MARCH 9, 1826.] power That tree the previous ballot. The amendments by which the this House, as such a contingency would very seldom, if to elect the Executive is to be taken from this ever, occur. As the great States, according to my House, and from the State Legislatures the power to ap-views, relinquish nothing, I would propose that, on the point the electors, cannot be effected, without a second second ballot, which is substituted for an election by the election by the People; but there is no necessity for the House of Representatives, that the votes should be countsecond election being conducted in a different mannered by States, in the manner in which they would be, if from the first. In the second election, as in the first, the election came before the House of Representatives; selectors might be chosen by the People. This mode and I would propose this mode, because it harmonizes would be according to the Constitution, in the first elec-with the Constitution. Unless for the strong reasons which I have stated, I detion; and, if there be no reason for departing from it, in the first instance, I see none for departing from it in the precate all innovations upon the Constitution. If we insecond. This mode of electing the Executive has pre- dulge in them, we shall gradually fritter away that instruvailed from the period of adopting the Constitution to ment, until not a fragment of it will remain. We all the present time. It was expressed and understood in unite in eulogizing the profound sagacity and practical the Constitution, that the Executive should be so elect- wisdom of those who framed a national compact, admiraed by the People. I know of no injury or inconveni-bly adapted "to form a perfect union, to promote the ence which has been produced by this mode. It may be general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty to said, that inconveniences may arise-that the electors ourselves and to posterity." Let us verify this admiration are a permanent body, and may be tampered with; and, by our actions. Let us preserve that compact in its uttherefore, that the same objection exists against them, as most possible purity. The great objects of the Constituagainst the House of Representatives. The difference tion have been obtained. Its benefits we have all expeWe have gathered, abundantly, the fruits of between the two cases is great. It was contemplated by rienced. the Constitution, that the House of Representatives would the tree which was planted by our ancestors. rarely, if ever, elect the President, as I have endeavor has long grown in a genial soil: beneath its shade we ed to demonstrate. Their electing the President is in- have reposed in prosperity and peace. Like the hardy consistent with the nature of their functions, and produc- oak of the forest, it is formed of sound materials; if we tive of all the injurious consequences which have been only prune its excressences, it may, and will endure for dilated upon. Though it be admitted that the electors ages: but if we rashly lop off its flourishing branches, are, to a certain extent, a permanent body, yet they are we shall deform its symmetry, impair its vigor, and leave so for a short time: the great mass of them must be at a bare and unprotected its venerable trunk. distance from the Presidential candidates. They are scattered over a wide surface, and, between the periods of their appointment and of their balloting, time would not be allowed to intrigue with them. According to usage, the particular candidate for whom the votes of the electors are to be given, is previously ascertained by the People, and the electors are pledged to vote for him. It is not to be supposed that they will deceive their constituents. Their responsibility is too immediate and direct. There never has been an instance of such a deception. If there never has been one, after the trial of nearly forty years, it is not to be presumed that there will be one. As far as we can test a practice by experi ence, which should be the polar star in politics, and by which we ought to be governed, and not by theory and speculation, the existing mode of appointing electors is seaceable and harmonious, and has fully answered the urposes for which it was intended. Can any change reate better effects? When things go on well as they are, it is not wise, it is not statesmanlike, to alter them. Et is peculiarly unwise to do so, when alteration cannot be attended with improvement. By the alteration sugrested, we may cause excitement and disorder. I do ot say that we should; but, if we might, (and no one can be certain of the result of the experiment) is it not better to persevere in the accustomed mode, by which, s far as experience can prove a fact, it has been proved hat the elections are conducted as well as can be deired? Mr. EVERETT then obtained the floor; when the committee rose, and the House adjourned. THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1826. