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but if courts and prosecuting attorneys think it their duty to have an instruction on that subject in every case, they should be careful not to go further in that direction than courts have already gone. An instruction giving the general rule can do no harm, and is not of much importance, for every intelligent juror knows, without any instruction on the subject, that a defendant, whether innocent or guilty, is deeply interested in being acquitted. But when such an instruction is reiterated, and put into exceedingly strong language, so as to give it peculiar emphasis, it is too apt to lead the jury to believe that the court thinks the defendant in the particular case on trial to be unworthy of belief. The credibility of the witness in such a case should be left as much as possible to the jury. In the case at bar, the court, speaking of the defendant and the two other witnesses who were also charged with the offense, said to the jury, among other things, as follows: "While they are allowed to testify, they are not given the same effect as witnesses unattended by indictment, or men not charged. They are not entitled to the same consideration." This language, if not error, is at least on the verge of error. Here is a case where several men have a dispute about a watch. Three of them swear that it was put up and lost on a game of chance; one of them swears that it was taken from him forcibly, and that there was no gambling at all; and the jury are instructed that the testimony of the three is not entitled to the same consideration as the testimony of the one, because the latter procured an information to be made against the former. This seems to be carrying the rule very far; and we allude to the matter because a criminal trial, which is usually a very simple thing when compared with the intricacies of the trials of civil cases, is so often complicated by new instructions on matters of evidence.

Judgment and order reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

SHARPSTEIN, J., and THORNTON, J., concurred.

[No. 13803. In Bank.-September 15, 1890.]

J. M. DAVIES, RESPONDENT, v. THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES ET AL., APPELLAnts.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPECIAL MUNICIPAL CHARTERS CONTROLLED BY GENERAL LAWS.-Under section 6 of article 11 of the constitution, all charters framed or adopted under the constitution are subject to and controllable by general laws; and a special charter adopted by a city, under section 8 of article 11, is no exception to this rule, any special provisions of such charter in conflict with general laws passed after its adoption being superseded by such general laws. ID. CHARTER OF LOS ANGELES-WIDENING OF STREETS.-The charter of the city of Los Angeles, framed under section 8 of article 11 of the constitution, is subject to general laws; and the statute of 1889, page 70, providing for the opening and widening of streets, is a general law within the meaning of the constitution, and applicable to the city of Los Angeles. ID.-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-GENERAL LAW-SPECIAL INTENT OF LEGISLATURE.-In construing an act of the legislature to determine whether it is a general or special law, the supreme court is governed by the language of the act, and not by any outside showing as to the intent and object of its passage; and a law general in its terms, and which may be applied to all cities, cannot be assailed on the ground that it was in fact passed to affect an improvement in one city only. ID. TITLE OF ACT OBJECT INCLUSIVE OF MEANS-STREET IMPROVEMENTS ASSESSMENT OF LANDS.-The title of the act of 1889 (Stats. 1889, p. 70), entitled "An act to provide for laying out, opening, extending, widening, straightening, or closing up, in whole or in part, any street, square, lane, alley, court, or place within municipalities, and to condemn and acquire any and all land and property necessary or convenient for that purpose," is sufficient to authorize sections of the act providing for the assessment of other lands to pay for lands condemned pursuant to the act, as a means by which the object of the act, as expressed in its title, is to be accomplished.

ID. DUE PROCESS OF LAW-NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS FOR STREET IMPROVEMENTS.-Such act does not provide for taking property without due process of law, by reason of insufficient notice of proceedings under the statute, since it requires that notice must be given of every material step to be taken as against either the owners of land to be taken or of lands to be assessed, and provides for an opportunity to be heard at each step of the proceedings; and the fact that the notice provided for may be given generally by posting, and that no personal notice to each of the parties interested is required, does not render the statute unconstitutional. ID.-SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE FOR ASSESSMENT OF LANDS BENEFITED. -The notice required to be given under such act for the assessment of lands benefited, taken in connection with the resolution of intention to which the notice refers for par

ticulars and which designates the property to be affected, is sufficiently definite to call to the attention of parties interested that the improvement is contemplated; and by a reference to the resolution which becomes, by such reference, a part of the notice, is sufficient to apprise them that their property is included within the district and will be affected by such proceeding.

ID. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE-POWER OF LEGISLATURE.-The legislature has the right to say what notice shall be given in proceedings for the opening and widening of streets, so long as the notice required to be given is reasonable, and the proceeding is not arbitrary, oppressive, or unjust. The notice provided for need not be a personal one, and the service thereof may be constructive.

ID. ASSESSMENT FOR BENEFITS CONTINGENCY AS TO COMPLETION OF STREET IMPROVEMENT.-The assessment for benefits that will result to the land assessed under such act is made upon the theory that the work is to be accomplished; and the provisions of the statute authorizing an assessment for bene fits and a sale and conveyance on delinquency are not invalidated by the fact that the benefit to result to the property is left in uncertainty, because, under the statute, the work may never be accomplished, and that no benefit could result upon such a contingency.

