THE APOLLO 13 ACCIDENT TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 1970 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. George P. Miller, chairman, presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Dr. Paine, Mr. Cortright, members of the Apollo 13 Review Board, we are pleased to welcome you to the committee today for the purpose of presenting findings, determinations, and recommendations of the Apollo 13 Review Board. Dr. Paine, I would like to commend you for the appointment of a most competent and outstanding board to review the Apollo 13 accident and the circumstances surrounding it. Mr. Cortright, whom this committee knows well, has distinguished himself not only as an administrator in the NASA Headquarters organization but also as a field center director at Langley Research Center. The other members of the board are similarly well qualified to have participated in this intensive and searching review. As I stated at the time of the Apollo 13 accident the committee decided that sufficient time should be allowed for NASA to fully investigate the accident and at such time that this investigation was completed the committee would convene to receive NASA's evaluation of the accident. Therefore, I have asked you to appear here today even though the board's report was only submitted to you yesterday, Dr. Paine, because I feel it is important that the members of the committee receive a firsthand and timely review of the Apollo 13 accident. Dr. Paine, I understand you have a short statement and then Mr. Cortright will go into the details of the accident and the board's findings. I want to give all members an opportunity to ask questions, so will you please proceed. Before proceeding, I would also like to make a part of the record the fact that Mr. Wilson of the staff of the committee was appointed to act as an observer with the board. I want to thank you for the courtesies you have shown us and it has given us a new system of liaison. Please proceed, Dr. Paine. STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS 0. PAINE, ADMINISTRATOR, NASA Dr. PAINE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on April 17, Dr. George Low and I established the Apollo 13 Review Board under the direction of Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, director of the Langley Research Center. The instructions to the board are contained in a memorandum dated April 17, and the membership of the board in a memorandum dated April 20, 1970, which are reproduced in the summary volume of the report you have received. The past 2 months have involved long hours and very hard work by the review board and supporting elements in NASA and the industrial community. I would like to take this opportunity to extend my thanks to them for the thoroughness of their investigation and their dedication to this arduous assignment. Since I received the review board report only yesterday, I have not had a chance to review it in detail. Nor have I had the benefit of the independent assessment which is being carried out by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, chaired by Dr. Charles Harrington. The Office of Manned Space Flight is also conducting a separate review of the report. In about 10 days I will receive the results of the safety panel and the manned space flight review. Until I have received and studied these reports. I will obviously not be in a position to give you my evaluation of the board's recommendations or NASA's future actions. Earlier we announced a change in our lunar landing schedule involving a delay of the Apollo 14 launch from October to the December launch window. However, this is subject to review in light of the report of the Apollo 13 Review Board and we will not fly Apollo 14 to the moon until we are confident that we have done everything necessary to eliminate the conditions that caused or contributed to the problems on Apollo 13. I believe that, as we plan man's future course in space, the preface to this report should be a reminder of the nature of the challenge we have undertaken. Let me quote: The Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's third mission to explore the surface of the moon, is a harsh reminder of the immense difficulty of this undertaking. The total Apollo system of ground complexes, launch vehicle, and spacecraft constitutes the most ambitious and demanding engineering development ever undertaken by man. For these missions to succeed, both men and equipment must perform to near perfection. That this system has already resulted in two successful lunar surface explorations is a tribute to those men and women who conceived, designed, built, and flew it. Perfection is not only difficult to achieve, but difficult to maintain. The imperfection in Apollo 13 constituted a near disaster, adverted only by outstanding performance on the part of the crew and the ground control team which supported them. The Board feels that the nature of the Apollo 13 equipment failure holds important lessons which, when applied to future missions, will contribute to the safety and effectiveness of manned space flight. Mr. Chairman, there has been time for me to reach one conclusion on the report of the Apollo 13 Review Board, and that is that the board and their supporting teams have done a magnificent piece of technical detective work that carefully reconstructs the background and the events which took place aboard Apollo 13 200,000 miles from earth. I would now like to introduce the chairman of the review board, Mr. Edgar Cortright, who will briefly discuss the report and respond to your questions. