[Adler v. The State; Pause v. The State; Simon v. The State.] the evidence proves that it is the one or the other, but they must be satisfied which kind of liquor it is.

"2. To convict the defendant, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that lager beer is a malt liquor, or a liquor made from the juice of the grape; and the fact that various kinds of beer are malt liquors, is not sufficient to prove that lager beer is a malt liquor, especially if there is satisfactory evidence before them that there are other kinds of beer which are not malt liquors.

"3. The jury must be satisfied from the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that lager beer is a malt liquor, or a vinous liquor; that the legislature, in using the words 'vinous liquors' in the statute, meant liquor made from the juice of the grape; and if they believe from the evidence that lager beer is not made from the juice of the grape, and they are not satisfied from the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that it is a malt liquor, then they must acquit the defendant."

The court refused each of these charges, and the defendant excepted to their refusal.

In the case of Moritz Simon, the defendant was indicted and convicted for selling liquor to one W. H. Rugely, a minor, without the requisition of a physician for medicinal purposes. On the trial, the said Rugely testified, that he had bought a glass of lager beer from the defendant, in the city of Montgomery, within twelve months before the finding of the indictment; that he was not then twenty-one years old, and did not have the requisition of a physician for medicinal purposes, "but d the consent of his father to drink lager beer whenever wanted it." On this evidence, the defendant requested the court to charge the jury, "that if the witness, Rugely, at the time he bought the lager beer from the defendant, had the consent of his father that he might drink lager beer, the defendant can not be convicted." The court refused to give this charge, and the defendant excepted to its refusal. An exception was also reserved to the admission of Webster's Dictionary, as in the other cases.

JOHN A. ELMORE, V. S. MURPHEY, and CLOPTON, HERBERT & CHAMBERS, for the defendants. 1. The statute under which the indictments were found is unconstitutional. The subject of that statute, as expressed in its title, is the existing "provisions of law" relating to the sale of liquors; and the declared purpose of the statute is to render these provisions more explicit, and to provide for their better enforcement. This title would indicate a statute declaratory and revisory

[Adler v. The State; Pause v. The State; Simon v. The State.] of existing laws-a statute which would remedy the declared defects, want of explicitness, and insufficiency in the manner of their enforcement. Yet the statute, in fact, only creates a new and distinct offense; and there is nothing in it which looks to the enforcement of the existing laws. There is no connection between the title and the subject of the act. The title is deceptive-it is a misnomer; and the act itself is a total departure from the title.-Tuskaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9, 17; Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 340-46; Walker v. The State, 49 Ala. 329; Moses v. Mayor of Mobile, 52 Ala. 212; Ex parte Conner, 51 Geo. 571; Brieswick v. Mayor of Brunswick, 51 Geo. 643. The title, moreover, embraces more than one subject-all the existing provisions of law in reference to the sale of liquor, which are variant and distinct subjects.-Mok v. Detroit B. & L. Association, 30 Mich. 515.

2. A wrongful act, and a wrongful intent, must both concur to constitute a crime. If the defendant, Adler, honestly believed that the person to whom he sold the lager beer was twenty-one years old, he ought to have been acquitted.Bishop on Crimes, 1021; Gordon v. The State, 52 Ala. 308; Stern v. State, 53 Geo. 229; 14 Indiana, 403; McGuire v. The State, 7 Humph. 54.

3. The first charge asked by the defendant, Pause, ought to have been given. The indictment charged the sale of three different kinds of liquor, in the disjunctive; which is the same, in legal effect, as if there had been three counts, charging three different offenses. Under such an indictment, a verdict of guilty, not specifying the particular count or offense, can not be supported: it is only saying that the jury find the defendant guilty of one or the other of the offenses named, but they can not say which one.

4. The other charges asked by the defendant, Pause, when closely analyzed, assert such plain elementary principles, that it is difficult to see on what ground they were refused.

5. The court erred, under the facts shown by the record, in admitting Webster's Dictionary as evidence before the jury.

JOHN W. A. SANFORD, Attorney-General, for the State. 1. The title of the act under which these indictments were found, indicates its purpose with sufficient definiteness and precision. It is simply to render the policy of the State more intelligible, in regard to the sale of liquor to minors. When there is nothing in the body of an act repugnant to its title-when all its provisions are germane to the object in view of the legislature, this court will not declare it to be unconstitutional, because every section is not fully indicated

[Adler v. The State; Pause v. The State; Simon v. The State.] by the title.-Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 99; Ex parte Hickey, 52 Ala. 228-30; Key v. Jones, 52 Ala. 246.

2. Webster's Dictionary is a standard authority as to the meaning of English words. There was no error in allowing it to be read to the jury for the purpose declared.-Starkie on Evidence, Sharswood's ed., 17; Blair v. The State, 52 Ala. 343; Rosenbaum v. The State, 33 Ala. 354; Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558.

3. What the defendant had heard, or had been told, as to the age of the person to whom he sold the lager beer, was not competent evidence. Even the affidavit of the person to whom the liquor was sold, that he was of lawful age, when in fact he was not, would have been no defense to the prosecution. Cotten v. Rutledge, 33 Ala. 110-14.

4. The permission given by the father to his minor son, that he might drink lager beer, does not take the case of Simon out of the plain letter of the statute, which only authorizes a sale upon the requisition of a physician.

