SENATE.]

can.

and this bill is now to be committed, with general instruc-tracts and exchanges, than among a manufacturing peotions not to do one thing, but to do whatever else you ple; and greater among the latter than those who are exclusively agricultural as they make more contracts, the source from which the greater part of the litigation of the country arises, that there must be more litigation in the States where the titles to land have been granted by dif derived from the same State: and also more among a dense than a sparse population, whatever their pursuits may be, as they must necessarily come more frequently into collison with one another.

Mr. BERRIEN said, if the system he had proposed was correct in theory, he would protest against its being tried by the practical illustration of the gentleman from Maine. It was not liable to the inconsistencies which that gentle-ferent States, than in those in which the titles have been man was disposed to impute to it, by a misapplication of its principles to existing facts and to the circumstances of the country. Mr. B. said his idea would be illustrated by reference to the example to which that gentleman had referred. The plough, of which he had spoken as hav- If, said he, these positions be correct, which he believed ing been formed on scientific principles, failed in its prac-them to be, then, though there be no data upon which tical application, probably, because its construction was they can be carried into operation with mathematical precommitted to some bungling mechanic, or its manage-cision, they ought to be kept steadily in view in the forment, when constructed, to an ignorant and unskilful ploughman.

mation of the circuits, in order that they may be so formed, that the justice of the country may be speedily and Mr VAN BUREN said it was with some relutance that satisfactorily administered, or, at least, that there be not a he relinquished his intention of vindicating the act of delay tantamount to a denial of justice. The experience 1802, froin what he considered the unjust attack made which we have had under the present system, the circuits upon it by the gentleman from Rhode Island. The re- of which, it would appear, have been in fact predicated commitment of this bill to the Judiciary Committee, on on those principles, furnishes the best guide for our dethe resolution of the gentleman from New Hampshire, liberations on this interesting subject. The judicial act with the explanations which had been made by the gen- of 1789 has been referred to as a precedent to justify the tlemen from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Georgia, increase of the number of Judges, and it is worthy of could be productive of no good, unless specific instruc-imitation, inasmuch as the Congress that enacted it, contions were given as to the character of the bill which the sisted of Revolutionary sages, and many of whom were Senate wished the committee to report. To commit it, members of the Convention that framed the Constitution. without such instructions, would have no other effect than, This act created five Judges of the Supreme Court and in all probability, to defeat the bill. and as many circuits. The number of representatives in that Congress has been taken as data to show that the average population of the circuits were entitled to twelve members and a fraction in the House of Representatives, or, in other words, to demonstrate that Congress then deemed it necessary that there should be a Judge of the Supreme Court for every twelve members and a fraction of the House of Representatives. And it has been contended that this principle, from the enlightened and patriotic body by which it was adopted, is entitled to the

Mr. FINDLAY, of Pennsylvania, said he had listened with much attention to the arguments which had been advanced both for and against the proposition; and which, together with other considerations which he should notice, had resulted in the conviction, that it was proper to recommit the bill.

As it is much easier to create Judges who hold their offices by the undefined and undefinable tenure of good behaviour, than to remove them from office, he could not vote to increase the number, unless it should be demon-highest respect that the increase of population, and the strated that the public interest imperiously required the

measure.

creation of new States, would warrant an increase of the number of Judges far beyond what is contemplated in From the representations of the Legislature, the Bar, the bill. He said there was no one more disposed than and Representatives on this floor, of some of the Western himself to respect any principle adopted by that ConStates, it cannot be questioned, but that they experience in-gress, if it was founded on experience, or on a full knowconveniences from the present organization of the Courts ledge of the subject. The act in question was enacted, of the United States. But from the silence on the sub-when human sagacity could not have foreseen the extent ject, of the People, the Legislature, and the Bar of other of litigation that might arise under the new system of of those States to which the bill contemplates extending the government. That Congress had no criterion by which circuit system, it may be inferred that the inconveniences they could Judge of this, more than by comparing what are not so great as some are ready to apprehend. As far, it might probably be, with that of the respective States, however, as they exist, they claim an efficient and which was not sufficient to enable them to arrive at any prompt remedy; and it is admitted that the Judicial Sys- certain conclusion in the case. Their opinion, formed tem, whatever it may be, should be uniform throughout under such circumstances, cannot claim implicit confithe Union. All have to contribute to the support of the dence; and, moreover, subsequent experience has shown system, and all should have an equal opportunity, as far as it to have been erroneous, circumstances may permit, of participating in its benefits. The inquiry then is, whether the present number of the Judges of the Supreme Court be sufficient for the extension of the circuit system to every State in the Union; or, if an increase of the number be indispensable, whether fewer than three additional ones would not be commensurate with the object?

