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namics had refused to give the Air Force any performance data that would reveal the range capability of the airplane.

In fact, the contractor delivered almost no flight test data on the F-111A. The Air Force had forgotten to include specific coverage for this data in the contract.

General Dynamics took the position that this information was beyond the scope of the contract and therefore the Air Force would have to buy the data at an increased contract price.

Mr. ADLERMAN. Do you mean to say the Air Force was unable to obtain any test data from General Dynamics, even though they had been flying these airplanes for a year?

Mr. CROMWELL. Yes.

Mr. ADLERMAN. They refused to do it because they said it was not in their contract?

Mr. CROMWELL. They said it was beyond the scope of the contract as written, since it was a fixed-price contract. They said they would submit a final report but no progress reports.

The CHAIRMAN. They contended that they didn't have to make a report on the progress and performance under their contract?

Mr. CROMWELL. They sent in a proposal to the Air Force to supply the data for several millions of dollars. I forget how much.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we get that, how much they wanted to make this report?

Mr. CROMWELL. Yes. I can review my own meeting records. I couldn't believe this when I heard this in interviews at the F-111 program office, so I verified this on three or four different occasions. I will have to review my own notes.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get that and have it inserted in the record at this point.

(Subsequent to the hearing, the Air Force supplied to the subcommittee two letters from the F-111 program office to General Dynamics that requested the contractor to submit an engineering change proposal (ECP) to give contractual coverage for flight test planning and data reports. These letters are identified as follows: ASD letter ASLC dated November 23, 1965 (log 65-11598); and ASD letter ASLC dated December 13, 1965 (log 65-12210).

(In response to these letters, General Dynamics submitted an ECP 10145 dated February 25, 1966, proposing contractual coverage for flight test planning reports and flight test data reports at a cost of $572,390. These three documents have been made exhibits and are available in the files of the subcommittee.

(The following letter of transmittal accompanied the documents:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, May 12, 1970.

Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,

Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The enclosed F-111 Engineering Change Proposal No. 10145 and related documentation are forwarded for insertion in the record of the recent hearings conducted by your Subcommittee. This information was requested by Mr. Cromwell and relates to his testimony on April 15, 1970. In this connection it should be observed that:

a. The proposal covers reports of all types of flight test data-not just flight test performance data.

b. The proposal also covers extensive flight test planning documentation-not just reports of completed flight test work.

c. Flight test performance data reporting comprises only a very small portion of the total task proposed.

d. The contractor's proposal price was $572,930.

e. The F-111 SPO disapproved the proposal in view of its cost and the need to effect all economies possible in the program.

Because of the significance of this information, it is respectfully requested that this letter of transmittal be inserted in the hearing record, along with the Engineering Change Proposal.

Your favorable consideration of this request will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

JOHN MURPHY,
Major General, USAF,
Director, Legislative Liaison.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 20B, 20C, and 20D, second series" for reference and may be found in the files of the Subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot understand, when the Government contracts to buy something, and the contractor contracts to produce something, why in the course of the development of it the contractor refuses to give information as to the progress being made, especially when there were questions about whether the contract was being complied with, whether the contractor was able to perform.

I can't understand that the Government is not protected in its contract so as to require and to get such information as this that is certainly vitally needed.

It was paying the bill. It is a strange thing to me that the contractor says, "Since you didn't provide for it, you will have to pay me millions of dollars extra to get it."

I want your testimony documented. I want you to get in whatever facts you have about it.

Mr. CROMWELL. We can call a witness, certainly, from the Air Force to verify that.

The CHAIRMAN. We may do that.

I don't want to delay your testimony this morning, but I don't want the record left this way. I want it cleared up.

Mr. CROMWELL. I think it will become evident in the next page or so as to why they didn't want to turn over any flight test performance data that would have revealed the deficient range capability of the airplanes.

(At this point Senator Gurney withdrew from the hearing room.) (The letter of authority follows:)

APRIL 13, 1970.

Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure which was amended by the Committee on Government Operations for its Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on June 3, 1965, and reaffirmed on March 4, 1970, permission is hereby granted for the Chairman to conduct hearings in open session without a quorum of two members for the purpose of taking testimony in the matter of Procurement and Management of the F-111 System (TFX) on April 15, 1970. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,

Chairman.

