Suicide appears first in English law, not as a crime per se, but as a confession of some other crime. Bracton1 says, fol. 130, speaking of escheat for outlawry,

The land should never return to the lord, unless there has been a conviction of felony in some way or other, as if he be hung or outlawed, or has acknowledged the felony and has abjured the realm, and such like. But if he has died before a conviction of felony, in whatever manner, the inheritance shall descend to his heirs, unless it should happen that conscious of his crime and afraid of being hanged or of some other punishment, he has slain himself, and the inheritance shall be an escheat of the lord's. But if he has through phrensy or impatience of grief or by misadventure, it shall be otherwise."

The deceased is here punished with forfeiture, not for the crime of taking his own life, but because his suicide is a confession of some other felony punishable with loss of lands.

2

When, later on, fol. 150, Bracton treats of suicide proper, he seems himself, and certainly leaves the reader in much doubt on the subject. Of what he there says of suicide this much, however, seems clear. I. If a man has slain himself after having committed a felony, and for the purpose of evading the punishment therefor, his lands escheat and his chattels are forfeited. 2. If he has brought death on himself" without any cause, through anger or ill will, as when he wished to hurt another, and could not fulfil what he wished," he is likewise to be punished with escheat of lands and forfeiture of goods. 3. If he commits suicide "from weariness of life or impatience of pain," his lands descend to his heir and his chattels only are to be confiscated. 4. If he was insane when he did the act that caused his death, or if he did it by accident, he is to be held guiltless, and forfeits nothing.

From this, aside from the cases of suicide by insane persons and accidental death which we would expect to find 'I find no mention of suicide in Glanvill.

2 Pol. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law, vol. 2, 486, n. have pointed out that some sentences in this chapter are marginal additiones, and seem to betray a fluctuating mind.