To illustrate which, and that an addition to the present number of Judges is not indispensable, he would, in imitation of the example of other gentlemen, take the number of members of the House of Representatives as the data to show the population of each of the present Circuits; of which he had formed a synopsis that he would take the liberty to read, and is as follows:

1st. Circuit, consisting of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maine, entitled to twenty-eight Representatives.

In adding to the number of the Judges, and creating new circuits, it was not necessary to take into consideration State pride, equal representation, or the exercise of executive patronage, which had been occasionally alluded to in the course of the discussion. The number of the States, the extent of territory, the population and their general pursuits, that shall compose the respective circuits, are the only proper objects of inquiry. That there 3d. New Jersey and Pennsylvania, thirty-two; deduct must necessarily be more litigation among a commercial eleven not included in the Circuit, leaves twenty-one population, whose daily business consists in making con- | Representatives in the Circuit.

2d. Connecticut, New York, and Vermont, forty-five Representatives; deduct the Western part of New York, not included in the Circuit, (supposed fifteen,) leaves thirty Representatives in the Circuit.

APRIL 13, 1826.]

Judicial System.

[SENATE.

4th. Delaware and Maryland, eleven Representatives. to eight circuits, averaging three to the circuit, which 5th. Virginia and North Carolina, thirty-four Representatives. The Western District of Virginia is not included in the Circuit.

would require the addition of one Judge only to the Supreme Court. The facilities now afforded in almost every portion of the Union for travelling, compared with what they were when the present circuits were formed, the fatigue, time, and expense, would not be equal in travel7th. Tennessee and Kentucky, twenty-one Represen-ling through the extended circuits, to what they were at tatives. that period. The duties of each Judge, annually presid

6th. South Carolina and Georgia, fourteen Representatives.

The States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Missis-ing at two terms, in the States respectively composing sippi, Louisiana, and Alabama, are entitled to twenty-six the circuit, and sitting once a year for a few weeks on the Representatives, and not included by the present Circuit Supreme Bench, would not be unreasonable to impose, system. nor so great as many of the State Judges perform.

It thus, said he, appears there is a great inequality in It may be inferred from the observations of more than the extent of population and the number of the States, and one of the committee, as the enlargement of the circuits consequently of Judicial business, in the existing Circuits. would affect the situation of some of the present Judges, There is no evidence before the Senate but that the busi-that this presented an insurmountable objection to the ness is faithfully and satisfactorily performed in the large measure. This, he was ready to admit, evinced the good as well as in the small Circuits, with the single exception feelings of the human heart; the indulgence of which, in of the seventh, which demonstrates that there were more private life, is worthy of applause; but he did not think Judges created by the act of 1789, than were necessary, it comported with the principles of a Republican governunless, indeed, it can be shown that there was more liti- ment, to suffer them to operate on a great public meagation in the Union at that period than at present, which sure, which this is declared to be, or permit considerations he presumed would not be attempted. of delicacy towards a few officers of the Government, however meritorious they may be, to conflict with the general interests.

Arguments, he said, had been adduced, in favor of an uniform extension of the Circuit System, not warranted by the provisions of the bill, which had been properly noticed by the mover of the resolution to recommit it, (Mr. WOODBURY,) and to which he had not heard a satisfactory reply.

As the first Circuit embraces à population engaged in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, the three great branches of national industry, the extent of litigation therein may be safely taken as an average of that which may prevail in any Circuit that may be formed, containing the like number of States and population. There may be more litigation among the land-holders in a Circuit, consisting of those in which the grants of land have been made under the authority of different States, than among the land-holders in the first Circuit; but as none of those States are, or ever can be, extensively commercial, with the exception of Louisiana, the aggregate of the various kinds of suits may not be as many in the States respectively, as in those which compose the first Circuit. If, however, they should be more numerous, the existing controversies respecting lands must necessarily be adjust-be a benefit, is to be afforded. He was not prepared to ed in the course of a few years; the consideration, therefore, of a temporary inconvenience, ought not to influence the principles of a system which, according to the observations of some gentlemen, is to continue without modification at least for half a century.

