[Mattison v. The State.] doubt and mystery which hang over the transaction, we can not say that the temper and fierceness of the dog presented an immaterial inquiry. 3. We do not consider the question before us as properly one of general character. General character is predicable of accountable moral intelligences. Instincts, habits, tendencies, natural inclinations, are the attributes of the brute. That a dog is fierce, or inclined to bite, is a fact susceptible of direct proof; and such fact can be known, only by observing his conduct in similar conditions. To prove such disposition, it is not necessary that it should have become notorious, or generally understood in the neighborhood. What the witness testified, was simply the affirmation of a fact, based on his own observation and knowledge; and we think the Circuit Court did not err in allowing it to go to the jury. 4. The charges given correctly define the crime of murder, and malice as an ingredient thereof. They also correctly declare the general doctrine of self-defense. The principles they enunciate are substantially copied from the language of this court in several well-considered opinions.-See Oliver v. The State, 17 Ala. 287; Carroll v. The State, 23 Ala. 28. The same doctrine is asserted, in substantially the same language, in the text-books.-Wharton's Amer. Cr. Law, §§ 1019, 1020; 1 Bish. Cr. Law, 3d ed., $ 636. It is contended, however, that the language of the charge numbered 8 is too restricted, in this, that it excludes from the consideration of the jury the well-defined right to take life in defense of one's wife, child, &c., on the same conditions as those which justify a resort to this extreme measure in defense of one's self. The language of the charge is, "The law does not justify the taking of life, unless the circumstances are such as to create in the mind of the slayer the reasonable belief that an imperious necessity then exists to take life, to prevent the taking of the life of, or great bodily harm to the slayer." The language of this court, in Carroll v. The State, is, "If he" [the prisoner] "kills when there is not a reasonable ground of apprehension of immediate danger to his person or property, it is manslaughter; and if done with malice, express or implied, it is then murder." WHARTON, in his excellent treatise on Criminal Law, § 1014, says: "It is not to the protection of self that the law of self-defense is confined. With the same limitations as those above given, master and servant, parent and child, husband and wife, killing an assailant in the necessary defense of each other respectively, are excused; the act of the relation assisting being construed the same as the act of the party himself." It will thus be seen that the right to defend one's wife, child, &c., is but a [Mattison v. The State.] species of self-defense. If there were any thing in this record which tended to show that the wife of the prisoner was assaulted, or exposed to any separate or peculiar peril, independent of, or greater than the alleged danger to which the prisoner was himself exposed, we might feel it our duty to hold, that the charge given denied to the defendant one legitimate ground of defense or extenuation. But there is no such testimony. The bill of exceptions recites that it contains all the evidence. We can not suppose there was any thing in the case, which made it the duty of the court to explain to the jury that phase of the doctrine of self-defense which takes in the wife, child, &c. Sufficient for this trial to state the general principle, without embarrassing the jury by the presentation of exceptional principles of law, which the testimony did not call into exercise. A charge, which correctly declares the law applicable to every hypothesis of fact justified by the evidence, is not only free from error, but is greatly preferable to one which goes beyond the evidence, and deals in abstractions. There was no error in the charges given. We do not think the testimony in the cause authorized the giving of the charge asked, even if that charge be free from error. The testimony does not tend to bring the case within the act of December 26th, 1868 (Pamph. Acts, 445), even if all the provisions of that act be constitutional. It may admit of doubt, whether the clause of the third section of said act, which provides for persons acting "without disguise," is sufficiently expressed in the caption of the act to bring it within the requirement of the second section, fourth article, of the constitution of 1868. We deem it unnecessary, however, to decide this, as we do not think the testimony tended, in the slightest degree, to show that the deceased, or any one with him, had begun "to demolish, pull down, set fire to, or destroy" any "building used for private or public use." The charge was abstract, and was rightly refused for that reason, if for no other. Judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed. 1. Ex parte McKivett. Petition for Habeas Corpus. Hurd labor, or imprisonment, on non-payment of costs; jurisdiction of justice. A justice of the peace has no jurisdiction, in a criminal case tried before him, to impose a sentence to hard labor or imprisonment on account of the non-payment of the costs, that power being conferred by the statute (Rev. Code, §4061) only on the County, City, and Circuit Courts. 3. Habeas corpus; when proper remedy.-A sentence to hard labor or imprisonment, imposed by a justice of the peace, on account of the non-payment of the costs in a criminal case tried before him, being void for want of jurisdiction, habeas corpus is the proper remedy by which to obtain a discharge from custody under it. Application by petition for the writ of habeas corpus, to obtain the discharge of the petitioner, Joseph McKivett, from custody and imprisonment under a judgment and sentence imposed by John B. Fuller, a justice of the peace in and for the county of Montgomery. The application was first made to Hon. JOHN A. MINNIS, judge of the City Court of Montgomery, by whom it was refused. A bill of exceptions was reserved to his decision, in which is set out all the evidence adduced on the hearing, and on which the petitioner renews his application to this court. GEO. F. MOORE, for petitioner. JNO. W. A. SANFORD, Attorney-General, for the State. BRICKELL, C. J.