relation of owner and master to each other at the time, and there fore the defendant cannot be liable for the acts of one who had for the time no connection with him. There are other cases to the same effect, but this is sufficient.

Master not liable for stores ordered before, but delivered after, his appointment as master.-Lord Mansfield, in delivering his opinion of the court, in a case of Farmer and another v. Davis, where goods were ordered for a ship by the owner, before the appointment of the captain, and some of which goods were delivered after his appointment, said, “Where a captain contracts for the use of a ship, the credit is given to him, in respect of his contract; it is given to the owners, because the contract is on their account; and the tradesman has likewise a specific lien on the ship itself. Therefore, in general, the tradesman who gives that credit debits both the captain and the owners. Now, what is this case? The captain made no contract personally; the owners contracted for their ship; the credit was given to them only; and there is not a shadow of colour to charge the captain with any part of these goods."

Master has no lien on the ship for his wages; nor for money paid for stores and repairs.—Wilkin and others (assignees of Brooke, a bankrupt) v. Carmichael. The question in this case was, whether a captain, having paid for stores supplied, and repairs done, to a ship in England, and having wages due to him, has such a lien on the ship as to be entitled to keep her till he is paid?

Lord Mansfield said, "Notwithstanding the strongest inclination that the defendant (the captain) should have full satisfaction, we are not able to find ground on which we can give judgment in his favour. 1. He has set up a lien upon two sorts of claim, viz. wages and stores and repairs. As to wages, there was no particular contract that the ship should be a pledge; there is no usage in trade to that purpose; nor any implication from the nature of the dealing. On the contrary, the law has always considered the captain as contracting personally with the owner, and the case of the captain has, in that respect, been distinguished from that of all other persons belonging to the ship; this rule of law may have its foundation in policy, for the benefit of navigation; for, as ships may be making profit and earning every day, it might be attended with great inconvenience, if, on the change of a captain for misbehaviour, or any other reason, he should be entitled to keep the ship till he is paid. As to stores and repairs, it is a strong answer to that claim, that, when the demand was made to the assignees, the captain had not paid the tradesmen's bills. But, if there was any lien originally, it was in the carpenter. The captain could not, by paying him, be in a better situation than he was, and he had parted with the possession; so that he had given up his lien, if he ever had one; the other creditors had none. If the defendant is liable to the tradesmen, it is by his own act. Work done for a ship in England is supposed to be done on the personal credit of the employer; in foreign parts the captain may hypothecate the ship. The defendant might have told the tradesmen that he only acted as an agent, and that they must look to the owner for payment." Judgment for the plaintiff. There are many other cases to the same effect; especially Westerdell v. Dale (7 T. R. 312.) But it has been recently decided that a shipwright has a lien upon a ship for repairs Franklin v. Hosier, 4 Barn, & Ald. 341

Owners liable for necessaries ordered by the master, whether they

know of it or not.-The plaintiffs being ropemakers, supplied the ship Henry-and-Thomas with cables to the value of £5. 8s. 3d. by the order of Thomas Harwood, the captain; and made Harwood and the owners of the ship (the defendant) the debtors, in the usual manner, without naming the owners, or knowing particularly who they were.— The ship Henry-and-Thomas had been let by the defendants to Harwood, upon certain articles, in which it was mutually covenanted between them as follows: 1st, the owners covenanted with Harwood, that, on his performance of the covenant stipulated on his part, he should have the sole management of the ship, and employ her for his sole benefit and advantage for the space of eleven years, if he should so long live, and the ship should not be lost. The covenants on the part of Harwood were, (amongst others,) to pay a yearly rent of £36. per cent., at stated periods; that he would at all times, at his own cost and charge, repair, maintain, and keep the vessel and her rigging, &c. in good and sufficient repair. The plaintiffs had no notice of this contract at the time they furnished Harwood, the captain, with the goods.-The question was, whether the defendants were liable to this debt?

