[Morningstar v. The State.] Mrs. Nancy George;" was convicted, and fined one hundred dollars. The bill of exceptions purports to set out all the evidence adduced on the trial, but it is not necessary to state it. The defendant asked the court, in writing, to charge the jury as follows: "If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant had a claim, honestly entertained, to the stick of timber in question, at the time it was cut and removed, he was not guilty of larceny in cutting and removing it, although he knew at the time, and prior thereto, of an adverse claim by another person." The refusal of this charge, to which an exception was reserved by the defendant, is the only matter now urged as error. The case was before this court at its June term, 1875, as shown by the report in 52 Ala. 405. HERBERT & MURPHEY, for the defendant. JOHN W. A. SANFORD, Attorney-General, for the State. STONE, J.-The charge asked in this case asserts a correct legal proposition, and should have been given, if there was any evidence before the jury tending to prove "that the defendant had a claim, honestly entertained, to the stick of timber in question."-2 Whar. Amer. Cr. Law, §§ 1769, 1770; Spivey v. The State, 26 Ala. 103; Kirksey v. Fike, 29 Ala. 208. There was some testimony tending to show that defendant had some claim to the timber, under his alleged purchase from the "Jordan boys." Whether he removed the timber under this claim; whether he honestly believed he acquired the timber by virtue of his alleged purchase; or whether he was resorting to this claim of purchase as a pretext, were questions for the consideration of the jury. To the presiding judge the testimony given may seem weak, or suspicious, or may appear to be entirely overborne by other testimony more satisfactory to his mind. The law has not made him the judge of the weight of evidence. If the testimony be legal, and pertinent, and tend, no matter how feebly, to establish any material fact in the issue, it is the right of the prisoner to have it passed upon under an appropriate charge to the jury.-1 Brick. Dig. 338, § 42; Traun v. Keiffer, 31 Ala. 136; Bank of Montgomery v. Plannett, 37 Ala. 222; M. O. Railroad Co. v. Hopkins, 41 Ala. 486; Dill v. The State, 25 Ala. 15. The charge should have been given. Judgment of the Circuit Court reversed, and cause remanded. Let the prisoner remain in custody, until discharged by due course of law. [Watson v. The State.] Watson v. The State. Indictment for Larceny. 1. Description of animal stolen.-A steer is an "animal of the cow kind," within the meaning of the statute approved February 20, 1875, amending section 3706 of the Revised Code (Sess. Acts 1874-5, p. 260); and it may be so described by that name, in an indictment under this statute, without the addition of any other words. FROM the Circuit Court of Baldwin. Tried before the Hon. H. T. TOULMIN. The indictment in this case charged, that the defendant "feloniously took and carried away a steer, the personal property of Mary O'Neal." The defendant pleaded not guilty, but was found guilty by the verdict of the jury, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of two years. He moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the offense charged in the indictment, if any, was only petit larceny; but the court overruled the motion. This is the only point here presented for revision. 66 D. C. ANDERSON, for the prisoner. JNO. W. A. SANFORD, Attorney-General, for the State. BRICKELL, C. J.-The statute approved February 20, 1875, amendatory of section 3706 of the Revised Code, converts the stealing of certain animals, and among others a 'cow, or animal of the cow kind," into grand larceny, punishable on conviction by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or hard labor for the county. The first question raised in the present case is, whether a steer is an "animal of the cow kind," within the meaning of this statute. We entertain no doubt that the statute was intended to embrace (and such is the popular signification of the words) every animal which is the offspring of the female of the bovine genus of animals. Steer and or, in the popular use of words, are equivalent, and are used to designate a castrated taurine male, which has been brought under the yoke. It is, equally with a heifer, an animal of the cow kind.-Parker v. State, 39 Ala. 365. It is insisted, if this be true, the indictment is insufficient, without an averment that a steer is an animal of the cow kind. [Jacobson v. The State.] There may be authorities found, which sustain the objection. More recent authorities affirm the better rule, that if the description of the animal in the indictment necessarily brings it within the general words of the statute, the indictment is sufficient.-State v. Abbott, 20 Vermont, 537; Taylor v. State, 6 Humph. 285. The statute provides, that in an indictment for the larceny of an animal, it is sufficient to describe it by such name as in the common understanding embraces it. R. C. § 4138. The judgment is affirmed. Jacobson v. The State. Indictment for Betting at Cards in Public Place. 1. Sufficiency of indictment.-An indictment, which charges that the defendant "did bet at a game with cards," &c. (Rev. Code, 3622; Form No. 29, p. 811), is sufficient on demurrer, although it does not aver that he bet money or other valuable thing. 2. General exception to entire charge.-A general exception to an entire charge, consisting of several distinct paragraphs, is not sufficient to reach any minor defect in a particular proposition, to which the attention of the court below is not specifically directed. 3. Oral charge asked.