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. On motion of Mr. McDUFFIE, the House again went into Committee of the Whole, on the State of the Union, on the resolutions offered by him for amending the Constitution. Mr. EVERETT addressed the Committee as follows Mr. CHAIRMAN: I rise to address the Committee, in a state of indisposition under which I ought, in prudence, to be at home, rather than on this floor. I am opposed to the resolutions of the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. McDUFFIE.) It is, with me, a matter of serious question, whether the alterations in the Constitution, for which they provide, are not, in their spirit and tendency, unconstitutional. I am not aware that this topic has been discussed, or that the limit, to which the power of amending goes, has been duly settled by the People of America. Meantime, I am strongly disposed to think, that the Parliamentary licence of amendment, by which we make what changes we will, in propositions that are before us, has no application to the Constitution of the United States. In the ordinary business of legislation, and for the sake of facilitating our proceedings, it is permitted, under the name of amendment, totally to change the nature of a proposiI would not depart from the Constitution, without the tion; to convert it from positive to negative, and the renost grave and serious motives. In varying any part of verse; and this, with good reason: for, the entire propot, by an amendment, I would not go beyond the modifi-sition and the whole subject matter of it, being within the ation of that part, so far as might be necessary for the control of the House, it is a mere matter of convenience, mendment required. Should the first ballot of the in point of order, whether we change one proposition by lectors be inconclusive, I would again commit the elec-way of amendment, or discard it, and bring in another. ion to electors chosen by the People, with a proviso, But, our relation to the Constitution of the United States hat a former elector should be ineligible, so as to obviate is very different; and no such latitude of amendment can he consequences resulting from a permanent body. At be indulged with respect to that instrument. he second ballot, I would limit the subjects of election The justice of this distinction may, I think, be illustrated o the candidates having the two highest numbers on the by a simple supposition, that should go to vary the relairst ballot; and should there be no election on the sec- tion in which we stand, even to ordinary matters of legisnd ballot, to avoid the inconveniences and excitements lation. In some Representative Governments, that of f frequent elections, let the election then devolve upon | France, for instance, all bills are introduced by the Officers Vor. IL-100 H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [MARCH 9, 1826. of the Crown, who are bound by their duty and oath of posed alterations, which unequally affect the various poroffice to support them, if required. Suppose something tions of the country. like this existed in our Government; and that you, sir, as I am, therefore, strongly inclined to think, the the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, were un-principle of this implied limitation must always be der an obligation of this kind, to support the leading ap-sulted; that this must shew us in each case how far propriation bills of the year. Should you esteem it to be alterations may go, and that it does dictate to us that a consistent with that obligation, to introduce, under the amendments must be confined to those changes which name of amendments, essential changes in the provisions necessary, not to alter the essential provisions of the Conof those bills' Would not such a step on your part be a stitution, but to carry them into more perfect and hap direct breach of official confidence? Now, with regard operation. In fact, I can conceive no maxim in potes to the Constitution of the United States, our whole legis-more dangerous or more false, than that a written com lative action with respect to it, whether in the way of ad-pact of Government can be construed to look forward in ministering, interpreting, or amending, must be governed its own worthlessness; that it can be supposed to be with by the obligation to support it which is imperative on every citizen, and particularly so on us. It is about three months since, in addition to the obligation which we share with every citizen of the country, we were laid under the specific and solemn obligation of an oath, to support the Constitution of the United States. The gentleman from South Carolina comes into the House; tells us that, in its most important functions, the Constitution of the United States has wholly failed; and proposes alterations in it, so essential, so vital, as will, if adopted, (in the judgment of the honorable gentleman) give perpetuity to our institutions; if rejected, leave us exposed, within fifty years, to revolution and ruin. I ask, sir, whether the latitude of amendment can be strained so far, in reference to a frame of Government, which is of the nature of a compact between the parties, and which we are under the strongest general and specific obligations to defend? I think, sir, it cannot. I am aware, that these remarks may seem somewhat paradoxical; and that, as far as they claim to present an argument, the answer is ready, viz: that the article of the Constitution, which provides for its own amendment, is an integral part of the instrument; that, therefore, the obligation to support it and adhere to it, as a compact, is modified