THIRD DEPARTMENT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1891. other, when we consider the condition of the banks and the brush and slashing thereon. At any rate, nothing but the wind and the condition of the banks carried the fire over. Hence the crossing was to have been anticipated. The case of Read v. Nichols (118 N. Y., 224), decided three months after the O'Neill case, makes no reference to it, and is not material here. It was the case of a fire in a village somewhat like the Ryan case. Sparks from a smoke-stack blown by a strong northeast wind had set fire to a house 280 feet distant, then the wind died. down and changed to a breeze from the south, and plaintiff's building was destroyed. There were no fire apparatus and no ladders long enough to enable persons to go on the roof of the first building. On all these circumstances the court held that the loss was not the direct effect of defendant's negligence. That case, therefore, belongs to the same class as the Ryan case. It is unlike the other and more familiar cases in which a fire negligently kindled on a man's ground has, under the operation of the existing natural conditions, extended itself to other land and destroyed woods, crops, grass and fences. The O'Neill case is so close in point that it is unnecessary to cite cases from other States. The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs. LANDON and MAYHAM, JJ., concurred. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. Banks-special examiner's compensation stale demand — res adjudicata — rights of the bank which is to pay statute of limitations. In 1877 one Best was appointed by the banking department of the State of New York a special examiner to examine a bank. The expense of such work, it is directed by statute, shall be paid by the corporation examined in such amount as the superintendent of the banking department shall certify to be just and HUN-VOL. LXII 24 THIRD DEPARtment, NovembER TERM, 1891. reasonable. The special examiner completed his work on February 27, 1878, and was paid therefor in part, but deemed the payment proposed to be made in full, for such work, insufficient. In 1887 Best applied to the then superintendent of the banking department for a certificate for what he deemed a reasonable amount, but his application was denied upon the ground that the failure, during a period of nearly ten years, to demand or to receive a certificate was a bar thereto. In 1890 Best applied again to the superintendent for such a certificate, who denied it upon the grounds that the claim was stale and that the decision of his predecessor was res adjudicata. An application for a peremptory mandamus to compel the giving of such a certificate by the superintendent was denied. Held, that this was proper. That the refusals of the two superintendents to issue such a certificate were not refusals to act, but constituted in each case a judicial decision that the examiner had no present claim. That the decision of the first superintendent was res adjudicata as to the second, and was binding upon the latter. That, in both instances, the remedy of the examiner was by certiorari, and that a mandamus was improper. That as the claim of the examiner was one against the bank, and not one against the State, the bank had a right to insist that the decision of the first superintendent was an absolute bar to a further application upon the same claim. That a mandamus cannot be granted after the period fixed by statute as a bar to an action has expired. That the examiner's right to demand said certificate accrued, in analogy to the principle laid down in section 410 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon the day when he finished his work, i. e., February 27, 1878. That he could not extend the time by neglecting to demand a certificate. APPEAL by the relator, William J. Best, from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of Albany county on the 31st day of March, 1891, refusing to grant a motion that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue to Charles M. Preston, as Superintendent of the Banking Department of the State of New York, directing him to certify such amount of compensation as he should deem just and reasonable to be paid to said Best by the Union Dime Savings Institution of the State of New York for services rendered by said Best in and about a special examination made by him of said institution. John T. McDonough, for the appellant. Charles F. Tabor and I. H. Maynard, for the respondent. THIRD DEPARTMENT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1891. LEARNED, P. J.: This is an appeal from an order denying relator's motion for a writ of peremptory mandamus. In 1877 the relator was appointed by the banking department a special examiner to examine the Union Dime Savings Bank of New York. He entered on his work September 26 and continued till February 27, 1878. The statute says that the expense "shall be paid by the corporation examined, in such amount as the superintendent shall certify to be just and reasonable." (Laws of 1875, chap. 371, § 43.) During the examination the bank paid for this examination, for services, expenses, services of accountant, attorneys and clerks and disbursements, in all $8,356.05. This included $2,500 for the services of the relator paid to him. After the examination Mr. Lamb, acting superintendent of the banking department, proposed to certify, under the law, $2,500 in full for compensation, being the amount already received. The relator deemed this insufficient, but presented no bill, and no formal action was taken by the acting superintendent. In November, 1887, the relator applied to Mr. Paine, then superintendent of the banking department, for a certificate of the amount deemed just and reasonable. Mr. Paine denied the application March 3, 1888, holding that the lapse of ten