Widening of Massachusetts, Tunlaw-New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Foxhall, and Reno Roads and construction of Delacarlia Parkway in Northwest Washington ($1,075,000).

Grade separation at Klingle Road and Porter Street in Rock Creek Park and the widening of the cross-park route to four lanes ($1,115,000).

Paving and widening of Kansas Avenue from Madison Street to District of Columbia line ($472,000).

Widening of Harewood-Fort Drive-Clermont, Riggs Road, South Dakota Avenue, Taylor-Bunker Hill-Randolph, and West Virginia and the construction of Mount Olivet Road in Northeast Washington ($1,450,000).

Widening of various streets and avenues east of the Anacostia River ($2,250,000). Other projects were progressing and would be completed by 1954: the proposed Baltimore-Washington Expressway (new route 1), by extension of New York Avenue as a four-lane freeway ($2,100,000), the widening and extension of South Dakota Avenue (the Whitehurst plan's intermediate loop) to join the New York Avenue Freeway ($376,000), the widening of Suitland Parkway to four lanes ($870,000), construction of a two-lane tunnel from Maine Avenue to 14th Street through the Liberty Loan Building ($150,000).

Concern that the existing northeast arterials (New York Avenue, Bladensburg Road, West Virginia Avenue, Rhode Island Avenue) would be insufficient to absorb the traffic from the New York Avenue Freeway extension also had led to adoption of a plan for a second new freeway approach from the northeast: a Kenilworth Avenue freeway along the east bank of the Anacostia River to East Capitol Street, a new six-lane bridge over the river at that point and the widening or improvement of Independence, Constitution, and C Street NE., as western approaches to this new bridge.

This expansion of the 1947 Whitehurst plan was a harbinger of the new, enlarged highway program being evolved by the area highway departments. While the Planning Commission was at work putting the finishing touches on its own "comprehensive plan," the District Highway Department, in cooperation with the Bureau of Public Roads and the Virginia and Maryland Highway Departments, was proceeding independently with its own reevaluation of transportation needs. Although not dissenting from the Planning Commission's policy of planned sprawl or the elimination of streetcars, it found many of the Planning Commission's recommendations for freeways (especially the proposed inner loop freeway) unsatisfactory both from the standpoint of cost and destructiveness. The District Highway Department's alternative was published in "A Recommended Highway Improvement Program," released in November 1952. announced:

It

"The program was formulated on the basis of traffic needs and existing highway budgets were ignored. The committee, however, has kept its recommendations within reasonable limits. The proposals provide for the maximum utilization of existing facilities and expensive freeway construction has been recommended only where the property damage would not be excessive." (P. 3.)

The only new freeway proposed was the Southwest Freeway; because it traversed an area already slated for urban renewal, it would not be responsible for any property destruction. The plan also advocated widening of Rock Creek Parkway as a "west leg" of the inner loop. But the "north leg" (now known as north leg-west section) and the "east leg" (now known as the center leg) were rejected in favor of using existing streets.

The Robertson plan said that recommending the construction of a freeway "along the north and east sides of the central area is considered unrealistic at this time because of its excessive cost. It is estimated that the right-of-way alone for a freeway would cost in the neighborhood of $68 million. Again because of excessive property damage no provision is made in the present program for a direct connection between Q and R Streets and the west leg of the inner-belt route which is formed by the Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway. A reasonably satisfactory connection does exist, however, via 22d and 23d Streets and New Hampshire Avenue." (P. 40.)

It was again proposed to extend the Whitehurst Freeway as a parkway through Glover-Archbold Park, but proposals for any new freeway to the north or east were rejected. The widening of North Capitol Street and its extension through Soldiers' Home would suffice. The alternative of an expressway was unacceptable as it "would require the acquisition of property at a cost deemed prohibitive at this time." (P. 54.) In general, the plan relied principally upon street widenings and grade separations. Another major addition to the earlier Whitehurst plan, however, was the proposal to construct a new central area bridge of six lanes

across Theodore Roosevelt Island. Captain Whitehurst had rejected such a proposal as "poor planning"; the Robertson plan concluded that it was necessary to prevent "intolerable congestion" that would otherwise occur.

9. District of Columbia Public Works Act of 1954 (May 18, 1954)

As refined and approved by the District Commissioners, the new all-highway long-range transportation plan provided nothing for improvement of transit and proposed a total program of major highway improvements over twice as large as the revised Whitehurst plan. Using fiscal 1939 as a base year, the Whitehurst plan had proposed a total program of $57,505,000 in 1941, which became $73,663,000 with the 1947 revision. The new program increased this to $183,855,000-$71,946,000 which had already been funded through fiscal 1954 and another $111,909,000 proposed for the next 10 years.

