MARCH, 1826.] On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.) nition of Napoleon bound us to fight with him for the throne of the Bourbons. [SENATE. How many missions and missionaries must we despatch to effect this object, even if we limit our benevolence to A mission, therefore, for these avowed objects on our those nations, whether American, European, Asiatic, or part, and with such avowed expectations on their part, African, with whom we enjoy commercial intercourse, and seems not only adverse to all the theory and practice of who retain the "prejudice, bigotry, and oppression," of this Government, but it is a mission, which, in all human an "exclusive church" On this principle, my own naprobability, must, ere long, terminate in open hostilities. tive State, for aught I know, will next be blessed with a These hostilities are made to depend on only one of two mission, either from us, to reform "its bigotry and opprescontingencies, which are monthly expected to occur. sion," or in return from the Panama Congress: for, by Negotiations for mediations, &c. have postponed more express prohibitions in her Constitution, not a single Caactive measures. But the great pacificator of the Eastern tholic, much less Jew, Mahometan, or Deist, is eligible to continent, even when living, gave us no just expectation either her House of Representatives, her Senate, or her of peace, except in their submission-and now, when dead, Executive chair-indeed, no person, unless he be of the the shadows, and darkness, and storms, that seem to rest "Protestant religion." But it is no more a practical opover the succession, exclude, at least, all better hopes. pression there, than their "exclusive church" is in South Spain, too, by the correspondence before us, has signified America: the Catholics with us, and the Protestants with her most fixed and unalterable resolve, never to remit them, being almost unknown, and never molested, with exertions, in any reverses, however desperate, to sub-us, in their worship or political rights. due her provinces-(See Mr. Everett's Letters, 27th Again: it is said, that our interests can be promoted at April, 1825, and 25th September, 1825, and October the Congress of Panama, by commercial discussions. But, 20, 1825.) In this crisis, new efforts and new arrange- with the most important of the States there represented, ments are highly probable, and are to be daily expected. we now enjoy treaties, placing us on the most friendly And the moment a Russian frigate may enter the har-footing. And, if the other deputies should come there bor of Havana, to take possession of her Forts, under empowered to negotiate on these points, of which I see such a contract as that by which we once entered New no evidence in these documents, we are not so likely to Orleans, that moment we are to say, by the principles of succeed when so greatly outnumbered, and in the midst this misssion, that the United States have become obliged of so much other more urgent business, as at the separate to embark in the existing war. Or the moment a German court of each Power. soldier is landed in Paraguay or Peru, to aid Spain in the subjugation of any of her provinces, we are to say, by the principle of this mission, that the United States, unless false to every tie of honor, and recreant to redeem their plighted faith, will march her sons over equinoctial sands and frozen cliffs, more distant than Europe itself, to perish in this American crusade for holy alliances. Much alarm has been professed, lest England would join the Congress, and forestall us in some advantages in trade. But the spirit of her constitution, and the disciplined judgment of her statesmen, have kept her out of the Holy Alliance, and would equally restrain her, I trust, from uniting in this, had she been invited. Further, we have the authority of Mr. Clay himself for saying, (letter But, to dwell no longer on these points, by which, al- to Mr. Poinsett, page 57,) "that such an invitation has ready, I fear, the patience of the House has been too se-been given to no European Power, and it ought not to have verely taxed, it is said that other objects exist in the mis-been given to this, if it is not to be considered as one of sion, which are highly desirable, and perhaps a full coun- the American nations." Every treaty and document beterpoise to all danger. It is urged, that we shall increase fore us expressly limit the Congress either to the nations the friendly regard between sister Republics. What, sir! ci-devant Spanish, or, at the furthest, to the nations of is there, in such a regard, any counterpoise to war? to the American continent. the destruction of our commerce, and the sacrifice of our As far as the Congress goes, not embracing every naseamen and soldiery? Or, if we blink the contest, and, tion here any more than the Holy Alliance embraces evwhen the crisis comes in one of the contingencies before ery nation in Europe, it is to be deemed the "Continennamed, if we skulk behind protestations, and proclama-tal System of America," (Canas' letter, Nov. 11, 1826,) tions, and diplomacy, will that increase fraternal amity and I trust the freest nations here, like the freest nations ? i or rather, will it not, after the present deliberate recog-there, (such as England and Sweden,) will not be benition of the supposed pledge, excite hate the most un-guiled into it, under any fallacious notions, that intermedquenchable? Will it be "a token of respect to them," to dling and force, as to the concerns of other States, are any seek to delay longer their threatened invasion of Cuba, more holy on one continent, than on the other. which our Cabinet can see no "justifiable ground" to oppose by force; though they can see such ground thus to oppose any peaceable transfer of it to any European power? or to protest and rail against their supposed principles of arming, in that invasion, a vast slave population against their masters, and of re-acting all the bloody scenes of St. Domingo so near our Southern border?