The second Circuit, though it includes but two States, and part of another, contains a greater population than the first, and which, like that, carry on the three great branches of industry alluded to, but which, as it includes the city of New York, must be more extensively commercial than the first, and no complaints, if any exist, as to the delay of the administration of justice in this Circuit, has been made known to the Senate.

He would not refer to the Western Districts of New York and Virginia, to which the benefits of the Circuit System has not been, nor is not intended by the present bill to be extended. He would only observe, that the Western District of Pennsylvania contains a much greater population than eight of the States, which, by the provisions of the bill, the benefit of the Circuit System, if it say, but that issues could be tried as well before a District as a Circuit Court. He understood that important land, and other causes, had been decided by the Judge of that district, and never heard any dissatisfaction indicated, much less expressed, with the manner in which justice was administered in that district since the appointment of the present incumbent : nor none previous thereto but what unavoidably arose from the protracted illhealth of his deceased and worthy predecessor. Whether the general satisfaction that prevails in the district on the subject arises from the distinguished talents, inflexible integrity, suavity of manner, and untired industry of the Judge, or from the character and habits of the People, it was not for him to say. But, knowing this to be the posture of things in the district, he was at a loss fully to account for the general dissatisfaction that is stated to prevail under the District System, in some of the Western States. The number of actions of ejectments that have been tried, or are pending in those States, as has been suggested, may account for this in part, but not to the extent to which it has been stated to exist.

Hence it results from these facts, that four States, containing a population entitled to twenty-eight Representatives in Congress, is not too extensive for a Judicial Circuit, and that no inconvenience has arisen from a Circuit being composed of a less number of States containing a greater population. By the enlargement of the Circuits to the extent which these principles and experience would justify, the States in the Union may be arranged into seven Circuits, and thereby supersede the necessity of He said, notwithstanding the grounds on which the bill adding to the number of Judges of the Supreme Court. had been predicated by the arguments of its friends The admission of gentlemen that the third, fourth, and would, on the principles of consistency, require the Cirfifth Circuits may be conveniently formed into two Circuit System to be extended to every portion of the Unicuits, and that the sixth may be enlarged, and, also, that on, yet, as the People of the Western District of Pennthe number of States of which a Circuit shall consist, is sylvania had not applied for this, or any other modificamore to be taken into consideration than the extent of tion of the Judicial System, and being persuaded that territory and population of the States respectively, of they are satisfied with the present order of things, he did which the Circuit shall be composed, render it so proba-not wish the bill to be recommitted for this purpose. ble that such an arrangement can be made, that it is at least worthy of an inquiry.

If this should be found impracticable, he was persuaded the States at all events may be conveniently arranged in

Vol. II-36

But there was another point, apart from all other considerations, which imperiously required him to vote for its recommitment. The law makes it the duty of the Circuit Judges to reside within their respective Circuits,

SENATE.]

The Judicial System.

with the single exception of the Judge of the third Circuit, and though something invidious may appear in this exception, believing nothing of this kind was intended by the law, and that it arose from circumstances which could not well be controlled, it has not been deemed of much consequence. It has, it is true, been a standing theme for the wits of other States, that the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, which compose the third District, had not a person qualified for the station of a Circuit Judge, and had to borrow one who was qualified, from the "Ancient Dominion." He had been entirely regardless of such witticisms, as he did not perceive that the residence of the Judge in his Circuit, would either redound to the credit, or conduce to the advantage of the States of which it may be composed.

The discussion, however, which took place a few days since on the amendment reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, to the bill under consideration, including the State of Ohio, instead of the State of Missouri, in the seventh Circuit, fully satisfied his mind, that the residence of the Judge in his Circuit was highly important.