To help finance the program, the District Commissioners proposed that the gasoline tax be increased from 5 to 6 cents per gallon, and that vault rental income be transferred from the general fund to the highway fund. But even this added revenue was recognized as being inadequate to cover the stepped-up highway construction. The proposed doubling of annual capital outlay for major highways to $11.2 million a year would still leave a deficit averaging $4 million per year. Borrowing was proposed to fill this gap. In 1947, the transportation plan had contemplated a $17.5 million loan to the highway fund for subway construction. With the elimination of transit improvements and the substitution of highways, it was proposed in 1954 that a 30-year loan of $50,250,000 be authorized to the highway fund for highway construction. After allowance for debt service requirements, this would provide an average of $4 million annually to permit completion of the major highway improvement program by fiscal 1964. A financial analysis submitted by the District government indicated that unpaid debt obligations as of July 1, 1964 ($65 million unpaid principal and interest) could successfully be amortized over the following 30-year period. The margin of estimated highway fund revenue over operating expenses in fiscal 1964 would be almost $6 million-enough to cover annual debt service requirements of $2 million and leave $4 million annually for street maintenance and the District's share of major highway improvements that might be constructed after July 1, 1964.5

In presenting this financing plan to Congress, Engineer Commissioner Brig. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss emphasized that at the conclusion of the new construction program in 10 years the highway fund would be "in balance." He added that "our program *** has been overhauled, revised, and refined, and I think it reflects the thinking of the best brains that we have been able to develop in Washington to help us."6 When Congressmen questioned the wisdom of costly new bridges and freeways, the Highway Department witness assured them that the program involved only one new bridge (tentatively planned for Theodore Roosevelt Island) and only one new freeway, the Southwest Freeway.7

Both the proposed increased tax revenue of the highway fund and the proposed borrowing authority were authorized by the District of Columbia Public Works Act of 1954, which also contained the blanket open-end project authorization providing that "A program of construction projects to meet immediate capital needs for highways in the District is hereby authorized." (Public Law 364, 83d Cong., May 18, 1954, sec. 401.)

10. Federal Aid Highway Act (June 29, 1956)

At the end of the first year of the enlarged highway plan, Highway Director J. N. Robertson reported that Washington already had "one of the most modern and up-to-date systems of highways, bridges, and related facilities to be found anywhere." And the new all-highway transportation program was proceeding on schedule. "Completion of the extension of New York Avenue, connecting with the Baltimore-Washington Expressway, has been of tremendous assistance to the motorist; in addition, it has alleviated many traffic problems arising in this section of the city due to the congested conditions prior to its completion." 8

But the estimates of needs for new highways under the all-highway program soon changed. Impetus for the change was the Federal Aid Highway Act of

See 1954 House District Committee hearings, "Public Works Construction, District of Columbia," pp. 107-108. See 1954 hearings, pp. 24, 29.

7 See 1954 hearings, D. 116.

Annual report of District of Columbia, fiscal year 1955, pp. 65-66.

1956 authorizing 90 percent Federal aid for such District freeways as were included in the system of interstate freeways.

This legislation offered the District three choices:

(a) Stick with the 1954 plan and pass up the opportunity for increased Federal highway aid. The one freeway (Southwest Freeway) included in the 1954 plan would not qualify for 90 percent Federal aid, because it did not lead into another freeway at its eastern terminus.

(b) Add such freeway mileage as would minimize the cost to the District highway fund of projects previously planned. This could be achieved by adding Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, 14th Street Bridge-Southwest Freeway and_Kenilworth Freeway to the Interstate System (reducing the net cost to the District from 50 to 10 percent) and adding 2 connecting expressways to provide a continuous interstate, limited-access route. Such a program would have enabled the District to complete all of its 1954 program, plus two new expressways (a south leg and a freeway from the terminus of the Southwest Freeway near the Capitol to the origin of the Kenilworth Freeway at East Capitol Street) at a substantially lower cost to the District's highway fund. Much, if not all, of the $50,250,000 loan authorized in 1954 would not need to be borrowed.

(c) Add the maximum amount of freeway mileage possible under the District's apportionment of potential Federal aid. While the District's share of costs for such new projects would be only 10 percent, this added burden would be more than the highway fund could finance, even with the 1954 loan authorization.

9

Even before the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 was enacted by Congress (but with its adoption imminent), the District government committed itself to the third course. Prior objections to the costliness and destructiveness of freeways were put aside and an outside consultant asked to recommend an “inner loop freeway.' The resulting report recommended not one inner loop but two, a figure 8 in which the east leg recommended by the Planning Commission in 1950 became the "center leg.' This report, premised on an all-highway transportation system, became the basis for the District Highway Department's development of a maximum freeway network.

