The worst sufferer from this transition in the past 25 years to a highwaydominant transportation system has been the central city. Between 1940 and 1960, the original Federal City of L'Enfant lost one-third of its resident population-a loss of 100,000 people. By 1948, 56 percent of the total land area of the Federal City (exclusive of Federal reservations and District property) was devoted to streets and alleys. At that time there were about 12,000 offstreet parking places in the central business district. By 1963 there were 45,000 off street parking places in the same area. Progressively homes and businesses have been displaced by the requirements for more space for moving and parked vehicles.

Despite the completion of four "inner loops" in the past,26 traffic congestion in the central business area has become steadily worse. And the initial results of the first completed section of the fifth and most ambitious proposed inner loop (Southwest Freeway) do not promise that it will be any more successful than the prior four.27

In 1927, the central retail area (bounded by 5th and 15th Streets, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Avenues) had an assessed value of $228,702,500 and yielded 24.2 percent of the District's property tax revenue. By 1962, despite 25 years of inflation, the assessed value was only $245,859,163 and yielded only 10.5 percent of the District's tax revenue. According to the Bureau of the Census, retail sales in the Central Business District have continuously declined-$421 million in 1948, $413 million in 1954, $396 million in 1958. As more and more of the city's core has been devoted to the accommodation of vehicles instead of people, commercial establishments have been forced to either leave the city or migrate into nearby areas that were formerly residential. And it may be more than coincidental that this central city business sprawl has been primarily in the direction that has been relatively immune from highway improvements: Northwest.

Indeed, the fickleness (and rewards) of Washington residents in disregarding the advice of yesterday's highway planning is nowhere more apparent than Northwest Washington. The last major arterial highway improvement in residential Northwest Washington was the widening of Foxhall Road from Reservoir Road to Whitehaven Street in 1950 at a cost of $138,000.28

The Whitehurst plan also had contemplated continuation of the widening of Foxhall Road to Nebraska Avenue and the extension of Nebraska Avenue through Battery-Kemble Park. Both proposals died in the face of citizen opposition. Since that time the following highway projects have been added to the District's program and then removed because of citizen opposition: Widening of Wisconsin Avenue between Q and R Streets, widening of Wisconsin Avenue from Massachusetts Avenue to the District of Columbia line, a six-lane freeway through GloverArchbold Park, a four-lane parkway through Glover-Archbold Park, a four-lane expressway through Whitehaven Park from Massachusetts Avenue to Wisconsin Avenue, a four-lane expressway through Normanstone Park from Rock Creek Parkway to 34th Street, widening of Porter Street from Connecticut to Wisconsin, widening and reconstruction of Pierce Mill Bridge at Tilden Street in Rock Creek Park, the extension of Rock Creek Parkway to Tilden Street or Broad Branch Road, new bridges at the base of Glover-Archbold Park or Arizona Avenue, a fourlane intermediate loop expressway from Military Road at Rock Creek Park to Tenley Circle, an interchange at Tenley Circle, the widening of River Road, and a six-lane freeway along the Palisades from Foxhall Road to the District line. Still other suggestions, such as the Planning Commission's 1959 proposal for a Northwest Freeway, the District Government has had the foresight to reject without adding them to its plans.

Although the residents of Northwest Washington were amply warned that failure to build such proposed highway improvements would lead to "intolerable congestion" and a decline in property values, the sentiment favored toleration of congestion and taking a chance on the economic predictions rather than accept the certain loss of parks, homes, recreation areas, and street-side shade trees.

Prior "northern" bypasses that have been built include: K St. widening and expressway, M St. widening, Q and R Sts. and Florida Ave. to U St. widening. Prior "western" loops include: 14th St., widened 17th St. to Conn. Ave., 20th, 22d and 23d Sts. and Rock Creek Parkway. Prior "southern" loops include Constitution Ave., Independence Ave., Maine Ave. and F and G Sts. SW., and M St. SW. to SE. Prior "eastern" loops include widened 7th St., 6th St., 3d St., and 4th and 6th Sts. NE. to SE.

Peak-hour inbound motor vehicles entering CBD from south of Constitution Ave.: 1953, 6,792; 1958, 6,859; 1963, 7,549.

29 Two arguable exceptions: widening of 34th St. for 1 block between Cleveland Ave. and Woodley Rd. (1958; $11,000), and paving over the streetcar tracks on Wisconsin Ave. (1961).