Jersey, (Mr. DICKERSON,) brought to the notice of the Senate a few days ago. According to his recollection of the suggestion, it was to repeal the acts of Congress which enabled the Courts to carry into operation certain powers which they claim under the Constitution, the exercise of which is offensive to the States and the People. He believed the gentleman would render an acceptable service if he would submit his suggestions to the Senate in a legislative shape. This, with duc deference to his opinion, would be the proper time to act upon the measure. If it be postponed till the bill under consideration becomes a law, the additional number of Judges created by it may be urged as an argument against abridging the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that the Judges would not then have business sufficient to employ them.

FRIDAY, APRIL 14, 1826.
JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

The Senate having resumed the consideration of the bill, and the motion to recommit

:

It was contended by some of the committee, as well as Mr. HARPER, of South Carolina, rose and said, it by other gentlemen, that the amendment was proper, in-seems to me, Mr. President, that there are objections to asmuch as the distance between the seat of Government the remedy proposed by the bill on the table, which will of Kentucky and that of Missouri, was too great for the occasion danger and inconvenience to the rest of the Judge to travel twice in the year, and, consequently, dis- United States, including the Western States, greater than appointments would occur, and the Courts not be regu- the inconveniences which they complain of. A better relarly held. It was still more impressively urged on themedy, it seems to me, has been devised in the plan which occasion, that, as the services of a Judge were often re- was proposed by the gentleman from Georgia yesterday. quired between the terms of the Court, it was indispensa-Some of the objections which exist against the bill which ble he should, for the convenience of suitors, reside in his lies on the table, have been stated by the committee of circuit. this House. They consist in these principally that it How, then, said Mr. FINDLAY, can the bill be supported will make the Supreme Court too numerous, perhaps it is on the grounds of the uniformity of its provisions, whilst too much so already-in the necessary course and prothey do not remove the existing and unequitable excep-gress of affairs it must become more numerous still; and, tion as it relates to the third circuit? If the residence of what is worse than this, it will render it subject to fluctuathe Judge in the other circuits be deemed essential to the tion, and make it so to be considered by the public at due administration of justice, as has been stated by those large. There are few who dissent from the proposition, fully conversant with judicial proceedings, must it not be that too numerous a judicial body is an evil, and then the the case in this circuit? Why, then, he would ask, is it question recurs, what number is too great for a judicial that this shall be dispensed with, without even an effort body? Some of the evils attending, are these-It is unto arrange the circuits in the Atlantic States, so as the favorable to dispassionate consultation: very numerous circuit may either include the Judge, or the Judge be assemblies are less capable of it than those which are limitbrought to reside in the circuit. He trusted, when the ed; and as you extend the body, so is it less capable of committee reflect that they had, by their own declarations, deliberating without excitement. In a judiciary body, impressed him with the necessity of this residence, that consisting of more than seven, their consultations are not they shall, if there were no other cause, agree to recommit properly consultations, but debates; they are a deliberathe bill in order to attain this object, to which their candor tive body, and the individuals composing it, instead of inmust admit the third district is entitled. terchanging ideas, make speches to influence the rest. There are other inconveniences attending too numerous a judiciary-they are liable to be divided into knots and cabals. If men of a superior character are found, they will have their followers; and this is more likely to be the case in a large, than in a small body. If the body is too numerous to allow them to consult in the way of free inFrom his experience and observation, he was induced tercourse of thought and conversation, you make it a deto believe that the People of the respective States would liberative body, you assimilate it to a legislative body, generally prefer having justice administered under the and you have the spirit of competition and opposition. judicial systems of the States, as far as they may be con- What number is the proper one? Why is it that an apstitutionally competent, than by the courts of the United pellate tribunal must consist of more than one individual ? States. The confidence of the public in the Supreme Because you require the lights of various understandings ; Court of the United States is, by no means, unlimited. because one man, be his talents and acquirements what There are many, very many, who seriously apprehend that they may, will not look at the case in every point of view; the constructive powers, which they indicate no reluc- another reason is, that any casual bias in the individual tance to exercise to the utmost extent, must, necessarily, may be corrected. How many understandings brought impair the sovereignty, and lead to the consolidation, of into consultation, are likely to throw light on the subject? the States. Whether such apprehensions shall be increas- The consultations of a judicial body are different in chaed or diminished, by adding to the number of the Judges, racter from those of a legislative one. In this, or other no one can foretell with certainty. Something may de- legislative assemblies, it is not expected that every mempend on the sentiments of those who may be appointed. ber should be conversant with every subject brought beThe most efficient measure which he had heard suggest-fore him; it is not expected that he should understand ed, to inspire the confidence in the court which they every question. But this is expected of every member ought to possess, was that which the gentleman from New of a judicial body: He must be conversant with every

He would not enter into a discussion of the probable tendency and effects of the bill in case it should become | a law, but he entertained the opinion that they would not be so beneficial, nor inspire the public confidence in the judiciary in the degree which some gentlemen seemed to anticipate.