The District's initial proposals to the Bureau of Public Roads, as contained in its cost estimates, July 1, 1957, suggested a system of freeways costing $354,709,000, including (a) a "new Route 240" (later 70-S) along the north side of the Potomac River from Montgomery County to 25th and K (4.7 miles, including widening of Whitehurst Freeway); (b) a “new Route 29" that included Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, a new west leg freeway, a new north leg freeway, and conversion of New York Avenue into a freeway from the north leg to the District of Columbia line (8.4 miles, including the completed portion of the New York Avenue Freeway); (c) a "new Route 1" that included a new 14th Street Bridge, the previously planned Southwest Freeway and a new center leg_freeway (4.1 miles); (d) a second "new Route 1" that included a new Alexandria Bridge, a new Anacostia Freeway, a widened and rebuilt bridge crossing at 11th Street S.E. and a new Southeast Freeway to the center leg freeway (7.3 miles) and (e) a third "new Route 1" that included an extension of the Anacostia Freeway to East Capitol Street and the soon to be completed Kenilworth Freeway (4.4 miles).

Many of these new freeway proposals caused immediate public controversy and one of them ("new Route 240") was immediately removed by action of the District Commissioners. After public hearings on the proposal, the District Commissioners decided that no interstate freeway would be built into Northwest Washington. Instead the Park Service agreed to build a Palisades Parkway as a link between the Capitol Beltway, where Route 70-S would terminate, to the Whitehurst Freeway.

11. National Capital Transportation Act (July 14, 1960)

When by 1955 it was becoming apparent that the District's all-highway transportation program was failing, even with sharply increased capital outlay, to achieve the expected results, the National Capital Planning Commission (by then under the chairmanship of its former consultant, Harland Bartholomew) obtained appropriations to undertake a new transportation study. This study was formally submitted on July 1, 1959.

The Planning Commission's study, undertaken jointly with the National Capital Regional Planning Council, started with the same policy and factual assumptions as the Highway Department's planning-continued sprawl and dispersal and an all-highway transportation system. Both likewise assumed that total transit patronage would at best hold its own at then-existing levels, so that all increased

De Leuw Cather & Co., "Report on Inner Loop Freeway System," Oct. 31, 1955.

travel would be by automobile. They differed, however, in their judgments of the degree of increased traffic that would need to be accommodated. Based upon its own traffic forecasts, the District Highway Department believed its program of highway construction, as enlarged under Harold L. Aitken's direction, 10 could accommodate 1980 requirements. But the Planning Commission's computers forecast substantially higher 1980 traffic volumes. 11 Based upon this higher traffic forecast, the Planning Commission initially concluded that an even greater enlargement of the District's highway program was required and issued, in 1958, a new comprehensive thoroughfare plan containing its recommendations. A year later, however, the final transportation plan concluded that such an allhighway plan was unworkable, even with maximum utilization of express buses. Four rail rapid transit lines would be necessary to absorb the highway overflow.12 Having committed itself to a major enlargement of the highway system a year before, the 1959 transportation plan did not examine any other alternative systems involving less pretentious highway networks.

In 1958, 1959, and 1960, the Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems, a special joint subcommittee of the House and Senate District Committees, undertook a thorough investigation of transportation planning. The result was the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960. This legislation and the explanatory reports spelled out an entirely new direction for transportation planning:

(a) Rejection of an all-highway transportation system.-The joint committee's final report concluded:

"Washington, like every other large American city, has been suffering from steadily worsening traffic congestion. For more than a decade after World War II, there was a steady decline in transit ridership, and a rapid increase in the number of private automobiles on the streets and highways. The Highway Departments of the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia have never been able to catch up with this increase in traffic nor does it appear likely that they can do so in the near future. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly evident that any attempt to meet the area's transportation needs by highways and automobiles alone will wreck the city-it will demolish residential neighborhoods, violate parks and playgrounds, desecrate the monumental portions of the Nation's Capital, and remove much valuable property from the tax rolls. In any case, an all-highway solution to the area's traffic problem is a physical impossibility.'

" 13

(b) Reliance on rapid transit.-Noting the "well nigh universal support" for a rapid transit system, the joint committee found that "a new system of high-speed express transit service is essential to preserve the District of Columbia and its environs as a good place in which to live and do business, and as a beautiful and dignified Capital City of our great Nation." It further found:

"It is now generally recognized that a healthy mass transportation system is essential to every metropolis. In no other way can large numbers of people be carried quickly and economically to their places of work each day. In no other way can the downtown area be revivied as a center of business, finance, cultural events, and other activities that draw people from all parts of the metropolis.