ID.-AMOUNT OF ASSESSMENT - EXCESSIVE ESTIMATE

REFUNDING EXCESS. The amount to be assessed under such act depends upon the amount found by the commissioners to be necessary to meet the expenses of the improvement, and not upon the actual expenses as shown by the completion of the work, and, as the act provides for refunding any excess, the fact that it may subsequently appear that they erred in overestimating the amount cannot invalidate the assessment, or otherwise avail the owners of the property assessed, after the report of the commissioners has been made and confirmed by the city council. ID.-VALUATION OF LANDS TAKEN-VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE-CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS-PARTY ASSESSED FOR BENEFITS CANNOT OBJECT. The provisions in such act for the assessment by commissioners of the value of the property taken, and for a voluntary conveyance of the land taken at such valuation, if the amount thus fixed is satisfactory to the owner, and if not, or condemnation of the property as in other cases, cannot affect the validity of the statute, nor the liability of the owner of property benefited to pay the assessment made against him; nor can such owner raise any questions upon the subject of the condemnation of the lands taken, affecting only the rights of the city and the party whose property is sought to be taken. ID. DELEGATION OF MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS TO SPECIAL COMMISSION-POWERS OF COMMISSIONERS TO OPEN STREETS--APPROVAL OF CITY COUNCIL.-Such act is not in violation of section 13 of article 11 of the constitution on the ground that it delegates to a special commission the power to perform municipal functions, as the commissioners are simply made the agents of the municipalities to assist them in opening the streets, and act under their direction, and their acts are not

binding or effective until the same are approved and confirmed by the city council. INVALID ASSESSMENT FOR STREET IMPROVEMENT-FAILURE TO ASSESS WHOLE PROPERTY BENEFITED INJUNCTION-PLEADINGDEMURRER.-In an action to declare void an assessment under such act, made against the property of the plaintiff for the payment of the expenses of opening and widening a street, and to enjoin the enforcement thereof, an allegation in the complaint that the property within the assessment district was not all assessed renders the complaint sufficient, and a demurrer thereto is properly overruled.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court

C. McFarland, Wells, Guthrie & Lee, Horace G. Platt, amicus curia and Pierson & Mitchell, amici curiæ, for Appellant.

John Haynes, Cameron H. King, amicus curiæ, and Henry E. Highton, amicus curiæ, for Respondent.

WORKS, J.-This is an action by the respondent against the city of Los Angeles and W. E. Morford, street superintendent of said city, to declare void an assessment made against the respondent's property for the payment of the expenses of opening and widening a certain street in said city, and to enjoin the enforcement thereof. There was a demurrer to the complaint, which was overruled, and, the defendants standing on their demurrer and refusing to answer, judgment was rendered accordingly, and the defendants appeal. The proceedings complained of were had under and in conformity to the act of the legislature of 1889, providing for the opening and widening of streets. (Stats. 1889, p. 70.) It is not only contended that the statute referred to was not fully complied with, but the statute itself is attacked on the ground that it is unconstitutional; and it is further claimed that, as the special charter of Los Angeles contains ample provisions for the opening and widening of streets, the statute is not applicable to that city. The

latter of these propositions is mostly relied upon, apparently, by counsel for the respondent, as it is much more fully and elaborately argued than other questions presented in his brief. But the point is made that the statute is unconstitutional on several grounds, and these points are supported by the attorneys, who are interested in other cases involving the same questions, and who have for that reason been allowed to file briefs.

As the question whether the statute in question or the special charter of Los Angeles shall prevail is presented by counsel for respondent alone, it will be first considered. The learned counsel has presented his views in support of the charter as the prevailing and only law in force in the city with great clearness and ability, but his whole argument is, in our opinion, in the face of direct constitutional provisions and a number of decisions of this court. His contention is, that the charter of the city contains provisions covering the entire subject embraced in the act referred to; that the provisions of the two are wholly inconsistent and irreconcilable, and cannot stand together; that a charter prepared and approved as this was, under the provisions of the constitution, cannot be altered, amended, annulled, repealed, or superseded by any act of the legislature, general or special; and that, therefore, proceedings of this kind cannot be taken under the statute, but must be had under the charter.

Section 8, article 11, of the constitution as amended, provides: "A city, or consolidated city and county, containing a population of, etc., may frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the laws of this state, by causing a board of fifteen freeholders, who shall have been, for at least five years, qualified electors thereof, to be elected by the qualified voters of such city, or city and county, at any general or special election, whose duty it shall be, within one hundred days after such election, to prepare and propose a charter for

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