The CHAIRMAN. Do you still think it was true?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you somewhere in here say 29 percent. In other words, it simply amounted to this: Your final conclusion was—this is Mr. Spangenberg's testimony. He said:

The number I have on the part of count commonality was given by General Dynamics as 29.4 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood it was 34 percent, but your figures show 29.4 commonality would have been retained by this redesign.

That is the redesign that was proposed in this report.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you say if they had brought it down to 30 percent-I don't think anyone would quibble about a little fraction of a percent there if they got it down to something like that on commonality, you believe the two planes could have been made and would have been capable of carrying out their respective missions.

Mr. SULLIVAN. To the established specifications and requirements; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To the established specifications and requirements. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then now can you say anything else except that this weapon was crucified on the cross of commonality? Commonality was insisted upon when apparently all of the technicians knew it couldn't be done, including General Dynamics. How can you answer that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Shall we let it rest there?

The CHAIRMAN. If you will agree, we will let it rest there.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Recommendation No. 5:

The Navy needed to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis to determine means of increasing effectiveness and lowering costs within the framework of the F-111 program, and to compare those results with alternate means of fleet air defense.

These studies were undertaken, but were not completed until late in 1966. The Navy was unable at any time to produce a convincing case for the cost-effectiveness of the F-111B-or against it, for that

matter.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that, that the Navy was unable to produce a convincing case for the cost-effectiveness of the F-111B or against it?

What do you mean by that? I don't understand it.

Mr. SULLIVAN. In the ideal world it would be nice to show that a new weapons system were, say, two or three times more cost effective than the machine it was to replace, whole numbers, orders of magnitude.

The CHAIRMAN. They were unable at this time to show either way, is that what you are saying?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is right. Against certain enemy projected raids it would be 90 percent cost effective.

Against other ones it would be 110 percent cost effective, and those numbers are too small, to make a convincing case.

43-096-70-pt. 3- -2

The CHAIRMAN. What was the cost of the F-4 at that time?
Mr. SULLIVAN. I am sorry, sir, I can't give you that information.
I would estimate around $3 million, but I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Around $3 million?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Roughly.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is somewhere in the neighborhood of it. What was the cost at that time of one F-111B?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe it was getting to be in the neighborhood of $8 million.

THE CHAIRMAN. $8 million?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it an 8 to 3 better plane?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That was the question.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the answer?

Mr. SULLIVAN. It depends on the threat. It was anticipated that the Phoenix

The CHAIRMAN. I mean if you got what you bought, if you were going to get the plane you bought, it may have been worth that. I don't know.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. The original studies would have indicated that it was worth it.

The CHAIRMAN. From the kind of plane you knew then you were getting?

Mr. SULLIVAN. This is the trouble. One of the reasons they couldn't finish the cost-effectiveness study was that they couldn't grab the cost of the airplane and hold onto it long enough to be sure of their studies. The CHAIRMAN. They weren't sure of what they were going to get and they couldn't make an evaluation as to cost?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is right.

Recommendation No. 6, the last recommendation:

The Navy needed to examine their proposed F-4 improvement program in the light of anticipated F-111B slippage, and to prepare a plan to implement that F-4 improvement program.

The Navy did eventually go ahead with their F-4J program-which will now have to see them through until the F-14 joins the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for information, and I don't know that it is exactly pertinent to this inquiry but so we will have a little better understanding of it, when is it anticipated that he F-14 can join the fleet?

Mr. SULLIVAN. May I ask someone who knows more about that than I do?

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. I won't insist upon it.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don't know. I have not been associated with the project.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that it is necessarily pertinent to this.

Mr. SULLIVAN. It must be 1973 or 1974.

The CHAIRMAN. 1974, I am advised by the staff.

In your prepared statement on page 4, speaking about this cost effectiveness, you state:

The force structure plan at that time which assumed the replacement of two F-4's with one F-111B produced a decreased overall air defense effectiveness for the fleet against most anticipated enemy threats. Higher indicated costs would reduce this cost effectiveness even more.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the situation at that time.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. Here again, it was another statement that we could not guarantee a 2 to 1 cost-effectiveness advantage to the F-111B that would allow the use of only half the number of aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Even with the improvements on them.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

In conclusion, looking back on this report, its recommendations and its implementation, I conclude that the Navy responded to the full extent of their ability to the efforts of the ad hoc group.

