the subversion of the discipline and police of the ship.1 But in all these cases, the correction or restraint must be reasonable, and not disproportionate to the requirements of the case, at the time.

§ 64. The act may also be justified by evidence that it was done in self defence. There is no doubt that any man may protect his person from assault and injury, by opposing force to force; nor is he obliged to wait until he is struck; for if a weapon be lifted in order to strike, or the danger of any other personal violence be imminent, the party in such imminent danger may protect himself by striking the first blow and disabling the assailant. But here, also, the opposing force or measure of defence must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the exigency of the case; for it is not every assault, that will justify every battery. Therefore, if A. strikes B., this will not justify B. in drawing his sword and cutting off A.'s hand. But where, upon an assault by A., a scuffle ensued, in the midst and heat of which A.'s finger was bitten off by B., the latter was held justified. If the violence used is greater than was necessary to repel the assault, the party is himself guilty.5

1 Turner's case, 1 Ware, 83; Bangs v. Little, Id. 506; Hannen v. Edes, 15 Mass. 347; Sampson v. Smith, Id. 365.

2 Bull. N. P. 18; Weaver v. Bush, 8 T. R. 78; Anon. 2 Lewin, C. C. 48 ; 1 Russ. on Crim. 756; The State v. Briggs, 3 Ired. 357.

3 Cook v. Beal, 1 Ld. Raym. 177; Bull. N. P. 18.

4 Cockcroft v. Smith, 1 Ld. Raym. 177, per Holt, C. J.; 11 Mod. 43; 2 Salk. 642, S. C., cited and expounded by Savage, C. J., in Elliott v. Brown, 2 Wend. 499.

5 Regina v. Mabel, 9 C. & P. 474. And see Rex v. Whalley, 7 C. & P. 245. The law on this point was thus stated by Coleridge, J.— “If one man strikes another a blow, that other has a right to defend himself, and to strike a blow in his defence; but he has no right to revenge himself; and if, when all the danger is past, he strikes a blow not necessary for his defence, he commits an assault and a battery. It is a common error to suppose that one person has a right to strike another who has struck him, in order to revenge himself." Regina v. Driscoll, 1 Car. & Marshm. 214. See also, the State v. Wood, 1 Bay, 351; Hannen v. Edes, 15 Mass. 347; Sampson v. Smith, Id.

§ 65. In justification of an assault and battery, it is also competent for the defendant to prove that it was done to prevent a breach of the peace, suppress a riot, or prevent the commission of a felony;1 to defend the possession of one's house, lands, or goods; 2 to execute process; or, to defend the person of one's wife, husband, parent, child, master, or servant. But in all these cases, as we have seen in others, no more force is to be used than is necessary to prevent the violence impending; nor is any force to be applied in defence of the possession of property, until the trespasser has been warned to desist, or requested to depart, except in cases of violent entry or taking by a trespasser, or the like;5 for otherwise, the party interfering to prevent wrong will himself be guilty of an assault.

365; The State v. Lazarus, 1 Rep. Const. C. 34; The State v. Quin, 2 Const. Rep. 694; 3 Brev. 515, S. C.

1 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 60, sec. 23; 1 Russ. on Crim. 755-757; Bull. N. P. 18. 2 Ibid.; Green v. Goddard, 2 Salk. 641; Weaver v. Bush, 8 T. R. 78; Simpson v. Morris, 4 Taunt. 821. And see ante, Vol. 2, § 98; 2 Roll. Abr. 548, 549.

8 2 Roll. Abr. 546; 1 Russ. on Crim. 757; Harrison v. Hodgson, 10 B. & C. 445.

4 3 Bl. Comm. 3; 1 Russ. on Crim. 756; 1 Hawk. P. C. supra. It has sometimes been held that a master could not justify an assault in defence of his servant; because, having an interest in his service, he might have his remedy by a civil action. But it was otherwise held, at a very early period, 19 H. 6, 31 b. 2 Roll. Abr. 546; and it seems now the better opinion, that the obligation of protection and defence is mutual, between master and servant. 1 Russ. on Crim. supra, cites Tickell v. Read, Lofft, 215.