APRIL 14, 1826.]

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question that comes before the court, and know all its ness, and integrity; and more than these: the individuals bearings upon the whole system. As regards the Fght | discharging duties on that bench should possess qualificathrown on the subject by various understandings, I should say, that, in general, it is not advantageous to go beyond four or six circumstances may render it necessary to go beyond that; yet, if that is as large a number as can consult advantageously, exceed it no further than is requisite: have no more evil than that which you cannot avoid. We find it practically even in our deliberative and other bodies. Subjects are brought before us-a few have investigated them, and they have to form our opinions for us, and indicate how we are to act in the particular point brought under consideration. When we do desire to get exact and detailed information, such as is necessary for a Judge to have on every question, the matter is referred to a committee; nor would it be possible for this body, acting as a whole, to get the full information which would be considered as necessary for a Judge. A General calling a formal council of war, collects a numerous assembly; but when was a formal council of war known to give useful, practical advice? Wanting such advice, he will resort to, at most, three or four of his most intelligent and best informed officers.

:

tions beyond those; they should all be statesmen. They should be capable of combining the complicated relations and parts of our system; our home relations to our foreign relations: they should be conversant with international law: they should be without the manner, party, or passions and views, of politicians: they should be perfectly acquainted with men, with the workings of human passions without being subject to the influence of those pas sions. These are some qualifications, and such as are not likely to be met with very often. Are they more likely to be found in a larger judiciary than in a small one, in a body of ten, than in one of seven? It may seem like a very insignificant proposition to say, that it is easier to find four such men than ten; yet the proposition is true. It might seem at first view, that, by selecting a numerous Court, the chance is increased of finding among them a certain number possessing the requisite qualifications, but such is not the fact. Hitherto it has been the case, and it will be again, that a few individuals will be distinguished, will be designated by the public voice as being peculiarly adapted for this, as well as other situations, and but a few. There It is said there are other numerous judicial tribunals, is one instance to which every body refers to the gentlefrom which no inconvenience is found that there are man who now fills the highest scat on our Judicial Bench. twelve Judges in England who consult each other, and He is recognized by the public voice as having, in a pethat many cases are decided by the House of Lords.culiar degree, the qualifications that fit him for that situa. With regard to the twelve Judges, they consult, but do tion. It is reasonable to expect that there will always be not decide; the decision is with the Court which has re-a few individuals, who will be thus pointed out by the quested the consultation; although, perhaps, it has never public voice, as appropriate for such situations; and as happened that the judgment of that particular Court you mix them with inferior material, you detract from has been contrary to the opinion of the twelve Judges. their value. In a Court of ten, the voice of Marshall might It is not expected in the House of Lords, that every Lord not be heard. You diminish the general weight of such should be conversant with the subject brought before the men, by putting them in a numerous body. Genius may House? The Judges decide it. The Lords may be termed operate in a crowd; her voice may be heard in a popular the law jury, and the Judges point out, if they can, the assembly, but the calm dispassionate wisdom which pecuerror on a particular point that has occurred in the adjudi- liarly befits a man for a Judicial station, is not so likely to cation below. It is but rarely that cases are brought be-be attended to as in a small body. fore them; the institution would not answer if appeals Hindividuals are thus indicated by the public voice as were numerous, if the Lords were to consider the bear-fit for such situations, are they likely to be selected by the ings and operations of the whole system, and the effect administration of the day? Is there any security for that? every decision was to have on the whole system. They Yes, there is. There is a feeling that will operate on may be considered as discharging political functions even every alministration-that this department of Governin the exercise of their legal jurisdiction. They guardment is sacred: however, in making other appointments, against the political effects which might be produced by petty views inay operate; yet in this they will not. This the decisions. The Court will not only be too numerous has been the feeling of all the administrations we have hi for dispassionate consultation, but its composition will, in therto had, and it is probable it will be the feeling of all fu all probability, be inferior to what it is at present. ture administrations; and if it should not be, public opi Perhaps it would be well to consider for a moment,nion will impose on them the necessity of this course. what the Supreme Court of the United States ought to Nothing could excite louder clamor; nothing would draw be, and what ought to be the qualifications of its Judges. down public execration more strongly, than that any adIt has been observed that the Supreme Court of the Unit-ministration of this country should select a judicial officer ed States has more important functions to perform than for any purpose of political management.