KARL E. MUNDT,
Ranking Minority Member.

Mr. CROMWELL. On December 10, 1963, Secretary McNamara announced the decision to produce a strategic bomber version of the F-111's to be called the FB-111A.

Two hundred and sixty-three of these planes were to replace the early versions of the B-52, the 345 B-52C's through F's, in the SAC bomber fleet.

Quoting from the transcript of Secretary McNamara's press conference at President Johnson's ranch in Texas:

Secretary MCNAMARA. The FB-111 will be a variant of the tactical bomber, the F-111. It will replace the B-52 series C through F. It will have twice the speed of those aircraft, approximately, with approximately the same range.

The CHAIRMAN. He was making these announcements to the press at a time when the whole plane was distressed. This was at a time when there was a question about whether they could even build the basic plane, which was then in question.

Mr. CROMWELL. That is right. There was some hard data available then

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). To show that the plane was in trouble at the time he was giving out these statements to the press. (The questions and answers follow:)

Question. Mr. Secretary, there has been sharp Congressional reaction to your actions regarding the B-52 manned bomber. Some Senators said this was an unwarranted and unnecessary action. What is your reaction to this criticism? Secretary MCNAMARA. They spoke much too soon. As we announced yesterday or day before, in connection with the closing of the bases associated with some of the B-52 operations, certain of the bases would remain open for new missions to be assigned to them. We discussed one of those new missions with the President today, and he has approved for inclusion in the Fiscal '67 program, which we will present to the Congress in January, the authorization for the development, production and deployment of a new dual-purpose bomber, a strategic and tactical bomber which will be known as the FB-111.

Question. What is that?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The FB-111 will be a variant of the tactical bomber, the F-111. It will replace the B-52 series C through F. It will have twice the speed of those aircraft, approximately, with approximately the same range. It will fly faster, both at low altitude and high altitude, and it will have capabilities for penetrating enemy defenses far greater than the plane it replaces. It will come into operational use in 1968. All of the units authorized will be equipped and operational by 1971. The total bomber force, which today approximates or will at the end of the fiscal year, approximate 680 in number-total heavy bomber force will approximate 680 in number, will at the end of this decade, assuming we follow thru with present plans, total about 465. So I think you can see that there are no plans to eliminate the bombers from our strategic forces. As a matter of fact, we today have a heavy bomber force approximately four times as large as the Soviet heavy bomber force. And I believe that we will continue to have an advantage of comparable magnitude thru the remainder of this decade and into the '70s as far as we can see at this time.

Question. What is the bomb load that that can carry?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The FB-111 will carry both nuclear and conventional bombs. It will carry 50-750-pound high explosive bombs.

Question. How much will the new bombers cost? Where will they be located? Secretary MCNAMARA. They will be based at a number of locations in the continental United States. Because of the characteristics of the bomber, it has a much lesser requirement for take-off and landing than does the B-52 which it replaces. And, therefore, we will have greater freedom of basing and the final choices for its base have not yet been made.

Question. What about the cost?

Secretary MCNAMARA. As to cost, I would hesitate to give you a final figure. I would say the total force which will be authorized at 210 aircraft, plus spares and attrition aircraft, would cost on the order of $1 billion and three-quarters. That figure, plus the operating cost, is less than the cost of modifying the B-52 series C through F and operating them for the period. So we are procuring a more modern aircraft, a more versatile aircraft, an an aircraft with considerably greater penetrating capability and military effectiveness, both for our strategic purposes and for tactical purposes, both for conventional and nuclear war, at a lesser cost than we would have expended to maintain the B-52s in operation. Question. Will this take a new contract with General Dynamics or will they continue with the present plans?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It will be a new contract with the contractor. I assume it will be produced in the present plants of the subcontractors, which are spread all over the country, and, of General Dynamics, which is located here in Texas.

Mr. CROMWELL. On January 25, 1966, the Air Force Flight Test Center issued a letter report on flight test results found by Air Force test pilots in flying the F-111A.