years since the services and the failure to give or demand a certificate during that time was a bar. Mr. Paine wrote a full and careful opinion and concluded by saying: "If I am wrong in this opinion, the examiner has his remedy in the courts." In May, 1890, the relator applied to Mr. Preston, the superintendent of the banking department, to re-open and re-hear the matter and to make the said certificate, and about December 31, 1890, the superintendent denied the application, writing an opinion and giving two reasons for his refusal. First, that the claim was stale and the applicant was barred; second, that the decision of Mr. Paine was res adjudicata and a bar to the re-opening of the matter. Thereupon the relator applied for a peremptory mandamus, which was denied. The opinion of the learned justice holds that the act of granting a certificate is judicial, and, therefore, mandamus does not lie. Also, that if the relator felt aggrieved by the decision of Mr. Paine he should have reviewed it by certiorari. Also, that THIRD DEPARTMENT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1891. Mr. Preston properly held that the decision of Mr. Paine was res adjudicata. The learned counsel for the relator on this appeal, while he does not dispute the general rule that mandamus does not lie to direct a judicial or quasi judicial officer how to act, insists that neither Mr. Paine nor Mr. Preston did act on the application, but that each refused to exercise judicial discretion; the former on the ground of the staleness of the claim, the latter on the ground of res adjudicata. The question, then, is this: When the relator applied for a certificate to Mr. Paine, and Mr. Paine refused it on the ground that the claim was stale (or barred by the statute), was that decision an acting or a refusal to act? We think it is the former. It was a judicial decision that the claim was stale. That decision presupposed a consideration of the services; of the time when they were finished; of the reasonable time thereafter to apply for a certificate; and it might have included a consideration of any excuse for the delay. It appears from the opinion that Mr. Paine considered also the fact that, owing to the lapse of time, the funds in the bank are not the same which they were at the time of the examination; and also that it would not be equitable to charge the depositors of 1888 for services rendered to the depositors of 1878. All this shows judicial action. True, he came to the conclusion to make no certificate. But in a trial at law, a plaintiff who fails because his action is barred by the statute, has a judicial decision as much as if he succeeded. We, therefore, think that the remedy of the relator in both instances was by certiorari. But as the facts are before us, and as another important question is presented, we proceed to consider that without reference to the form of the present proceeding. Mr. Preston, in refusing to grant the certificate, held that the action of his predecessor, unreversed, was binding on him as res adjudicata, in a manner analogous to a judgment in a court. We are of opinion that he was right. The answer of the appellant to this point is, that a decision is binding in this way only when it is on the merits. (Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N. Y., 222.) But we have already stated that we consider the action of Mr. Paine to be not a refusal to decide, but a decision. And if a decision, then, of course, on the merits. A judg THIRD DEPARTMENT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1891. ment that an action is barred by the statute of limitations is just as much a judgment as any other, so far as the matter of res adjudicata is concerned. In Osterhoudt v. Rigney (ut supra, at p. 234) the court says: "The rule which forbids the re-opening of a matter once judicially determined by a competent jurisdiction applies as well to the decisions of special and subordinate tribunals as to decisions of courts exercising general judicial powers." That remark was not obiter; for the question of re-opening such a decision was directly before the court. It is hardly necessary to cite any other authority in this State. In United States v. Bank of the Metropolis (40 U. S. [15 Pet.], 377) the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of the powers of the postmaster-general, say: "The right of an incumbent of reviewing a predecessor's decisions extends to mistakes in matters of fact arising from errors in calculation and to cases of rejected claims, in which material testimony is afterwards discovered or produced." Taking this exposition of the right to review claims, the relator's case does not come within it. (See, also, Lavalette v. U. S., 1 Court of Claims, 147.) But there is another consideration. In the present case the relator had no claim against the State. The relator's claim is against the savings bank. The superintendent of the banking department is only the judicial authority to decide the amount. When that has once been decided between the parties the savings bank has a right to insist on the absolute bar to any future application. In our system of government, where changes of State officers are so frequent, and where one political party may succeed another in a few years, it is of great importance that there shall be no right in a new officer to reverse the decisions of his predecessor. The contrary rule would, in our government, be especially dangerous. And officers themselves should be protected from the importunity of claimants in such cases; even where the claim is one against the State itself. Still another objection exists. Mandamus should not be granted. after the period fixed by statute, as a bar to an action has expired. (Code, § 414; People ex rel. Millard v. Chapin, 104 N. Y., 96.) And may even be refused for laches before that period. Where a |