Obviously, however, neither the recommendations nor the resulting actions were strong enough by themselves to produce an operationally acceptable F-111B. I am prepared to answer any further questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. It is perfectly obvious that, if the Grumman report, which you submitted originally, had been followed, the resulting plane obviously would have come nearer, and that was the thing that should have been done at that time.

Mr. SULLIVAN. It would have helped.

The CHAIRMAN. This is one of the contractors, one that had the major responsibility, I think, for the Navy plane; isn't that correct? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes; it did, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, it had to be responsive to the prime contractor.

Mr. SULLIVAN. It was a pretty long chain for Grumman to deal with the Navy, because Grumman had to deal with General Dynamics, with the Air Force, to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. But in retrospect, you now say had the Grumman report been adopted and implemented, you would have had a much. better plane, a much better weapon?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have asked you most of my questions as we went along. I didn't read your statement until you were presenting it.

I hand you a document and ask you to identify it, if you will, please, sir.

(Document handed to the witness.)

Mr. SULLIVAN. This is the final report of my ad hoc group, sir. It is a correct copy.

The CHAIRMAN. You were chairman of this ad hoc committee that made this report?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, let it be received and it may be printed in the record.

(The document follows:)

OCTOBER 1, 1964.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Subject: Report of PHOENIX/F-111B ad hoc group. Reference: Your letter to Assistant Secretary R. & D., Navy and Air Force, establishing ad hoc group, dated 26 August 1964.

In accordance with your letter I established a group to review development progress and current program plans for the F-111B and its PHOENIX missile system. I offer herein the general conclusions reached, and my recommendations for the actions which should be taken. Examples to support each conclusion are included where appropriate.

1. The development schedule for the PHOENIX system appears to be compressed beyond the minimum reasonable for a program of this magnitude. $48M in overruns is already being requested, a slippage of ten months is presently being considered, and the program has not yet progressed to the point where all of the possible problem areas have been identified. Two examples of the overly compressed development schedule are illustrative:

It is now planned to have complete drawing release for the pilot production AMCS units before the first missile is fired from any aircraft. (Initial firings will be from an A3 dogship).

It is now planned to have complete drawing release for the pilot production missiles before the first development missile has been launched from an F-111B test aircraft.

2. The current development schedule for the F-111B aircraft appears to be compressed to the point where the first two aircraft to be made available for PHOENIX development work (Navy #2, and #3) cannot possibly be truly representative of the "final" configuration-predominantly because the "final" configuration has not yet been established to the satisfaction of the Navy requirements.

3. The currently projected "final" configuration of the F-111B may not meet the Navy's carrier performance requirements, primarily because of the weight increases. The combination of aerodynamic improvements and the proposed ship modifications will provide only marginal carrier suitability. (The ship modification PCP has been positively endorsed by Comptroller).

The best current estimate is that the F-111B will enter the fleet with the same wind-over-deck requirements for landing as the F-4 has today; 22 to 24 knots with the new Mk 7-3 arresting gear. Whereas the F-4 is going to be improved to reduce WOD, growth of the F-111B gross weight will almost certainly increase its WOD; approximately 2 knots per thousand pounds. 25 knots is universally accepted as an upper limit.

4. The currently projected "final" configuration of the F-111B will not meet the Navy's flight performance requirements, again primarily because of the weight increases and the external missile configuration. Loiter performance, from the standpoints of ceiling, maneuverability, buffet, and fuel consumption have all degraded significantly, and the acceleration characteristics in the transonic region are far worse than those of the F-4.

It is almost impossible to quantify the effectiveness reductions against common threats due to those changes in flight performance. However, there is a very real and practical problem of "pilot acceptance" of lower performance than the F-4 in the regime where fighter pilots normally "live". The magnitude of this hurdle cannot be over-emphasized; if the pilots don't like it, it will never reach the fleet.

Against the more critical high performance threats, acceleration and supersonic launch are essential. This can significantly reduce scheduled loiter time and relief-on-station time: one acceleration to M-1.5 deletes 1.5 hours of loiter, one acceleration to M-2.2 deletes 2.5 hours of loiter. As configured, the supersonic performance cannot be used practically if the F-111B is to carry a full complement of missiles on CAP.

5. The Navy's belief that the planned weight savings are optimistic continues to be substantiated as development continues. For example:

It was originally projected that 607 pounds would be saved by relocating the missiles on the fuselage from the F-111A wing pylons. Detail review of that first estimate reduced the saving to 200 pounds, and detail design now indicates a weight penalty in trying to attach the missiles to the duct walls in a practical location.