-It appears from the record presented to this court, that the relator was, by one Fuller, a justice of the peace of Montgomery county, convicted of an assault and battery, without the use of a stick or weapon, and sentenced to pay a fine of fifteen dollars, and the costs of prosecution, amounting to eight 25-100 dollars. Failing to pay or secure the fine and costs, the mittimus addressed to the sheriff, which is the only warrant or authority for the detention of the relator, returned in answer to the writ of habeas corpus, recites: "in default of the payment of said fine and cost, that he do hard labor for the county, for one hundred and sixteen days, the same being in payment of said fine at the rate of twenty cents per day." The mandate of the mittimus is, that the sheriff detain the relator, "so that the sen [Ex parte McKivett.] tence of the court may be fully carried out." The relator, averring that the sentence was illegal and void-an excess of the jurisdiction of the justice-applied for a habeas corpus, to be discharged from the custody of the sheriff. The City Court, on hearing the application, refused to discharge him; and he now in this court renews the application. The statute, in obedience to a provision of the constitution, confers on justices of the peace jurisdiction of assaults, assaults and batteries, and affrays, in which no stick or other weapon is used, and some other minor misdemeanors.-R. C. § 3932. In default of payment, or security for the payment of the fine, when a conviction is had of an offense punishable by fine, all courts of criminal jurisdiction are vested with authority to sentence the prisoner to imprisonment in the county jail, or to hard labor for the county. If the fine does not exceed twenty dollars, the limit of the term of imprisonment, or of hard labor, is ten days on account of the fine.-R. C. § 3760. If the conviction is before the County, Circuit, or City Court, if the costs are not paid, additional hard labor for the county, "for a term sufficient to cover all costs and officers' fees, allowing not exceeding forty cents per diem for the additional labor," may be imposed.-R. C. 4061. No authority is conferred on a justice of the peace to imprison, or to sentence to hard labor for the county, for the payment of costs. That authority, by the words of the statute, is limited to the County, City, or Circuit Court. It is apparent, therefore, that the sentence of the justice of the peace is in violation of law, and an excess of the authority and jurisdiction with which he was clothed. The limit of the term of hard labor, to which the relator could be sentenced, the fine not exceeding twenty dollars, was ten days. If the mittimus is to be construed as declaring that the term of hard labor was fixed on account of the fine only, the law was violated in the imposition of a longer term than ten days. Its proper construction, however, is, that the term of hard labor was imposed for fine and costs in the aggregate, a day's labor being estimated at twenty cents. In the imposition of labor for the costs, as we have said, the justice exceeded his jurisdiction. The City, Circuit, or County Courts can, and a justice of the peace cannot, impose hard labor or imprisonment for the payment of costs. The statute authorizing the imposition of hard labor, as a mode of compelling the payment of costs of a criminal prosecution, is highly penal, confined in terms to particular courts, and cannot by construction be extended to other tribunals. The fine being less than twenty dollars, the term of hard labor is definitely prescribed by the statute at ten days. The court is without [Ex parte McKivett.] discretion-the term cannot be enlarged or diminished. We repeat, the sentence of the justice is without authority, and in violation of law. The relator could have appealed from the judgment of conviction to the next ensuing term of the Circuit or City Court. On an appeal, the cause would have been triable de novo, without regard to the illegality of the sentence pronounced by the justice, or any error in the proceedings before him.-R. C. §§ 4029-30. No appeal having been taken, the material inquiry is, can the relator, on habeas corpus, be relieved from the execution of the illegal sentence which the justice has pronounced? Habeas corpus is the immediate and adequate remedy for every illegal restraint of the liberty of the citizen. The justice of the peace had jurisdiction of the offense imputed to the prisoner, and could legally adjudge him guilty, declare the fine he should pay, and the term of hard labor, or of imprisonment, which the statute affixes to the fine. No error or irregularity which he may have committed in exercising this jurisdiction could be inquired into on habeas corpus. The proceedings of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot, on habeas corpus, be assailed for mere error or irregularity. An appeal, writ of error, or other revisory remedy, in a court of appellate jurisdiction, is the only mode of redressing, or obtaining relief from error or irregularity. Judgments or sentences may be not only erroneous, but void, and erroneous because void. When they are a usurpation or excess of jurisdiction, and the usurpation or excess is apparent on the face, not dependent on extrinsic facts or matter-when, if the sentence is expressed on the face of the warrant addressed to the officer who is to execute it, the warrant will afford no justification to the officer-when he becomes a trespasser, if he obeys it-the judgment or sentence, and the warrant for its execution, are void, and habeas corpus is a proper remedy for freedom from imprisonment which may be imposed under it. Such, in effect, is the provision of the statute. All inquiry into the legality or justice of any order, judgment, decree, or process, of any court legally constituted, or into the justice or propriety of any commitment for contempt, made by a court, officer, or body, according to law, and charged in such commitment, is forbidden on habeas corpus. R. C. § 4285. But, if it appears the applicant for the writ, or the person alleged to be falsely imprisoned, is in custody by virtue of process issuing from any court legally constituted, or issued by any officer in the course of judicial proceedings before him authorized by law, there are several cases in which the statute commands his discharge. The first of these is, where jurisdiction has been exceeded, as to |