Lord Mansfield, in delivering judgment, said, "This case was reserved, not with a view to the particular matter in dispute, or the parties now before the court, but in consideration of a general anxiety in the owners of ships, employed in this trade, to know how far they are by law liable for the acts of their respective lessees. In that point of view we think it impossible to say that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. Whoever supplies a ship with necessaries has a treble security. 1. The person of the master. 2. The specific ship,* 3. The personal security of the owners, whether they know of the supply or not.-1. The master is personally liable as making the contract. 2. The owners are liable in consequence of the master's act, because they choose him: they run the risk, and they say whom they will trust with the appointment and office of master. Suppose the owners in this case had delivered the value of the goods in question in specie to the master, with directions for him to pay it over to the creditors, and the master had embezzled the money; it would have been no concern of the creditors; for they trust specifically to the ship, and generally to the owners. In this case the defendants are the owners; and there happens to be a private agreement between them and the master, by which he is to have the sole conduct and management of the ship; and to keep her in repair, &c. But how does that affect the creditors, who, it is expressly stated, were total strangers to the transaction? And that is an answer to the observation, that the plaintiff must have known the real situation of the matter, in this case, from the general usage and custom of the country in that respect. Indeed, if it appeared that a tradesman had notice of such a contract: and, in consequence of it, gave credit to the captain individually as the responsible person, particular circumstances of that sort might afford a ground to say, he meant to absolve the owner, and to look singly to the personal security of the master; but here it is stated, that the plaintiff had no notice whatever of the contract. The

* This lien on the ship has since been denied in several cases for necessaries and repairs, as has been recently noticed; but the other observation of Lord Mansfield is decidedly confirmed, when the very case was fully discussed.

owners themselves are aware of their being liable at the time; they choose a master to whom they agree to let the ship, and trust for their security to the covenants which they oblige him to enter into; these covenants are, that he shall be obliged to keep the ship in repair, and deliver her up at the end of the term in as good condition as when delivered to him. This is not all; for they indemnify themselves against the private debts of the master, and against his being taken in execution; for, if he does not perform all and every the covenants in the agreement, (except in case of the loss of the ship,) the consequence (beside the remedy against him upon the covenant) is, that the contract and agreement are to be absolutely at an end, and they are to take possession of the ship.

"Suppose the ship had been impounded in the admiralty-court, and that happened at the end of the term; or, suppose the captain had broken a covenant which had put an end to the agreement; the defendant could never have taken the ship out of court, without paying the debt for which the ship was impounded. We are all of opinion, therefore, that, under these circumstances, there is no colour to say that the creditors shall be stripped of the general security they are, by law, entitled to against the owners."-Rich, executor, v. Coe, Cowper, 626. The liability, however, of the owners to the contracts of the master is confined to contracts for necessaries only, and the word necessary, applied to repairs, means such as are proper for the vessel, and such as a prudent owner would, if present, order. See Evans v. Williams, 7 T. R. 481. Rocher v. Busher, 1 Stark. 27. Palmer v. Gooch, 2 Stark. 428. and Webster v. Seekamp, 4 Barn. & Ald. 352. But though the owner be liable for necessaries, such liability does not supersede the right of the owner to examine the accounts, and to On this inquire into the necessity which occasioned the orders. ground, an owner is not bound to honour a bill of exchange drawn by the master in a foreign port for money supplied to him for procuring these necessaries. (Harder v. Brotherstone, 4 Campb. 254.)

A party who takes a share in a ship under a conveyance, void for want of conformity with the provisions of the Registry Acts, is not liable for articles furnished to the ship, unless credit be given to him individually, or he holds himself out as owner. Harrington v. Fry, 2 Bingham, 179.