—(Clay to Middleton, December 26, 1825.) Will they consider it among our "good offices" if we lecture them, in the language of the President, about their "religious bigotry and oppression?" (Message, December 25, 1825:-"Some of the Southern Nations are, even yet, so far under the dominion of prejudice, that they have incorporated with their political Constitutions, an exclusive church, without toleration of any other than the dominant sect. The abandonment of this last badge of religious bigotry and oppression may be pressed," &c. As I understand it, the very faith of those nations is exclusive: and are we about to undertake missions to alter the religious faith of other nations, about "an exclusive church," and particularly of a nation, a large portion of whose officers are priests of this very faith? VOL. II-14 No less questionable is the expectation, that such a mission will terminate in any improvement in the codes of national or maritime law. In the midst of an inveterate and bloody war, and while devising measures to consolidate their independence, and impart greater vigor to their arms, the chance is a sorry one, and the leisure scanty, for adjusting these complicated objects of peace. We, also, should be a humble minority in number, in the discussion of every principle of this kind, and should not be very likely to persuade persons educated in the bigotry and despotism of Spanish principles, to think like the descendants of the "sea-girt isle," who, for ages, have breathed so different an atmosphere, in law, politics, and commerce. If there can be named a single controverted question on these points, where the interests of those States would not induce them at once to join us by an ordinary negotiation at their own courts, I frankly avow that, with all my prejudices against England, as the oppressor of our fathers, and the recent enemy of ourselves, I would prefer to abide by the enlightened opinions of her jurists SENATE.] On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.) [MARCH, 1826. in the discussion and adjustment of it-men who have "perpetual league." These and other circumstances grown up under a free press, jury trial, representative strengthen the second conjecture before named, of its legislation-a habeas corpus and an independent judiciary resemblance to our old Congress: because, like that, it is than to abide by the decision of Spain, or any limb of convened under a "Confederation" of independent States. Spain in either hemisphere. Nobody can exult more It is convened under a similar contest for liberty, and highly than myself in the prospect of the independence with a similar view to concentrate their hostile efforts in of the cidevant Spanish Provinces; but there must expire promotion of the common cause. Like that, the votes of some generations more, ere their education, laws, and each State are equal, by means of their Representahabits, will so radically change, as to convert them into tives being equal in number, and the place of meeting safe arbitrators for nations like ourselves. Neither can is subject to be changed by a majority of the States. they be safe counsellors beyond their immediate interests. (Doc. p. 33.) The names given to these Representatives, They are not in general of a like origin, a like religion-we have before seen, are various, and exhaust almost the a like language a like system of laws; and whatever whole vocabulary as to agents with delegated power, and disputed questions of national law are to be changed or consequently settle nothing as to their specific authority. adjusted, in which their interests do not already incline But, like our old Congress, they are to have “rules” of them towards our views, it will, in my opinion, be much proceeding, (Obregon's Letter, p. 5.) and a regular “orwiser to trust to the silent and gradual operation of a free ganization," (Mr. Clay, p. 4,) and "mode of action," press-of books-of increasing civilization and commerce (do.) and to be thus formed into an "Assembly," and with -than to debating assemblies, in which they constitute all these things "distinctly arranged prior to the opening the majority, and have other subjects at stake, far more of its deliberations," (do.) else they never can proceed momentous and urgent. And who ever heard of a nation in these "deliberations"-collect and register their being at once convinced against its interest by the plea "votes"-have their judgments as "umpires" in disof a lawyer, or the argument of a diplomatic agent? putes, recorded, and the "quota of troops" between the Again: it has been suggested by the gentleman from "Confederates" adjusted. It is true, that in some reRhode Island, that it may be useful to have this mission spects their power seems greater than that of our old Conapproved, so that the Envoys may watch contingen-gress, and in some it is manifestly less; though neither of cies." I did suppose that our present large foreign corps them are permitted to encroach on the separate sovereignin South America, and one of them at Colombia, in the ty and internal police of the States forming the Confedevery neighborhood of this Congress, might be sufficient ration, and represented in the Congress. to