by this amending power; in other words, that we do, while amending, support it. We do while amending support it and adhere to it; but the distinction still recurs, that to amend is one thing, essentially to change another. To amend is to make changes consistent with the leading provisions of the Constitution, and by means of which those leading provisions will go into happier operation. Can this be the same thing as to change, what we call, while we propose the change, those essential provisions themselves? in the competence of a body of political functionaries, as : Having expressed myself thus strongly on this pott, and less strongly I could not have expressed mysdi, z have done justice to my convictions, I am bound to a), that, if there are any in this House of the class of podle cians to which the honorable mover of the resolutions alluded, those who feel an indiscriminate reverence for the perfect and imperfect features of the Constitution, I am not one. In setting my face against all alterations of the essential provisions of this frame of Goverment, I am in no degree influenced by a belief or feeling that, in the Let us look to the article of the Constitution, which as- most essential provisions, it is a perfect system. Far certains the right and power of amendment. The fifth otherwise perfect! how can it be? Was it not a comarticle of the Constitution fixes the mode in which amend-promise between parties equally balanced Was it not a ments shall be made, with this proviso, that, before the compromise between parties on the point of breaking up year 1808, no amendment shall be made, that shall reach the convention, and going home? For, the secret which the first and fourth clauses of the ninth section of the first the gentleman from New York (Mr. STORES) thought was article, and also that no State shall, without its consent, be yet to be disclosed, was told, near forty years ago, by deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. These are Luther Martin and Governor Randolph. ́ Yes, Sir; they the only express limitations of the amending power. Now, were on the point of breaking up the Convention, whe one of two propositions must be maintained: either that the most essential feature of the Constitution, the adjurthese two express limitations are the only limitations of the ment of the Federal and Popular principles in the Genera amending power, or, that there is a prior limitation of the Government, was settled, by a compromise between #: amending power, growing out of the nature of the Con- two parties, in this excited state. Could we expect, stitution as a compact. Unless we admit the latter pro-der these circumstances, to find it perfect? No, 84, position, there is nothing to prevent a combination of twothirds of Congress, in the first instance, and three quar ters of the States in the second, from depriving the remainder of the States of any advantage they possess in those provisions of the Constitution, which guaranty the Federal equality, which was not to be touched without Unanimous consent. Nay, sir, without this prior limitation of the amending power, there is nothing to prevent the only express limitation which now exists from being itself removed by way of amendment, thus leaving the fifth article without conditions. The necessity of admitting this prior limitation is peculiarly apparent, in the case of all pro- | say, boldly-if it requires boldness to make the areal- MARCH 9, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R.. leaders, whose talents and services place the office of is one thing to hold that the Constitution is perfect, so perfect as to be beyond amendment-I did not suppose that any body held that opinion: I do not now suppose that any body views it in that light, not even the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. ARCHER) who regards it as the work of inspiration. Even he is in favor of one of these amendments, and acquiesces in the other; which, unless he supposes the amendments also inspired, would be patching up inspiration with mere mortal wisdom-Sir, it is one thing to think the Constitution perfect, and another to think that, whether perfect or imperfect, it is a compact which it is our duty, nay, which it is our interest, to support and it is still another thing to believe, that, even in those points which are fully and clearly within the reach of the amending power, properly construed, and fairly applied, it is better, far better, to bear with almost any political evil, than to fly to the Constitution with amend ments. In my judgment, the very worst possible remedy for any evil, not positively intolerable, in this country, is : an amendment of the Constitution. It is an acknowledged maxim of political prudence, that frequent changes of the laws, even in matters of ordinary legislation, are pernicious. It is the opinion of every sound statesman, that it is far better to bear with any evil that is not absolutely in-tration would be ominous to the welfare of the People. tolerable, than to render the great interests of the country insecure, by indecisive and fluctuating legislation. But, the Constitution-the Constitution-the only thing permanent which we have: the only thing which the People of the United States have taken out of the grasp of this daily changeful