The report was very similar to the Navy NPE report in overall tone and in the specific deficiencies and problem areas identified.

At this point, I would like to insert in the record as an exhibit some excerpts from that report.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the report before you?

Mr. CROMWELL. Yes; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the whole report or just excerpts?

Mr. CROMWELL. I excerpted the introduction and the comments that had to do with airplane performance.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have the whole report?

Mr. CROMWELL. We have it in our files.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the whole report be made "Exhibit No. 21A." Mr. CROMWELL. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that parts of the report are not pertinent for public distribution.

The CHAIRMAN. Is some of it classified?

Mr. CROMWELL. In essence, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of it is classified?

Mr. CROMWELL. It is classified, I believe, "For Official Use Only." The CHAIRMAN. We will examine it. I don't want to put something in here and have someone say, "You didn't put all of it in. You just took that part favorable from your point of view."

I will let these excerpts go in. These are taken from the report? Mr. CROMWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I will let them go into the record, but if there is any question, I want the whole report made a part of this record for reference, so there will be no question about it.

It is classified so far as public information is concerned?

Mr. CROMWELL. That is true. I think its only classification was For Official Use Only, but I would like to give the Air Force a chance to review it. Parts of it discuss specific deficiencies pertinent to the production airplane, some parts of it, that could reveal combat weaknesses of the plane.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We will put this into the record now. This will be inserted into the record and you can quote from it. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 21A" for reference; excerpts follow :)

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1. Reference unclassified message ASLT 81815 Doc 65.

2. The following letter report is a summary of the qualitative comments of AFFTC test pilots who have participated in the F-111A Category I Test Program while flying contractor test plans and executing his specific test cards. It is recognized that many of the deficiencies noted are still in the developmental stage and the final configuration was not and is not firm.

3. A very limited amount of quantitative engineering data has been obtained from the Contractor, and all data thus obtained have been forwarded to your office.

ALBERT M. CATE,

Colonel, USAF Deputy for Systems Test.

AFFTC QUALITATIVE COMMENTS ON F-111A FLIGHTS

1. INTRODUCTION

A. This report presents a consolidation of AFFTC pilots' qualitative comments based on 28 flights in four different F-111A aircraft between 10 May 1965 and 7 January 1966. These flights were flown by three AFFTC test pilots for a total of 58 hours and 45 minutes and were distributed between aircraft as follows:

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It should be pointed out that the majority of these flights were during Category I systems tests, no performance evaluations were flown, and only three stability points were flown.

B. The Air Force has not flown a formal evaluation on the F-111A aircraft. All AFFTC pilots flew contractor flight plans, profiles, and data cards with the exception of the acceptance flight on aircraft number 73. No evaluations were made on AFFTC-generated flight plans or with an Air Force crew. The following flight limitations were observed on all flights (reference FZM-12-922, Revision N).

1. 400 KEAS or 1.2 Mach, whichever is less.

2. 300 KEAS speed brake limit.

In addition, the following equipment was not operated by AFFTC pilots except on the one acceptance flight:

1. Attack Radar.

III

E. Climb: Military climb at the recommended climb speeds have resulted in ceilings of approximately 27,000 feet at aircraft weight of 58,000 pounds.

F. Cruise: The maximum speed in military power at 27,000 feet was .75 Mach with an average fuel flow of approximately 2,500 lbs/hr per engine.

G. Let Down: Let down performance has not been evaluated because of the airspeed.

H. Landings: All approach speeds and touchdown speeds have been quite conservative because lack of slow speed flight information. However, it was in this area that the low military thrust was most apparent. Touch and go landings are uncomfortable in military power because of the slow aircraft acceleration. The handling qualities of the F-111 in the landing pattern with dampers on were better than most Century series fighters. The slow approach and touch down speeds coupled with the short landing distance greatly decreases the hazards associated with landing jet fighters. The spoiler landing roll brakes were excellent, even though some difficulty had been experienced with the inboard spoilers floating up in flight thus increasing drag and causing damage to the wing seal. The wheel brakes were very effective. The stopping distances appear to be as predicted.

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