This citizen perversity has saved the District's highway fund up to $100 million in highway projects that have been put back on the shelf. It also may well have averted the very evils that the highways were supposed to prevent. Instead of blight or the need for urban renewal, the area has been a model for private renewal. Instead of confronting intolerable congestion, traffic increases in this section and the area west of 12th Street have been less than other corridors leading to the central city. From 1955 to 1963 the peak-hour traffic growth from Montgomery County into Northwest Washington was 30 percent compared with a 52-percent increase from Prince Georges County and Virginia into the District. And, as more suburbanites have used their cars to commute through Northwest Washington to work, more Northwest residents have left their cars at home to use public transit. In 1930, when residents in all other sections of Washington commuted to Sector Zero mostly by transit, the transit usage in Northwest Washington was only 39 percent. The most recent survey (1961) showed that transit usage for commuting to Sector Zero had risen to 57 percent from Northwest Washington (see table IX). Perhaps this may help explain why motor vehicle traffic counts in the Northwest corridor show no increase at all 1955-63 at the central area cordon line.29

While Northwest Washington has been gravitating toward an improved balance in urban transportation with greater efficiency in the use of space for travel (and resulting economies to the District government), the reverse has been happening in other residential areas, notably Northeast Washington and Anacostia. In the Northeast quadrant of Washington outside the Federal City the following major arterial highway improvements were deemed necessary under the postwar Whitehurst Plan:

29 Motor vehicles entering inner cordon (bounded by Constitution Ave., 21st St., L St., and 3d St., NW.) at peak hour:

This was all that was deemed required; all has been constructed.

The 1954 Robertson plan concluded that such highway improvements would not be adequate. It reasoned that instead of one freeway there should be two, by converting Kenilworth Avenue into a freeway to East Capitol Street, constructing a new bridge in that location. In addition it thought that for an adequate long-range, all-highway system various other street widenings and street extensions were also required. It therefore added the following:

All of the above projects have likewise been completed except for the widening of Rhode Island Avenue (soon to be completed), the widening of 13th Street (which has not been started), and the widening of Michigan Avenue which was shelved in 1961 with the decision to do more limited repaving work instead.

But faster than these earlier projects have been completed, new ones have been added:

Here, in one residential quadrant of the city, a long-range highway program, thought to require only $5 million capital outlay in 1947, had grown to $47 million by 1954 and is $215 million today. Over $50 million has already been invested— 10 times originally estimated requirements-with the unfinished portion now in excess of $150 million.

With the city now committed to a balanced transportation system is it truly necessary to invest 43 times as much in new highways as was thought necessary prior to the Robertson all-highway plan?

What has the first $50 million achieved? In 1954 (the last year prior to opening the New York Avenue Freeway), the peak-hour traffic from Prince Georges County into the District was 9,345. In the wake of new highway capacity it has rocketed upward 88 percent to 17,509 by 1963. A once highly favorable transit ratio for commuting from Northeast to central Washington (60 percent in 1930, higher in 1940) had slumped to 48 percent by 1961. The shock waves of razed trees, widened streets, new parking lots, and new urban renewal areas has been felt right to the city's core.

3. Striking a new balance

The above is not intended as a criticism that all past highway construction has been a mistake or, indeed, that all proposed highway construction would be a mistake. To the contrary, it is recognized that Washington has a superb highway system today and the necessity undoubtedly exists or will arise to build more.

The problem is how much, where, and when. Until the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960, the task of the District Highway Department was a relatively easy one. Its function was to meet all transportation needs and its own construction activity would largely govern where the next needs arose. Now that the District is committed to a balanced transportation system, the problem is extremely more intricate. Necessarily the amount and location of new highway construction must depend on the basic rapid transit system and be coordinated with it.

It is no solution to simply assume that a highway network which has been planned on the premise that there will be no rapid transit (which is the case for the present $834,500,000 program) will be required no matter what the extent of the rapid transit system. The very act of building such a highway network renders it less likely that finances will be available to build the transit system or, if built, that it could be economically operated on a self-sustaining basis.

The potentiality of rapid transit to reduce highway requirements-particularly in a city with such a low existing level of transit usage is tremendous. If it merely increased transit usage in commuting to sector zero to 70 percent (the minimum in cities with rapid transit), the number of motor vehicles in the central city would decline by one-half. Indeed, with such a ratio, the number of total commuters could double with no increase in highway and parking requirements over what exist today.

One year ago, President Kennedy directed the District Commissioners to reevaluate the District's highway program in the light of rapid transit plans. Regrettably, such a step has not yet begun. A special committee was appointed to reevaluate two projects (north leg and Three Sisters Bridge). The committee could agree that if they were required, certain changes in location and design should be made. But the committee notably did not agree that they would be required for a balanced transportation system.

4. Financing a balanced system.-Largely because of the fruitless attempts of the past to build an all-highway transportation system that could keep up with the traffic it generated, the District's highway fund will soon be broke. The proposed gasoline tax increase will enable the highway fund to service its existing $50 million debt, pay its operating expenses, and undertake a bare minimum of street maintenance activities. This additional revenue is urgently needed. It will not, however, be adequate to either finance the present enlarged highway program or make any contribution to the District's share in starting a rapid transit system. The proposed $35 million loan would be self-defeating. Its debt service requirements would more than wipe out the benefits obtained from increasing the gasoline tax, leave the highway fund unable to pay both its operating expenses and $5 million annual debt service requirements and saddle the highway fund with unpaid debt obligations of $130 million as of fiscal 1970. It would effectively rule out any contribution to a rapid transit system or, beginning in fiscal 1969, any further highway construction of any type.