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6 Art. 3. That the Mexican armed force retire within seven days from this date beyond the line formed by the pass of the Rinconada, the city of Linares, and San Fernando de Pusos.

« Art. 4. That the citadel of Monterey be evacuated by the Mexican and occupied by the American forces to-morrow morning at ten o'clock.

« Art. 5. To avoid collisions, and for mutual convenience, that the troops of the United States will not occupy the city until the Mexican forces have withdrawn, except for hospital and storage purposes.

66 Art. 6. That the forces of the United States will not advance beyond the line specified in the third article before the expiration of eight weeks, or until the orders of the respective governments can be received.

« Art. 7. That the public property to be delivered shall be turned over and received by officers appointed by the commanding-generals of the two armies.

« Art. 8. That all doubts, as to the meaning of any of the preceding articles, shall be solved by an equitable construction, and on principles of liberality to the retiring army.

- Art. 9. That the Mexican flag, when struck at the citadel, may be saluted by its own battery.

W. J. Worth, Brig.-Gen. U. S. A.

Major-Gen. commanding Texan volunteers.
JEFFERSON Davis, Col. Mississippi Riflemen.

Approved :


Major-Gen. U. S. A. commanding.
Dated at MONTEREY, Sept. 25, 1846."


Evacuation of Monterey–Policy of the Capitulation-Views of the Administra.

tion--General Taylor's letter-Retrospect of Mexican affairs Elevation of Paredes-Pronunciamento in favour of Santa Anna-His arrival at Vera CruzPermission to pass through the Fleet-Termination of the Armistice-Projected Expedition against Tamaulipas--Opinions of General Taylor relative to the Pro. secution of the War-Saltillo occupied by the American troops-Protest of the Governor of Coahuila-Advance to Agua Nueva-General Wool's Expedition against Chihuahua-Arrival of Wool's column at Monclova–Marches to ParrasTampico occupied—General Taylor marches upon Victoria—Reconnoissances towards Labradores and Linares-Arrival of General Scott in Mexico-Withdrawal of troops from General Taylor-Orders consequent thereon-Santa Anna's March from San Luis Potosi against General Taylor-Ruse of General TaylorForces of Santa Anna—Angostura-February 22d—Summons of Santa Anna to General Taylor to surrender–Taylor's Reply–Battle of Buena Vista–Skir. mishes-Result of the Action.

Ar ten o'clock on the 25th, pursuant to the articles of capitulation, the ceremony of the surrender took place. General Worth, who by his labours had contributed so largely to the reduction of the place, was appointed to see the execution of the stipulations. Two companies of each regiment in the second division, with a section of each battery, the whole under the immediate command of Colonel Persifer F. Smith, were appointed to take possession of the citadel. These troops were drawn up on the road leading to the citadel, the Texans on one side, and the regulars on the other, while the imposing display was graced by the presence of General Taylor and staff, and all the principal officers of the army in splendid military costume.

With a parting salute from the shrill bugle and the booming cannon, the Aztec eagle fluttered down from its airy height, while the “ stars and stripes” floated upward on the gentle breeze, and unfolded from the citadel amid the strains of martial music and the



united cheers of the victorious troops. From the other eminences, in like manner, the Mexican colours disappeared, and were replaced by the national ensign of the conquerors. The Mexicans then marched out from the citadel, between the two lines of the Americans, and the latter moved into the place they had quitted. The first division of the enemy marched out of the city on the 26th, the second on the 27th, and the remainder on the 28th. General Ampudia accompanied the second division and proceeded with his troops to Saltillo. He wished to fortify the place, but since he had been unable to defend Monterey, a position having much greater advantages, the inhabitants refused their consent, whereupon he retired to San Luis Potosi, which became, shortly after, the head-quarters of the northern army. He, himself, soon became a prisoner in the castle of Perote, by order of Santa Anna, who had returned from exile, as will hereafter be related.

The terms of the capitulation, though favourable to the Mexicans, displayed not merely an exalted humanity on the part of General Taylor, but great military prudence, and sound policy. A brief consideration of the circumstances will serve to show this view of the capitulation to be correct.

Without siege-artillery, or intrenching tools, General Taylor could not have carried the citadel without great loss to his troops, who were less than one-half the forces of the enemy. If he had carried the citadel, he could not have prevented the escape of the enemy, for he had not sufficient troops to invest the city; nor had he means of transportation, so that he could have pursued him after he had compelled him to evacuate the city. If beaten, the Mexican general could still have retired with his troops, small-arms, and ammunition.

How much better and wiser was it in General Taylor, to gain, without sacrificing the lives of his troops, all the advantages which could have been ultimately obtained, with this additional circumstance in his favour, that the moral effect upon the enemy

was much greater than if he had retired, as he could otherwise have done, without the consent of the Americans.

The government at Washington, however, and a small portion of the administration party, did not approve of the terms of the capitulation, and especially the armistice. Accordingly, General Taylor was instructed by the President “ to give the required notice, that the armistice was to cease at once, and that each party was at liberty to resume and prosecute hostilities without restriction.” The reply of the general to this order, addressed to the AdjutantGeneral at Washington, is so full and satisfactory upon these points, that we insert it entire :



November 8, 1846. “SIR: In reply to so much of the communication of the Secretary of War, as relates to the reasons which induced the convention resulting in the capitulation of Monterey, I have the honour to submit the following remarks.

« The convention presents two distinct points: First, the permission granted the Mexican army to retire with their arms, &c. Secondly, the temporary cessation of hostilities for the term of eight weeks. I shall remark on these in order.

“ The force with which I marched on Monterey was limited, by causes beyond my control, to about six thousand men. With this force, as every military man must admit, who has seen the ground, it was entirely impossible to invest Monterey so closely as to prevent the escape of the garrison. Although the main communication with the interior was in our possession, yet one route was open to the Mexicans throughout the operations, and could not be closed, as were also other minor tracks and passes through the mountains. Had we, therefore, insisted on more rigorous terms than those granted, the result would have been the escape of the body of the Mexican force, with the destruction



of its artillery and magazines, our only advantage being the capture of a few prisoners of war, at the expense of valuable lives and much damage to the city. The consideration of humanity was present to my mind during the conference which led to the convention, and outweighed, in my judgment, the doubtful advantages to be gained by a resumption of the attack upon the town. This conclusion has been fully confirmed by an inspection of the enemy's position and means, since the surrender. It was discovered that his principal magazine, containing an immense amount of powder, was in the Cathedral, completely exposed to our shells from two directions. The explosion of this mass of powder, which must have ultimately resulted from a continuance of the bombardment, would have been infinitely disastrous, involving the destruction not only of Mexican troops, but of non-combatants, and even our own people, had we pressed the attack.

“ In regard to the temporary cessation of hostilities, the fact that we are not at this moment, within eleven days of the termination of the period fixed by the convention, prepared to move forward in force, is a sufficient explanation of the military reasons which dictated this suspension of arms. It paralyzed the enemy during a period when, from the want of necessary means, we could not possibly move. I desire distinctly to state, and to call the attention of the authorities to the fact, that with all diligence in breaking mules and setting up wagons, the first wagons in addition to our original train from Corpus Christi (and but one hundred and twenty-five in number), reached my head-quarters on the same day with the secretary's communication of October 13th, viz: the 2d instant. At the date of the surrender of Monterey, our force had not more than ten days' rations, and even now, with all our endeavours, we have not more than twenty-five. THE TASK OF FIGHTING AND BEATING THE ENEMY IS AMONG THE LEAST DIFFICULT THAT WE ENCOUNTER--the great question of supplies necessarily controls all the operations in a country like this.

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