"The speed with which transportation changes have been taking place, and congestion growing worse, indicates that no time should be lost in meeting transportation needs. It is further clear that prompt action, in the case of new rapid transit lines, will contribute to orderly metropolitan growth and hence simplify and ease transportation problems in the future; while delays in providing the needed rapid transit will allow further deterioration of central city business districts and employment centers, and accelerate suburban sprawl, and thus make it still more difficult to provide mass transportation in future years." 14

(c) Reduction in highway program.-District Engineer Commissioner Welling had been one of the first to point out that if Washington was to have a subway system (which he favored) the construction of parallel freeways should at least be deferred in the hope that they would never be necessary. Numerous other

19 Mr. Aitken originally joined the District Highway Department as Mr. Robertson's special assistant in charge of highway programing, becoming the new highway director when Mr. Robertson retired.

11 Wilbur Smith & Associates, Traffic Engineering Study, 1958.

12 "The Mass Transportation Survey Report," 1959.

13 Report of Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems, "National Capital Transportation Act of 1960," June 15, 1960, pp. 4-5. The subsequent Senate and House reports adopted the same language as is quoted herein.

14 Id., p. 5.

witnesses, expert and civic, echoed this suggestion. The committee agreed that reduction in the highway program seemed indicated. It observed:

(i) Its hearings "produced relatively little support for the idea of an expanded highway program. Indeed, many witnesses protested that even the highways already planned will damage the beauty and livability of the Nation's Capital, while taking valuable property off the tax rolls.” 15

(ii) "New rapid transit lines to carry people between downtown Washington and the suburbs may permit a substantial reduction in the number of highways that must be built into the city, leading to a substantial saving in public funds and avoiding the harmful effects often attendant on the construction of freeways through residential areas. In any case, any additional highways that will eventually be built should be deferred until the railroads and rapid transit lines have had an opportunity to develop their full patronage, since experience has shown that a new highway provides competition that no rail line can meet.'

16

(d) Establishment of new agency for comprehensive transportation planning.Finally, it was decided to bypass both the Planning Commission and the highway planners and vest the responsibility of developing a suitable plan for a balanced system of rapid transit and highways in a new agency, the National Capital Transportation Agency, with jurisdiction over the entire metropolitan area. Finding that "it would be a mistake to accept" the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey as it had been presented, the joint committee found that “No other government agency is well suited to continuing the comprehensive job of transportation survey and planning that was begun by the Mass Transportation Survey." " Congress accepted these recommendations and on July 14, 1960, the National Capital Transportation Act became law. (Public Law 669, 86th Cong.) 12. Year 2000 plan (May 8, 1961)

Both the Planning Commission and District Commissioners actively supported the creation of the NCTA. The Planning Commission also early accepted the new role being given that agency. Even before the legislation was passed, Harland Bartholomew had informed the joint committee that "reconsideration of the part to be played by highways and mass transit will become properly the function" of the new agency.13

Recognizing that the 1950 comprehensive plan with its planned sprawl and all-highway transportation proposals was now obsolete, the Planning Commission prepared a new statement of planning goals which were enunciated in its "Year 2000 Plan." Where once it advocated a diminution of the importance of the central city, it now urged continued growth of the central city. Where once it advocated planned sprawl, it now urged high density development along rapid transit radials. Where once it advocated freeways to handle all increased travel, it now advocated primary reliance on a rail rapid transit system supplemented by freeways "to handle those trips for which there will be no convenient rapid transit service."

13. Aitken plan (November 18, 1963)

Under the impetus of planning for an all-highway transportation system, the District's highway program had jumped from $73,662,000 under the revised Whitehurst plan in 1948 to $183,855,000 under the Robertson plan in 1954. After increased Federal highway aid became available, the goal was raised annually until, by the time the National Capital Transportation Act was passed, it surpassed $500 million.

After enactment of the Transportation Act, it might have been expected that the new planning goals would be reflected in a reduction in this program to more manageable proportions. Instead, 6 weeks after the act was signed by President Eisenhower and 4 weeks after the end of Engineer Commissioner Welling's tenure as engineer commissioner, the major highway program was expanded to $660,702,000. In fiscal 1962 it was expanded again to $827,819,000. At this juncture, amidst increasing protests from District citizens, the Planning Commission and the NCTA that the District Highway Department was disregarding the new transportation planning goals and procedures, a special House sub

18 Id., p. 4. The reference to "highways already planned" were projects such as the north leg freeway then a part of the District's highway program; the reference to "an expanded highway program" was to projects that would have been added by the 1959 MTS recommendations.

16 Id., p. 8.

17 Id., pp. 11-12.

15 Report of Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems, "Organization for Transportation in the National Capital Region," Apr., 1960, p. 75.