legislation: the thing which is to stand us in stead of all the perpetuities of the old world, ecclesiastical, political, social, and personal. Sir, I do not think it perfect; but it is good enough for me. I have lived under other political institutions; nearly a third of my life, since I came to years of discretion, has been passed under other forms of Government; and I have learned enough of the state of foreign societies, and enough of the political condition of the great majority of this race of man, to be well contented with what Providence has given to us, in the Constitution of the United States. I am contented to live by it: contented, when I die, to leave my children in its safeguard and I would sooner lay down this right hand, to be cut off, than I would hold it up to vote for any essential change in this form of Government. ince. : The honorable mover of these resolutions tells us, that he was induced to propose them, because he regards the subject-matter of them as the most important function of his Government. Highly important, Sir, it unquestionbly is far too important, in my view of the subject, to admit a change in this part of the compact. But I cannot agree with the honorable gentleman, in thinking it the most important function of the Government; and, if he will permit me the reflection, I must say, that we do lower the tone of our politics, that we lower the tone of our egislation, that we lower the tone and spirit of this Peole, by allowing questions of this kind so much importI am free to confess, Sir, that I regard very many unctions of the Government as more important than the election of President. The Constitution of this House; of the other House; of the Judiciary; the power of Congress over questions of Internal Improvement; the power of acquiring and governing Territory, without imitation, beyond the bounds of the United States-these re far more important than the modification of the elecion of President. And if I believed the power of amendnent was unrestricted, I would much sooner discuss, for lays and weeks, amendments to the Constitution, that hould touch some of these questions, wherein the great nterests and industry of the country are wrapped up, than hose which we have now in hand. Sir, I take the error to e, that of confounding what is of importance to the individual citizen with what is important to the People at large. To the individual citizen, to the few prominent political : But, Sir, the gentleman argued, that this was not only the most important function in the Constitution, but that it was a function in which the Constitution had completely failed. This, I regarded, not only as an erroneous proposition, but as wholly at variance with another proposition, in a subsequent part of the gentleman's argument; which was, if I did not misunderstand him, that all the Presidents whom we have had, with one exception, were the ablest and best men which the country afforded, and were really the choice of the People. Now, Sir, we have had ten Presidential elections: they have resulted, the gentleman says, with one exception, in the election of the ablest and best men-each of whom was the choice of the People: and that exception, if I understood his allusion, was of an individual, who, beginning with President Washington, and coming down, has received the highest marks of confidence, and has been placed in the most responsible stations, by all those ablest and best men. And this, the gentleman calls a complete failure. I call it complete success. I beg leave to tell the gentleman, that, if he expects, by an amendment of this Constitution, or by a new Constitution, in this or any other country, to the end of time, to get a Government that will not be found to fail, at least once in ten times, in its practical operation, he will be disappointed. A result like this, stretching over our whole history, and giving us the ablest and best men of the country, in succession, with a single exception, and that exception made by a political opponent, which (I know the gentleman's candor will permit me to add) detracts something from its weight-such a result, I say, is perfect success, unexampled success, glorious success; and I would not alter a letter in the Constitution, in the hope of obtaining a happier operation. In respect to the controversy which forms a leading part of the honorable gentleman's argument, the alternative of the General Ticket and District system, I have not much to say: the rather, as I conceive the practical operation of the two systems to come nearly to the same thing. I say this, on grounds of reasoning, and I am not aware that there is any thing in experience, to bring us to a different H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [Man 9, 1826. conclusion. The two systems, in the long run, must come how many branches does it consist? How to be dosen? to the same thing. On the General Ticket system, sup- For how long? What are the checks of these brandes on posing it to be uniformiy adopted throughout the United each other? There is not a word of all this in the Consti States, the unrepresented minorities would be balanced tution of the United States; and yet will the gentian by each other, or, in other words, the minority, whose say, that the whole institution of