Of seven other weight saving items planned to provide 1148 pounds, only 599 is now predicted and design has not been completed.

Between weight status report No. 6 of March 1964, and the latest report No. 11, the projected weight of aircraft #1 is up 1600 pounds, of #2 is up 2700 pounds. 6. The full Navy aircraft/system development program cannot be accomplished with the five aircraft currently scheduled. A significant increase in the scope of the Navy flight test program is now indicated.

The contractor has recently submitted a revised plan calling for nine rather than five aircraft. This number is naturally based on the current fleet introduction date, and on the use of aircraft #2 and #3 in a somewhat limited capacity. 7. There has been a serious lack of coordination between the aircraft and missile development programs which suggests the necessity for a reorganization or strengthening of the Navy BuWps program office.

First flight dates of the #2 and #3 aircraft were picked by the aircraft people "to meet the PHOENIX development schedule" whereas the PHOENIX AMCS and missile development have been pegged to "having something available to put in aircraft #2 and #3 since they will be available". Both development groups would prefer more time.

First flight of the #2 F-111B is scheduled within six months of the first flight of the A3, with AMCS aboard in each case. This essentially results in parallel rather than series testing.

8. There is no rational requirement for the fleet introduction date other than that it was picked prior to the competition and has not been adjusted since. Neither an important increase in the threat, nor the mandatory retirement of F-4 aircraft are pertinent to the late 1968 date. There is equally little logic in the selection of the first flight of the F-111B, other than the desire to keep it close to the first flight of the F-111A, presumably to demonstrate "commonality". 9. The arbitrary selection of the early fleet introduction date has curtailed the Navy's plans for updating the capabilities of the F-4. Both airframe and missile system improvements are practical within the time period. Both might be more aggressively pursued if it were an accepted fact that the F-111B were to be delayed.

10. It is evident that the R&D costs and the unit production costs are going to be substantially higher than originally predicted, although firm PCP's have not yet processed to DOD. The R&D costs of each the PHOENIX and the F-111B will probably increase by at least $100M. The unit costs of the production aircraft are now informally estimated to be as high as $7.5M dollars compared to the original estimates of under $5 million. The unit costs have risen for several reasons, aside from the initial proposal optimism:

Many items have been added to the aircraft.

A 10% increase in empty weight is bound to reflect in at least a 10% increase in unit cost.

The weight saving program will result in more expensive production costs— such as the increased use of titanium.

Less total aircraft are now being planned for, thereby raising the average cost of each unit.

11. Cost-effectiveness studies, based on the original cost estimates, show a significant advantage for the F-111B over the improved F4 under most conditions on an equal-deck-space assumption-particularly, of course, in areas where the F4/Sparrow system performance is inadequate. However, if the current force structure guidelines of replacing two F-4's with one F-111B stands, the overall air-defense effectiveness decreases against the most common raids. With the higher costs now anticipated, additional effectiveness will have to be provided in the F-111B to keep it competitive on almost any basis. Possible means for increasing F-111B effectiveness include:

Adding more missiles, or changing to a "mix" of missiles so that the heavier and more expensive PHOENIX missile will only be used when either Sparrow or Sidewinder cannot do the job.

Increased radar dish size may provide additional effectiveness in autonomous air-to-air warfare (as over a beachhead) and in increasing Sparrow capabilityif a missile mix is adopted. Performance penalties and development costs are not excessive for dish sizes up to 45 inches or so.

Exploration of better warhead and fuzing designs to increase per-missile kill capability.

12. The major advantage of the F-111B airframe is simply its ability to stay aloft longer with a payload of more than twice that weight of the F4. This can only be considered significant if that extra payload can demonstrate the margin of superiority in effectiveness necessary to justify the cost. It is not apparent that the presently configured aircraft can pass that test. On the other hand it is not possible at this time to prove its impotency. An urgent need exists to reassess both the development program, and the suitability of the end product. Based on these conclusions, inexact as they may be, I strongly recommend that the DDR&E initiate action requiring the Navy to:

1. Strengthen their program management structure to better coordinate the airframe and missile system developments.

2. Re-appraise their development program in detail, with the aim of delaying their planned fleet introduction date by as much as 18 months, if necessary, to obtain a sound operational system.

3. Re-appraise their current intention to build early Navy versions which are not representative of an acceptable fleet weapon.