Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; but Dr. Cheatham was my boss' boss and he worked for Dr. Brown. The CHAIRMAN. So there was one layer of authority above you, Dr. Cheatham; is that right? Mr. SULLIVAN. There was an additional one in the form of Mr. Sam Perry, but that was not widely exercised at the time. Officially, there were two levels between myself and Dr. Brown. The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. SULLIVAN. This report was forwarded to Dr. Brown by my boss, Dr. Cheatham, on October 12, 1964. Your staff has a copy of that report, and I understand will also hear testimony from Dr. Cheatham. I am prepared to summarize the conclusions of that report, and to indicate the actions resulting from the recommendations contained therein, if you so desire. The report contained 12 general conclusions which I can summarize as follows: 1. The development program for the Phoenix missile system appeared to be overly compressed. Overruns and delays appeared certain. The CHAIRMAN. This is a report in October 1964? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 2. The development schedule for the F-111B aircraft had been compressed to the extent where the first two F-111B aircraft to be made available for Phoenix development work could not possibly be representative of a realistic final configuration acceptable for operational use. The CHAIRMAN. Why was that? Mr. SULLIVAN. These airplanes, sir, had not in any way had the benefit of the design refinements and improvements that were in process at the time. The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the two that were going to be produced were not going to be suitable for real testing of the Phoenix system? Mr. SULLIVAN. We felt not, sir. 3. The projected final configuration of the F-111B, at that time, might not meet Navy carrier performance requirements, due primarily to weight increases. 4. The projected final configuration of the F-111B, at that time, would not meet the Navy's flight performance requirements, again primarily due to weight increases. 5. The Navy's belief that the contractor-planned weight savings were optimistic continued to be substantiated as the development continued. The CHAIRMAN. What you mean is that when the contractor was contending it had the ability to reduce that weight you just felt they were not going to be able to do it? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Optimistic is a charitable way to say it? The CHAIRMAN. You thought that was a charitable way to ex press it? TFX CONTRACT INVESTIGATION (SECOND SERIES) HEARINGS BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS SECOND SESSION PURSUANT TO SENATE RESOLUTION 308, 91ST CONGRESS 43-096 APRIL 15, 16, 22, 24, AND 28, 1970 PART 3 INCLUDING INDEX Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1970 Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. I assume in personal conversations when you were discussing it with them you told them what the real facts were. Mr. SULLIVAN. This was difficult to do, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Did you talk to your superiors that way? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; it is difficult to state with finality what the facts were when people were in essence dealing with predictions. The CHAIRMAN. When I said facts, I should have said your realopinion. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The hangup was on whether or not they were facts. The CHAIRMAN. I understand. But you did tell them what your opinion was of it, frankly and candidly? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. So they did know that, but in your report you referred to it as their viewpoint being optimistic? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. SULLIVAN. You might remember, sir, that there was Air Force as well as Navy participation in the ad hoc group and the wording had to be acceptable to both. The CHAIRMAN. I see. You would have made it stronger, I assume, from what you are saying. Mr. SULLIVAN. I am afraid so, sir. I am not as tactful as I should be. Conclusion No. 6: The full aircraft/missile system development program could not be accomplished with the five test aircraft scheduled at that time. The CHAIRMAN. Why was that? Why couldn't it be? Because some were not suitable? Mr. SULLIVAN. Mainly because there were more tasks to be done than there were aircraft to do them with. A development program of this type would normally have seven to nine test aircraft in the development program. The CHAIRMAN. Could the F-111A do the job for the testing that you desired here? Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. The CHAIRMAN. You were supposed to maintain about 80 percent commonality. Mr. SULLIVAN. Within that 80 percent was not the requirements for the wiring and the black boxes associated with the missile control systems. The CHAIRMAN. That was a different matter entirely? Mr. SULLIVAN. That was one of the basic differences between the two airplanes. 7. There had been a serious lack of coordination within the Navy between the aircraft and missile development programs. 8. We could find no rational requirement for the fleet introduction date which was forcing the development program at this time. The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand that. Mr. SULLIVAN. It is customary, when the development contract is let, to establish a date at which the finished weapons system is needed in operational use in the fleet. When a program runs into trouble, one of the first things you look at is to see whether you can delay the operational introduction date and spend more time in development. The CHAIRMAN. What does this signify-what you found here? Mr. SULLIVAN. We could find no pressing reason why the first F111B's with their Phoenix missiles had to be aboard the carriers and in operation at the date specified at the time the contract was awarded. The CHAIRMAN. In other words, there was no good reason why the time couldn't be extended for the final production and acceptance; is that right? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. What was the date that they were supposed to have been completed with research and development, do you recall? Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe it was originally scheduled for fleet introduction in 1968, but I am not sure of that. The CHAIRMAN. 1968? Mr. SULLIVAN. 1968. The CHAIRMAN. This indicated to you at that time that they wouldn't be ready then? Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we could see that coming. The CHAIRMAN. That is what I say. Mr. SULLIVAN. But, you see, we would not have recommended that its fleet introduction be delayed if in fact there was a military threat or an obsolescence of the prior types of aircraft that required that it be there on time. The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the emergency at that time didn't seem to compel the insistence of completion without better develop ment. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes; and it leads directly to the next conclusion, which reads that the arbitrary selection of the early fleet introduction date had curtailed the Navy's plans for updating the capabilities of their F-4. The CHAIRMAN. Regarding the early date that had been set, they thought if you got this plane by that time it wouldn't be necessary to update the F-4's; is that right? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, that had been delayed in anticipation of this plane being available? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. SULLIVAN. It is like selling your old house before your new house is finished. The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Mr. SULLIVAN. It was evident that the R. & D. costs, as well as the unit production costs, for both the Phoenix and the F-111B were going to be substantially higher than those originally predicted. 11. The force structure plan at that time, which assumed the replacement of two F-4's with one F-111B, produced a decreased overall air defense effectiveness for the fleet against most anticipated |