-The refusal of a charge requested is not an error for which the judgment will be reversed, when the record does not show that it was reduced to writing, as required by the statute (Rev. Code, § 2756). FROM the City Court of Selma. Tried before the Hon. JONA. HARALSON. The indictment in this case contained two counts, the first count being as follows: "The grand jury charge that, before the finding of this indictment, Martin Jacobson did bet at a game with cards, or dice, or some device or substitute for cards or dice, at a tavern, inn, store house for retailing spirituous liquors, or house or place where spirituous liquors were at the time sold, retailed, or given away, or in a public house, highway, or some other public place, or at an outhouse where people resort; against the peace," &c. The defendant demurred to this count, on the following grounds: "1st, because it charges no offense known to the laws; and, 2d, because it does not allege that the defendant bet anything of value." The court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant was tried on issue joined on the plea of not guilty. "On the trial," as the bill of exceptions states, "the State introduced Y. L. Royston as a witness, who testified that he [Jacobson v. The State.] had seen the defendant, within the last six months, playing at cards with ivory checks, which represented money, and had himself played in the same game for a few minutes; that the playing was in a room over Boylan's auction store, in Selma, which was a room of ordinary size, provided with chairs and tables; that he did not know whose room it was; and that he was there once before, but did not remember whether he went by invitation or not. The State then introduced T. C. Ferguson as a witness, who testified that he also had seen the defendant, within the last six months, play cards, betting checks, which represented money; that he saw defendant play with said Royston at the game spoken of by him; that what was won depended on a count of the checks after the game; that the playing was in a room over the store of one Boylan, an auctioneer, in Selma; that Boylan had no control over said room; that there was no connection, or stairway, leading from his store to the room; that there was a stairway from the street, leading up to the room; that the room was rented as a 'club-room,' by a party of ten or twelve gentlemen, each of whom had a key, by which he could enter when he pleased, and was kept for gaming purposes; that a Mr. Andrews kept the room; that persons went in and out, but the door was kept locked; that people went there to play cards; that he had never seen more than ten or twelve persons in the room at one time; that no one could enter the room, without being specially invited by some member of the club; that the door was always kept locked when playing was going on; that the room could not be seen from the street, nor any bar-room, and was not in any way connected with any bar-room, or other public room or place; also, that parties had frequently knocked at the door, and had been refused admittance to the room." "This was all the evidence," and the court thereupon charged the jury as follows: "That it was not an unlawful thing to play or bet at a game with cards, at a strictly private place; as, for instance, if any one of you should invite a party of friends to your house or room, to spend an evening, and, during the time, playing and betting at cards were indulged; that would be no violation of law, for the place would be strictly private. The kind of betting denounced by the law, is that which is indulged at one of the places named in the statute, where playing and betting are forbidden. Whether the room at which the playing or betting in this case occurred is a private or a public place, must be determined by surroundings and circumstances. The proof tends to show, that the room was situated above the public auction house of Mr. Boylan, in Selma. If you believe, from [Jacobson v. The State.] the evidence, that the room had no connection with his store, although it was in the same building, and was not owned or controlled by him, but by some other person, the character of the store below would not determine the character of the room above; but, if the room above, like the one below used as an auction store, belonged to, and was controlled by the same person, and was part of the same establishment, though not opening the one into the other, the auction store being a public house or place, would impress that character also on the room above. But, if said room had no such connection with said store as would make it public, the jury must look at other facts and circumstances, to determine the character of the room-whether it was a public or a private place." The judge here read to the jury an extract from the opinion of this court, delivered by C. J. DARGAN, in the case of Coleman v. The State, 20 Ala. 52; and then added: "If you believe, from the evidence, that the room here in question was a place where some ten or twelve persons occasionally gathered together, by invitation, for amusing themselves, or partaking in social enjoyments, and to which the public had no right to go; in other words, if it answers the description given by Judge DARGAN of a private place, in the foregoing extract from his opinion, then you cannot find the defendant guilty of betting at a public place." The judge then read a long extract from the opinion of C. J. BRICKELL, in the case of Smith v. The State, 52 Ala. 384; and added: "The jury will apply the law, as above laid down by the Supreme Court, to the room here in question; and if, from the evidence, they believe that it was a gambling room, used and occupied for gambling purposes, to which persons desiring to gamble resorted, and was kept by Andrews for such purposes as these, and was frequented by a club of some dozen men or more for gambling purposes at will, each being provided with a key to the door, and visiting and carrying those whom he chose, for the purpose of gaming, the room would come within the prohibition of the statute, and, in legal contemplation, would be a public place; and this, notwithstanding the fact that the room was kept locked when playing was going on, and was up stairs, and surrounded by an air of privacy. For, the greater the air of secrecy which may have been thrown around the room, the greater may have been the lure. It could not be tolerated that, by such devices, resorted to, it may be, for the purpose of pleading it as a private place, this law could be thus set aside." "The defendant excepted to said charge, and especially to the use of the word 'strictly,' wherever it occurs before the |