watch"contingencies." Or, if we must have some But, while all this is very well and proper for those person at the very place of meeting, that a mere agent, "Confederate belligerents," and is just such a Congress without public credentials, and paid from the contingent as would be expected among them alone, and such as fund, would be an Argus, much more safe, as well as suc- was for three years confined, even in theory, to them alone, cessful, in watching "contingencies." One incalculable as before explained, it is very apparent to every reflectadvantage from such a course would be, the impossibility ing mind, that we cannot form a component part of it by of thus implicating us in the character or measures of the any clause of power conferred on us in our Constitution. Congress, and the freedom we should still enjoy as to em- That we can join in no other permanent political assembarking in the present war voluntarily, on the occurence bly without a new charter for our own States; that the inof any of the circumstances already commented on. But terpretation of our treaties cannot by us be transferred to a a still further advantage would be, that our course, by distant tribunal of Spanish deputies, and that we must conkeeping quietly at home, or sending only such an agent, tinue the umpires of our own disputes, and the head of our till we have further light on the organization, objects, and own Confederacy, until the People and States of this general character of this Congress, would not expose us Union consent to mingle their fortunes with other Confeto any censure on Constitutional grounds, or on grounds deracies; to be lost in this great swarm of Spanish Ameof rash and expensive adventure, upon any project dan-rican States; to become a single sattelite to a larger planet, gerous and impracticable. and with no more power in the great Continental Confederacy of all the American nations, than Peru or Guatemala. For, I ask gentlemen, and entreat a reply, whether they are now able to tell us the whole mode of proceeding, and the binding effect intended to be given to such proceeding in this Congress? Nor can it be tolerated for a moment, that they will admit us into such a Congress as a component part, unless we are to be bound in common by their decisions; but I admit, that, after such a Congress is formed, it may be considered such a Government or Federal State, that we could despatch Ambassadors to it in the usual way, and to treat with it on usual subjects for negotiation; and this brings us to the last conjecture, as to the manner in which our Envoys are to go and act at Panama. One has said it was to be a mere ordinary Congress of Plenipotentiaries, simply with full powers to negotiate on certain points. Another has conjectured that it would be a Congress like the old Provincial Congress, and that our Delegates would form a component part of it, and be bound as other Delegates on the subjects entrusted to the Congress. Another, seeing the difficulties of either of This hypothesis would accord very happily with the these hypotheses on the documents before us, has insisted, usage of nations in despatching Ministers to our old Conthat, whatever may be the true character of the Con-gress, after our independence was acknowledged, only it gress itself, we were not to form a component part of it, but merely to despatch our Representatives to reside near it, and negotiate with its agents, as foreign Ministers negotiate with our agents here. Some of these views have been presented in debate, and others in conversation. But doubts and difficulties insuperable seem to attend either of them. We have already shown, by numerous and clear quotations from the treaties and other documents, that, so far from being an ordinary Congress of mere diplomatic agents, to last a few months or years, and then be dissolved, some of its duties are perpetual, and are judicial rather than diplomatic; and that it has ever been destined to be the perpetual head, "council," And rallying point, of an association of States, under a happens unluckily that such Ministers cannot take part in the deliberations, of any kind, of such a Congress; and that our Ministers at Panama are again and again said to be intended " to take part in those questions" there to be discussed; (Obregon's letter, p. 4,) and in the meeting" of which Congress, "that the United States of America, by means of their Commissioners, should constitute and take part." (Ditto.) They are, also, to have "persons to represent them in this Assembly;" (Salazar's letter, p. 8,) and how else can it be "a general Congress of the American Republics?" (Canas' letter, p. 11.) And if our Ministers are to be seen only in the galleries or lobbies, like other foreign Ministers, what becomes of the splendid illusion sported before our eyes, that we are to MARCH, 1826.] On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.) [SENATE. form the head of this great Continental Confederacy, and and it seems to me the dictate of prudence now to replay in its "Council" the Nestor, Agamemnon, or Ulysses, main contentedly at home, without embarking in any new or all of them at once? In this view of it, likewise, how experiments of diplomacy or off coalitions with "confecan our Ministers be deputed to a Congress or Confedera- derate belligerents"-to pay of as fast as possible the cy, with whom, as a quasi State, they are to negotiate, un- debts of former wars-to husband our resources-to entil that Congress is organized? Even since the nomina-courage our States in the cultivation of the arts, of manutions on your table were made, we have heard