It has been already observed at the commencement of this chapter, that those who intend to acquire the property of a ship by purchase, should previously ascertain that the person who proposes to sell is legally empowered to do so; for, although a sale of other goods, by the person who is in possession of them, may, in many cases, vest the property in the buyer, even when the seller himself has neither property in them nor authority to dispose of them, it is not so with respect to ships: for the sale of which there is no open market. Written documents, it has been seen, determine this species of property; and the buyer has therefore the means of ascertaining the title of any one who offers to sell, and can seldom be deceived, unless by his own fault. The requisite documents not only furnish the owner with proof of his property, but also enable him to dispose of it when the ship is at sea, or in a foreign port.

In case of a sale, or agreement for sale, of a part only, it has been thought sufficient, if the vender, having delivered the muniments of his title, ceased from the time to act as a part-owner, actual delivery of a part being considered impossible. This, however, is to be und

stood with some limitation; for, if a part owner has the actual possession of the ship, it is not impossible for him to deliver the possession; but, if he has not the actual possession, the possession of the other part-owners may reasonably be considered to be the possession of the vendee after the sale.

When a ship is abroad, a perfect transfer of the property may, at the common law, be made by assignment of the grand bill of sale, and delivery of that, and the other documents relating to the ship, as the delivery of the key of a warehouse to the buyer of goods contained therein, is held to change the property of the goods, according to the rule of the civil law; such delivery, in each case, being not merely a symbol, but the mode of enabling the buyer to take actual possession so soon as circumstances will permit. See Abbott, pp. 11, 12.

For an explanation of the law relative to the sale of a ship by the master, see the next chapter.

For what relates to the owner's responsibility on the subject of loss by PILOTS, see 6 Geo. IV. c. 125, § 53, 54, and 55, PART I. Chap. V.

For what relates to the owners on account of masters not using proper Dunnage, see LOADING OF SHIPS, PART IV. Chap. III.

CHAPTER II.

MASTERS OF SHIPS.

No person can be qualified to be a MASTER of a British ship, except he be a natural born subject of his Majesty, or be a person naturalized by act of parliament, or a denizen by letters of denization, or have become a subject of his Majesty by virtue of conquest or cession of some newly acquired country, and who shall have taken the oaths of allegiance, &c. or a foreign seaman having served three years in time of war on board one of his Majesty's ships. (See PART II. Chap. I.)

It behoves a master to know what degree of responsibility is attached to his situation, and what privileges it invests him with; and it is the design of this chapter to explain them. The master and owner are however, as has been observed, so connected together, that many observations in the preceding chapter of owners, will be found to be necessary knowledge for the master of a ship. The doctrine of marine assurances, too, he should be well acquainted with, in order that he may not, by his conduct, inadvertently prejudice his owners' claim on the underwriters. (See PART III. Chap. II.)

Masters of ships responsible for goods committed to their charge.— The law makes no distinction between carriers by land, and carriers by water; and, for whatever losses arise from the neglect of persons employed under them, they are answerable; whatever cases, therefore, relate to carriers by land, must be understood generally to be equally applicable to carriers by water, such as masters of ships and hoymen.

The master of a ship is liable for goods of which the ship is robbed in the river.—The reasons are: 1. Because he is an officer known. 2. Because he receives his salary out of that which is paid for the freight. But the master may reimburse himself out of the mariners' wages for a loss happening by their neglect.

Masters are charged to carry goods against all events, but the acts of God and the king's enemies.-The plaintiff put goods on board the defendant's hoy, who was a common carrier. Coming through bridge, by a sudden gust of wind, the hoy sunk, and the goods were spoiled. The plaintiff insisted that the defendant should be liable, it being his carelessness in going through at such a time; and offered some evidence, that if the hoy had been in good order, it would not have sunk with the stroke it received; and thence inferred, the defendant was answerable for all accidents which would not have happened to the goods in case they had been put in a better hoy. But the Chief Justice held the defendant not answerable, the damage being occasioned by the act of God; for though the defendant ought not to have ventured to shoot the bridge if the general bent of the weather had been tempestuous, yet this, being only a sudden gust of wind, has entirely differed the case; and no carrier is obliged to have a new carriage for every journey; it is sufficient if he provides one which (with