18. A bill may be accepted; § 18. (1) Before it has been signed by the drawer, Time for or while otherwise incomplete:1 (2) When it is overdue, or after it has been dishonoured by a previous refusal to accept, or by non-payment. ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. A. draws a bill on B., dated January 1, payable one month after date. The holder presents it for acceptance in March. B. accepts. As regards B. this is a valid acceptance of a bill payable on demand.2 A week 2. The holder of a bill payable one month after sight presents it to the drawee for acceptance. Acceptance is refused." after it is re-presented, and accepted. The acceptance is valid.3 (3) When a bill payable after sight is dishonoured by non-acceptance, and the drawee subsequently accepts it, the holder in the absence of any different agreement, is entitled to have the bill accepted as of the date of first presentment to the drawee for acceptance. This sub-section was added in committee. It accords with mercantile practice, and was intended to secure that, apart from special agreement, the holder should be put, as far as possible, in the same position as if the bill had not been dishonoured. acceptance. as to time Unless the contrary appear by its terms, a bill of Presumption exchange is primâ facie deemed to have been accepted before maturity and within a reasonable time after its issue, but there is no presumption as to the exact time of acceptance. For example, B. accepts, without dating, a bill drawn payable three months after date. He attains his majority the day before the bill matures. This is primâ facie evidence that B. accepted it while an infant.* 1 See sect. 20, post, p. 49; London and South Western Bank v. Wentworth (1880), 5 Ex. D. 96. 2 Mutford v. Walcot (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 574; and sect. 10 (2). 3 Wynne v. Raikes (1804), 5 East, 514. 4 Roberts v. Bethell (1852), 12 C. B. 778. 19. 19. (1) An acceptance is either (a) general or General and (b) qualified. qualified acceptances. Qualified acceptances. Conditional. By sect. 44, post, p. 140, the holder may refuse to take a qualified acceptance. If he takes it, he must give notice to the drawer and indorsers who may decline to be bound by it. The continental codes admit a partial acceptance, but make any other condition equivalent to a refusal to accept. As to the effect of this conflict of laws, see sect. 72. The whole question of qualified acceptances was discussed in the House of Lords in Rowe v. Young, but the particular point there decided has since been negatived by statute: see sub-sect. (2) (c), post. An acceptance is, whenever possible, to be construed as general, not qualified; and a mere memorandum, such as a wrong due date, inconsistent with such construction, has been rejected as being no part of the acceptance.3 This section has no application to notes: see sects. 87 and 89. (2) A general acceptance assents without qualification to the order of the drawer. A qualified acceptance in express terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn. In particular an acceptance is qualified which is ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. The drawee of a bill accepts it, "Accepted-payable on giving up bills of lading for clover per ship Amazon." 4 2. Or he accepts it, "Accepted-payable when in funds." 5 1 See German Exchange Law, Art. 22; French Code, Art. 124; Netherlands Code, Art. 120. 2 Rowe v. Young (1820), 2 Bligh, H. L. 391; 2 B. & B. 165. 3 Fanshawe v. Peet (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 314; cf. Stone v. Metcalfe (1815), 4 Camp. 217; Fitch v. Jones (1855), 5 E. & B. at p. 246; Decroix v. Meyer, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 343, C. A. 4 Smith v. Vertue (1860), 30 L. J. C. P. 56. 5 Id., and Julian v. Shobrooke (1753), 2 Wils. 9. In an action by holder against acceptor, Byles, J., says; "The simple meaning of an acceptance is I will pay.' So translating the word accepted,' what is meant by saying accepted payable on giving up bill of lading'? It is impossible, I think, to contend that this is not a conditional acceptance. Then it is said that this being a conditional acceptance, the bill of lading must be handed over to the acceptor on the day when the bill falls due [and if not, that the acceptor is discharged]. Now it seems to me that that is not so, but that the qualification merely qualifies the acceptor's obligation throughout the whole extent of that obligation; and that, as between the holder and the acceptor, that obligation exists for six years at all events." See further sect. 52 (2), post, p. 177. § 19. (b) partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay Partial. part only of the amount for which the bill is drawn: ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. Bill drawn on B. for 1007. B. accepts it as to 501.2 2. Bill drawn on B. for 1007. B. accepts it, payable half in money, half in goods. This is valid as a qualified acceptance for 501,3 As to partial acceptances, see further sect. 44 (2), post, p. 140. place only. (c) local, that is to say, an acceptance to pay l'articular only at a particular specified place : An acceptance to pay at a particular place is a general acceptance, unless it expressly states that the bill is to be paid there only, and not elsewhere. ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. The drawee of a bill accepts it "payable at Messrs. Smith & Co.," his bankers. This is a general acceptance.* 1 Smith v. Vertue (1860), 30 L. J. C. P. at p. 60. 2 Cf. Wegersloffe v. Keene (1709), 1 Stra. 214. 3 Petit v. Benson (1697), Comberb. 452; cf. Rowe v. Young (1820), 2 Bligh, H. L. at p. 409; 2 B. & B. 165. 4 Cf. Halstead v. Skelton (1843), 5 Q. B. 86, Ex. Ch. § 19. Time. Some of several drawees. 2. The drawee of a bill accepts it "payable at the Union Bank and not elsewhere," or "payable only at the Union Bank.” This is a qualified acceptance.1 This sub-section reproduces the effect of the repealed 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, which was passed to override the case of Rowe v. Young, where it was held that an ordinary acceptance payable at a banker's was a qualified acceptance. See further sects. 44, 45 (4), and 52 (2). (d) qualified as to time: ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. A. draws a bill on B., payable two months after date. B. accepts it, payable six months after date.3 66 2. B. accepts a bill drawn on him, on condition that it be renewed," for six months.* The validity of such an acceptance must of course be subject to the provisions of the Stamp Acts. (e) the acceptance of some one or more of the drawees, but not of all. ILLUSTRATION. Bill drawn on B., X., and Y. B. accepts. X. and Y. refuse to accept. This is a qualified acceptance.5 The particular cases specified in sub-sect. (2) do not profess to be exhaustive. Where a bill was drawn payable "in effective" an acceptance payable in "denaros was held to be qualified." In a recent case where a bill was payable to drawer's order, and the acceptor struck out the words "or order" and wrote over his acceptance the words "in favour of the drawer only," it was held that the acceptance was not qualified and that an indorsee could sue the acceptor.7 1 Cf. Halstead v. Skelton (1843), 5 Q. B. 86, Ex. Ch. 2 Rowe v. Young (1820), 2 Bligh, H. L. 391; 2 B. & B. 165. 3 Russell v. Phillips (1850), 14 Q. B. 891; cf. Fanshawe v. Peet (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 314. 4 Id. 5 Marius, No. 16; New York Draft Code, § 1784; Nouguier, § 451. 6 Boehm v. Garcias (1808), 1 Camp. 425, n. 7 Decroix v. Meyer, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 343, C. A., affirmel, (1891) A. C. 520, H. L. German Exchange Law, Art. 22, admits a partial acceptance, but makes any other qualification a refusal to accept. French Code, Art. 124, prohibits a conditional, but admits a partial acceptance, directing the holder to protest the bill as to the residue. England and the United States seem to be the only countries that allow of conditional acceptance. $19. instruments 20. (1) Where a simple signature on a blank Inchoate stamped paper is delivered by the signer in order or blank signatures. that it may be converted into a bill,' it operates as a primâ facie authority to fill it up as a complete bill for any amount the stamp will cover,2 using the signature for that of the drawer,3 or the acceptor, or an indorser; 5 and, in like manner, when a bill is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession of it has a primâ facie authority to fill up the omission in any way he thinks fit.6 (2) In order that any such instrument when completed may be enforceable against any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up within a reasonable time, and strictly in accordance with the authority given.8 Reasonable time for this purpose is a question of fact. Provided that if any such instrument after completion is negotiated to a holder in due course 1 Baxendale v. Bennett (1878), 3 Q. B. D. at p. 531, C. A. 2 Swan v. N. B. Australasian Co. (1863), 2 H. & C. at p. 184; 32 L. J. Ex. 273. 3 Collis v. Emmet (1790), 1 H. Bl. 313. 4 Molloy v. Delves (1831), 7 Bing. 428. 5 Foster v. Mackinnon (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. at p. 712. 6 Crutchly v. Mann (1814), 5 Taunt. 529, and cases, supra. Temple v. Pullen (1853), 8 Exch. 389; Montague v. Perkins (1853), 22 L. J. C. P. 187. 8 Awde v. Dixon (1851), 6 Exch. 869; Hanbury v. Lovett (1868), 18 L. T. N. S. 366. C. E |