any other tribunal that exists on the face of the earth. It Are we not more likely also, to get individuals qualidecides in the last resort cases of common law jurisdic-fied for the situation by selecting them from large distion, of admiralty, of equity, and is required to be in tricts? Perhaps the present number of Judges is greater some degree conversant with the systems of twenty-four than is necessary; perhaps the whole of the United States States. It has still more important functions to perform, might be advantageously divided into six circuits, six important political functions. It is made, by our Constitu- being one of the most convenient numbers to form a quotion, the arbiter between the conflicting elements of our rum. If you have a large circuit from which to select, the very complicated system. It is among its functions to Judge of the circuit must in general be selected from the restrain every department within its proper orbit. It has circuit. You have a better chance of getting an individual offices of immense difficulty and delicacy to perform; it qualified from three or four States, than from one or two. has not only to restrain the power of the States, but, also But this is not all; the selection is less likely to be influ those exercised by the General Government. It may have enced by partial views, or oblique motives. In a single this important duty to perform, to declare the solemn act State a man may make himself of consequence by his of the confederated Legislature void, to resist the voice party zeal, by subserving some purpose of temporary inof a majority of this whole country. This has been dele-terest; and an individual may be chosen, having an ephegated to it by the Constitution, and in some cases it will meral reputation founded on other causes than his merit. unquestionably be incumbent on it to discharge it. To It is more difficult when you require him to have a reputa what sort of a body should the discharge of these import- tion over three or four States. He must have something ant functions be committed? Every one will say, its substantial in his character and mind to sustain this exmembers ought to possess, in a high degree, talent, firm- tended reputation.

SENATE.]

The Judicial System.

[APRIL 14, 1826.

But all these considerations are of less importance with our Government, and the majority that constitutes the Gome than that to which I am about to refer. The Judiciaryvernment should not violate these. The Constitution is should not be put on a footing that will render it liable to made to control the Government; it has no other object; fluctuation; if it is, we have, in effect, no judiciary; we and though the Supreme Court cannot resist public opihave, in effect, no constitution, so far as the judiciary are nion, it may resist a temporary majority, and may change the guardians of it. If the judiciary is liable to fluctua-that majority. However high the tempest may blow, indition, to be diminished three or four to-day, or to be aug-viduals may hear the calm and steady voice of the judimented fifteen or twenty to-morrow, we might as well ciary warning them of their danger; they will shrink have no judiciary, so far as it is requisite the judiciary away; they will leave that majority a minority; and that should be, from the consistency of its views and decisions, is the security the Constitution intended by the Judiciary. the guarantee of the Constitution. These are the motives that prevent me from voting for the bill on the table.

It may be asked, do you secure this fixedness and permanency of the Judiciary, by rejecting the bill? If you confine them to the present number, or reduce them to six, do you provide that they shall be a permanent, unfluctuating body? will you not stand on the same footing as before? It will still be in the power of Congress to add to or diminish its numbers. My object is to place it on such a footing, as that there may be no temptation, no necessity to innovate; that its organization may continue permanent for so long a tire, that public opinion may settle on it as the common law of our Constitution. By adopting a scheme similar to that proposed by the gentleman from Georgia, alteration may be unnecessary for half a century to come. It is not merely what is written on the parchment, that is to be considered Constitution. The composition of the English Courts is not fixed by any positive law, yet the English Parliament would as soon think of changing the succession to the throne, as of changing the Constitution of the Courts at Westmins ter. It may become so with us, and I wish to put it on such a footing that it may become so.

because it is admitted that this accumulation is owing to temporary causes. The most important grievance that is complained of, is, that incorrect decisions are given, for want of ability in the local Courts; and a want of information as respects the local laws in the Supreme Court.