that the factures, and of agriculture-to give due protection to deputies from Mexico had not started, and no information commerce-and retain for our motto, "honest friendship has yet been received of its being organized at all for any with all nations, entangling alliances with none." Numerpurpose whatever. Why this haste to plunge into new ous other considerations press upon my mind in connecexperiments and unforeseen dangers? Nor, in this last tion with this mission; but I do not choose to fatigue an view of the mission, if their be in any other, does there yet attention which has been so kindly indulged to me, by exist any protection for our Ministers-any guaranty for repeating what has before been expressed with so much our national honor. If they enter a corner of the territory eloquence by the gentleman from South Carolina; or by of Colombia, it is not under a commission to the Colom- pressing additional points, which other members will bian Government; and we have no treaty stipulation, like doubtless enforce better at some more seasonable hour. all the other Confederates, as to the persons of our Re- Under these convictions, sir, as to the principles of the presentatives at the Congress. (See all the treaties in do- mission, I am prepared to vote against it in every shape; cuments.) For aught which appears, they may be im- and seek no higher vindication for my conduct, than the prisoned for debts, or prosecuted for torts; and the suffer-consciousness of having formed those convictions after ings and claims and remonstrances of other Spanish vic-full research and patient reflection. tims like Richard Meade, may longer inflame this nation, and burthen our journals. In fine, under none of those delusive expectations as to certain ill defined, and unattainable objects, at the imminent hazard of our neutrality, or with a view to redeem pledges, which this Government, as a Government, have never yet given-and I trust never will give-in defiance of all the policy and injunctions of our wisest statesmen, and which pledges tend directly to war-I hope we never shall he incautiously allured into any kind of alliance or connection with this non-descript Congress at Panama. If our Constitution had not become almost a mere nose of wax, I should add that, if the Congress be a permanent Confederacy, for any political objects whatever, common to it members, we cannot become a component part of it, without transcending our constitutional powers: or if we are not to form a component part, but merely have ministers resident near it, that the Confederacy must be organized, before, by any construction of our constitutional powers, a commission can run to it. The other idea, that they might be deputed to a Congress at large, of mere Plenipotentiaries, to negotiate treaties of commerce, or peace, or limits, and then disperse; and that they could so be deputed without any guarantee by treaty or otherwise, for their persons, and without any legal provision of any kind for the creation of such Deputies, though in some degree questionable, may be correct in the abstract, for aught I shall now stop to inquire. But in point of fact, it is not correct, from these documents, that the Congress at Panama is a body of this description; but, as before shown, it is a Congress formed under a perpetual league, with perputual duties, and those duties, some belligerent and some peaceful, some political and some judical and municipal, and no more to be joined with in deliberation by a mere Envoy, and a neutral Envoy with customary powers, than we are to be joined with in deliberation by any of the Plenipotentiaries, however respectable, who are deputed hither. Under all these circumstances, it is, in my opinion, the solemn duty of the Senate, not to advise this mission: the solemn duty of this nation, under such doubt and peril, not to try, while we are well, to be better. I would wait, in patience, till at last we obtained that more specific information about the powers, and character, and objects of the Congress, which the President himself, at first considered indispensable; (Doc. p. 4.) and which information, to the extent desired, the Secretary frankly admits, has never yet been obtained.-Letter, November 30, 1825, page 10. Peace will doubtless arrive as soon as those belligerent powers will enjoy leisure to engage with utility in any peaceful improvements with us-Inter arma silent leges; Mr. WHITE, of Tennessee, said, that, were he to be advised by his feelings, he should remain silent; but, when he reflected upon the relation in which he stood to the report now under consideration, a sense of duty compelled him to submit to the Senate some of the views which his mind had taken of this subject. The only question is, (said Mr. W.) the expediency of the mission to Panama. The President has distinctly asked of us an opinion upon this question. (See his Message, page 1.) Our advice is to be given as freemen, not as slaves. In this course we serve the Executive, maintain the dignity and independence of the Senate, and promote the best interests of the United States. If the mission should not be advised, we give no cause of offence to the Spanish American States. The evidences heretofore given of our friendship for them, in acknowledging their independence, and interposing our good offices to effect it, ought to shield us against any suspicion of unfriendly feelings towards them, at present. The President will likewise comply with the only promise made to those who have tendered the invitation, his acceptance of it having been conditional, "if the Senate advise," &c. (See document, page 