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Paine. We are very happy to have you here, Mr. Cortright. STATEMENT OF EDGAR M. CORTRIGHT, CHAIRMAN, APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD; DIRECTOR, LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER Mr. CORTRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement and, with your permission, I will submit this for the record and attempt to convey to you what the Board has done and what our conclusions have been in a more informal manner. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be the manner in which we will proceed. (The prepared statement of Mr. Cortright is as follows:) PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDGAR M. CORTRIGHT, CHAIRMAN, APOLLO 13, REVIEW BOARD, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Committee to summarize the Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board. As you know, yesterday I presented this Report on behalf of the Board to the Administrator and Deputy Administrator. Copies of the Report were given to the Members and Staff of the Committee, and the Report was made public yesterday afternoon, at which time Dr. Paine and I held a press conference. This morning I would like first to outline for the Committee how the Board was established and how it organized itself to review and report on the Apollo 13 accident. Then I will cover in some detail the findings and determinations of the Board regarding the accident, including pre-accident mission events, the events of the accident itself, and the recovery procedures which were implemented to return the crew safely to earth. I will also summarize the Board's findings and determinations regarding the management, design, manufacturing, and test procedures employed in the Apollo Program as they relate specifically to the accident. Based on its findings and determinations, the Board made a series of detailed recommendations. I will report these to you and be pleased to answer any questions you may have on the Board's work. ESTABLISHMENT AND HISTORY OF THE BOARD The Apollo 13 Review Board was established, and I was appointed Chairman, on April 17, 1970. The charter of the Board was set forth in the memorandum which established it. Under this charter the Board was directed to: (a) "Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to the spacecraft which occurred during the flight of Apollo 13 and the subsequent flight and ground actions taken to recover, in order to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident and assess the effectiveness of the recovery actions. (b) Review all factors relating to the accident and recovery actions the Board determines to be significant and relevant, including studies, findings, recommendations, and other actions that have been or may be undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and contractors involved. (c) Direct such further specific investigations as may be necessary. (d) Report as soon as possible its findings relating to the cause or causes of the accident and the effectiveness of the flight and ground recovery actions. (e) Develop recommendations for corrective or other actions, based upon its findings and determinations or conclusions derived therefrom. (f) Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations and submit a final report." The Membership of the Board was established on April 21, 1970. The members are: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman (Director, Langley Research Center) Mr. Robert F. Allnutt (Assistant to the Administrator, NASA Hqs) Mr. Neil Armstrong (Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center) Dr. John F. Clark (Director, Goddard Space Flight Center) Brig. General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (Director of Space, DCS/R&D, Hqs. USAF) Mr. Milton Klein (Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office) Legal Counsel to the Board is Mr. George T. Malley, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center. Appointed as Observers were: Mr. William A. Anders (Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council) Dr. Charles D. Harrington (Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel) Mr. I. I. Pinkel (Director, Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute, NASA Lewis Research Center) Mr. James E. Wilson, Jr. (Technical Consultant, House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics) The documents establishing the Board and its membership and other relevant documents are included in Chapter 1 of the Board's Report. The Review Board convened at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Houston, Texas, on Tuesday, April 21, 1970. Four Panels of the Board were formed, each under the overview of a member of the Board. Each of the Panels was chaired by a senior official experienced in the area of review assigned to the Panel. In addition, each Panel was manned by a number of experienced specialists to provide in-depth technical competence for the review activity. During the period of the Board's activities, the Chairmen of the four Panels were responsible for the conduct of reviews, evaluations, analyses, and other studies bearing on their Panel assignments and for preparing documented reports for the Board's consideration. Complementing the Panel efforts, each member of the Board assumed specific responsibilities related to the overall review. own analysis of the Apollo 13 accident. Coordination between the Investigation Director of the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, was also conducting its Spacecraft Center Apollo 13 Investigation Team, under James A. McDivitt, membership and responsibilities of each Panel are set forth in the Report. ment are shown along with the subpanels and the supporting office structure. The Panels Mission Events, Manufacturing and Test, Design, and Project ManageWhile the Board's intensive review activities were underway, the Manned On Slide 1 is shown a chart depicting the organization of the Board. The four |