5. The several charges asked by the defendant, Pause, were properly refused. The reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, which will acquit the accused, is a doubt of his guilt, and not a doubt as to the precise nature of the liquor which he sold. The second charge was an invasion of the province of the jury. Alsobrooks v. The State, 52 Ala. The third charge devolved upon the jury the duty of ascertaining the intention of the legislature from the evidence in this case; or, if this was not its object and effect, it was properly refused, because it is obscure, involved, and having a tendency to mislead the jury.

STONE, J.-The act of the legislature under which these several indictments were found-Pamph. Acts 1874-5, p. 280is assailed as violative of the second section of the fourth article of the constitution of 1868, which declares, that "each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."

Speaking of this provision, we, in Boyd v. The State, at the last term, after quoting approvingly the reasons given by Mr. Cooley for incorporating this clause in constitutions, said: "But, while giving full effect to the provision quoted above, in its admitted purpose to prevent log-rolling,' 'surprise' and 'fraud,' we must be careful, in the application of this rule, not to allow ourselves to be carried so far as unduly to cripple and embarrass legislation. It is not essential that the title of a statute shall define or declare the subject with the most precise accuracy."-See, also, Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 99; Key v. Jones, 52 Ala. 238.

[Adler v. The State; Pause v. The State; Simon v. The State.] The Louisiana constitution contained a clause similar to ours, quoted above. The legislature, under the title of "an act to provide a homestead for the widow and children of deceased persons," enacted that the widow and minor child, or children, should, in certain conditions, receive $1,000 in money from the succession. The question was, whether this provision was expressed in the title. Chief Justice SLIDELL, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "We think the argument invokes an interpretation of the constitutional clause, that is too rigorous and technical. If, in applying it, we should follow the rules of a nice and fastidious verbal criticism, we should often frustrate the action of the legislature, without fulfilling the intention of the framers of the constitution. That intention has been repeatedly the subject of judicial comment. It was mainly to prevent that loose legislation which disgraced our statute books. The title of an act often afforded no clue to its contents. * * In carrying out this intention, as we are bound to do, our inquiries should be, whether, in the particular case, there has been a substantial compliance by the legislature with the command of the constitution, according to its fair and reasonable intendment;" and the court declared the act constitutional. Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. An. 329.

In the case of the State of Missouri v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, the court, speaking of the constitutional provision under discussion, said: "The courts in all the States, where a like or similar provision exists, have given it a very liberal interpretation, and have endeavored to construe it so as not to limit or cripple legislative enactments any further than was necessary, by the absolute requirements of the law."

In the case of the State of Minnesota v. Gut, the court said, "A strict adherence to its letter would seriously interfere with the practical business of legislation, and would frequently nullify laws not repugnant to its spirit or meaning." 13 Min. 349.

In Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 117, the court said, "The degree of particularity with which the title of an act is to express its subject, is not defined in the constitution, and rests in the discretion of the legislature."-See, also, Town of Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barbour, 640; Board of Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Min. 339; Murphy v. Menard, 11 Tex. 676; Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa, 1; Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 299; Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197; Cooley's Const. Lim. 144, and note.

Under the rules above declared, we do not think the objection to the constitutionality of the act under discussion is well taken. True, the title does not clearly point to all the

[Adler v. The State; Pause v. The State; Simon v. The State.] provisions of the act. The authorities above cited show that this is not necessary. It does, however, "clearly express that "the sale or giving away of spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors," is the subject. Every provision of the statute falls within the scope of this general subject; and we hold that the court did not err, in deciding that this act is free from the objection urged against it.- Ölmstead v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 41 Ala. 9.

2. We can perceive no good reason why a work of such standard authority as Webster's Unabridged Dictionary confessedly is, should not be used before a court or jury, whenever the meaning of an English word is brought in question. That it is a work of standard authority, is so widely known; indeed, so universally acknowledged wherever the English language is spoken, that it must be classed among the facts judicially known.-See Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558; Merkle v. The State, 37 Ala. 139; Salomon v. State, 28 Ala. 83; Burdine v. Grand Lodge, 37 Ala. 478. So, the court will take judicial notice of the meaning of the compound word "malt-liquor," found in the statute under which the present indictments were found.-Mayor & Aldermen v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651. What constituted malt liquor was a material inquiry in these cases. The court might properly have given the proper definition in charge to the jury. There was no error in placing before them the proper definition, as furnished in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. The objection and exception taken in each of these cases to the reading in evidence of the definition of the term malt-liquor, as furnished in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, could not have wrought any injury to defendants.

3. In the case of Leopold Adler, there was some evidence that the defendant, when he made the sale to Silas Berry, had been informed that the latter was twenty-one years old. If he, in good faith, believed such was the case, he was innocent of any intent to violate the law. In the case of Gordon v. The State, 52 Ala. 308, we said: "All crime exists primarily in the mind. A wrongful act, and a wrongful intent, must concur, to constitute what the law deems a crime." In that case, as in this, the offense charged was purely statutory, and intent was not expressly named as an ingredient of the offense. Still, this court held that, if the act were done in the honest, though mistaken, belief that the accused had reached the age which would render the act lawful, no crime was in fact committed. So, in this case, if Adler, in good faith, believed that Berry was twenty-one years old, the element of intent to commit the offense was wanting. Whether he did, in good faith, so believe, was a question for the jury, under an appro