10.) The subject is then fairly before us, for the exercise of our best judgment, without a fear that any promise of the Executive will be violated, should the Senate disagree with him in opinion: but even if this were not so, we could not, without a shameful dereliction of duty, offer any thing, as our advice, but the result of our best judgment. The first reflection upon this subject, is produced by its novelty. Since the acknowledgment of our independence, it has no precedent in our history. This ought to beget caution and circumspection. If this mission should be advised, a new era will have commenced in the history of our foreign relations. Have peace with, and good will towards, all Nations; entangling alliances with none-has been our cardinal policy, in time past. It was recommended by the Father of our Countryrepeated, and practised upon, by his republican successors. When given, we were few in number, comparatively poor, and insignificant, in the scale of nations: now twelve millions, rich in men, in means, and in character. Our prosperity has surpassed the most extravagant calculations of the most sanguine amongst us. In our late contest with the most powerful nation in the civilized World, unaided by, and unallied to, any other nation, we furnished conelusive evidence, both upon the ocean and upon the land, that we are able and willing to defend the rich inheritance derived from our ancestors. The sincerity of our conduct in our intercourse with other nations; a careful abstinence from all interference in their concerns; united to our determined and successful SENATE.] On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.) resistance to lawless encroachments upon our rights; have We ought not to advise it, except to obtain some lasting MARCH, 1826. jects and duties are peaceful. The first subject, then, which will claim the attention of this Congress, is some plan, by which the independence of cach State will not only be maintained, but secured. er, now neutral in this war, will be induced to unite with A fear has been entertained, that some European PowSpain, and lend her assistance to reduce these States to the condition of colonies. They wish to provide against such an event, and in giving these invitations state that an accord between them and the cabinet at Washington, they have a pledge from the President, and that there is that, if any neutral power does take part with Spain, the Here we cannot fail to perceive how difficult it appears tendance of our Ministers with a view to discuss this subUnited States will take part with them; and wish the atto have been for those who gave the invitations to fixject, and come to an agreement in relation to it, by which upon any subject for discussion, which they believed of it will be stipulated what contingent each party shall fursufficient importance to the United States, to induce them nish when the casus fœderis shall occur, and say, that in to accept those invitations: hence, both the Minister from the mean time this agreement or convention may be kept Colombia and from Mexico introduce the idea of sub-secret. jects "which the Congress may give rise to," &c. (See documents, pages 6 and 8.) Mr. President, I object to sending Ministers for the purHow can the Senate advise the President to send Minis-vention upon this subject. It is not true, as far as I am pose of discussing and coming to any agreement or conters to discuss unknown subjects? to accomplish objects advised, that the United States stand pledged to take part which no person can designate? and in relation to which it in this war, in any event whatever. Nothing can bind us is impossible to say whether their attainment would com- to go to war with any nation, but a declaration made in port with the honor and interest of the United States, or the proper form, and by the proper department of this not? Suppose those giving these invitations had specified Government. The Executive cannot declare war, but no subject whatever for discussion, but to have asked the admit he may pursue a course of policy which will justify attendance of our Ministers, to discuss, and come to another nations in making war upon us. Congress has taken agreement upon, such subjects as the Congress might no step, has done no act, has passed no law, by which we give rise to; is there any one member of this Senate, that are bound to unite with these new States in their war of would advise a mission upon such an invitation? Would it independence, upon any contingency whatever. not be thought both useless and hazardous? pledge he could give. But what has he done? The groundExecutive had no power to bind the United States by any work of this pretended pledge, it seems, is found in President Monroe's Message of December, 1823. It contains The To these questions it would seem to me there can be but one answer. Fond would he be of the creation of officers, and heedless of the honor and interest of his country, who would advise the appointment of Ministers to a Fo-no pledge-it is a general declaration to his own Conreign country, to attend a Congress for the purpose of seeing whether a subject could be produced that might be proper for an agreement with the United States. I will not degrade the Senate by supposing there is any such man among us, and will proceed with this investigation, as if no allusion had been made to any unknown subject, which could neither be designated nor described. The first subject mentioned is, the resistance or opposition to be made to the interference of any neutral nation in the war of Independence, &c. (See documents, pages 5 and 