Republican Goverest voice is not heard in one State, on one side of the quesis of less importance than the particular modification of tion, would be balanced by the minority, whose voice is the electoral suffrage for President; or that, being jasi not heard, in another State, on another side of the ques- assuredly is) infinitely more important, we have no on tion. On the District system, the same result would take stitutional provision for it? place. The minority represented in the Electoral Colleges, on one side of the question, in one State, would be balanced, and being balanced, would be neutralized, by the minority represented in another State, on the other side of the question: and, therefore, in their practical operation, there would be very little to choose, between the two systems. I repeat, sir, that it is the life and soul of this Gover ment, to exercise no more power than is absolutely neces sary, and to leave as much as possible to the discretion o the States. It is for want of some such adjustment as this that all the Governments that have ever been establisted over widely extended regions have fallen to pieces. Sa, I am willing to retract what I said. I am ready to think that, in this respect, this Constitution is perfect. When I consider this partition of powers, when I see how the se parate States are relieved from all the perplexity of foreign relations, and how the General Government is relieved from all the odium of local administration, I am ready to pronounce it in this part, a perfect system. I this Government in this respect. I believe it night, go into harmonious operation, from Labrador to Cape Hort, as easily as it does from Maine to Florida-Imean as far as this part of the system is concerned. I think this is a part of the Constitution which, of all others, ought to be treated sacredly. I grant to the gentleman from South Carolina that diversity, in this respect, is an evil. It is an evil that one State should appoint its Electors in one way, and another State in another way. I admit that this is an evil, for which a remedy is desirable; though I do not know-if no other remedy could be applied-whether it would be expedient (if it were competent to us) to alter the Con-apprehend there are no limits to the possible extension of stitution for this purpose. But the gentleman himself tells us there is another remedy. He says that, as the Constitution now is, without any alteration, the States will all be led to adopt the General Ticket system. What more do we want, as far as uniformity goes? If the States will all adopt the General Ticket system, without any amendment to the Constitution, then the only evil which I admit to exist, is remedied: for I maintain that it is no evil that the General Ticket system should prevail, rather than the District system; because, in their practical operation, they must come to the same result. In the few observations, therefore, which I have to make on this part of the gentleman's argument, I desire to be understood not so much as being opposed to the District system, as wishing to show, that some of those inconveniences, which he traces to the General Ticket system, are equally incident to the District system: and that others flow, not from this or that system, but from human nature itself, and are evils inseparable from any kind of choice. But, at least, the gentleman contends, we have no Cas stitutional provision which results in uniformity. Even this, as I have already had the honor of stating to the Committee, is at war with his admission, that the Consttution, such as it is, will practically result in uniformity, That uniformity is not, I know, the uniformity which the gentleman prefers; but it is the uniformity of one system, if not of another. But I will waive this point, and wilklow the gentleman for a moment, in the argument on this subject of uniformity; and I must ask leave to sit, cosdering that this idea of uniformity is the basis of his s tem, that I could wish he had applied a little more of that sagacity, in which few men equal him, in analysing the idea of uniformity. The first argument by which the gentleman supported the amendment, which goes to introduce the District sys- There are many incidents to the electoral choice. In tem, is, that, as the Constitution now stands, we have no some of these, uniformity is provided for by the Constituconstitutional provision at all. He even said that, on this tion, as we have it. In others, where it does not exist, subject, we have no Constitution. In other words, be- the gentleman wishes to provide for it; which, in others, cause the Constitution gives to the States a discretion on and in those, in my judgment, not of less importance, he this point, and because the States have exercised this dis- leaves it still wholly unprovided for. We have an unicretion differently, in different States, and at different form Constitutional provision, which ascertains the power times, in the same State, we have, therefore, no Constitu- that shall appoint the electors; the States shall apponá tion. But this is confounding constitutional provision with them. We have an uniform constitutional provision which constitutional restriction. This proposition is at war with ascertains the tribunal that shall decide how this appointthe