Persinger v. Tinkle. action is still pending in the lower court. There is noth ing to prevent the plaintiff from having an alias summons issued and served upon the defendant and a final judgment rendered against him on the merits. In the absence of a judgment finally disposing of the case, this court has no authority or jurisdiction to act. In Brown v. Edgerton, 14 Neb., 453, it is ruled that an order vacating a judgment during the term at which it was rendered is not a final order, and is not reversible on error. In Artman v. West Point Mfg. Co., 16 Neb., 572, it is held that the setting aside of the verdict of a jury and grant-. ing a new trial is not a final order. In Aspinwall v. Aspinwall, 18 Neb., 463 an order awarding alimony pendente lite, it is held cannot be reviewed on appeal or error before a decree granting or refusing a divorce. In Brown v. Rice, 30 Neb., 236, it is held that the decision of the district court in sustaining the defendant's motion to quash the service against him by publication is not such a final determination of the plaintiff's right of action as can be reviewed on error. It follows that we have no jurisdiction of the case, and the petition in error is MAXWELL, CH. J., concurs. DISMISSED. POST, J., having presided in the district court, did not offer an opinion. Sale: CONDITIONAL CONTRACT FOR: VALIDITY. A contract for the sale and delivery of personal property upon condition that the title is to remain in the vendor until the purchase price is paid, is invalid, as against purchasers in good faith, judgment and attaching creditors of the vendee, without notice, unless a copy of the contract is verified and filed in the manner pointed out in section 26, chapter 32, of the Compiled Statutes. ERROR to the district court for Douglas county. Tried below before Davis, J. Howard B. Smith, and Clinton N. Powell, for plaintiff in error, cited: McCormick v. Stevenson, 13 Neb., 72. Cornish & Robertson, contra, cited: Garwood v. Garwood, 4 Hal. [N. J. L.], 193; Daniels v. Sorrells, 9 Ala., 436; Tutwiler v. Montgomery, 73 Id., 263. NORVAL, J. On August 11, 1888, and for some time prior thereto, William R. Eaton and M. A. Eaton were engaged in the confectionery business in Omaha, under the firm name of Eaton Bros. On that day two attachment suits were commenced against them, one in favor of Henry J. Druce, and the other by McCague Bros. The writs of attachment were delivered to Louis Peterson, plaintiff in error, as constable for execution. The officer attached the stock of Eaton Bros., the attachment of Druce having priority. In the stock was the soda water fountain in controversy in this suit. On the 25th day of August, 1888, Henry J. Druce obtained judgment in his suit for $45 and costs, and on the 12th day of October, 1888, McCague Bros. recovered Peterson v. Tufts. judgment in their action for the sum of $500 and costs. The former judgment was paid in full, and the latter partly paid out of the proceeds of the attached property. While the property was in the possession of the constable under the two writs of attachment, the defendant in error brought this suit to recover the possession of the soda fountain, which was taken by the sheriff under the writ of replevin, and delivered to the defendant in error. The case was tried to a jury, which resulted in a verdict in favor of James W. Tufts, the plaintiff below. The evidence shows that on the 21st day of March, 1888, James W. Tufts sold the fountain to Eaton Bros. for the agreed price of $2,000, of which $500 was to be paid in cash, and the balance was to be paid in monthly payments of $50 each, with interest at five per cent. The contract was in writing, and contained, among others, the following stipulation: "The delivery of said apparatus, etc., to be conditioned upon compliance with the above terms and conditions, and said apparatus to remain the property of James W. Tufts till paid for." Neither the contract nor a copy thereof was filed in the office of the clerk of Douglas county. The sum of $500 had been paid on the fountain, and no more. The defendant in error claims the property by virtue of the clause of the contract above quoted. The evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff below tended to show that prior to the levying of the attachments McCague Bros. were notified of the terms of the contract under which Eaton Bros. held the fountain, and that nothing had been paid thereon except the $500. The defendant's evidence was to the effect that McCague Bros. had no notice of the contract of conditional sale, but supposed that Eaton Bros. were the absolute owners of the fountain. The question for determination arises upon the instruction of the court to the jury to return a verdict for the Peterson v. Tufts. plaintiff. Whether the court erred in directing the verdict depends upon the construction placed upon section 26, chapter 32 of the Compiled Statutes, which provides "That no sale, contract, or lease, wherein the transfer of title or ownership of personal property is made to depend upon any condition, shall be valid against any purchaser or judgment creditor of the vendee or lessee in actual possession, obtained in pursuance of such sale, contract, or lease, without notice, unless the same be in writing, signed by the vendee or lessee, and a copy thereof filed in the office of the clerk of the county within which such vendee or lessee resides; said copy shall have attached thereto an affidavit of such vendor or lessor, or his agent or attorney, which shall set forth the names of the vendor and vendee or lessor and lessee, or description of the property transferred, and the full and true interest of the vendor or lessor therein. All such sales and transfers shall cease to be valid against purchasers in good faith, or judgment or attaching creditors without notice, at the expiration of five years, unless such vendor or lessor shall, within thirty days prior to the expiration of the five years from the date of such sale or transfer, file a copy thereof, verified as aforesaid, in the office of said clerk, and the said vendor or lessor may preserve the validity of his said sale or transfer of personal property by an annual refiling in the manner as aforesaid, of such copy." As between Tufts and Eaton Bros. and all others with notice, it must be held that the title and ownership of the fountain did not pass to Eaton Bros. until they complied with the conditions upon which the sale was made, by paying the entire purchase price to the vendor. Were it not for the above section of the statute, the sale of personal property on condition that the title or ownership should not pass to the purchaser until the purchase money is paid would be valid and binding as against the creditors of the vendee, even though a copy of the contract of sale was not Peterson v. Tufts. recorded, and the creditors had no notice thereof. This was expressly declared in Aultman v. Mallory, 5 Neb., 178. * * The question is, how far this rule has been changed by statute? It is argued by defendant in error, and such was the theory of the court below, that the section quoted has the effect only to protect bona fide purchasers and judgment creditors of the vendee or lessee, and that it affords no protection to attaching creditors. By the first part of the section it is enacted, "that no sale * shall be valid against any purchaser or judgment creditor of the vendee or lessee in actual possession, obtained in pursuance of such sale, contract, or lease without notice, unless the same be in writing, signed by the vendee or lessee, and a copy thereof filed in the office of the clerk of the county,' etc. If this provision stood alone, the construction contended for by the defendant in error would, doubtless, be sound, unless it should be held that when the plaintiff in attachment recovers a judgment, his rights as a judgment creditor relate back to the time of the levy of the attachment. Whether the doctrine of relation applies we will not now stop to discuss or determine, for as we read the first part of the section, in connection with the provisions following it, we conclude that it was the intention of the legislature to place attaching creditors upon the same footing with judgment creditors as regards conditional sales and leases of personal property. It is a familiar rule applied in the construction of statutes that all the provisions of an act are to be construed together, giving effect, if possible, to every word therein. It will be observed that the section under consideration also declares that "all such sales and transfers shall cease to be valid against purchasers in good faith or judgment or attaching creditors without notice at the expiration of five years," unless a copy of the contract is again filed with the county clerk within thirty days prior to the expiration of the five years, and the validity of the sale or transfer may be preserved by an |