7.) This appears to be a point of primary importance, in the estimation of all concerned. sionately reflect upon it. Six of the former Spanish AmeLet us calmly and dispasrican Colonies have declared themselves independent of Spain, and to maintain this independence, have put at hazard their lives and their fortunes. Spain asserts that they are still parts of her dominions, that she has the right to govern them, and that, cost what it may, she will reduce them to subjection. The decision of this issue is submitted to the God of battles. These six colonies have become six States, and are belligerent on one side, and Spain on the other. Heretofore these States have exerted their strength separately without any regular alliance with each other, although they have had a common enemy to contend with. The belief, that it would conduce to their common interest, and best secure that independence for which all are contending, has induced five of them to enter into treaties, by which they are bound to make common cause against Spain, and, by their united efforts, compel her to acknowledge the independence of each, To produce union in council, and concert in action and design among the new States, they have devised the Congress at Panama. It is to be perpetual-Its primary and Leading object is belligerent. Its secondary and inferior ob gress, of the sentiment which would be felt if any neutral should interfere on the side of Spain. Notwithstanding that declaration, the United States were still at liberty, consistent with their honor, to take part with the new States, or omit to do so, as the wisdom of Congress might judge best, when any neutral power did take part with to give offence to the United States, it Spain. This declaration had a good effect. Not wishing vented some of the European States from taking part with Spain. The new States have had the full benefit of this may have prethe close of Mr. Monroe's Administration. Since the new declaration. Thus the matter appears to have rested, till appearance of a French fleet in our seas, some of the new Administration came into power, it seems that, upon the States called upon the Executive to redeem the pledge which had been given. Upon this application, in place of correcting the mistake upon this subject, it would appear from the documents with which we are furnished, the Administration admitted that which I do not see was the fact, that a pledge had been given, and directed Mr. Brown, our Minister in France, to ask an explanation, &c. Upon this point, however, I think we are still in the dark; we have no copy of the application from the new States, nor of our answer to them. These documents would have shown how far our new Administration have gone towards compelling us to take part in this war. It is very singular, that after all the calls for information which the Senate have been compelled to make, upon this important business, there is still a want of documents, that would, probably, be useful. But, if we are at liberty to judge from the correspondence between Mr. Poinsett and the Mexican Minister, and from Mr. Secretary's letter to Mr. Poinsett, it does really seem, that the Executive has admitted to Mexico, that we have given a pledge, which we may be called on to redeem, whenever the contingency shall MARCH, 1826. On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.) [SENATF. in a given quarter? Surely not. And yet this is the very point which gentlemen on the other side must maintain. This part of the subject has been placed by the gentleman from South Carolina on ground which cannot be shaken. His argument has not been answered. It never will be, while there is a distinction between truth and the reverse. occur. * Of this pledge, the People of these States are yet uninformed. I feel persuaded they have no idea we stand pledged upon any contingency, to embark in the war with these new States, whether it may compete with our interest or not. This is an inadvertence which cannot be corrected too soon. If we send Ministers, and an agreement is entered into, then, indeed, will the United States be pledged. We now know the object-we see the pre- Mr. President, I go one step farther, and insist, if you dicament in which we are placed; and with this know-do send Ministers, and they discuss this subject, and enledge, if Congress can be induced to give its sanction to ter into the proposed agreement, so far as you have power this measure, and this pledge of the Executive is refined over the matter, your neutrality is not only broken, but into an agreement, by which the United States shall be you are in a state of war, and that with any and every bound to furnish men, money, ships, &c. in aid of the Power that is now neutral, and may hereafter elect to take new States, whenever any Power, now neutral, may chuse a part with Spain. This is a dilemma from which we canto take part with Spain, then, indeed, shall I think this not escape, without disgrace. Send Ministers, make the nation has given a pledge, one that it may cost us too agreement-and the question of peace, or war, is not with much to redeem, when the casus fœderis shall happen. us; and, at any moment afterwards any European, or even American nation can put you at war, whether it may suit your interest or not. But, sir, how is it that we are told our neutral character is not to be compromitted? that we are not to enter into any alliance' to engage in nothing importing hostility to any other nation? Are we to be led away from the substance of things by mere names? Are we to have so much faith as to induce us to disregard the plainest evidence that