substantial principles of all our institutions; with that ing power is to be exercised; the Legislatures of the principle which lies at the basis of this entire Republic States. We have an uniform provision that ascertains the to throw back on the States as much of the detail of the number of electors to which each State shall be entitled system as is possible. There is as much constitution here, Here is a great deal of uniformity, as much, as I have alsir, as in the other most important functions of the Go-ready said, as exists in other most important parts of this There is as much constitutional provision for Government. But the gentleman maintains that it is n the choice of electors as for the choice of the members of enough. There is one discretionary element in t this House. I have never heard it suggested there was tem, and the States have exercised that discretion by no no constitutional provision to fill these benches. They do fixed rule. This must be remedied; and he proposes, certainly get filled without much difficulty; and the Peo- a remedy, to prohibit the States from exercising this d ple are as well satisfied that they have the power to fill cretion, and to lay out the United States into an uniform them, as they would be if there were a constitutional pro- system of Districts. I beg that the order of the words vision that prescribed the mode. We have the power to may be marked, an uniform system of Districts. S alter the laws passed by the States, regulating the time, is one thing; but is it to be a system of uniform districts place, and manner, of choosing Representatives, and the for that is another thing; though the vital difference be time and manner of choosing Senators; and we have never tween them has been overlooked by the gentleman from exercised this power. Is there, therefore, no Constitu- South Carolina. I will suppose that the State of wish I tion in these respects? There is another constitutional have the honor to be a Representative, shall be ended, provision, which guaranties to cach State a Republican as now, to fifteen electors, and that it shall be required to Government. What is a Republican Government? Of be laid out into a system of districts, and that the districts vernment. MARCH 9, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. acres of his rich fellow-citizen to their possessor. Lastly, there is the great distinction between freedom and slavery, which allows the friend who sits at my right hand, (Mr. HAMILTON) to have near twice as much political power as is conceded to me, being a citizen of a non-slave holding State. Yet, you tell me, sir, that a system, which takes no account of this discrepancy in the qualifications and numbers of those who compose the districts, is uniform, Certainly, it is any thing but uniform. The answer made by the gentleman from South Carolina to this difficulty, is, that, if this were a matter of ordinary legislation; if it were a matter within the grasp of the changeful discretion of a State, he should think it was an evil that called for a remedy. Sir, if it were, as he represents the matter, a consti tutional fixture in the States, it would only prove that no remedy could be had. It would only prove that uniformity was not merely difficult to be had, but positively unattainable, the obstacles to it being guarantied in the Constitutions of the States. But it is not competent for the Constitutions of the States to make any limitations on this subject. The Constitutions of the States cannot fix the qualifications for voters for electors of President and Vice President. This is left to the Legislatures of the States, and is as much within reach of amendment (or alteration, as I should rather call it,) of the Constitution, as any thing in this connexion. If the gentleman, therefore, wishes to have an uniform system, he must-there is no avoiding it-bring in the proposal of an amendment, which will go to lay off this country into districts, each of which shall represent an equal portion of the popular will; of the power, the knowledge, the desires, and interests, of the People of the United States. Any thing short of this, may have a greater or less degree of merit ; but it will not have the merit of uniformity. re to be uniform. Suppose this operation to be begun ›y running a line through the State, a parallel of latitude ›r a meridian, and dividing it into two portions, as nearly equal as may be, so that we shall have eight electors on one side of the line, and seven on the other. Suppose hat, on one side of the line, those qualifications of voters shall prevail which obtain in Virginia, which my friend From that State (Mr. ARCHER) thinks the very perfection of the electoral franchise, which shut out from the polls nore than one half of the arms-bearing and tax-paying ree citizens, while on the other side of the line, universal uffrage shall prevail. Now, sir, when we come to divide hese two portions of the State into districts, though we nay call the system uniform, are the districts uniform Does each of the districts on one side reflect the same quantum of popular voice and popular will, as on the other side? No, sir; we have the word uniformity, and it is the only thing we have; and that is in the wrong place. The very object at which the gentleman aims, under