The idea of judicial representation is on all hands disclaimed in this House, and is admitted to be absurd. We cannot be ignorant, however, of the language which has been used out of doors in the United States. It has been said in the newspapers, and the doctrine has been the subject of discussion, that the particular views and feelings of particular sections of the country, on particular subjects, and those perhaps of temporary interest, should be represented on the bench of the Supreme Court. All admit here that this doctrine is detestable. It is impossible to have impartiality if those views are carried into effect. Do you adopt this doctrine by adopting the bill on your table? If individual Judges are appointed, believing that they were selected with these views, they will be likely to give effect to those views. It is a part of human nature for a man to act up to the character which is attributed to him. If you expect firmness, moderation, and wisdom, he will endeavor to sustain the character which the world has given him. If you take it for granted that he is to act under the impulses of intemperance and passion, there is no motive for him to attempt to preserve a better character than that which the world has given him; and if individuals are placed on the bench with these Does the project of the gentleman from Georgia proviews, they will be likely to act in conformity with them. vide a remedy for the grievances complained of by the It has been said that the increase of the number of the Western Country? Those cvils are, that there has been a Judges in the Supreme Court will have a tendency to great accumulation of business in the Courts of the Wesset afloat all the decisions that have been made in consti-tern Country; and this objection is the less insisted on, tutional questions. Whether this is true or not, I do not pretend to say, but certainly it may have that effect. It was intended that the three departments of the Government should be perfectly independent of each other; it was not intended that the individual Judges of the Supreme Court, or their decisions, should be under the control of the other branches of the Government; but if, in time of excitement, the majority, having become a faction, is not satisfied with the decisions of the constitutional Court, will it not at any time be in the power of the other branches of the Government to over-rule those decisions In England much alarm was once taken at the creation of many new lords. It was regarded as a dangerous inno- Instead of associating three District Judges to form a vation, and an attempt was made to restrain the power of Circuit Court, I would propose that the District Courts the crown in this respect, though that restraint would have should exercise an unlimited jurisdiction, as the Circuit been a change of one of the fundamental principles of Courts at present. Let each Circuit Judge hold a single their constitution. Yet the check of that branch of their Court of original and appellate jurisdiction, annually, in legislature is perhaps less important and essential than cach District of his Circuit. Where the amount in conthat of the judiciary with us. The independence of the troversy is less than two thousand dollars, let there be an judiciary is at the very basis of our institutions. With re-appeal, as at present, from the District to the Circuit gard to the act of 1802, whatever may be said of it in other Court, and let the determination of that Court be final. respects, none doubt it was a hazardous precedent, and When the amount exceeds two thousand dollars, let it beevery individual will join with me in wishing that it may at the option of the party to take an appeal either to the not be necessary to follow in these times. It is in times Circuit or Supreme Court; but, in either case, let the deof faction, when party spirit runs high, that dissatisfaction cision be final. Where causes are brought originally in is most likely to be occasioned by the decisions of the Su- the Circuit Court, let the appeal be as at present. It preme Court. I do not believe that the Supreme Court, seems to me, that this plan is not liable to any serious obor the Constitution itself, will ever be able to stand against jections; that it will provide an effectual remedy for the the decided current of public opinion. It is a very dif- grievances which are complained of; and that it contains ferent thing from the temporary opinion of a majority; as little innovation as any effectual and unobjectionable for a majority acting unjustly and unconstitutionally, un-plan that can be devised." der the influence of excitement, a majority though it be, | It will provide for the transaction of business.

According to the plan of the Senator from Georgia, the number of the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the number and distribution of the District Judges, are to remain as at present. I would throw out for consideration, whether the Judges of the Supreme Court may not be conveniently reduced to six. The quorum of that Court will be four, and the majority of the quorumm three.

There

is nothing more than a faction, and it was the object of our is no ground to apprehend that the District Judges will Constitution to control it. The Constitution has laid find any difficulty in transacting the business of their Disdown the fundamental and immutable laws of justice for tricts, as at present arranged, for a century to come; and