can be furnished? I hope not. What is the substance of this proposition? These new States say, the President has given a pledge to take a part in the war now waged, if any neutral nation shall take part with Spain; and that the Cabinet at Washington has done the like; but, as this is only a general pledge, and they do not know exactly what assistance they are to receive, they wish the United States to send Ministers to Panama, empowered to discuss this subject, and come to a definite agreement upon it, by which it may be distinctly known what contingent the United States are to furnish, when the casus fœderis happens, and that all this matter shall be kept secret. I object to sending Ministers for the discussion of any such subject, or for the accomplishment of any such object. Even if we believed that such a state of things would probably be produced, as to make it proper for us to take a part in this war, I would still be opposed to any agreement by which we will become bound to do so. It is impossible now to foresee what may best comport with the interest of the United States at any subsequent period; and they ought to be left free to act, unfettered by any agreement whatever, as their interest or honor may require, when some other Power does actually interfere. It is vain to say, we are not to take a part in any belligerent question; that our neutrality is not to be violated; that we are not to engage in any thing importing hostility to any other Power; while this proposition is presented to us. One of the Ministers who gave the invitation classes the subjects to be discussed into belligerent and peaceful, and states that the United States are not expected to take any part in the first; but, in the last, they are, and, in this class, he specifies this very subject. Does this make it peaceful? Surely not. It is belligerent. I admit it is not an absolute stipulation to take part in the war, and, therefore, some may feel justified in saying it does not import hostility; yet, it is undoubtedly an agreement to take part upon the happening of a certain contingency. It will import hostility upon a certain condition, which contingency or condition is not within the control of the United States. Suppose we do send Ministers, for such a purpose, to a Congress composed entirely of belligerents on one side, is it not a violation of our neutrality? What is our situation? We profess friendship for both the parties to this war, and that we are not disposed to aid either. Is it no departure from these professions to send our Ministers Can any gentleman doubt upon this point? Recollect that this Congress is created and assembled avowedly for the purpose of discussing war measures, settling plans, and devising means, by which Spain shall be compelled to acknowledge their independence, and by which that independence can be best secured. With this knowledge, It may be said there is no danger of any mischief foland for the purpose of entering upon the discussion, and | lowing from such an agreement; that the war is, in submaking an agreement, by which we will be bound, upon stance, at an end; and that there is good reason to believe a certain contingency, to aid the party with whom we the independence of the new States will be speedily remake the agreement, we send our Ministers. Can we be cognized by Spain. I admit, that, when the corresponcalled indifferent? Countenancing neither, to the preju- dence between our Government and Russia was commudice of the other? Surely not. What is the answer to this nicated to the Senate, upon a resolution seeking addiargument? The only one as yet attempted is by the gen- tional information, if any could be furnished, an opinion of tleman from Rhode Island, that, if two nations are at war, that kind was intimated by some of our officers. It then it is no breach of neutrality in a third Power to send a struck me as singular; I did not believe those documents Minister to both, or either. This is very true, and yet it warranted any such opinion; but, as our Minister in Russia proves nothing, as it relates to the question now in dis-and the Secretary of State understood the rules by which pute. For peaceful purposes-for any purpose unconected with the war, the third Power may send a Minister, may discuss, may treat upon any peaceful subject; but, does this prove that you may send a Minister to the Court of one belligerent to discuss belligerent questions, to advise one party what steps he is to take in the war, whether it is most prudent to strike his adversary at a given time, or diplomatic conversations were to be interpreted, to wit: that, when a man says one thing he means another, I was inclined to think I was mistaken; but even in that view of the case, I believed we ought not to enter into any such agreement, because, if the war of independence was at an end, the agreement would be useless, as the casus fœderis could never happen; and, if, contrary to these 'Mr. Poinsett's letter to Mr. Clay, 28th September last. "To these observations I replied, that, against the power of Spain they had given sufficient proof that they required "no assistance, and the United States had pledged themselves not to permit any other Power to interfere with their "independence or form of Government; and that, as in the event of such an attempt being made by the Powers of "Europe, we would be compelled to take the most active and efficient part, and to bear the brunt of the contest, it was "not just that we should be placed on a less favorable footing than the other Republics of America, whose existence "we were ready to support at such huzards." |