5 1 Russ. on Crim. 757; Ante, Vol. 2, § 98; Mead's case, 1 Lewin, 185; Tullay v. Reed, 1 C. & P. 6; Commonwealth v. Clark, 2 Met. 23; Imason v. Cope, 5 C. & P. 193.

BARRATRY.

§ 66. A BARRATOR is a common mover, exciter, or maintainer of suits or quarrels, in court or in the country. The indictment charges the accused, in general terms, with being a common barrator, without specifying any particular facts or instances; but the Court will not suffer the trial to proceed, unless the prosecutor has seasonably, if requested, given the accused a note of the particular acts of barratry intended to be proved against him;1 and to these alone the proof must be confined.2

§ 67. This offence is proved by evidence of the moving, exciting, and prosecuting of suits in which the party has no interest, or of false suits of his own, if designed to oppress the defendants; or, of the spreading of false rumors and calumnies, whereby discord and disquiet are spread among neighbors. But proof of the commission of three such acts, at least,

1 Rex v. Wylie, 1 New Rep. 95, per Heath, J.; Commonwealth v. Davis, 11 Pick. 432.

2 Goddard v. Smith, 6 Mod. 262; 1 Russ. on Crim. 184. The indictment for this offence is as follows: :

The Jurors, (&c.) upon their oath present, That

county of

on

of in the and on divers other days and times, as well before as afterwards, was, and yet is, a common barrator, and that he the said

on the said

day of

times, as well before as afterwards, at

and on divers other days and aforesaid, in the county afore

said, divers quarrels, strifes, suits, and controversies, among the honest and quiet citizens of said (State,) then and there did move, procure, stir up, and excite, against the peace of the (State) aforesaid.

The words "common barrator" are indispensably necessary to be used in an indictment for this crime. 2 Saund. 308, n. (1); Rex v. Hardwicke, 1 Sid. 282; Reg. v. Hannon, 6 Mod. 311; 2 Chitty, Crim. L. 232.

3 1 Inst. 368, a.; 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 81. For a copious description of this offence, see The Case of Barrators, 8 Rep. 36.

is necessary, to maintain the indictment.1 The bringing of an action in the name of a fictitious plaintiff, is a misdemeanor; 2 but it does not amount to barratry, unless it be thrice repeated.

1 Commonwealth v. Davis, 11 Pick. 432, 435.

2 4 Bl. Comm. 134; 1 Russ. on Crim. 185.

BLASPHEMY.

§ 68. THIS crime, in a general sense, has been said to consist in speaking evil of the Deity, with an impious purpose to derogate from the divine majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of God.1 Its mischief consists in weakening the sanctions and destroying the foundations of the Christian religion, which is part of the common law of the land, and thus weakening the obligations of oaths and the bonds of society. Hence, all contumelious reproaches of our Saviour, Jesus Christ,2 all profane scoffing at the Holy Bible, or exposing any part thereof to contempt and ridicule,3 and all writings against the whole or any essential part of the christian religion, striking at the root thereof, not in the way of honest discussion and for the discovery of truth, but with the malicious design to calumniate, vilify, and disparage it, are regarded by the common law as blasphemous, and punished accordingly.*

1 Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 213, per Shaw, C. J. For other and more particular descriptions of this offence, see 4 Bl. Comm. 59. The People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293, per Kent, C. J.; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 129-151.

2 The State v. Chandler, 2 Harringt. 553; Rex v. Woolston, 2 Stra. 834, more fully reported in Fitzg. 64; Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26; The People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; 1 Russ. on Crim. 230; Rex v. Taylor, 1 Vent. 293.

3 Updegraph v. The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394; 1 Russ. on Crim. 230; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 138-143; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, 224, 225.

4 Updegraph v. The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394; Rex v. Carlisle, 3 B. & Ald. 161; 2 Stark. on Slander, p. 144-147; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 220, 224, 225; The People v. Ruggles, supra. The indictment for verbal blasphemy may be thus:

The Jurors, (&c.) on their oath present, that county of

of

in the

intending the holy name of God, [and the person and cha