cover of his word uniformity, eludes his grasp. The system is iniform so far as this, that all the States will be divided nto districts; but the districts are as un-uniform as possible. Is this doubted, sir? Look, for a moment, at the qualifications of voters in the different States. I have, for this purpose, looked through the Constitutions of the United States, as contained in the collection printed in eighteen hundred and twenty, and comprehending all of them but the very last; and I think I may say that I have not found two States in the Union where the qualifications for voters are precisely the same. It seems as if the ingenuity of the framers of them had been tasked to find out some qualification for voters in each State that should differ a little at least from the qualifications in every other State. In some of them it is required that the voter should be a citizen of the United States; in others it is not. Now, from one Presidential term to another, we have forty thousand emi- Further, sir, it is in the regulation of the qualification grants arriving in this country. Under one State Consti- for voters, that the most successful attacks may be made tution they may be voters if they possess the other requi- on the purity of the electoral franchise. Will gentlemen sites; and under other Constitutions they cannot be. This consider what is now passing before us, in the great kingis of great importance: for it might put it in the power of dom of France-a kingdom, at this moment, more instrucan irruption of this kind from abroad to change the fate of tive to the American statesman, in the events there passa contested election. Then, apart from slavery, there is ing, (though they may be less astonishing and alarming the discrimination of color. In my State, that forms no than those of former periods) than it has been at any disqualification; in most other States it does. Now, sir, time within the last fifty years. There they are making in the State of New York, there is a free colored popula- the experiment of a grand electoral system. The vast tertion near half as large as the entire population of that ritory of the kingdom, comprising thirty millions of inhaState (Delaware) which you so worthily represent, and bitants, is laid out into departments and arrondissements; which, in New York, is not entitled to vote except under they have their electoral colleges of arrondissement, and a burdensome qualification of property, and, in most their electoral colleges of department, and all looks as fair States, is not entitled at all. Is not this a great difference? and systematic as the diagrams in your General Land Of The distinction of sex ; even that is not a constant discrim-fice; and what is the result? It is so contrived, by reguination. In one State (New Jersey) all the inhabitants possessing fifty pounds of proclamation money may vote; and, in times of high party excitement, the inhabitants have all voted, male and female, till the evil was thought so considerable that an honorable gentleman over the way, (Mr. CONDICT) fearing the possible effect of this new gynecocracy, more prudently than gallantly undertook to apply a remedy; and proposed a law, which took from the fairest and best part of creation that influence at the polls which we are all willing to concede to them every where else. But, this exclusion is only a matter of law; And here, sir, I feel it my duty, in reply to some intimathe Constitution remains the same; and, in times of high tions of the honorable gentleman, to make a single remark, party excitement, should they ever return, who shall tell shewing the inconvenience of treating this subject, not as us that sex will not again make a variety in the qualifica-a constitutional question, resting solely on the terms of the tions of voters in the different States? Again, the diver- compact, but as one of abstract popular right. The gensity in property, as a qualification of a voter, is so great tleman spoke of the sublime spectacle of ten millions of that, in one State, more than half the free population, who freemen marching to the polls; and he alluded to the late pay taxes and bear arms, are excluded, while other States election, as an election that had resulted in the choice of admit to the polls the poor man, who has nothing but his a candidate, who was not the favorite of the People. Now, life to bind him to the community, nothing to contribute sir, if I enter into a political compact, by which I agree to its support but the labor he bestows on the highway, that my friend here shall have two votes, while I shall have but whose life and liberty are as dear to him as the broad but one, I will not afterwards murmur at the terms of that lating the qualifications of electors, that, in a Chamber of Deputies, consisting of four or five hundred members, and at a time when popular opinion was, perhaps, equally di vided in the Kingdom, there were some fifteen or twenty members of the liberal party, and all the rest were on the side of the Crown. This is what an artificial regulation of the qualification of voters can do, in perverting the purity of the electoral franchise. I wish to be understood, sir, as speaking on American principles; I am not sure that a Representation like ours would be safe in France. |